Works of mercy
"We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts, not for His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For He needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy, whereby we supply others' defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor's well-being, according to Hebrews 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained."
"The sum total of the Christian religion consists in mercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity, whereby we are united to God preponderates over both love and mercy for our neighbor."
"Charity likens us to God by uniting us to Him in the bond of love: wherefore it surpasses mercy, which likens us to God as regards similarity of works."
Summa Theologiae, II,II, Q30, Art.4
#charity
"We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts, not for His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For He needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy, whereby we supply others' defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor's well-being, according to Hebrews 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained."
"The sum total of the Christian religion consists in mercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity, whereby we are united to God preponderates over both love and mercy for our neighbor."
"Charity likens us to God by uniting us to Him in the bond of love: wherefore it surpasses mercy, which likens us to God as regards similarity of works."
Summa Theologiae, II,II, Q30, Art.4
#charity
Ecce Verbum
On the Teaching of Truth Happy the man who is instructed by Truth itself, not by signs and passing words (Num 12:8), but as It is in itself. Our own conjectures and observations often mislead us, and we discover little. Of what value are lengthy controversies…
An analogy between eating well and learning well
"Then we should be careful to provide this wholesome food in proper amount. Mental gluttony, or over-reading, is a dangerous propensity, tending to weakness of digestive power, and in some cases to loss of appetite: we know that bread is a good and wholesome food, but who would like to try the experiment of eating two or three loaves at a sitting?
I have heard a physician telling his patient—whose complaint was merely gluttony and want of exercise—that ‘the earliest symptom of hyper-nutrition is a deposition of adipose tissue,’ and no doubt the fine long words greatly consoled the poor man under his increasing load of fat.
I wonder if there is such a thing in nature as a fat mind? I really think I have met with one or two: minds which could not keep up with the slowest trot in conversation; could not jump over a logical fence, to save their lives; always got stuck fast in a narrow argument; and, in short, were fit for nothing but to waddle helplessly through the world."
source: an essay by Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll), "Feeding the Mind".
"Then we should be careful to provide this wholesome food in proper amount. Mental gluttony, or over-reading, is a dangerous propensity, tending to weakness of digestive power, and in some cases to loss of appetite: we know that bread is a good and wholesome food, but who would like to try the experiment of eating two or three loaves at a sitting?
I have heard a physician telling his patient—whose complaint was merely gluttony and want of exercise—that ‘the earliest symptom of hyper-nutrition is a deposition of adipose tissue,’ and no doubt the fine long words greatly consoled the poor man under his increasing load of fat.
I wonder if there is such a thing in nature as a fat mind? I really think I have met with one or two: minds which could not keep up with the slowest trot in conversation; could not jump over a logical fence, to save their lives; always got stuck fast in a narrow argument; and, in short, were fit for nothing but to waddle helplessly through the world."
source: an essay by Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll), "Feeding the Mind".
Ecce Verbum
An analogy between eating well and learning well "Then we should be careful to provide this wholesome food in proper amount. Mental gluttony, or over-reading, is a dangerous propensity, tending to weakness of digestive power, and in some cases to loss of…
Rule for correspondence that has, unfortunately, become controversial
•Don’t repeat yourself
When once you have had your say fully and clearly on a certain point, and have failed to convince your friend, drop that subject. To repeat your arguments all over again, will simply lead to his doing the same, and so you will go on like a circulating decimal. Did you ever know a circulating decimal come to an end?’
• ‘If your friend makes a severe remark, either leave it unnoticed, or make your reply distinctly less severe; and if he makes a friendly remark, tending towards making up the little difference that has arisen between you, let your reply be distinctly more friendly.
‘If, in picking a quarrel, each party declined to go more than three-eighths of the way, and if in making friends, each was ready to go five-eighths of the way—why, there would be more reconciliations than quarrels! Which is like the Irishman’s remonstrance to his gad-about daughter: “Shure, you’re always goin’ out! You go out three times for wanst that you come in!”’
• ‘Don’t try to get the last word.... (N.B.—If you are a gentleman and your friend a lady, this rule is superfluous: You won’t get the last word!)’
Let the last word to-day be part of another rule, which gives a glimpse into that gentle heart:
• ‘When you have written a letter that you feel may possibly irritate your friend, however necessary you may have felt it to so express yourself, put it aside till the next day. Then read it over again, and fancy it addressed to yourself. This will often lead to your writing it all over again, taking out a lot of the vinegar and pepper and putting in honey instead, and thus making a much more palatable dish of it!’
source: William H. Draper, Prefatory note to "Feeding the Mind" by Lewis Carroll
#speech
•Don’t repeat yourself
When once you have had your say fully and clearly on a certain point, and have failed to convince your friend, drop that subject. To repeat your arguments all over again, will simply lead to his doing the same, and so you will go on like a circulating decimal. Did you ever know a circulating decimal come to an end?’
• ‘If your friend makes a severe remark, either leave it unnoticed, or make your reply distinctly less severe; and if he makes a friendly remark, tending towards making up the little difference that has arisen between you, let your reply be distinctly more friendly.
