🔔 | Updates:

🇮🇷 IRGC seizes anti-security weapons shipment on Oshnavieh border:

The IRGC Ground Force announced the discovery and seizure of a shipment of anti-security equipment on the Oshnavieh border in West Azerbaijan Province following intelligence operations.

The shipment included 6 Kalashnikov rifles, 28 Kalashnikov magazines, 6 magazine vests, 456 foreign cartridges, 77 tracer cartridges, and 246 regular cartridges. According to the IRGC, separatist terrorist groups intended to transfer the weapons into Iran for sabotage operations under the guidance of foreign intelligence services and the Zionist regime.

🇾🇪 Yemeni Armed Forces down Saudi Wing Loong II drone:

The Yemeni Armed Forces announced the downing of a Saudi-operated Wing Loong II armed reconnaissance drone while it was carrying out hostile missions over northwest Maqbanah in Taiz Governorate. The drone was reportedly brought down with a locally available air defense weapon as heavy battles continue across the Taiz front.

🇾🇪: Yemeni Armed Forces bombard Saudi positions in western Taiz:

The Yemeni Armed Forces launched heavy strikes against Saudi-backed military headquarters in western Taiz Governorate, continuing missile and artillery operations alongside ongoing ground offensives.

🇮🇷 IRGC drones expand presence over the Strait of Hormuz:

Maritime reports indicate that IRGC naval drones have been flying over commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, with Iranian drones maintaining a visible presence over the strategic waterway as regional tensions continue to escalate.

🔹@enemywatch

🔔| Updates:

🇱🇧 7 martyrs in Israeli drone strike on Nabatieh al-Tahta

Lebanon’s Ministry of Health announced the martyrdom of seven people after an Israeli drone struck a parking area in Nabatieh al-Tahta in southern Lebanon.

🇱🇧 Israeli attacks continue across southern Lebanon

Israeli artillery shelling targeted Wadi Zibqin and Al-Mansouri, while the Israeli army also carried out an explosion inside Al-Mansouri amid continued attacks across southern Lebanon.

Israeli drones were also reported over Harouf, Nabatieh, Barghaz, Koukaba, and surrounding areas, with warnings calling for the highest level of caution and vigilance.

🇮🇷 Two IRGC guards martyred in terrorist attack

Two members of the IRGC were martyred in Sistan and Baluchestan Province after unknown armed individuals carried out a terrorist attack.

🏴@enemywatch

🔔 | Updates: (+ve)

🇮🇷 Iran

• Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Major General Mohsen Rezaei said Iran tested a new advanced anti-ship ballistic missile against American naval vessels 48 hours ago.

• Rezaei announced that Iran will soon declare a prohibited zone outside the Strait of Hormuz, extending from the American naval blockade line into parts of the Persian Gulf. Any vessel entering the zone will be placed on Iran’s sanctions list.

• Rezaei said Iran’s measures in the Strait of Hormuz are intensifying and claimed the impact of Iranian sanctions in the Strait would be greater than the impact of missiles.

• Reports emerged of Iranian missiles launched toward ships accused of violating restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz, while several explosions were reported as U.S. forces escorted a convoy of oil tankers.

• Rezaei said Iran has not decided to sink American oil-carrying vessels, arguing that doing so would cause environmental damage in the region.

🇮🇶 Iraq

• The Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi) launched a preemptive security operation in the Rawa desert west of Ramadi, destroying four ISIS hideouts used by remnants of the group.

🇾🇪 Yemen

• A senior Yemeni military source said the Yemeni Armed Forces will respond to escalation with escalation.

• The source warned that if Saudi Arabia enters an all-out war, the Yemeni Armed Forces have multiple military options and possess an integrated arsenal capable of confronting different types of warfare.

• The source also said Yemeni strikes are focused on Saudi-backed mobilization commanders based on precise operational intelligence and have disrupted a significant portion of Saudi preparations for a ground offensive.

🔹@enemywatch

🔔 | Updates: (-ve)


🇵🇸 Gaza

• Reports indicate Youssef Akila (Abu al-Walid), identified as a commander in Hamas’ military wing and the former bodyguard of Yahya Sinwar, was killed in a car bombing west of Gaza City.

🇱🇧 Lebanon

• Israeli attacks continued across southern Lebanon throughout September 6.

