🇦🇴 Luanda's Greed for Oil Takes It to (S)hell

🛢 Angola’s upstream regulator, ANPG, says it will sign an exclusive agreement with Shell on November 3 to explore and potentially develop several offshore and ultra-deepwater oil prospects.

⏩ That is, Angola wants oil here and now, without running lengthy license rounds. ⏪

🔸 In late 2023, the country felt constrained by OPEC’s 1.1 million barrels per day quota and said farewell to the organization in January 2024. Ironically, output then dropped even further below the OPEC-suppresses-us days.

🔸 While the reason of Angola's embarassing position lied in constant underinvestment, especially in costly, high-risk exploration, now Luanda seems ready to bring investors back by hook or crook, planning to bounce back to 1.1M barrels per day output by 2027.

However, what if the prices plunge by then? 🤨

🔸 The problem is not that Shell gets exploration permits without contest, but the fact that the oil-dependent economy seems unwilling to give up its dependence. Angola, whose exports rely on oil and gas for nearly 95%, sells almost all of its oil crude, having only built its first oil refinery in 50 years with the capacityof neglectable 30,000 barrels per day in September 2025.

For a country facing such oil dependence, fast-tracking proper procedures may feel natural - but Luanda clearly needs diversification more than another dash for oil ambitions.

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🇬🇭 Ghana: Let’s Audit Reuters

🌍 According to Reuters, the Ghanaian government plans a comprehensive audit of major large-scale gold miners from November 1 through June 2026 to scrutinize production volumes, mineral flows, and tax payments.

⏩ Given the exclusivity of Reuters’ sources, this could be either a scam or a genuinely positive sign for Ghana. ⏪

🔸 The report is based on a letter seen by Reuters, which was allegedly sent by the governmental Minerals Commission to major mining companies - AngloGold Ashanti, Asante Gold, Gold Fields, Newmont, Perseus, Xtra-Gold, and Zijin.

🔸 Given that Reuters often becomes a platform for anonymous political and economic signalling, this could be a fabrication by someone seeking to limit competition in Ghana’s gold sector - or a government leak.

If this is truly what Accra intends to do, it could be another step in curbing the country’s disastrous gold-mining problem.

🔸 Even though scrutiny of large-scale miners won’t directly affect illegal mining, some illicit gold that isn’t smuggled across the borders may be laundered through large-scale producers. Typically, illegal miners dig near large-scale operations and secretly sell ore to a processing plant, which then boosts reported output.

Amid many frankly awkward ideas, the Ghanaian government has recently proposed several promising measures, including decentralized licensing and now stronger oversight of major producers.

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🇳🇬 Nigeria: When Oligarchy Works for People

On Thursday, Nigeria's President Bola Tinubu slapped an extra 15% tariff on imported fuel, which was clearly another boost for Aliko Dangote, the tycoon behind Nigeria’s biggest oil refinery. Decades of preferential treatment built his empire. But could this long-running policy favoritism have brought any good to ordinary Nigerians?

Let's figure out who is Aliko Dangote and how his actions have shaped Nigeria.

⏩ Paradoxically, Dangote's political ties to Nigerian elites illustrate a rare example of how an oligarchy can serve a nation.⏪

🔸 Dangote owes much of his success to those ties. His first big win came in cement, which he expanded under the patronage of then-president Olusegun Obasanjo, whose 2003 campaign he heavily financed.

🔸 The mogul maintained good relations with all successive Nigerian administrations benefiting from import tariffs, tax breaks, public contracts, and a $2.7B foreign cash loan from the Central Bank of Nigeria to launch the now-famous Dangote oil refinery in 2023.

🔸 Paradoxically, that favoritism has served Nigeria in many ways - from a cement importer, the country became Africa’s largest producer. If the model works a second time, the oil-rich nation could end fuel imports and potentially acquire a world’s largest refinery bypassing the Jamnagar complex in India (1.24 million bpd)

A rare case when a conflict of interests resulted in national successes, this would never work out with investors from abroad, which would bribe and create nothing for people in return.

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💡 Resource Nationalism Index [ TANZANIA ]

As people are going into streets in Tanzania, we decided to look beyond the borders of our region and speak about what Tanzanian resource extraction policies look like through the prism of our "Resource Nationalism Index" series.

Tanzania's main mineral exports are gold, oil and copper.

So, how has the Tanzanian government been handling the natural wealth of the nation?

🔸 "Process It First" – 6/10 – raw materials are prohibited from exporting, though this does not apply to intermediate products (copper concentrates and doré gold), which can be sold abroad; also, no value addition in relation to crude oil is required by law.

