🇰🇼 Breaking — HIMARS rocket systems of the American army are striking Iranian territory from Kuwaiti soil. These rocket launchers utilize a range of missiles, such as ATACMS with a range of 300 kilometers or PrSM with a range of 500 kilometers, and are well-suited for targeting various locations in southwestern Iran.

🔹@enemywatch

🇮🇶 | Islamic Resistance in Iraq -

1) Saraya Awliya al-Damm's operations during 22 days.

Total number of operations: 136
Within: 22 days

Aerial reconnaissance operation targeting the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad
Hudhud al-Awliya – 1 operation

U.S. targets in Iraqi Kurdistan

55 operations
• 53 by drones
• 2 by missiles

Victory Base (U.S.) in Baghdad

31 operations
• 25 by drones
• 6 by missiles

U.S. targets in Syria

11 operations
• 9 by drones
• 2 by missiles

U.S. targets in Jordan

19 operations
• All by drones

U.S. targets in Saudi Arabia

11 operations
• All by drones

U.S. targets in Kuwait

8 operations
• All by drones

2) Ashab al-Kahf

Took responsibility for targeting the interests of the American occupation in northern Iraq using drone aircraft on 24/03/2026.

#IraqiResistance

🔹@enemywatch

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🇮🇷 | Imam Mujtaba Khamenei’s “best” appointments

What has been taking shape under Imam Mujtaba Khamenei since the beginning of his leadership of the Islamic Revolution, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Wali al-Faqih, is becoming clearer with each step. In his first statement, he outlined a complete seven-point plan for responding to enemies while also addressing a wide range of internal and external issues.

He then instructed previous officials, through a formal letter, to continue carrying out their duties without disruption. This was followed by an important message for Eid and Nowruz, where he not only spoke in detail but also named the Persian New Year with a focus on strengthening the domestic economy. Alongside this, he issued separate statements on the martyrdoms of Dr. Ali Larijani, Sardar Gholamreza Soleimani, and Sayyid Ismail Khatib. So far, these form the core of his official correspondences.

A key aspect to understand is the transition between Imam Ali Khamenei and Imam Mujtaba Khamenei. The former spent years preparing a generation of capable, loyal, and ideologically firm figures among his students and commanders. What we are now seeing is Imam Mujtaba identifying, selecting, and positioning the most suitable among them for this phase.

Among his early steps, he retained experienced figures like Mohsen Rezaei as military advisor and kept Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati as political advisor. Today’s appointment of Mohammad Baqir Zolghadr (in Farsi we say Zolgadr) as the secretary of Supreme National security council (SNSC) further reflects this direction. It signals that Iran is entering a more defined and decisive phase of governance—one that required years of groundwork and, as some would argue, could only emerge after the martyrdom of Imam Ali Khamenei. For every phase, there is a reason behind its timing.

Hajj Zolghadr is widely known for his firmness and uncompromising approach. His selection suggests a preference for strong revolutionary figures with operational experience and disciplined working styles. Over the years, he has held numerous sensitive positions across military, security, and judicial institutions. He served as a commander within the Revolutionary Guards, including roles such as heading the Ramazan Garrison and serving as Chief of Staff, later becoming Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC and taking on responsibilities within the General Staff, particularly in Basij affairs.

His experience also extends into government and judiciary structures, where he worked as Security and Disciplinary Deputy Minister of Interior, later as Deputy Minister, and then as Strategic Deputy of the Judiciary. He was also involved in electoral and advisory roles, including heading the electoral staff of the Popular Front of Revolutionary Forces and serving as Secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council.

He is generally described as a disciplined, strategic, and quietly influential figure, someone who prioritizes action over public rhetoric. His background reflects a combination of field experience and institutional depth, allowing him to operate effectively in both operational and policy-level roles.

With this appointment, Imam Mujtaba Khamenei appears to be shaping a new phase where internal pressure, covert agendas, and attempts to weaken revolutionary structures will be confronted more directly.

🔹@enemywatch

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✅ | Saudi Arabia, in CIA-media Telegraph, AXIOS, NY TIMES, is portrayed as the country urging the Americans to hit Iran harder and capture its oil facilities. In reality, Saudi Arabia is not in a position to retaliate directly. Instead, the Americans want to impose Saudi Arabia and Pakistan into the war. Witkoff is probably in Pakistan to pursue an already decided plan—to attack Iran in the name of a so-called “defense agreement,” possibly involving Pakistan.

It has become clear that while the Saudi regime is not going directly against Iran, it is doing something worse in Lebanon. The removal of the Iranian ambassador in Lebanon, which was also welcomed by the Zionist foreign minister, is part of a Saudi-American move (Trump negotiated with Lebanon for this, and the mission was carried out by his Saudi bellboys), carried out through its tools in other countries under its influence.

The Lebanese government’s decision to withdraw approval for the Iranian ambassador and declare him an unwanted person exposes Lebanon to unnecessary risks and will deepen the state’s crisis. This behavior contradicts the realities of the regional balance of power and the developments achieved so far in the course of the war.

What is happening in Nawaf Salam’s conduct and within the government can only be understood as a preemptive attempt to prevent the political consolidation of Tehran’s achievements and those of its ally Hezbollah in the war. However, since Washington may be forced into negotiations to stop the war, including the Lebanese front within Iran’s conditions, this step by Salam’s government can be considered ineffective and indeed will backfire, leaving Nawaf feckless.

In the end, the results of the war will either lead to Nawaf Salam’s government reversing all its hostile and unpatriotic decisions against the resistance and its guardian Iran, or to the fall of the entire government and its replacement by another—an outcome that appears more likely.

🔹@enemywatch