📌 | Don’t post your children’s pictures or videos online. Publicly shared media can be permanently copied, scraped, tracked, and manipulated, including through AI-generated deepfakes. Images can also reveal faces, voices, school uniforms, home details, routines, and locations, making children easier to identify or track.

🔹@enemywatch

🇮🇷❌🇺🇸🇪🇺一 Iran May Target US Military Facilities in Europe if Tensions Escalate — FT

According to the report, the options reportedly under consideration include:
🔹Bulgaria: Sources indicate that Iranian forces have been assessing the possibility of striking US military facilities in southeastern European countries, including Bulgaria.
🔹Cyprus: The island is also seen as a potential target for Iranian retaliation, particularly given the British airbase located there, which was previously struck by a drone in March.
🔹Undersea Internet Cables in the Strait of Hormuz: Iranian forces have reportedly also been exploring the option of targeting undersea fiber-optic cables running through the Strait of Hormuz in the event of renewed escalation.

These considerations point to Tehran's readiness to broaden the scope of any retaliatory response in a future confrontation — meaning strikes would not be confined to US bases and facilities in the Middle East, but could also extend to targets beyond the region.

@SimurghRes

The first involved the issue of drone trucks seized by the security services, documented and publicly displayed before the case ended with the drones being handed over to one of the factions. The second was the attempt to storm al-Nujaba’s headquarters in Jurf al-Naddaf, an operation that failed to achieve its objective. The third was the arrest of Abbas al-Yaqoubi from his home. It was the boldest of the three in terms of the nature of the target and the manner of execution, but it also ended in a similar outcome, as al-Yaqoubi is now back at home receiving well-wishers following his safe return.

Here lies the practical paradox: what was intended to demonstrate the state’s ability to reach a first-rank faction leader ultimately showed that the problem is not merely the government’s ability to carry out an arrest, but its ability to withstand what comes after it.

🔹@enemywatch

🇾🇪 🇾🇪 🇾🇪 | Yemeni Armed Forces:

The Yemeni Armed Forces have become so powerful that we are now dictating terms. With God's help, we have established three principles:

First, a blockade for a blockade, whereby we have imposed a strict siege on the Saudi enemy, preventing even a single ship from passing through. Second, striking Saudi troop concentrations wherever they may be. Third, protecting Yemen's sovereignty and confronting any enemy airspace incursions.

In implementing this blockade for a blockade, from the declaration of the maritime embargo against the Saudi enemy on July 20th until today, the Yemeni Armed Forces have targeted eight Saudi oil tankers: five in the Red Sea and three in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea.

Additionally, 48 Saudi oil tankers were prevented from passing and forced to turn back, including 34 in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, and 14 in the Red Sea.

In response to the Saudi aggression against Sana'a Airport and Hodeidah Port, and to reinforce the principle of protecting Yemeni sovereignty from violations of our country's airspace, particularly in the governorates of Sa'dah and Hajjah, the Yemeni Armed Forces carried out nine military operations targeting Yanbu, Najran, Jizan, Abha, and oil supply lines in the Eastern Province.

Furthermore, to solidify the principle of targeting Saudi troop concentrations wherever they may be, the Armed Forces conducted fourteen military operations targeting Saudi enemy troop concentrations in Al-Ruwaik, Al-Abr, Al-Wadi'ah, Ma'rib, and Al-Mukha, as well as ships and boats transporting equipment and reinforcements belonging to the Saudi enemy.

The results of these operations included the death and injury of hundreds of Saudi enemy troops, including commanders and officers; the burning and destruction of a large number of warehouses and equipment belonging to the Saudi enemy; the sinking and burning of two military landing ships transporting Saudi weapons and reinforcements in Al-Mukha; the burning and sinking of more than ten ships belonging to the Saudi enemy, which were engaged in acts of piracy, banditry, and looting in the Red Sea under Saudi directives.

We warn the Saudi regime against the dangers of any escalation. Any escalation will be met with a comprehensive response. The Saudi regime has no option but to lift the blockade, implement the agreements reached, end the aggression, pay salaries, allow the occupiers to leave, and return the wealth of the Yemeni people to all of us. We advise those of our countrymen who have been misled to return and leave the enemy camps, because they are Yemenis, and we do not want to target them or make them victims.

