🇮🇶 | The recent Reuters report on the establishment of operational cells by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) inside Iraq to carry out attacks against American interests and their Gulf allies carries implications that go beyond a simple security assessment.

According to the report, these cells represent a structure operating in parallel with the well known Iraqi resistance factions. They were allegedly created to reduce the intelligence footprint of such operations and provide greater plausible deniability for those directing them.

The report states that the network consists of three to four cells, each made up of around ten Iraqi fighters. It alleges that these cells were responsible for at least seven drone attacks carried out between April 20 and May 17, targeting sites in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, with the drones reportedly launched from desert areas near Basra and Samawah.

Reuters further claims that while some members of these cells have organizational links to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, their operations are conducted independently of the traditional command structures of the established factions. The report also points to the emergence of relatively unfamiliar groups that have claimed responsibility for some of these attacks, suggesting that these names may serve as covers for existing organizations.

One such example appears to fit Reuters’ assessment regarding the use of new names to conceal the activities of established networks. Based on the circumstances and the timing of the operation, it is considered likely that the group known as “Abu Hashem al-Iraqi” is linked to the Kataib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades), particularly because the attack followed the killing of three Kataib Hezbollah members in Basra.

The attacks targeting the UAE and Saudi Arabia are believed to include the May 17 drone strike against the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant in the UAE, as well as a simultaneous attack involving three drones against targets inside Saudi Arabia on the same day. According to the report, both countries stated that the drones had originated from Iraqi territory.

The Al-Wa’d al-Haq Brigade, one of the media and operational fronts associated with Iraqi resistance factions, had previously threatened to target the UAE’s Barakah nuclear facility on March 11, explicitly referring to the use of drones.

Just one day after the ceasefire, on April 9, Kuwait was reportedly targeted by drones launched from Iraqi territory. The following day, a group calling itself “Abu Hashem al-Iraqi” claimed responsibility for the attack. The author argues that this incident also supports Reuters’ assertion that newly created group names are being used to mask the activities of existing organizations.

The available information further suggests that the concept of establishing these operational cells did not originate with the recent conflict but dates back to an earlier period. However, according to the author, the decisive turning point came with the outbreak of the war and the subsequent killing of Qassem Soleimani, after which the first group of IRGC Quds Force officers reportedly entered Iraq.

Following the start of the conflict, Iraqi resistance factions significantly expanded their operations. The author states that on February 28, the factions announced in an official statement that they had carried out 16 operations using dozens of drones both inside and outside Iraq, only hours after the announcement of Soleimani’s death.

According to the author, some Iraqi security institutions possessed intelligence indicating that several Iranian officers had been stationed in safe houses located in Baghdad, Najaf, Diyala, and Basra. One of these locations, in Baghdad’s Jadriya district, was reportedly targeted in an attack that resulted in the death of a senior Iranian adviser known as Hajj Abdullah.

The author claims that, following that incident, relations between the Iraqi resistance factions and Iraq’s intelligence service entered an unprecedented period of tension.