🔸 "Share With the State” – 8/10 – The state does not take any share of mineral production free of charge, however, 20% of gold output must be first offered for acquisition to the Central Bank and local buyers.

🔸 “We’re in Too!” – 9/10 – Some 15% of the shares of new gold and copper enterprises must be transferred to the state free of charge and another 30% of the shares must be listed at The Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange, while all oil projects exist in the form of joint venture, where the state-run TPDC holds a >25% stake.

🔸 “The Money's Yours, the People Are Ours" – 9/10 – The law requires up to 100% of personnel (up to 80% for management and technical specialists) 0enterprises in the of solid minerals sector to be Tanzanian nationals and up to 90% of subcontractors to be Tanzanian companies. For oil extraction the requirements are lower.

🔸 “Just Pay Up" – 7/10 – Taxes reach 6% for copper and gold, and 12.5% for oil + extra levies on excessive revenues from high commodity prices.

🔸 "You Come – You Build" – 5/10 – Companies are obliged to contribute some 0.25% of their turnover to local community development.

🔸 “We’ll Do It Ourselves” – 8/10 – The state has established a system of tax breaks for invetments in local processing and makes investments itself through the state-owned companies STAMICO and TPDC.

🔸 “Come Here, You Bast*rd!” – 7/10 – The government has effective control over the country's mineral deposits, though illegal gold mining is a problem.

Final score is 7.4 out of 10 — the highest in our observations so far, underpinned by strict yet elaborate policies and effective state control.

#Tanzania #ResourceNationalism

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World Bank Won’t Fast-Track Barrick vs. Mali

The World Bank’s arbitration court has rejected Barrick’s bid to fast-track its case against Mali, according to Reuters.

⏩ The refusal to expedite Barrick’s request suggests Mali’s legal position may be strong in its dispute with one of the world’s largest gold miners. ⏪

🔸 The dispute stems from the introduction of the new Mining Code in 2023, which implied a renegotiation of mining terms. After both sides failed to reach agreement, Barrick filed for arbitration in December 2024.

🔸 In mid-2025, a Malian court placed Barrick’s Loulo-Gounkoto complex under provisional administration. The administrator oversaw a restart of the operation, with underground blasting resuming on October 15, 2025.

However, Barrick was not the only company that had to renegotiate

🔸 Because the new code applied to all miners, other foreign operators also had to reach agreements with Bamako, and seven other less prideful miners - including Allied Gold, B2Gold, Resolute Mining, and Ganfeng Lithium - have successfully concluded new terms.

🔸 Bamako’s decision to assume control followed Barrick’s own suspension of operations, which left deposits idle when gold prices were near record highs.

In this case Mali is defending the unalienable right of a state to set the rules and make business obey by them. Otherwise, the World Bank would have long ruled out in favor of Barrick.

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🇹🇿 Tanzania Elected Not to Trade

🌐 Bloomberg reports that Africa’s copper flows to China have been knocked offline amid Tanzania’s post-election unrest. Traders say new shipments from the African Copperbelt have become impossible after the Port of Dar es Salaam was temporarily closed.

⏩ Dar es Salaam is the key port for the TAZARA railway, the subject of a $1.4 billion deal signed on September 29 by China, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. ⏪

🔸 Dar es Salaam is a key artery for Zambian and DRC copper, with roughly 2/3 of Africa’s copper to China funneling through the city.

🔸 The shutdown follows a citywide curfew in Dar es Salaam and wider unrest around the October 29 vote. Initially expected to end by October 31, the closure was extended on Friday indefinitely.

🔸 It usually takes up to 25 days to move minerals from the Copperbelt to South African ports. With the railway system overloaded, it will take even longer to reroute them. Meanwhile, all the shipments already in port are now completely immovable.

🔸 The PRC has not made any public statements about the October 29 vote.

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🌐 Weekly News Digest on West & Central Africa’s Mineral Industries [ October 27 – November 3 ]

The week was rich in ministerial rearrangements and efforts to rein in major mining companies.

