🇮🇶 | The recent Reuters report on the establishment of operational cells by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) inside Iraq to carry out attacks against American interests and their Gulf allies carries implications that go beyond a simple security assessment.
According to the report, these cells represent a structure operating in parallel with the well known Iraqi resistance factions. They were allegedly created to reduce the intelligence footprint of such operations and provide greater plausible deniability for those directing them.
The report states that the network consists of three to four cells, each made up of around ten Iraqi fighters. It alleges that these cells were responsible for at least seven drone attacks carried out between April 20 and May 17, targeting sites in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, with the drones reportedly launched from desert areas near Basra and Samawah.
Reuters further claims that while some members of these cells have organizational links to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, their operations are conducted independently of the traditional command structures of the established factions. The report also points to the emergence of relatively unfamiliar groups that have claimed responsibility for some of these attacks, suggesting that these names may serve as covers for existing organizations.
One such example appears to fit Reuters’ assessment regarding the use of new names to conceal the activities of established networks. Based on the circumstances and the timing of the operation, it is considered likely that the group known as “Abu Hashem al-Iraqi” is linked to the Kataib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades), particularly because the attack followed the killing of three Kataib Hezbollah members in Basra.
The attacks targeting the UAE and Saudi Arabia are believed to include the May 17 drone strike against the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in the UAE, as well as a simultaneous attack involving three drones against targets inside Saudi Arabia on the same day. According to the report, both countries stated that the drones had originated from Iraqi territory.
The Al-Wa’d al-Haq Brigade, one of the media and operational fronts associated with Iraqi resistance factions, had previously threatened to target the UAE’s Barakah nuclear facility on March 11, explicitly referring to the use of drones.
Just one day after the ceasefire, on April 9, Kuwait was reportedly targeted by drones launched from Iraqi territory. The following day, a group calling itself “Abu Hashem al-Iraqi” claimed responsibility for the attack. The author argues that this incident also supports Reuters’ assertion that newly created group names are being used to mask the activities of existing organizations.
The available information further suggests that the concept of establishing these operational cells did not originate with the recent conflict but dates back to an earlier period. However, according to the author, the decisive turning point came with the outbreak of the war and the subsequent killing of Qassem Soleimani, after which the first group of IRGC Quds Force officers reportedly entered Iraq.
Following the start of the conflict, Iraqi resistance factions significantly expanded their operations. The author states that on February 28, the factions announced in an official statement that they had carried out 16 operations using dozens of drones both inside and outside Iraq, only hours after the announcement of Soleimani’s death.
According to the author, some Iraqi security institutions possessed intelligence indicating that several Iranian officers had been stationed in safe houses located in Baghdad, Najaf, Diyala, and Basra. One of these locations, in Baghdad’s Jadriya district, was reportedly targeted in an attack that resulted in the death of a senior Iranian adviser known as Hajj Abdullah.
The author claims that, following that incident, relations between the Iraqi resistance factions and Iraq’s intelligence service entered an unprecedented period of tension.
According to the report, these cells represent a structure operating in parallel with the well known Iraqi resistance factions. They were allegedly created to reduce the intelligence footprint of such operations and provide greater plausible deniability for those directing them.
The report states that the network consists of three to four cells, each made up of around ten Iraqi fighters. It alleges that these cells were responsible for at least seven drone attacks carried out between April 20 and May 17, targeting sites in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, with the drones reportedly launched from desert areas near Basra and Samawah.
Reuters further claims that while some members of these cells have organizational links to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, their operations are conducted independently of the traditional command structures of the established factions. The report also points to the emergence of relatively unfamiliar groups that have claimed responsibility for some of these attacks, suggesting that these names may serve as covers for existing organizations.
One such example appears to fit Reuters’ assessment regarding the use of new names to conceal the activities of established networks. Based on the circumstances and the timing of the operation, it is considered likely that the group known as “Abu Hashem al-Iraqi” is linked to the Kataib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades), particularly because the attack followed the killing of three Kataib Hezbollah members in Basra.
The attacks targeting the UAE and Saudi Arabia are believed to include the May 17 drone strike against the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in the UAE, as well as a simultaneous attack involving three drones against targets inside Saudi Arabia on the same day. According to the report, both countries stated that the drones had originated from Iraqi territory.
The Al-Wa’d al-Haq Brigade, one of the media and operational fronts associated with Iraqi resistance factions, had previously threatened to target the UAE’s Barakah nuclear facility on March 11, explicitly referring to the use of drones.
Just one day after the ceasefire, on April 9, Kuwait was reportedly targeted by drones launched from Iraqi territory. The following day, a group calling itself “Abu Hashem al-Iraqi” claimed responsibility for the attack. The author argues that this incident also supports Reuters’ assertion that newly created group names are being used to mask the activities of existing organizations.