🇾🇪@enemywatch

— The talk of a potential israeli-Turkish confrontation following the israeli attack on the already-damaged Abu al-Duhur military airport in occupied Syria, and israeli claims that the strike was intended to counter Turkish military positioning, should not be exaggerated or treated as an imminent major confrontation unless further developments confirm it. However, far more than reflecting the reality of an imminent confrontation, the situation increasingly looks like a well-planned theatre designed to create a particular narrative around something else that may be unfolding behind the scenes. The timing of the strike, the subsequent rhetoric from Ankara and Tel Aviv, and the involvement of figures such as Tom Barrack could all serve broader political and strategic purposes. Until more evidence emerges, it would be premature to interpret the developments simply as the beginning of a direct israeli-Turkish confrontation.

Nevertheless, the israeli strike has created a significant point of tension because Abu al-Duhur lies within an area connected to Turkey’s broader security environment. Tom Barrack’s remarks suggest that Turkey and israel may have come close to a military confrontation over the issue, while israeli statements have framed the attack as an attempt to prevent Turkish military positioning in Syria. Netanyahu has also raised the level of rhetoric toward Erdoğan by publicly presenting the Abu al-Duhur attack as part of an effort to prevent what israel considers threatening Turkish military positioning.

The larger issue is that israel continues to define its security environment through the post-October 7 doctrine, treating potential military threats before they fully materialize as targets for preemptive action. The attack in Syria, particularly within an area closely connected to Turkey’s security interests, fits into this broader approach. Reports of an understanding between israel and Damascus regarding the maintenance of the existing security situation also suggest that Tel Aviv wants to restrict military cooperation between Damascus and outside powers such as Turkey.

Turkey, however, is unlikely to accept arrangements that permanently constrain its perceived security interests in northern Syria. Ankara has repeatedly emphasized the importance of its strategic depth and security presence in the region. If israel continues expanding its military pressure inside Syria, particularly toward areas closer to Damascus, the possibility of confrontation or indirect escalation with Turkey could increase.

The more serious concern is therefore not necessarily an immediate israeli-Turkish war, but the possibility of miscalculation. israel’s increasingly expansive definition of its security perimeter, combined with Turkey’s determination to protect its interests in Syria, could produce an escalation neither side initially intends. The danger is that a policy designed to prevent future threats could itself create a confrontation far more dangerous than the traditional conflicts israel has faced with its established adversaries.

At the same time, the current presentation of events deserves scrutiny. The repeated statements, carefully timed rhetoric, political messaging, and attempts to frame the Abu al-Duhur strike as a direct israeli-Turkish confrontation may be serving a larger strategic narrative. Figures such as Tom Barrack and other political actors could use the situation for propaganda, pressure, or diplomatic leverage. There may be a broader calculation behind the scenes that has not yet become visible. However, one thing appears clear: Turkey and israel remain in coordination at multiple levels. The apparent confrontation itself could therefore be only one part of a much larger political or strategic development. Whatever happens next, israel may eventually seek to drag Turkey further into the situation, and a significant number, perhaps even a majority, of regional actors may have little sympathy for Turkey if that happens.

🔹@enemywatch

📣 | Updates:

Iran and France

Iran accused France of maintaining a hostile policy of pressure and interference against Iran, citing Paris’s expulsion of Iranian diplomats in response to Tehran’s reciprocal measures. The Iranian statement accused France of having supported anti-Iranian groups, hosted the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization, supported Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, and sided with Iran’s adversaries. Tehran also accused French diplomats of involvement in a case related to infiltration and foreign interference. Iran rejected recent expressions of sympathy from the French foreign minister as an attempt to influence public opinion and warned that further hostile actions would receive an appropriate and decisive response.

occupied Syria and israel

Syrian sources reported that an israeli force consisting of more than 100 soldiers and 15 vehicles infiltrated Jubata al-Khashab in the northern Quneitra countryside at dawn, reportedly searching homes and detaining residents.