‘If, in picking a quarrel, each party declined to go more than three-eighths of the way, and if in making friends, each was ready to go five-eighths of the way—why, there would be more reconciliations than quarrels! Which is like the Irishman’s remonstrance to his gad-about daughter: “Shure, you’re always goin’ out! You go out three times for wanst that you come in!”’
• ‘Don’t try to get the last word.... (N.B.—If you are a gentleman and your friend a lady, this rule is superfluous: You won’t get the last word!)’
Let the last word to-day be part of another rule, which gives a glimpse into that gentle heart:
• ‘When you have written a letter that you feel may possibly irritate your friend, however necessary you may have felt it to so express yourself, put it aside till the next day. Then read it over again, and fancy it addressed to yourself. This will often lead to your writing it all over again, taking out a lot of the vinegar and pepper and putting in honey instead, and thus making a much more palatable dish of it!’
source: William H. Draper, Prefatory note to "Feeding the Mind" by Lewis Carroll
#speech
Ecce Verbum
The emptiness of non-Christian Philosophy The Spirit of St. Francis de Sales, page 76 I was speaking on one occasion of the writings of Seneca and of Plutarch, praising them highly and saying that they had been my delight when young, our Blessed Father replied:…
Aquinas on studying philosophy
Of all human studies, the study of wisdom is the most complete, most sublime, most useful, and most joyful:
Most complete because, inasmuch as man gives himself to the study of wisdom, so much does he have already some part of true beatitude, so that the wise man says, "Blessed the man who continues in wisdom" (Sir 14:22).
And it is most sublime because through this, man preeminently approaches to the divine likeness, who "made everything through wisdom" (Ps 103:24), in that, because likeness is the cause of love, the study of wisdom preeminently unites with God through friendship. Thus Wis 7:14 says that wisdom "is an infinite treasury to men, of a sort that those who use are made participants in friendship with God."
And it is most useful because through this wisdom we come to the kingdom of immortality: "Craving for wisdom leads to the perpetual kingdom" (Wis 6:21).
And it is most joyful because "her company has no harshness, nor her banquet any sorrow, but gladness and delight" (Wis 7:16).
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles 1.2.1
*Studium could also be translated as 'pursuit', so one could substitute that for 'study' at any point here. The point of the 'most complete' is that, as the pursuit of wisdom already participates in beatitude, and beatitude or happiness lacking nothing is the ultimate end and goal of all human pursuits, there is nothing in any pursuit it does not in some way cover. Thus the honest seeker of wisdom, to the extent that he or she actually seeks wisdom, is fulfilled as a human being (blessed), a friend of God, is preparing for an inexhaustible reward, and is already in the process of achieving what he or she loves (which is how Aquinas understands joy).
*If one follows through the reasoning, the claim is that the pursuit of wisdom is more complete, sublime, useful, and joyful than all (other) human pursuits.
#philosophy
Of all human studies, the study of wisdom is the most complete, most sublime, most useful, and most joyful:
Most complete because, inasmuch as man gives himself to the study of wisdom, so much does he have already some part of true beatitude, so that the wise man says, "Blessed the man who continues in wisdom" (Sir 14:22).
And it is most sublime because through this, man preeminently approaches to the divine likeness, who "made everything through wisdom" (Ps 103:24), in that, because likeness is the cause of love, the study of wisdom preeminently unites with God through friendship. Thus Wis 7:14 says that wisdom "is an infinite treasury to men, of a sort that those who use are made participants in friendship with God."
And it is most useful because through this wisdom we come to the kingdom of immortality: "Craving for wisdom leads to the perpetual kingdom" (Wis 6:21).
And it is most joyful because "her company has no harshness, nor her banquet any sorrow, but gladness and delight" (Wis 7:16).
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles 1.2.1
*Studium could also be translated as 'pursuit', so one could substitute that for 'study' at any point here. The point of the 'most complete' is that, as the pursuit of wisdom already participates in beatitude, and beatitude or happiness lacking nothing is the ultimate end and goal of all human pursuits, there is nothing in any pursuit it does not in some way cover. Thus the honest seeker of wisdom, to the extent that he or she actually seeks wisdom, is fulfilled as a human being (blessed), a friend of God, is preparing for an inexhaustible reward, and is already in the process of achieving what he or she loves (which is how Aquinas understands joy).
*If one follows through the reasoning, the claim is that the pursuit of wisdom is more complete, sublime, useful, and joyful than all (other) human pursuits.
#philosophy
Ecce Verbum
A Good Rule for Finding the Truth "A good rule for finding the truth is to draw near it with an unprejudiced mind and a will equally disposed to receive whatever the truth has to give -- if we do not approach in this way, we hear not what it says to us, but…
Man's rational nature
"It ought not to be disputed that rational nature was made holy by God, in order to be happy in enjoying Him. For to this end is it rational, in order to discern justice and injustice, good and evil, and between the greater and the lesser good. Otherwise it was made rational in vain. But God made it not rational in vain. Wherefore, doubtless, it was made rational for this end....Wherefore rational nature was made holy, in order to be happy in enjoying the supreme good, which is God. Therefore man, whose nature is rational, was made holy for this end, that he might be happy in enjoying God."
