🇮🇷🇮🇱| Iran’s Judiciary has given the order to seize the assets of Mahmoud Enayat, the manager of the Mossad-affiliated ‘Iran International’.

Among the 34 seized assets and properties are plots of land, several farms, houses and apartments, several garden plots, and one factory.

@FotrosResistancee

✅ | Based on analyses of what is currently unfolding on Iranian Twitter and other pro-resistance platforms—though with limited or weaker insights, we would like to address several important issues for those seeking direction and clarification.

1) Skipping and accepting natural responses

This situation can be described as a wider-zone war, if not a fully declared war, but still cities, provinces, and multiple fronts are affected by bombardments and casualties. In such conditions, natural emotional responses inevitably emerge. Many times, these reactions come from frustration, lack of awareness, pain, or misleading information and lack of transparency.

People often express their opinions impulsively, and we must accept that this is a natural phenomenon in such environments. However, there are instances where individuals exceed acceptable boundaries by targeting resistance leadership, ideology, or even Islam itself.

In all such situations, one must respond carefully. It is essential to evaluate intention before reacting. In many cases, ignoring provocative or emotionally driven comments with dignity is more effective than engaging in unnecessary confrontation.

2) Presence of pseudo-intellectuals on social media

A large number of pseudo-intellectuals are present on social media due to various reasons, most of which end in the pursuit of fame and material benefit. These accounts try to present themselves as realistic, but mostly they brag and do not respect the sensitivity and sanctity of the movements. They often insult and mock, but people usually run behind and follow them because they consider “realistic talk” more factual than slogan-based or optimistic statements, which creates frustration among the masses, mostly youth.

One example here needs to be mentioned: a number of Iranian accounts have started targeting the negotiating team, repeating the same narrative of JCPOA failure and “selling Iran’s dignity to enemies.” We too stand in the same space of protest, but there is a thin line difference that everything must be judged separately with time, place, and core stance.

We usually reject negotiations with America because it brings humiliation, as the leader has repeatedly stated. But the leader has not prohibited all attempts of the Foreign Ministry; rather, he has said it is one of many tasks of this ministry. Many accounts are found accusing the team and the leadership of failing again, falling into the same argument as before. However, the key difference from the past is that unlike JCPOA and other talks, these discussions are happening in a different context, often under direct or indirect enemy request, not initiated solely by Iran. During war-like conditions, such engagements must be handled carefully and may occur in one form or another but they are needed.

The main issue of focus is whether you are selling your stance or compromising your dignity. This distinction is very important and must not be ignored. This thin difference must be addressed properly instead of burning the entire issue by declaring everything as haram (prohibited) or automatically a compromise in front of the enemies. We too protested and questioned how the team was going forward without declared or written files and papers.

But what we knew was that we had done our part; when the time came, everything was clear. The team was comprehensively ready to deal with the issues, unlike what many thought. A major problem in public discourse is that incomplete information often leads to premature conclusions, which later turn out to be incorrect when full context emerges.

The martyred leader stated in the past, there are many things which our people do not know, and they are not for public disclosure. This gap between internal knowledge and public interpretation often creates confusion, emotional reactions, and unnecessary mistrust.

🔹@enemywatch

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That is why relying on official stances is required, and they become the only option in sensitive matters.

Without this discipline, narratives become fragmented, and external actors can easily exploit internal disagreements for psychological pressure or propaganda purposes. Consistency in referencing official positions helps maintain unity, prevents misinterpretation, and reduces internal friction during critical moments.

At the same time, constructive questioning is not the problem—rather, the absence of verified information and the rush to judgment is what creates instability in understanding. Therefore, balance between awareness and reliance on verified sources is essential for maintaining clarity and direction.

🔹@enemywatch

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3) Mr. Qalibaf was made “Umar Saad”?

We saw a tweet with thousands of RTs in which a female protester was holding placards calling Qalibaf “Umar Saad” (the wretched villain of Islamic history who killed Imam Husayn (A) and his entire family and companions). In a nutshell, years ago this kind of overreaction—which simply slides into emotional extremism and becomes prey to manipulation—was sometimes termed a “super-revolutionary” approach. But we do not want to use this derogatory term, because a revolutionary is simply a revolutionary; there is no “super,” and anything beyond balance becomes either emotional excess or ideological distortion.

This tendency has been seen in many Iranian accounts, which often strip their responsibilities on media and instead target the negotiating team or internal figures in a destructive way. We, too, as part of the ideological front, observe both reformist and moderate camps with scrutiny. We do not blindly accept or deny them, but evaluate them on logical and principled grounds. In the end, they remain part of us, and we remain part of them within the same national and ideological framework.

We also saw a channel pointing out the martyrdom narrative of Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, referencing his past ideas and attempts to normalize relations with America. This is indeed a lesson from history, and many people misunderstand such figures. However, while criticism of past positions is legitimate, it does not allow us to reduce their status or turn them into objects of ridicule. Even in revolution's history, In our own families many senior families and members had different views, and some supported early ideas of normalization with America or even Europe for the sake of peace. Everyone sought stability in their own understanding, though history later judged some positions as incorrect. Some repented, others passed away holding those beliefs, but all were part of their time and context.

We also saw channels that completely distorted narratives over time, for example targeting figures like Martyr Abu Udayah or others based on selective interpretations of their positions toward Shiism or ideological alignment. Such approaches are deeply harmful and distort the intellectual and historical fabric of practical-resistance discourse.

The late Imam and the martyred Imam, who shaped the revolutionary framework over decades, demonstrated the ability to integrate diverse currents into a unified ideological society. It was he who absorbed different strands of thought and guided figures like Ali Larijani, transformed him into a revolutionary one. It was also under his leadership that figures like Kamal Kharrazi remained within the advisory circle, even when disagreements existed.