Reuters reported that Mossad Director Roman Gofman spoke with the Syrian foreign minister on August 14, before the israeli attack in Syria. The conversation reportedly addressed Turkey’s military presence in Syria and what was described as Ankara’s attempts to interfere in Syria’s internal affairs. Netanyahu subsequently said israel would not tolerate Turkish military deployment or reinforcement in Syria that it considered a threat to israeli security, adding that israel had made its position clear and had acted after concluding that its message had not been sufficiently understood.

Iran and UAE

Iran reportedly seized an Emirati oil tanker and took it to Bandar Abbas.

🔹@enemywatch

📣 | Updates:

🏴‍☠️ American

The American military has reportedly transferred a P-8A reconnaissance aircraft from Djibouti to Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE, while American aerial-refueling aircraft are operating from Qatar and Tel Aviv around the Strait of Hormuz to refuel fighter aircraft.

🇵🇰 Pakistan

Pakistan summoned the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Islamabad and conveyed a strong protest over statements by the U.S. Ambassador to India regarding Kashmir. Sergio during his first visit to Srinagar, reportedly stated that Jammu and Kashmir is “an important part of India” and that the American administration would reconsider its travel advisories for the region.

🇱🇧 Southern Lebanon

Israeli forces carried out airstrikes, artillery shelling, explosions, machine-gun fire, and other military operations across southern Lebanon. Airstrikes targeted Ali al-Taher, Doha Kafarroman, areas between al-Qantara and Deir Sirian, and the Machaa al-Mansouri area. Artillery shelling targeted Ali al-Taher, Doha Kafarroman, Hadatha, Mays al-Jabal, al-Mansouri, Machaa al-Mansouri, Sadana on the outskirts of al-Hebbarieh, the outskirts of Shaqra, Mayfadoun, Baraachit, and Beit Yahoun. Explosions were reported in Hadatha, Baraachit, Bayout al-Siyad, Machaa al-Mansouri, Kafr Tebnit, Houla, Talousa, Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, and Khiam. Machine-gun fire targeted al-Mansouri, Mays al-Jabal, Hadatha, the outskirts of Ayta al-Jabal, Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, and Sorbine. Two Merkava tanks advanced into the Machaa al-Mansouri area alongside bulldozing, demolition, and burning of several homes, while israeli forces also advanced from Hadatha toward the outskirts of Ayta al-Jabal. A Merkava tank targeted Khiam, and an israeli drone dropped sound bombs over al-Mansouri. Earlier attacks from midnight included artillery shelling of Wadi al-Saluqi, Doha Kafr Rumman, and Ali al-Taher, an airstrike near the al-Dabsha site in Doha Kafr Rumman, illumination flares over al-Mansouri, and machine-gun fire toward Zawtar al-Sharqiyah and Hadatha.

🇵🇸 Gaza

Hamas spokesperson Hazem Qassem said reports from israeli sources regarding an American “green light” contradict the existing agreements, statements by mediators, and commitments previously made by the American administration. He called on the so-called Peace Council to take a clear position on the reported massacres and end its alignment with the israeli position.

🇷🇺🇮🇷 Russia and Iran

Rosatom will reportedly send several dozen additional Russian specialists to Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant in September, bringing the number of Russian personnel working at the site to more than 100 as Moscow continues efforts to keep construction work moving.

🇾🇪 Yemen (moments ago)

The Yemeni Armed Forces reportedly targeted concentrations of Saudi forces in several governorates.

🔹@enemywatch

🏴‍☠️ 🇸🇾| Whether Bashar did it or not, no one knows other than the Zionist Arab media, their mouthpieces, and fabricators, but this process is ongoing. Top HTS figures around Julani are suddenly dying of heart attacks, with this being the third reported case of this kind in the past two weeks. The “silent death” series appears to be continuing to claim the lives of Julani’s militia leaders. The militia leader known as Muhammad Nayef Al-Hajj, nicknamed “Abu Suhaib,” was reportedly killed following a sudden heart attack.

The repeated deaths of senior figures within a short period naturally raise questions about the internal situation surrounding Julani’s leadership and the ongoing consolidation of power around a central figure.

At the same time, the concentration of authority around one leadership structure, combined with the reported involvement and support of regional and foreign intelligence agencies, raises broader concerns about the direction of occupied Syria. If this pattern continues, Syria could see the emergence of a new authoritarian order centered around a single figure, with external powers playing a decisive role in shaping its political and security architecture.

