Cross Layer Attacks and How to Use Them (for DNS Cache Poisoning, Device Tracking and More)
(why does this guy always publish alone)
#dns #security
(why does this guy always publish alone)
#dns #security
ieeexplore.ieee.org
Cross Layer Attacks and How to Use Them (for DNS Cache Poisoning, Device Tracking and More)
We analyze the prandom pseudo random number generator (PRNG) in use in the Linux kernel (which is the kernel of the Linux operating system, as well as of Android) and demonstrate that this PRNG is weak. The prandom PRNG is in use by many "consumers" in the…
I_Still_Know_What_You_Did_Last_Summer_Inferring_Sensitive_User_Activities.pdf
13.4 MB
I Still Know What You Did Last Summer: Inferring Sensitive User Activities on Messaging Applications Through Traffic Analysis
Key idea: Major IM operators do not deploy effective mechanisms to obfuscate traffic characteristics (e.g., packet timing and sizes), leaking the information that "this user is using this IM".
Performed analysis on Signal, Telegram, WhatsApp, Wickr, and Wire.
#trafficanalysis #security #tls #privacy
Key idea: Major IM operators do not deploy effective mechanisms to obfuscate traffic characteristics (e.g., packet timing and sizes), leaking the information that "this user is using this IM".
Performed analysis on Signal, Telegram, WhatsApp, Wickr, and Wire.
#trafficanalysis #security #tls #privacy
A Large-scale Temporal Measurement of Android Malicious Apps: Persistence, Migration, and Lessons Learned
PDF | Video
PHA: Potentially Harmful Apps. Data from on-device detection app.
#security #maliciousapps #andriod #measurement
PDF | Video
PHA: Potentially Harmful Apps. Data from on-device detection app.
#security #maliciousapps #andriod #measurement
Lumos: Identifying and Localizing Diverse Hidden IoT Devices in an Unfamiliar Environment
PDF | Videos
Adversary: attacker who has placed IoT devices to spy on users in an unfamiliar environment such as an Airbnb or hotel room.
1. A greedy muti armed bandit approach that uses packet arrival time to determine what channel to sense/for how long
2. Feature extraction and classification by using coarse 802.11 layer attributes
3. Localize IoT location by user's motion
#iot #security
PDF | Videos
Adversary: attacker who has placed IoT devices to spy on users in an unfamiliar environment such as an Airbnb or hotel room.
1. A greedy muti armed bandit approach that uses packet arrival time to determine what channel to sense/for how long
2. Feature extraction and classification by using coarse 802.11 layer attributes
3. Localize IoT location by user's motion
#iot #security
YouTube
USENIX Security '22 - Lumos: Identifying and Localizing Diverse Hidden IoT Devices...
USENIX Security '22 - Lumos: Identifying and Localizing Diverse Hidden IoT Devices in an Unfamiliar Environment
Rahul Anand Sharma, Elahe Soltanaghaei, Anthony Rowe, and Vyas Sekar, Carnegie Mellon University
Hidden IoT devices are increasingly being used…
Rahul Anand Sharma, Elahe Soltanaghaei, Anthony Rowe, and Vyas Sekar, Carnegie Mellon University
Hidden IoT devices are increasingly being used…
An analysis of wide-area name server traffic: a study of the Internet Domain Name System
Uncovered the prevalence of many bugs in popular DNS implementations
#dns #security #measurement #dnsimplementation
Uncovered the prevalence of many bugs in popular DNS implementations
#dns #security #measurement #dnsimplementation
Saving Brian's privacy: the perils of privacy exposure through reverse DNS
Problem: Privacy leaks in dynamically registered hostnames in global IPv4 reverse DNS.
Adversary: "anyone on the Internet to observe automated changes. An adversary with measurement capability and knowledge about a potential target"
RQ:
1. To what extent, does information carry over from DHCP into reverse DNS, and
2. What privacy risks does this entail?
Findings:
1. PTR records contain unique and privacy-sensitive information
2. Strong relationship between presence of users & presence of dynamic PTR record entries
Methods:
- Datasets: weekly global reverse DNS scans (Rapid7) and global DNS reverse scans (OpenINTEL)
- take 50 most popular baby names used in the US (Census) in 2000-2020
- Validation: against ground truth for our campus network
See also: RFC7844
I love their "When to stage a heist" subsection
#privacy #dns #DHCP #pii #security
Problem: Privacy leaks in dynamically registered hostnames in global IPv4 reverse DNS.
Adversary: "anyone on the Internet to observe automated changes. An adversary with measurement capability and knowledge about a potential target"
RQ:
1. To what extent, does information carry over from DHCP into reverse DNS, and
2. What privacy risks does this entail?
Findings:
1. PTR records contain unique and privacy-sensitive information
2. Strong relationship between presence of users & presence of dynamic PTR record entries
Methods:
- Datasets: weekly global reverse DNS scans (Rapid7) and global DNS reverse scans (OpenINTEL)
- take 50 most popular baby names used in the US (Census) in 2000-2020
- Validation: against ground truth for our campus network
See also: RFC7844
I love their "When to stage a heist" subsection
#privacy #dns #DHCP #pii #security
ACM Conferences
Saving Brian's privacy | Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Internet Measurement Conference
How the Great Firewall of China Detects and Blocks Fully Encrypted Traffic
https://people.cs.umass.edu/~amir/papers/UsenixSecurity23_Encrypted_Censorship.pdf
Circumvention Strategies:
1. Customizable Payload Prefixes
2. Customizable IV header
#censorship
https://people.cs.umass.edu/~amir/papers/UsenixSecurity23_Encrypted_Censorship.pdf
Circumvention Strategies:
1. Customizable Payload Prefixes
2. Customizable IV header
#censorship
A Global Measurement of Routing Loops on the Internet
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-28486-1_16
traceroute the entire IPv4 address space from two vantage points: discoverover 24 million IP addresses with routing loops
routing loops can even enable or exacerbate denial of serviceattacks
#internetmeasurement
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-28486-1_16
traceroute the entire IPv4 address space from two vantage points: discoverover 24 million IP addresses with routing loops
routing loops can even enable or exacerbate denial of serviceattacks
#internetmeasurement
SpringerLink
A Global Measurement of Routing Loops on the Internet
Persistent routing loops on the Internet are a common misconfiguration that can lead to packet loss, reliability issues, and can even exacerbate denial of service attacks. Unfortunately, obtaining a global view of routing loops is difficult. Distributed traceroute...
Understanding Dark Patterns in Home IoT Devices
57 smart home devices: home automation, home appliance, health, smarthub, camera, doorbell, television, media device, and speaker devices
#iot #darkpatterns #privacy
https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3544548.3581432
57 smart home devices: home automation, home appliance, health, smarthub, camera, doorbell, television, media device, and speaker devices
#iot #darkpatterns #privacy
https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3544548.3581432
Measuring and Evading Turkmenistan’s Internet Censorship A Case Study in Large-Scale Measurements of a Low-Penetration Country
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2304.04835.pdf
#censorship
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2304.04835.pdf
#censorship