• Airstrikes targeted Kfar Rumman, Nabatieh, Nabatieh al-Fawqa, Arabsalim, Al-Qantara, and Wadi Zibqin.

• Drone strikes targeted Nabatieh al-Fawqa, Nabatieh, and the area between Choukine and Nabatieh al-Fawqa.

• Artillery shelling hit Wadi al-Hujair, Wadi al-Salouqi, Douhat Kfar Rumman, Barashit, Nabatieh al-Fawqa, Al-Mansouri, Harsh Kounin, Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, Aitaroun, Hadatha, Beit Yahoun, and Wadi Zibqin.

• Additional explosions were reported in Al-Mansouri, Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, Kfar Tibnit, Wadi al-Salouqi, and Aitaroun, while explosive devices were detonated in Harsh Ali al-Taher.

• The latest attacks included artillery shelling on the outskirts of Barashit and machine-gun sweeping toward Hadatha and the outskirts of Ayta al-Jabal.

🇮🇶 Iraq

• The Iraqi government is preparing to send a revised Popular Mobilization Forces law to parliament after removing provisions that had drawn U.S. objections.

• Iraqi political, military, and PMF leaders are expected to meet before the 30 September deadline to discuss bringing weapons under state control, amid warnings about the potential impact of U.S. sanctions on Iraq’s financial situation.

🌍 Regional military activity

• Reports indicate at least three American tankers are operating in the Strait of Hormuz with transponders active, while a U.S. Navy P-8 maritime patrol aircraft departed from Bahrain toward the Strait.

• Extensive NATO reconnaissance flights were also reported over Jordan and the surrounding region as military activity around the Strait of Hormuz continued to increase.

🔹@enemywatch

🇵🇸 🇱🇧 🇮🇷 🇸🇾 🏴 | The children killing count continues to rise across Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, and Syria:

In just the last two weeks, the killing of children across Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, and Syria has reached another horrifying level. Initial reports indicate that American and Israeli attacks are killing an average of around seven children every day across these fronts. Some are killed instantly in airstrikes, shelling, and drone attacks, while many others die later from their wounds, burns, displacement, starvation, or the long-term consequences of war.

Since October 2023, the killing toll from American-Israeli genocidal campaigns, together with the massacres carried out by their regional allies, including HTS terrorists in the occupied Syria, has crossed an initial estimate of 100,000 children.

Gaza alone has witnessed the killing of nearly 50 thousand children. In Lebanon, children continue to die from Israeli airstrikes, drone attacks, and even cluster munitions left behind after bombardments. In Iran, children have also become victims of direct American attacks, including the massacre in Sirik, where an American strike targeted a wedding ceremony and killed children alongside civilians. The massacres in Minab and Lamard added even more innocent victims to this growing list.

The names continue to grow. Muhammad Ali Ibrahim, a child from Haboush in southern Lebanon, was killed after an Israeli cluster munition exploded. Lama Mohammed Habib, a Palestinian child, was killed in an Israeli strike in the Al-Katiba area of western Gaza City while families had gathered only to collect water. A baby was also killed after an Israeli strike destroyed a residential building in southern Lebanon, and many more children remain trapped under rubble or fighting for their lives in hospitals.

This is no longer a collection of isolated incidents spread across different countries. It is one continuous pattern of violence stretching from Gaza to southern Lebanon, from Sirik in Iran to Syria’s devastated towns. Children have become the most vulnerable victims of a war that continues to expand across West Asia under the framework of American and Israeli terrorism, while the world continues to witness the destruction of an entire generation.

▪️@enemywatch

📌 | Dear Mr. Marandi, using the name of a fabricated or propagandistic event (Holofraud) decades later can help preserve the legitimacy of the original narrative, even if that is not your intention. Language shapes how people remember history, and repeating a label without context may normalize the story created by colonial or occupying powers. If the name itself contains a disputed claim or was designed to justify domination, then continuing to use it can unintentionally reinforce that claim, especially for people who are unfamiliar with the plot/agenda & history behind it.

🔹@enemywatch

The problem with this argument is that it imports a political logic that does not really apply to the Islamic Republic. The question should not be whether an official is “more loyal” or “less loyal” to the Leader. State officials are expected to be committed to the values of the Islamic Revolution and to the leadership, while their suitability for a particular position should be assessed on the basis of experience, competence, judgment and the demands of the circumstances.