The Saddam-ification of Julani reflects the concern that another highly centralized and externally supported system could emerge in Syria, where political opposition, internal rivals, and independent institutions are progressively marginalized. If such a model takes root, the consequences for Syria’s social fabric, political sovereignty, religious communities, and regional stability could be far more serious than currently anticipated.

🔹@enemywatch

🇮🇶 | Faleh al-Fayyad, head of Iraq’s Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF):

The PMF does not have authority to decide on war and follows the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

Over 100 PMF headquarters were reportedly bombed during the war with Iran, with more than 100 PMF members killed and dozens wounded.

The PMF was targeted to pressure Iraqi resistance factions.

Work is ongoing to separate some PMF brigades from political and factional affiliations.

External pressure on the PMF will not be accepted.

Iraq needs a new security arrangement after the U.S. withdrawal, including stronger protection of its airspace and sovereignty.

A framework to regulate weapons is needed, while forcibly imposing disarmament should be avoided.

The departure of U.S. forces will be a day of celebration.

🔹@enemywatch

Following the visit of Gen. Esmail Qaani to Iraq, the rejection of handing over resistance weapons to the Iraqi state under the banner of the so-called “state monopoly on arms” promoted by the American-backed Iraqi government, the continuation of economic coordination through visits by ministers from both governments, and now the parliamentary delegation’s visit to Iraq led by Speaker Dr. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, it appears that both Iran and Iraq are fully aware of the consequences of growing American pressure and the fragile regional conditions. That is why these meetings should be viewed with caution until or unless their outcomes are confirmed through official statements from the resistance itself.

The Islamic Resistance is clearly aware of the dangers currently surrounding Iran, as well as the possibility of hidden conspiracies targeting the health, security, and safety of resistance leaders. This creates a serious and sensitive scenario that goes beyond ordinary political negotiations. As the PMF itself has stated, it is looking for a solution that avoids internal conflict while preserving Iraq’s stability.

There now appear to be two possible scenarios. The first is that elements within the Sistani camp, reportedly represented politically by Reza Sistani, may want the PMF to distance itself from resistance factions aligned with Wilayat al-Faqih. However, this remains unconfirmed, and there is no clear evidence that the Sistani school is moving away from its longstanding positions toward Iran. The relative silence surrounding Iran could have several explanations, including political caution, deliberate neutrality, coordination, or even a position that contradicts some of the claims currently circulating. It would therefore be premature to present the existence of a coordinated “Sistani lobby” as an established fact.

If such a separation were actually pursued, however, it would raise a much larger question: what would separating the PMF from the resistance actually mean? Would it simply mean placing all armed formations under greater formal state supervision, or would it also involve restricting their political, ideological, regional, and strategic relationships? Would individual factions retain their existing organizational structures and capabilities, or would they be required to transform themselves completely into conventional state security formations? These questions require clear answers before the implications of any proposed restructuring can be properly understood.

Moreover, such a scenario faces significant practical obstacles, particularly because of the existing unity and interconnectedness among Iraq’s various resistance factions. The PMF is not a single homogeneous organization, and its constituent factions have different political, military, ideological, and social structures. Any attempt to separate the PMF as a whole from the wider resistance environment could therefore create internal disagreements and potentially produce the very instability that the Iraqi government claims it wants to prevent.

The second possibility is that these statements are primarily intended to balance internal pressures, postpone confrontation, and buy time for broader political negotiations and possible solutions. In that reading, the current rhetoric may be more about managing American pressure and preventing an internal crisis than about implementing an actual separation from the resistance.

At the same time, the frequency of high-level meetings between Iranian and Iraqi officials suggests that discussions may extend well beyond the immediate issue of weapons or security arrangements. It increasingly appears that both nations are planning for larger agreements and broader strategic scenarios aimed at dealing with the regional imbalance that may emerge in the coming years. These discussions could involve security coordination, economic integration, border management, energy cooperation, regional trade routes, financial mechanisms, and contingency planning for possible political and military crises.