St. Anselm, Doctor of the Church, Cur Deus Homo 2.1
#fidesetratio
"It ought not to be disputed that rational nature was made holy by God, in order to be happy in enjoying Him. For to this end is it rational, in order to discern justice and injustice, good and evil, and between the greater and the lesser good. Otherwise it was made rational in vain. But God made it not rational in vain. Wherefore, doubtless, it was made rational for this end....Wherefore rational nature was made holy, in order to be happy in enjoying the supreme good, which is God. Therefore man, whose nature is rational, was made holy for this end, that he might be happy in enjoying God."
St. Anselm, Doctor of the Church, Cur Deus Homo 2.1
#fidesetratio
"Where is the New Theology Leading Us?"
Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Legrange, O.P
On the far-reaching consequences of abandoning rational philosophy
#philosophy #fidesetratio
Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Legrange, O.P
On the far-reaching consequences of abandoning rational philosophy
#philosophy #fidesetratio
St. Athanasius's criticism of Arians
• In Discourse I Against the Arians (§1), he identifies one of Arianism’s most dangerous tendencies—its constant use of Scripture to deceive the faithful.
•In §§52-53, St. Athanasius asserts that while Arians tend to frequently employ Scripture, since they do so apart from the Church “according to their wont,” they employed it in an “irreligious” way. They thereby make their own peculiar beliefs the standard by which they interpret—and thereby misinterpret—the Scriptures:
"For being forced from conceptions or rather misconceptions of their [the Arians’] own hearts, they fall back upon passages of divine Scripture, and here too from want of understanding, according to their wont, they discern not their meaning; but laying down their own irreligion as a sort of canon of interpretation, they wrest the whole of the divine oracles into accordance with it. And so on the bare mention of such doctrine, they deserve nothing but the reply, “You do err, not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God.” [Matt. 22:29]…These passages they brought forward at every turn, mistaking their sense…and thus they deceive the thoughtless, making the language of Scripture their pretense, but instead of the true sense sowing upon it the poison of their own heresy."
•In De Synodis (§14), St. Athanasius decried the manner in which Arians simply rejected the traditions and teachings of the Fathers (by which he meant previous Church Fathers, as well as the Bishops who promulgated the Nicene Creed), and that by doing so they were acting contrary to the teachings of the Apostles, which had been faithfully delivered by such means:
"The blessed Apostle approves of the Corinthians because, he says, “you remember me in all things, and keep the traditions as I delivered them to you.” [1 Cor. 11:2]"
"But they [Arians], as entertaining such views of their predecessors, will have the daring to say just the reverse to their flocks: “We praise you not for remembering your fathers, but rather we make much of you when you hold not their traditions.”
And let them go on to accuse their own unfortunate birth, and say, “We are sprung not of religious men, but of heretics.” For such language, as I said before, is consistent in those who barter their Fathers’ fame and their own salvation for Arianism, and fear not the words of the divine proverb, “There is a generation that curseth their father,” [Prov. 30:11; Ex. 21:17] and the threat lying in the Law against such."
"They then, from zeal for the heresy, are of this obstinate temper; you, however, be not troubled at it, nor take their audacity for truth. For they dissent from each other, and whereas they have revolted from their Fathers, are not of one and the same mind, but float about with various and discordant changes."
•While rejecting their Fathers in the Faith, he described how the Arians who justified doing so appealed to Scripture as their sole authority, claiming to reject everything that was not written (§36):
“But,” they say, “all this is not written: and we reject these words as unscriptural.” But this, again, is an unblushing excuse in their mouths. For if they think everything must be rejected which is not written [in Scripture], wherefore, when the Arian party invent such a heap of phrases, not from Scripture, “out of nothing,” and “the Son was not before His generation,” and “Once He was not,” and “He is alterable,” and “the Father is ineffable and invisible to the Son,” and “the Son knows not even His own essence,” and all that Arius has vomited in his light and irreligious Thalia [a work by Arius], why do not they speak against these, but rather take their part, and on that account contend with their own Fathers?"
part2
• In Discourse I Against the Arians (§1), he identifies one of Arianism’s most dangerous tendencies—its constant use of Scripture to deceive the faithful.
•In §§52-53, St. Athanasius asserts that while Arians tend to frequently employ Scripture, since they do so apart from the Church “according to their wont,” they employed it in an “irreligious” way. They thereby make their own peculiar beliefs the standard by which they interpret—and thereby misinterpret—the Scriptures:
"For being forced from conceptions or rather misconceptions of their [the Arians’] own hearts, they fall back upon passages of divine Scripture, and here too from want of understanding, according to their wont, they discern not their meaning; but laying down their own irreligion as a sort of canon of interpretation, they wrest the whole of the divine oracles into accordance with it. And so on the bare mention of such doctrine, they deserve nothing but the reply, “You do err, not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God.” [Matt. 22:29]…These passages they brought forward at every turn, mistaking their sense…and thus they deceive the thoughtless, making the language of Scripture their pretense, but instead of the true sense sowing upon it the poison of their own heresy."