The available information further suggests that the concept of establishing these operational cells did not originate with the recent conflict but dates back to an earlier period. However, according to the author, the decisive turning point came with the outbreak of the war and the subsequent killing of Qassem Soleimani, after which the first group of IRGC Quds Force officers reportedly entered Iraq.
Following the start of the conflict, Iraqi resistance factions significantly expanded their operations. The author states that on February 28, the factions announced in an official statement that they had carried out 16 operations using dozens of drones both inside and outside Iraq, only hours after the announcement of Soleimani’s death.
According to the author, some Iraqi security institutions possessed intelligence indicating that several Iranian officers had been stationed in safe houses located in Baghdad, Najaf, Diyala, and Basra. One of these locations, in Baghdad’s Jadriya district, was reportedly targeted in an attack that resulted in the death of a senior Iranian adviser known as Hajj Abdullah.
The author claims that, following that incident, relations between the Iraqi resistance factions and Iraq’s intelligence service entered an unprecedented period of tension.
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Allegations that had previously been discussed privately reportedly evolved into public accusations directed at a number of intelligence officers.
In the author’s assessment, this broader context cannot be separated from the information presented in the Reuters report. The report’s detailed discussion of organizational structures and operational locations, the author argues, suggests that its sources may be connected in some way to the internal dispute that emerged after the targeting of the Iranian officers’ location and the subsequent exchange of accusations between the involved parties.
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In the author’s assessment, this broader context cannot be separated from the information presented in the Reuters report. The report’s detailed discussion of organizational structures and operational locations, the author argues, suggests that its sources may be connected in some way to the internal dispute that emerged after the targeting of the Iranian officers’ location and the subsequent exchange of accusations between the involved parties.
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Enemy Watch — Official
🇮🇷: 🇮🇶 | Details of the funeral procession for the martyred Leader in Iraq and Iran announced: Speaking at a press conference, the Secretary of the Funeral Committee for the martyred Leader of the Revolution said: • On July 5, the funeral prayer for the…
🇮🇷 | Updates on preparations for the funeral ceremonies of the martyred Leader:
• More than 2,100 portable and public toilets will be deployed along the funeral procession route to provide essential facilities for attendees.
• Garbage collection stations will be installed throughout the route, while all 22 municipal districts of Tehran will oversee continuous cleaning and waste management operations.
• More than 350 cleaning vehicles, sanitation machines, and service units, along with over 7,000 personnel, will be deployed to provide cleaning, sanitation, and logistical support throughout the ceremonies.
• The organizing committee stated that any announcement regarding the Supreme Leader’s attendance at the ceremonies falls exclusively under the authority of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief and the Office of the Supreme Leader, and not the funeral organizing committee.
• If any program involving the Supreme Leader is scheduled, it will be officially announced by the relevant offices at the appropriate time.
• Thousands of journalists, photographers, filmmakers, and media and cultural organizations from across Iran are participating in documenting and covering the ceremonies, which organizers describe as a historic event.
• More than 300 foreign journalists have completed the necessary arrangements to travel to Iran and provide international news and visual coverage of the funeral ceremonies.
• The committee’s International Affairs Division has also announced its readiness to organize dedicated press conferences with ceremony organizers and senior Iranian officials, subject to official approval and media requests, to provide further information about the event.
• The Governor of Qom announced preparations to accommodate approximately one million pilgrims during the funeral ceremonies. As part of the arrangements, around 1,700 tents will be set up across the city, along with special traffic and transportation measures to manage the expected influx of visitors.
• According to Pourjamshidian, the burial location of the martyred Leader has been selected with the aim of making future visits easier for pilgrims and the general public.
• A limited and carefully managed burial ceremony is planned at the Holy Shrine of Imam Ali ibn Musa al-Ridha (A) in Mashhad, so that the ceremony can be conducted in a calm and orderly manner.
• Organizers stated that the burial site has been chosen in a way that will allow both women and men to visit the grave conveniently in the future, while also ensuring that the movement of pilgrims and visitors to the shrine is not disrupted by congestion. Further details about the burial ceremony are expected to be announced at a later stage.
#ImamKhameneiFuneral
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• More than 2,100 portable and public toilets will be deployed along the funeral procession route to provide essential facilities for attendees.
• Garbage collection stations will be installed throughout the route, while all 22 municipal districts of Tehran will oversee continuous cleaning and waste management operations.
• More than 350 cleaning vehicles, sanitation machines, and service units, along with over 7,000 personnel, will be deployed to provide cleaning, sanitation, and logistical support throughout the ceremonies.
• The organizing committee stated that any announcement regarding the Supreme Leader’s attendance at the ceremonies falls exclusively under the authority of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief and the Office of the Supreme Leader, and not the funeral organizing committee.
• If any program involving the Supreme Leader is scheduled, it will be officially announced by the relevant offices at the appropriate time.
• Thousands of journalists, photographers, filmmakers, and media and cultural organizations from across Iran are participating in documenting and covering the ceremonies, which organizers describe as a historic event.