Both Tehran and Baghdad understand that the regional balance is changing rapidly. American pressure, israeli military activity, instability in Syria, developments in the Gulf, the future of Iraq’s security architecture, and the wider confrontation between competing regional blocs could all create problems for both countries. As a result, the current diplomatic activity may be part of a broader attempt to establish arrangements capable of absorbing future shocks rather than merely responding to the immediate weapons debate.

From this perspective, the recent visits may represent only the visible part of a much larger process. Behind the public statements, both countries may be attempting to develop mechanisms capable of withstanding future pressure campaigns, sanctions, security threats, economic disruptions, and shifts in regional alliances. The emphasis on dialogue, coordination, and repeated exchanges between senior officials suggests that preparations may be underway for scenarios that are not yet publicly visible.

The question surrounding Najaf is also important, but it requires particular caution. The silence of the Sistani school has become an important unanswered question in this wider discussion, but silence itself should not automatically be interpreted as opposition to Iran, coordination with external actors, or support for a particular political faction. Given the advanced age and health of the senior religious authority, the future structure of religious and political influence in Najaf is naturally becoming an increasingly important issue. The growing public visibility of Reza Sistani, his eldest son, has therefore attracted attention, but the meaning of this development should be assessed through concrete statements and actions rather than assumptions about succession or political alignment.

Ultimately, the central question is not simply whether the PMF will remain armed or whether some factions will formally integrate further into the Iraqi state. The deeper question is what kind of Iraqi security architecture is being negotiated, who will control it, what relationship it will have with the resistance factions, and how much external pressure will influence the final arrangement.

Whether the current developments lead to greater unity, a restructuring of the resistance landscape, or a broader regional realignment remains unclear. What is becoming increasingly evident, however, is that both Iran and Iraq appear to recognize that the coming period could be considerably more challenging than previous years. Long-term planning, strategic coordination, and preparation for multiple possible scenarios therefore appear to be increasingly important to both governments.

🔹@enemywatch

At the same time, it would be difficult to assume that Reza Sistani would automatically inherit the same level of religious authority, political leverage, and public acceptance currently associated with his father. The Najaf religious establishment has a complex internal structure, and authority is not simply transferred from one generation to another. Various issues of religious standing, scholarly recognition, internal acceptance, institutional networks, and relationships across Najaf and its broader religious networks would all affect any future role for him. For this reason, several other figures are increasingly being discussed as potential successors or influential authorities within the Najaf establishment.

Among the names receiving attention was Ayatollah Ishaq al-Fayyad, who passed away, while Ayatollah Irrawani, a relatively grey and politically cautious religious figure, has also been promoted in some circles as a potential future authority. In parallel, Ayatollah Muhammad al-Yaqoubi has been expanding his religious and organizational network. There have also been allegations regarding paid promotion and financial networks connected to his activities across parts of South Asia and the European Union, although such allegations require independent verification and should not be treated as established facts. At the same time, Ayatollah Yaqoubi and his office have openly expressed support for the Islamic Republic of Iran and have shown respect for Imam Khamenei and Iran's political and religious system, making his position particularly relevant to discussions about the future balance within the Najaf establishment.

Other figures, including Sheikh Bashir Najafi, Sheikh Mohammad Sanad, Sheikh Kashif al-Ghita, and several other senior scholars, are also being viewed by different circles as potential influential figures in the future religious landscape. Their respective scholarly standing, networks, political positions, and relationships with Iraq's religious and political institutions could become increasingly important as the question of succession and influence develops.

Attention has also shifted toward the al-Modarresi family and its associated jurists, who have remained politically active and have been seen participating in pro-Iran rallies and Quds-related programs. Their networks and political-religious activities could therefore become another factor in the evolving competition for influence within Iraq's Shi'a religious establishment.

None of these developments, however, should be interpreted as evidence that a formal succession contest is already underway. Najaf's religious authority is considerably more complex than a conventional political succession process. Scholarly credentials, seniority, religious recognition, financial independence, institutional networks, public acceptance, and relationships with other senior scholars all play important roles.

What appears clearer is that Reza Sistani would face significant challenges in becoming the central figure in Najaf with the same level of authority enjoyed by his father. Those challenges could include questions of scholarly stature, internal acceptance, relationships with other senior scholars, and the ability to command the same broad network of religious and social institutions. These are issues that may be addressed or evolve over time, but they cannot simply be assumed away.