•In De Synodis (§14), St. Athanasius decried the manner in which Arians simply rejected the traditions and teachings of the Fathers (by which he meant previous Church Fathers, as well as the Bishops who promulgated the Nicene Creed), and that by doing so they were acting contrary to the teachings of the Apostles, which had been faithfully delivered by such means:
"The blessed Apostle approves of the Corinthians because, he says, “you remember me in all things, and keep the traditions as I delivered them to you.” [1 Cor. 11:2]"
"But they [Arians], as entertaining such views of their predecessors, will have the daring to say just the reverse to their flocks: “We praise you not for remembering your fathers, but rather we make much of you when you hold not their traditions.”
And let them go on to accuse their own unfortunate birth, and say, “We are sprung not of religious men, but of heretics.” For such language, as I said before, is consistent in those who barter their Fathers’ fame and their own salvation for Arianism, and fear not the words of the divine proverb, “There is a generation that curseth their father,” [Prov. 30:11; Ex. 21:17] and the threat lying in the Law against such."
"They then, from zeal for the heresy, are of this obstinate temper; you, however, be not troubled at it, nor take their audacity for truth. For they dissent from each other, and whereas they have revolted from their Fathers, are not of one and the same mind, but float about with various and discordant changes."
•While rejecting their Fathers in the Faith, he described how the Arians who justified doing so appealed to Scripture as their sole authority, claiming to reject everything that was not written (§36):
“But,” they say, “all this is not written: and we reject these words as unscriptural.” But this, again, is an unblushing excuse in their mouths. For if they think everything must be rejected which is not written [in Scripture], wherefore, when the Arian party invent such a heap of phrases, not from Scripture, “out of nothing,” and “the Son was not before His generation,” and “Once He was not,” and “He is alterable,” and “the Father is ineffable and invisible to the Son,” and “the Son knows not even His own essence,” and all that Arius has vomited in his light and irreligious Thalia [a work by Arius], why do not they speak against these, but rather take their part, and on that account contend with their own Fathers?"
part2
www.newadvent.org
CHURCH FATHERS: De Decretis (Athanasius)
Featuring the Church Fathers, Catholic Encyclopedia, Summa Theologica and more.
Ecce Verbum
St. Athanasius's criticism of Arians • In Discourse I Against the Arians (§1), he identifies one of Arianism’s most dangerous tendencies—its constant use of Scripture to deceive the faithful. •In §§52-53, St. Athanasius asserts that while Arians tend to…
St. Athanasius's criticism of Arians p.2
•In De Decretis (§3), he called the definitions of the Council of Nicaea “sound and ecclesiastical,” and “the Church’s faith, and the tradition of the Fathers.”
•In §4 of the same work, he describes how those who hold true doctrine are not only united among themselves, but with what had been delivered to them by the Fathers. Heretics, on the other hand, were constantly shifting their positions and quarreling with one another—a process he describes in detail as taking place among the Arians, who were constantly rewording and changing their confessions of faith:
"For, what our Fathers have delivered, this is truly doctrine; and this is truly the token of doctors, to confess the same thing with each other, and to vary neither from themselves nor from their fathers; whereas they who have not this character are to be called not true doctors but evil. Thus the [Arians], as not witnessing to the same doctrines, but quarreling one with another, have no truth of teaching; but the holy and veritable heralds of the truth agree together and do not differ."
•St. Athanasius was consistently appealing to the very things the heretics rejected—binding Apostolic tradition, and the rulings/definitions of our Fathers in the Faith at Ecumenical Councils whose authority bound the entire Church.
• In many places, St. Athanasius went on to explain why citing Scripture, on its own, was not the path to the true Faith. After all, Satan himself had quoted Scripture to Christ. So quoting Scripture, and being able to weave it together according to a seemingly coherent individual theology, wasn’t enough. Rather, the interpretation of Scripture must be guided by what in various places St. Athanasius calls the “ecclesiastical” and “religious sense.”
•In his Discourse II Against the Arians (§34), he rhetorically asks the following:
"Who heard, in his first catechizing, that God has a Son and has made all things by His proper Word, but understood it in that sense in which we now mean it [referring to the Arian interpretation]? Who on the rise of this odious heresy of the Arians, was not at once startled at what he heard, as strange, and a second sowing, besides that Word which had been sown from the beginning?"
*Reference to the reader’s “first catechizing.”: Catechesis was the process by which converts were taught the Catholic Faith prior to being baptized, confirmed, and receiving the Eucharist. In other words, St. Athanasius directs the reader to what had been passed down and taught in the Church itself as the proper standard for interpreting Scripture.
•In De Decretis (§13), he contrasts this with the Arian pretension to basing their beliefs on Scripture:
"Therefore let them tell us, from what teacher or by what tradition they derived these notions concerning the Savior? “We have read [in Scripture],” they will say…But they seem to me to have a wrong understanding of this passage also; for it has a religious and very orthodox sense, which had they understood, they would not have blasphemed the Lord of glory."
• In Discourse III Against the Arians (§10), he contrasts private interpretation of Scripture with the preaching of the Church:
"However here too they introduce their private fictions, and contend that the Son and the Father are not in such wise “one,” or “like,” as the Church preaches, but, as they themselves would have it."