• More than 300 foreign journalists have completed the necessary arrangements to travel to Iran and provide international news and visual coverage of the funeral ceremonies.
• The committee’s International Affairs Division has also announced its readiness to organize dedicated press conferences with ceremony organizers and senior Iranian officials, subject to official approval and media requests, to provide further information about the event.
• The Governor of Qom announced preparations to accommodate approximately one million pilgrims during the funeral ceremonies. As part of the arrangements, around 1,700 tents will be set up across the city, along with special traffic and transportation measures to manage the expected influx of visitors.
• According to Pourjamshidian, the burial location of the martyred Leader has been selected with the aim of making future visits easier for pilgrims and the general public.
• A limited and carefully managed burial ceremony is planned at the Holy Shrine of Imam Ali ibn Musa al-Ridha (A) in Mashhad, so that the ceremony can be conducted in a calm and orderly manner.
• Organizers stated that the burial site has been chosen in a way that will allow both women and men to visit the grave conveniently in the future, while also ensuring that the movement of pilgrims and visitors to the shrine is not disrupted by congestion. Further details about the burial ceremony are expected to be announced at a later stage.
#ImamKhameneiFuneral
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Zahra was 14 months old. She was the daughter of Imam Khamenei’s eldest daughter, Sayyidah Boshra Sadat Khamenei, and Hujjat al-Islam Shaykh Javad Golpayegani. Her paternal grandfather, Hujjat al-Islam Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani, served for many years as the Chief of Staff of Imam Ali Khamenei’s office. According to available accounts, firefighters recovered her body the following day from beneath the rubble, where she was found burned and crushed under the collapsed structure.
She was deeply beloved by Imam Ali Khamenei (r), being among the youngest of his grandchildren. Whenever he was free from his duties, he would often hold her in his lap for long periods and spend time with her. In a profound sense, Imam Khamenei (r), who spent decades consoling and standing alongside the families of countless children martyrs, ultimately offered one of his own most beloved grandchildren on the very same path of sacrifice.
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Enemy Watch — Official
And somehow, she looked very much like the Imam!
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Enemy Watch — Official
🇧🇭 | Bahraini authorities arrest prominent Shia religious figures following Ashura procession: Bahraini authorities have arrested several prominent Shia religious figures and reciters following their participation in a mourning procession in the village of…
🇧🇭: 🏴 | Your unique way of matam reflects your courage and steadfastness. Shias of Bahrain, you are not alone. Let your matam shake the palaces of the tyrants and bear witness to your resistance.
#BahrainShia
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#BahrainShia
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#SyriaShia
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The clash took place in the highlands between Mahabad and Piranshahr, with fire support from artillery units. In this engagement, the six‑member team was entirely eliminated.
#BorderThreats
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Enemy Watch — Official
#BorderThreats
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Enemy Watch — Official
“For the first time, we announce that the pure bodies of our martyred Imam and his martyred family members have, until this moment, neither been buried nor placed in temporary custody. They have been preserved with the utmost honour and care, in full accordance with Islamic and legal requirements.”
This is the first official confirmation that the bodies of the martyred Leader and his family have not yet been laid to rest or entrusted for temporary burial.
#ImamKhameneiFuneral
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🥀 | Within three more days, the lovers will meet Imam Ali Khamenei (r) once again. Four months of separation has been far too long. We will see him again, but this time it will be beside his coffin.
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🥀 | It was never imagined how the world would be after him, and now time keeps passing while he is no more. Time is cruel. It keeps demanding that we move forward, even after the martyrdom of Imam Husayn (A). Some say time heals everything, but we say it does not heal. It only deepens the pain. Time is merciless. It keeps taking our loved ones, our friends, and those we never thought we would have to live without.
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🥀 | Only the believers know this pain. It is a unique pain, one that cannot be understood through ordinary grief or reflection. The shock itself is so overwhelming that it numbs and freezes every feeling, making acceptance seem impossible. It lingers for a long time, until one day it finally breaks, and only then do we truly realize what we have lost, as we shatter into tears.
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🥀 | The biggest problem arises whenever you think about him. What should you say? How should you say it? How much can you possibly write, and how long should it be? Every word feels insufficient. There is always the fear of leaving something important unsaid or failing to do justice to him. The struggle is real.
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🥀 | One unmovable pain is knowing that some of his greatest suffering came not only from outside Iran but also from within his own community and even from within the sect itself. It must have been an immense struggle to face such people, to know who they truly were, what they did to him during his lifetime, and then to watch many of them suddenly retreat into silence, hiding themselves as though they had done nothing at all.
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🥀 | Knowing his suffering, one thing is certain to say: perhaps it is better that he is finally going to be buried now, because he did not deserve to remain for long among us; who betrayed him, ignored him, ridiculed him, and insulted him and his commands on a daily basis.
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