This is why the current period deserves close attention. The future of Najaf will not necessarily be determined by one individual alone. It could instead emerge through a broader redistribution of religious authority among several senior scholars and networks, with different groups seeking to preserve their influence while responding to Iraq's changing political environment, relations with Iran, American pressure, and the wider regional balance.

🔹@enemywatch

Imam Mujtaba Khamenei is an established jurist, recognized within the Assembly of Experts, among other scholars and relevant scholarly circles. His recognition as a jurist predates his announcement as the Leader. Even before assuming the leadership, he was regarded within these circles as an established jurist and was widely considered among the leading scholars, much like his elder brother, Ayatollah Mustafa Husayni Khamenei.

In the coming months or years, it may become clearer whether his marja'iyyah will be formally announced. Although he has not officially announced himself as a marja' to date, he is reportedly already followed by some muqallids in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. His formal declaration of marja'iyyah, if and when it takes place, could therefore become an important development within the wider Shi'a scholarly establishment.

Considering the current scenarios, it is also possible that the Najaf school may not immediately produce a single, widely accepted and centralized figure capable of assuming an absolute leadership position across the broader Shi'a world. In such a scenario, the position of supreme leadership could remain centered around Ayatollah Mujtaba Khamenei, including among those scholars and communities who may not fully accept the doctrine of absolute Wilayat al-Faqih.

However, it is still too early to make a definitive judgment. The final direction will depend on the decisions and recognition of senior scholars, the Assembly of Experts, seminaries, and the major maraji'. The question of future religious authority cannot be separated from the broader scholarly structures that determine recognition, legitimacy, and acceptance. Time will ultimately clarify how these developments unfold.

🔹@enemywatch

Meanwhile, one must also be aware that the martyred Leader, Imam Sayyid Ali Khamenei, had expanded the role and nature of marja' al-taqlid in a broader and somewhat different way, making it more inclusive and accessible than a model limited to followers under a single authority and a single series of risalah amaliyah. The martyred Imam did not actively promote his own marja'iyyah or invite followers in major countries where his following could have expanded. This appears to have been intentional, allowing a greater degree of ikhlas (sincerity and spiritual purity) and inkisari (humility and self-effacement), while avoiding an excessive personality-centered model of religious emulation.

As a marja' al-taqlid himself, he had millions of muqallids, reportedly second only to Ayatollah Sistani in terms of the scale of his following. Yet he maintained an open approach in which many of his risalahs and books incorporated or acknowledged the opinions of other maraji'. He also allowed his followers to refer to other maraji' on specific issues where appropriate. This approach created a more flexible model of taqlid, in which adherence to one marja' did not necessarily mean complete exclusion of the scholarly opinions of others.

Ayatollah Sistani has similarly maintained a position that allows his followers, under certain circumstances, to refer to the a'lam among other qualified maraji' for specific questions or issues, particularly where particular rulings or sensitive matters require further consideration. This demonstrates that the practical tradition of taqlid has not always been as rigidly centralized as it is sometimes portrayed.

With the passing of the martyred Imam, the question now becomes more significant: how will this broader concept of taqlid and reference to multiple maraji' develop under Imam Mujtaba Khamenei? It will be particularly interesting to observe whether his approach continues the practice of allowing followers to consult other recognized maraji' for specific rulings, or whether he develops a distinct doctrinal framework for contemporary marja'iyyah.

There are already indications that his jurisprudential approach may be both clear and comprehensive, with rulings that sometimes resemble those of his father while providing broader explanations and greater elaboration. His discussions during dars al-kharij and meetings with scholars and experts may offer further insight into how he understands the relationship between his own jurisprudential authority, the opinions of other maraji', and the practical needs of Muslims seeking guidance.

Ultimately, the development of marja'iyyah under Imam Mujtaba Khamenei may become one of the significant questions for the contemporary Shi'a scholarly establishment. The issue is not simply who will be followed, but what model of religious emulation will emerge: whether it will remain centered around a single personality, develop as a more plural and interconnected system of qualified authorities, or establish a new balance between individual marja'iyyah and broader collective scholarly consultation.

🔹@enemywatch