From this, the lesson is clear: we may reject positions, criticize policies, and oppose individuals by name when necessary for example: targeting Javad Zarif is the most important task, but this must be done within disciplined boundaries, not through emotional destruction.

🔹@enemywatch

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4) Imam Mujtaba Khamenei is performing his duty as intended.

Western actors are trying hard to create confusion and target Imam Mujtaba Khamenei, who holds the same position as the Martyr Imam Khamenei. Imam Mujtaba Khamenei is the leader, and he is fulfilling his duty properly. He stands where his father stood.

A major flaw in public perception is that many are not fully aware of the position of the Wali al-Faqih. The leader is at the top in every sense of authority in the Islamic system. No foreign minister or official can simply act independently or “sell whatever he wants.” Rather, whatever happens is known, guided, and confirmed through the leader’s statements and positions.

The Wali al-Faqih is the highest authority in the Islamic system (not in the sense of external acceptance or rejection, but within the doctrinal framework), and the first in the Shia world in terms of religious-political authority. Some people incorrectly assume that officials operate independently, or that decisions are fragmented. In reality, the leader defines the core direction, and strategic decisions are aligned with that framework. It is therefore impossible for major decisions to contradict the ideological and Islamic foundations.

At the same time, it must also be understood that this is not a dictatorial system. Officials have significant space to perform their duties—more than in many other systems. The leader’s role is guidance, supervision, and final alignment rather than micro-management of every action.

In sensitive matters such as resistance and security issues, authority ultimately rests with the leader and the armed forces. No external narrative or media interpretation can alter or override this structure.

However, some reformist officials often use the idea of “permission from the Leader” in a way that creates confusion. It must be made clear that there is a difference between permission and direct order.

The martyred Leader Imam Khamenei and Imam Mujtaba Khamenei did not order these talks, but rather permitted the Foreign Ministry to enter negotiations when it expressed interest in doing so. This also reflects the relative independence and operational space that ministries enjoy even in sensitive matters.

At the same time, it must be understood that such permission is not unconditional. It is always granted within specific guidelines, parameters, and red lines defined by the leadership. It is not simply general approval without structure or oversight.

🔹@enemywatch | End

🇦🇫 | Armed attack targets civilians in Shia area of Herat; casualties reported:

Yesterday, local sources in Herat reported that armed individuals opened fire on civilians in a Shia-populated area in Dah Mehri, Injil district of Herat province, near the shrine of Sayed Mohammad Agha. According to reports, the incident resulted in martyrs, although the exact number of victims remains unclear.

#AghanistanShia
#ShiaGenocide

🔹@enemywatch

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🇰🇼 | Arrests of individuals in Kuwait on charges of alleged financing links to the IRGC and Hezbollah:

Kuwaiti regime have arrested former Shiite MP Professor Adnan Abdulsamad, Dr. Sayed Ahmed Al-Mousawi, Head of the English Department at Kuwait University, former MP Ahmed Lari, former MP Dr. Khalil Abdullah Abul, former MP Professor Hani Shams, and former MP Professor Mubarak Al-Najadah on charges related to alleged financing links to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah.

The arrests were carried out on false allegations of providing financial support to the IRGC and Hezbollah, according to claims.

#KuwaitShia

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🇸🇦: 🇧🇭 | Widespread arrests against Shiites in Gulf states and related protest actions reported:

The Saudi authorities have arrested Shia scholar Sayed Muhammad Baqir Al-Nasser (Abu Taha) after continuous restrictions on his religious activities, as part of an ongoing campaign targeting scholars and activists in Qatif and Al-Ahsa in the Hijaz region.

In Qatif, Saudi authorities are also reported to have arrested a number of Shiite clerics amid an expanded enforcement campaign.

In Bahrain, reports state that Ayatullah Sayed Abdullah Al-Ghuraifi was arrested by the Bahraini authorities, along with Abdullah Abbas Al-Mousawi, a young Shiite detainee.

#BahrainShia
#SaudiShia

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🇮🇷 | Iran imposes fees for Strait of Hormuz passage:

US media reports indicate that Iran intends to allow approximately 10 to 12 ships per day to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, in exchange for fees that could reach up to $2 million per supertanker.

According to the reports, shipowners from several countries are said to be in negotiations with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to obtain transit permits through the strategic waterway. Vessels permitted to pass would be required to follow designated routes and obtain official authorization prior to transit.

The reports further state that this development follows remarks attributed to Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi regarding the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz after a two-week ceasefire.

🔹@enemywatch

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🇪🇺 | Airports Council International (ACI) Europe warns of aviation disruption due to Strait of Hormuz risks:

Airports Council International (ACI) Europe has warned that if disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz continue for another three weeks, flight operations across Europe could face significant disruptions.

In an urgent letter to the European Commission, ACI Europe stated that prolonged instability in the Strait of Hormuz could lead to a systemic shortage of jet fuel across the European continent. The organization, representing more than 600 European airports, emphasized that if maritime traffic through the Strait is not sustainably restored within three weeks, jet fuel reserves may reach critical levels.

The Financial Times also reported that reduced energy shipments from the Arabian Gulf could eventually result in widespread disruptions to European flight schedules.

🔹@enemywatch

🇮🇷 | | Hunting Zionist regime drones from the sea:

An “Orbiter” drone belonging to the Zionist regime was retrieved from the waters of the Arabian Gulf by the nets of fishermen in the Iranian city of Bushehr.

🔹@enemywatch

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