•In the same work (§18), he refers to the various ways in which one arrives at a correct interpretation:
"And yet, needless though it may be to refine upon these passages, considering their so clear and religious sense, and our own orthodox belief, yet that their irreligion may be shown here also, come let us shortly, as we have received from the fathers, expose their heterodoxy from the passage."
part1
part3
•In De Decretis (§3), he called the definitions of the Council of Nicaea “sound and ecclesiastical,” and “the Church’s faith, and the tradition of the Fathers.”
•In §4 of the same work, he describes how those who hold true doctrine are not only united among themselves, but with what had been delivered to them by the Fathers. Heretics, on the other hand, were constantly shifting their positions and quarreling with one another—a process he describes in detail as taking place among the Arians, who were constantly rewording and changing their confessions of faith:
"For, what our Fathers have delivered, this is truly doctrine; and this is truly the token of doctors, to confess the same thing with each other, and to vary neither from themselves nor from their fathers; whereas they who have not this character are to be called not true doctors but evil. Thus the [Arians], as not witnessing to the same doctrines, but quarreling one with another, have no truth of teaching; but the holy and veritable heralds of the truth agree together and do not differ."
•St. Athanasius was consistently appealing to the very things the heretics rejected—binding Apostolic tradition, and the rulings/definitions of our Fathers in the Faith at Ecumenical Councils whose authority bound the entire Church.
• In many places, St. Athanasius went on to explain why citing Scripture, on its own, was not the path to the true Faith. After all, Satan himself had quoted Scripture to Christ. So quoting Scripture, and being able to weave it together according to a seemingly coherent individual theology, wasn’t enough. Rather, the interpretation of Scripture must be guided by what in various places St. Athanasius calls the “ecclesiastical” and “religious sense.”
•In his Discourse II Against the Arians (§34), he rhetorically asks the following:
"Who heard, in his first catechizing, that God has a Son and has made all things by His proper Word, but understood it in that sense in which we now mean it [referring to the Arian interpretation]? Who on the rise of this odious heresy of the Arians, was not at once startled at what he heard, as strange, and a second sowing, besides that Word which had been sown from the beginning?"
*Reference to the reader’s “first catechizing.”: Catechesis was the process by which converts were taught the Catholic Faith prior to being baptized, confirmed, and receiving the Eucharist. In other words, St. Athanasius directs the reader to what had been passed down and taught in the Church itself as the proper standard for interpreting Scripture.
•In De Decretis (§13), he contrasts this with the Arian pretension to basing their beliefs on Scripture:
"Therefore let them tell us, from what teacher or by what tradition they derived these notions concerning the Savior? “We have read [in Scripture],” they will say…But they seem to me to have a wrong understanding of this passage also; for it has a religious and very orthodox sense, which had they understood, they would not have blasphemed the Lord of glory."
• In Discourse III Against the Arians (§10), he contrasts private interpretation of Scripture with the preaching of the Church:
"However here too they introduce their private fictions, and contend that the Son and the Father are not in such wise “one,” or “like,” as the Church preaches, but, as they themselves would have it."
•In the same work (§18), he refers to the various ways in which one arrives at a correct interpretation:
"And yet, needless though it may be to refine upon these passages, considering their so clear and religious sense, and our own orthodox belief, yet that their irreligion may be shown here also, come let us shortly, as we have received from the fathers, expose their heterodoxy from the passage."
part1
part3
www.newadvent.org
CHURCH FATHERS: De Decretis (Athanasius)
Featuring the Church Fathers, Catholic Encyclopedia, Summa Theologica and more.
Ecce Verbum
St. Athanasius's criticism of Arians p.2 •In De Decretis (§3), he called the definitions of the Council of Nicaea “sound and ecclesiastical,” and “the Church’s faith, and the tradition of the Fathers.” •In §4 of the same work, he describes how those who…
St. Athanasius's criticism of Arians p.3
• Right interpretation is inherently connected to a pre-existing “religious sense” derived from “orthodox belief” in accordance with what has been “received from the fathers”—the doctrine, as St. Athanasius said, Christians learned in Catechesis. This is confirmed later in the same work, Discourse III Against Arians (§28):
"[W]hat they [the Arians] now allege from the Gospels they certainly give an unsound interpretation, we may easily see if we now consider the scope of that faith which we Christians hold, and using it as a rule, apply ourselves, as the Apostle teaches, to the reading of inspired Scripture."
•Likewise, in §40, he speaks of rejecting an Arian notion about God’s wisdom because “neither in the divine oracles [Scripture] is found another wisdom besides this Son, nor from the fathers have we heard of any such…”
• According to St. Athanasius, the rule of faith is that standard by which we properly understand the Scriptures as well—a canon of interpretation, and thus a rule of faith that is both outside, and completely compatible with (indeed necessary to) a proper reading of Scripture, having been passed down in the Church Herself, as the Scriptures themselves were. As Athanasius says, this is exactly “as the Apostles teaches.”
•He might have been thinking of verses such as 2 Thessalonians 2:15, in which St. Paul commands: “So brethren, stand firm and hold to the traditions which you were taught by us, either by word of mouth or by letter.” Or 1 Corinthians 11:2, where he told the Corinthians “I commend you because you remember me in everything and maintain the traditions even as I have delivered them to you.”