Imam Mojtaba Khamenei’s decision to appoint Mohsen Rezaei should therefore be understood in that context. Rezaei brings decades of experience in security, defence and state affairs, as well as a long record of commitment to the revolutionary cause. His straightforward and serious approach has also made him a target of criticism from reformists and other political camps precisely because he does not generally soften his positions to accommodate political perceptions.

In a war, serious positions require serious and direct figures. The SNSC Secretary is not appointed to satisfy the public’s preferred image of what a secretary should sound like. Nor should an important state position be weakened, delayed or compromised merely because some statements might affect public perception.

There is also a broader problem here. Public perception is not a stable measure of state policy. The same public that demands one position today may demand something completely different tomorrow. If major state decisions are constantly adjusted simply to satisfy immediate public expectations, governance becomes reactive rather than strategic.

The more important issue is the growing tendency across different levels of the state to treat governance as a theatre of messaging, signalling and perception management rather than as the execution of policy. When every institution becomes preoccupied with “giving a message” instead of doing the work, the practical machinery of governance is inevitably weakened.

If Rezaei speaks more directly than his predecessors, that does not automatically diminish the SNSC. What matters is whether his words correspond to the state’s strategic position and whether the institution is capable of turning those positions into action. In wartime, clarity and seriousness can be far more valuable than carefully managed silence.

🔹@enemywatch

🇾🇪 📕 | The story behind Ansar Allah’s missile arsenal is much deeper than “Iran gave them missiles”:

When people look at Ansar Allah’s missile arsenal in Yemen today, it is easy to reduce the entire story to a single sentence: “Iran supplied the Houthis with missiles.” That explanation ignores an entire layer of Yemen’s military history and, more importantly, it ignores the one element that cannot simply be imported: human expertise.

The foundation of Ansar Allah’s missile capability was not created after 2015. For decades, the Yemeni military operated Soviet, North Korean, and Chinese missile systems. These weapons did not arrive alone. They came with training programs, technical education, maintenance procedures, launch protocols, and generations of Yemeni officers, engineers, and technicians who learned how to manage missile systems from storage and servicing to deployment and refurbishment.

A significant part of that expertise was already close to Ansar Allah even before it took control of state institutions. Military units, officers, engineers, and technicians within the Yemeni Armed Forces formed alliances with Ansar Allah during the political and military shifts that preceded 2014. This meant that experienced personnel with years of missile knowledge became part of Ansar Allah’s structure, rather than a completely new cadre appearing after the collapse of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi’s government in Sana’a.

That point became decisive after 2014. When large parts of the Saudi-backed government collapsed and Ansar Allah seized military bases and stockpiles belonging to the Yemeni Army and the Republican Guard, they inherited much more than warehouses filled with weapons. They gained missile platforms, spare parts, maintenance equipment, technical documentation, engineers, and technicians who already understood those systems from the inside.

This is where the real transformation began. Instead of treating the inherited arsenal as a finite stockpile that would eventually run out, Ansar Allah turned it into the foundation of a missile program that could be repaired, rebuilt, modified, and expanded. Some missiles were restored to service, others were overhauled and modernized, while older systems became platforms for experimentation and redevelopment. This also explains why some Soviet-era systems have reportedly been adapted for missions very different from those for which they were originally designed, including the conversion of certain air defense systems into ground attack weapons after extensive modifications.

None of this means Ansar Allah developed everything on its own. As the war continued and older stockpiles were depleted, support from Iran and Hezbollah became increasingly important, particularly in technical development. The relationship is better understood as cooperation between an existing Yemeni military foundation and external expertise that contributed new technologies, components, engineering methods, and approaches to modernization.

In other words, the Yemenis already possessed the basic knowledge of missile systems, while support from the Axis of Resistance added new layers of expertise in upgrading, modifying, improving performance, and reusing equipment that could be salvaged from older arsenals.

That is what makes Ansar Allah’s missile program different from the simplistic claim that it merely received missiles from abroad. Its development is the result of accumulation: a Yemeni missile legacy built over decades, military stockpiles transferred into Ansar Allah’s hands after 2014, experienced personnel who remained within the new military structure, years of war that forced constant maintenance, refurbishment, and innovation, and external technical support that helped transform an inherited arsenal into a more diverse and sophisticated missile force.

🇾🇪@enemywatch