• In other words, the original means by which the original Christians had received the Faith—through the Apostolic preaching and example lived out among them—could not be pitted against that which they also received from the Apostles in writing, namely Scripture. Both constitute the Apostolic tradition. They are not at odds, but partners in a necessary union.
• In §58, he again asserts the necessity of interpreting Scripture with an “ecclesiastical scope”:
"Had Christ’s enemies [heretics] dwelt on these thoughts, and recognized the ecclesiastical scope as an anchor for the faith, they would not have made shipwreck of the faith.."
• In his conclusion (§67), he declares that it is because they have rejected this “ecclesiastical scope,” this “anchor of the faith,” that when it came to the Arian heretics, “the divine Scriptures are closed to them…”
part2
• Right interpretation is inherently connected to a pre-existing “religious sense” derived from “orthodox belief” in accordance with what has been “received from the fathers”—the doctrine, as St. Athanasius said, Christians learned in Catechesis. This is confirmed later in the same work, Discourse III Against Arians (§28):
"[W]hat they [the Arians] now allege from the Gospels they certainly give an unsound interpretation, we may easily see if we now consider the scope of that faith which we Christians hold, and using it as a rule, apply ourselves, as the Apostle teaches, to the reading of inspired Scripture."
•Likewise, in §40, he speaks of rejecting an Arian notion about God’s wisdom because “neither in the divine oracles [Scripture] is found another wisdom besides this Son, nor from the fathers have we heard of any such…”
• According to St. Athanasius, the rule of faith is that standard by which we properly understand the Scriptures as well—a canon of interpretation, and thus a rule of faith that is both outside, and completely compatible with (indeed necessary to) a proper reading of Scripture, having been passed down in the Church Herself, as the Scriptures themselves were. As Athanasius says, this is exactly “as the Apostles teaches.”
•He might have been thinking of verses such as 2 Thessalonians 2:15, in which St. Paul commands: “So brethren, stand firm and hold to the traditions which you were taught by us, either by word of mouth or by letter.” Or 1 Corinthians 11:2, where he told the Corinthians “I commend you because you remember me in everything and maintain the traditions even as I have delivered them to you.”
• In other words, the original means by which the original Christians had received the Faith—through the Apostolic preaching and example lived out among them—could not be pitted against that which they also received from the Apostles in writing, namely Scripture. Both constitute the Apostolic tradition. They are not at odds, but partners in a necessary union.
• In §58, he again asserts the necessity of interpreting Scripture with an “ecclesiastical scope”:
"Had Christ’s enemies [heretics] dwelt on these thoughts, and recognized the ecclesiastical scope as an anchor for the faith, they would not have made shipwreck of the faith.."
• In his conclusion (§67), he declares that it is because they have rejected this “ecclesiastical scope,” this “anchor of the faith,” that when it came to the Arian heretics, “the divine Scriptures are closed to them…”
part2
www.newadvent.org
CHURCH FATHERS: Discourse III Against the Arians (Athanasius)
Featuring the Church Fathers, Catholic Encyclopedia, Summa Theologica and more.
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Man's rational nature "It ought not to be disputed that rational nature was made holy by God, in order to be happy in enjoying Him. For to this end is it rational, in order to discern justice and injustice, good and evil, and between the greater and the lesser…
Logic - the art of reason
"In the beginning of his Metaphysics, Aristotle states that the human race lives by art and reasoning. He seems to touch here on something properly human, which distinguishes man from the other animals. For while the brute animals are moved to their actions by natural instinct, we direct our actions by rational judgments.
To enable us to carry out these actions easily and in an orderly way, we have invented many arts. For an art is nothing other than a certain ordering of reason by which human acts achieve a suitable end through determinate means.
Now reason is able to direct not only the acts of inferior faculties, but also its own acts. For the capacity to reflect upon itself is proper to the intellectual power; the intellect understands itself and, similarly, reason can reason about itself.
Now, if by reasoning about the acts of the hand, we discovered building, and this art enables us to build easily and in an orderly way, then, for the same reason, we need an art to direct the acts of reason, so that in these acts also we may proceed in an orderly way, easily, and without error. This art is logic, the science of reason."
Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, Berquist, tr., Dumb Ox Books (Notre Dame, IN: 2007) p. 1
"And the attempts of some who discuss the terms on which truth should be accepted, are due to a want of training in logic [lit. ‘a lack of learning of the analytics,’ Gk. ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν]; for they should know these things already when they come to a special study, and not be inquiring into them while they are pursuing it."
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 4.4 (1005b2-5)
#fidesetratio
"In the beginning of his Metaphysics, Aristotle states that the human race lives by art and reasoning. He seems to touch here on something properly human, which distinguishes man from the other animals. For while the brute animals are moved to their actions by natural instinct, we direct our actions by rational judgments.
To enable us to carry out these actions easily and in an orderly way, we have invented many arts. For an art is nothing other than a certain ordering of reason by which human acts achieve a suitable end through determinate means.
Now reason is able to direct not only the acts of inferior faculties, but also its own acts. For the capacity to reflect upon itself is proper to the intellectual power; the intellect understands itself and, similarly, reason can reason about itself.
Now, if by reasoning about the acts of the hand, we discovered building, and this art enables us to build easily and in an orderly way, then, for the same reason, we need an art to direct the acts of reason, so that in these acts also we may proceed in an orderly way, easily, and without error. This art is logic, the science of reason."
Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, Berquist, tr., Dumb Ox Books (Notre Dame, IN: 2007) p. 1
"And the attempts of some who discuss the terms on which truth should be accepted, are due to a want of training in logic [lit. ‘a lack of learning of the analytics,’ Gk. ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν]; for they should know these things already when they come to a special study, and not be inquiring into them while they are pursuing it."
Aristotle, Metaphysics, 4.4 (1005b2-5)
#fidesetratio
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Collectivism_Individualism_and_Card.pdf
article
Irrational Rationality of Individualism,
Tortuous Logic of Collectivism
*"All communities must be of human measure. All of them must have as a starting point the rights and obligations of the human person so that a man can feel good in them, as in well-tailored clothing. Hence, social life forms cannot be built differently but according to the human person’s characteristics. Whenever social institutions and forms of social life collide with rights and duties, with the human person’s character and nature, they often become a torment."
Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Pacem in terris. Conference 2. Warsaw, St Anne’s Church, 27.01.1964
*"Contemporary philosophical systems referring to the Hegelian and Marxist traditions have held that knowing the truth (in other words, “real” knowledge) presupposes actions leading to its realization. However, theory and practice are only two sides of the same dialectical process. Moreover, they cover the whole of reality.Accompanying this is the belief that history and society can be studied in a “scientific” way by deriving laws about the future course of history and the desired shape of the social order. The ultimate goal and the fundamental task set by followers of such a theory are not to understand reality, especially social reality, but to change it."
source
*The methodology of both individualism and various collectivist concepts are currently experiencing their undoubted renaissance, significantly impacting contemporary sociopolitical life. Theories that follow extreme individualism model the fundamental dimensions of social life, emphasizing the fact that all social phenomena should be interpreted in light of facts about individuals but do so in ways that fail to capture reality in its completeness and diversity. On the other hand, collectivist concepts argue that human behavior is shaped primarily by sociological rules that cannot be reduced to particular individual facts. Collectivism comes perilously close to conformism and passivity and, consequently, apathy that leads to social stagnation. As an extreme individualist a person only seeks his own good (social egoism); as a member of a collective – he subjects himself to community aspirations, to the – very often – intangible “good of all people.”
*Among the collectivist concepts, the anthropology of Marxism-Leninism functioning in the postmodern reality bears a certain stigma of syncretism, which is its main disadvantage. It is often accused of having a tribalist and “ludic” vision of society, which has very negative consequences for understanding the role of the individual in social life and which reduces the personal dimension to a conscious extent. Consciousness understood in this way is recognized in many dimensions of social life as the creator of reality. Collectivism also em- phasizes that man is only a social being whose individual needs are secondary to the social needs. The person’s uniqueness has been subjected to a society understood as a collective."
*In turn, individualism – and especially classical capitalism based on this idea – tends to devalue the human person only to the dimension of a labor product – a kind of by-product of socio-cultural processes"
source
#personalism
Irrational Rationality of Individualism,
Tortuous Logic of Collectivism
*"All communities must be of human measure. All of them must have as a starting point the rights and obligations of the human person so that a man can feel good in them, as in well-tailored clothing. Hence, social life forms cannot be built differently but according to the human person’s characteristics. Whenever social institutions and forms of social life collide with rights and duties, with the human person’s character and nature, they often become a torment."
Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Pacem in terris. Conference 2. Warsaw, St Anne’s Church, 27.01.1964
*"Contemporary philosophical systems referring to the Hegelian and Marxist traditions have held that knowing the truth (in other words, “real” knowledge) presupposes actions leading to its realization. However, theory and practice are only two sides of the same dialectical process. Moreover, they cover the whole of reality.Accompanying this is the belief that history and society can be studied in a “scientific” way by deriving laws about the future course of history and the desired shape of the social order. The ultimate goal and the fundamental task set by followers of such a theory are not to understand reality, especially social reality, but to change it."
source
*The methodology of both individualism and various collectivist concepts are currently experiencing their undoubted renaissance, significantly impacting contemporary sociopolitical life. Theories that follow extreme individualism model the fundamental dimensions of social life, emphasizing the fact that all social phenomena should be interpreted in light of facts about individuals but do so in ways that fail to capture reality in its completeness and diversity. On the other hand, collectivist concepts argue that human behavior is shaped primarily by sociological rules that cannot be reduced to particular individual facts. Collectivism comes perilously close to conformism and passivity and, consequently, apathy that leads to social stagnation. As an extreme individualist a person only seeks his own good (social egoism); as a member of a collective – he subjects himself to community aspirations, to the – very often – intangible “good of all people.”
*Among the collectivist concepts, the anthropology of Marxism-Leninism functioning in the postmodern reality bears a certain stigma of syncretism, which is its main disadvantage. It is often accused of having a tribalist and “ludic” vision of society, which has very negative consequences for understanding the role of the individual in social life and which reduces the personal dimension to a conscious extent. Consciousness understood in this way is recognized in many dimensions of social life as the creator of reality. Collectivism also em- phasizes that man is only a social being whose individual needs are secondary to the social needs. The person’s uniqueness has been subjected to a society understood as a collective."
*In turn, individualism – and especially classical capitalism based on this idea – tends to devalue the human person only to the dimension of a labor product – a kind of by-product of socio-cultural processes"
source
#personalism
ResearchGate
(PDF) Irrational Rationality of Individualism, Tortuous Logic of Collectivism, and Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński’s Integral-Humanist…
PDF | On Dec 29, 2021, Ryszard Ficek published Irrational Rationality of Individualism, Tortuous Logic of Collectivism, and Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński’s Integral-Humanist Concept of Socio-Political Life | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate
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A Good Rule for Finding the Truth "A good rule for finding the truth is to draw near it with an unprejudiced mind and a will equally disposed to receive whatever the truth has to give -- if we do not approach in this way, we hear not what it says to us, but…
Newman on Opinion Journalism
Most men in this country like opinions to be brought to them, rather than to be at the pains to go out and seek for them.
They like to be waited on, they like to be consulted, for they like to be their own centre. As great men have their slaves or their body-servants for every need of the day, so, in an age like this, when every one reads and has a voice in public matters, it is indispensable that they should have persons to provide them with their ideas, the clothing of their mind, and that of the best fashion. Hence the extreme influence of periodical publications at this day, quarterly, monthly, or daily; these teach the multitude of men what to think and what to say. And thus is it that, in this age, every one is, intellectually, a sort of absolute king, though his realm is confined to himself or to his family; for at least he can think and say, though he cannot do, what he will, and that with no trouble at all, because he has plenty of intellectual servants to wait on him. Is it to be supposed that a man is to take the trouble of finding out truth himself, when he can pay for it? So his only object is to have cheap knowledge; that he may have his views of revelation, and dogma, and policy, and conduct,—in short, of right and wrong,—ready to hand, as he has his table-cloth laid for his breakfast, and the materials provided for the meal.
Bl. John Henry Newman, "Christ Upon the Waters--Part 2", Sermons Preached on Various Occasions.
Most men in this country like opinions to be brought to them, rather than to be at the pains to go out and seek for them.
They like to be waited on, they like to be consulted, for they like to be their own centre. As great men have their slaves or their body-servants for every need of the day, so, in an age like this, when every one reads and has a voice in public matters, it is indispensable that they should have persons to provide them with their ideas, the clothing of their mind, and that of the best fashion. Hence the extreme influence of periodical publications at this day, quarterly, monthly, or daily; these teach the multitude of men what to think and what to say. And thus is it that, in this age, every one is, intellectually, a sort of absolute king, though his realm is confined to himself or to his family; for at least he can think and say, though he cannot do, what he will, and that with no trouble at all, because he has plenty of intellectual servants to wait on him. Is it to be supposed that a man is to take the trouble of finding out truth himself, when he can pay for it? So his only object is to have cheap knowledge; that he may have his views of revelation, and dogma, and policy, and conduct,—in short, of right and wrong,—ready to hand, as he has his table-cloth laid for his breakfast, and the materials provided for the meal.
Bl. John Henry Newman, "Christ Upon the Waters--Part 2", Sermons Preached on Various Occasions.
Ecce Verbum
Dignity of Every Human Being Cardinal Wyszyński 1.Holiness in everyday life and through work Cardinal indicated the importance of holiness in everyday life, of sanctification through simple, ordinary chores and duties, including professional work. His…
Dignity of every human being
In his doctrine on creation of man, De hominis opificio, Gregory of Nyssa says that,
"Man has been created after all the rest because all the rest has been created for him. Unlike other creatures, he was created in the image of God. This can be gathered from the shape of his body, but still more from his soul, to which man owes his truly royal dignity. Man is masterless; he does everything of his own accord; he governs himself, so to speak, with supreme authority ; in short, he is a king. Man is not a king unto himself only, but with respect to the whole world. He is in the image of God, because he is a king as God is a king. The beauty that shines in God also shines in man, whose destiny it is to share in an ineffable beatitude through virtue, and thus to become still more similar to his Creator.”
Etienne, Gilson. History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages p.56,57
In his doctrine on creation of man, De hominis opificio, Gregory of Nyssa says that,
"Man has been created after all the rest because all the rest has been created for him. Unlike other creatures, he was created in the image of God. This can be gathered from the shape of his body, but still more from his soul, to which man owes his truly royal dignity. Man is masterless; he does everything of his own accord; he governs himself, so to speak, with supreme authority ; in short, he is a king. Man is not a king unto himself only, but with respect to the whole world. He is in the image of God, because he is a king as God is a king. The beauty that shines in God also shines in man, whose destiny it is to share in an ineffable beatitude through virtue, and thus to become still more similar to his Creator.”
Etienne, Gilson. History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages p.56,57