💡Here are the key highlights:

🏦 Afreximbank
- Afreximbank's New Chair Announced Support For Domestic Mineral Processing

🇦🇴 Angola
- Angola Plans to Give Shell Exclusive Rights

🇨🇩 DR Congo
- The DRC Arranged For $660M of Guarantees From UK Export Finance

🇬🇭 Ghana
- Ghana to Decentralize Gold Licensing
- Ghana to Launch Comprehensive Review of Major Miners

🇱🇷 Liberia
- Liberia's President Replaced Mines Minister to Attract American Investments

🇲🇱 Mali
- World Bank's Arbitration Court Refused to Fast-Track Barrick vs Mali

🇳🇦 Namibia
- Namibian President Dismissed the Minister of Mines and Assumed the Post Herself

🇳🇪 Niger
- Niger Forced China's Oil Giant to Hire More Locals

🇳🇬 Nigeria
- Nigeria Tries Again to Revitalize Its Aliminium Smelter
- Nigeria Imposed Additinal 15% Tax on Fuel Imports

🇹🇿 Tanzania
- Post-election Unrest Disrupted Shipments Through Dar es Salaam Port

#NewsDigest

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⚔️ Resource Nationalism Is Getting Litigious

🌐 Investor–state fights over oil, gas, and minerals have hit a 10-year high. No fewer than 32 resource cases have already been filed at the World Bank’s arbitration court in 2025 - more than in all of last year. Most involve oil and gas, with Latin America leading the tally. Africa accounts for 10 cases, including Niger, Tanzania, the DRC, Mali, Morocco, and Senegal.

⏩ For all the talk about lithium and cobalt, the biggest share of disputes still comes from plain old oil and gas — 17 of 32. Energy-transition headlines haven’t reshaped the legal battlefield as much as one might expect. ⏪

🔸 Governments are under growing pressure to show value at home. Budgets are tight, elections loom in many places, and anti-colonial (let’s say “resource-nationalist”) rhetoric is widely deployed against incumbents.

🔸 The critical-minerals race adds a new layer: every major license revocation is now quickly labeled a geopolitical pivot and an unfair move demanding counteraction rather than co-optation. The U.S.–China contest over critical minerals is the backdrop.

🔸 But commodity prices matter most. With many minerals - including gold and copper - trading near highs, governments seek extra revenue, imposing new tax and local-content rules that weren’t anticipated at the planning stage.

The geographic distribution of cases shows that the drive to rein in resource companies extends far beyond Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger— and far beyond Africa itself.

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⚙️ Instruments of Geopolitical Competition

The competition over resources and markets does not always take the form of military engagements or commercial contracts. Sometimes it manifests as a race to set global requirements and standards of “responsible” behavior that can later be used against particular countries.

🌐 Mining 2030, a global mining-investor initiative backed by institutions overseeing about $18 trillion, has released a 10-year blueprint to make mining “responsible.” On paper, the plan calls for transparency, environmental accountability, and an end to illicit mining and trade.

⏩ However, the initiative is dominated by Western, and its publication neatly coincides with the October 31–November 1 G7 meeting in Canada on environmental protection and minerals — a signal that a new large framework is being built to contain China’s clout in mineral supply chains. ⏪

Mining 2030’s vision for a responsible mining sector — key points:

🔸 Credible, independent performance standards

🔸 Responsible sourcing across value chains

🔸 Regulatory and institutional frameworks that promote effective sector governance

🔸 Equitable and sustainable benefits from mining

🔸 Reduction of conflicts linked to mineral extraction

To achieve these goals, investors propose an International Minerals Agency, akin to the International Energy Agency created after the 1973 oil crisis to coordinate Western responses to supply risks.

🔸 This isn’t just ESG branding. The blueprint lands right after G7 ministers in Canada pushed “standards-based” critical-minerals markets and a strategy to diversify away from China, building on the June G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan (which also calls for transparency, diversification, security, and sustainable mining). The proposed agency and new buyer rules allow to hard-wire these standards into financing and procurement, steering offtake and capital toward non-Chinese routes.

🔸 If the agency idea sticks, miners that align with these standards may find cheaper capital and faster permits from G7 partners, while projects tied to Chinese processing — often labeled environmentally harmful — could face higher hurdles. The proposal also presses auto and big-tech buyers to prove “responsible” sourcing.

🔸 The West has long used standards and responsibility as instruments to contain adversaries — primarily through economic means — from oil and gas in the 1970s to telecoms more recently, and now to critical minerals.

Yet, as we’ve seen many times, the attractivenes of the Chinese model is exactly that it does not emphasize any “responsibility” and "requirements" at all. The risk is that worthy initiatives for responsible conduct get hijacked by political considerations and fail to improve ordinary people’s lives.

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🇨🇳 Iron Grasp of China

Guinea’s Simandou mega-mine — the world’s largest untapped high-grade iron-ore deposit — has begun moving ore and is preparing first shipments in November–December, marking the real start of a project long billed as a market-shifter. The $20–23 billion complex includes two mines and a new 650 km railway to a deep-water port — infrastructure created from scratch specifically for this project.

⏩ If successful, the project will give the PRC significant leverage over such a basic material as iron ore (and, by extension, steel) — in addition its near-monopoly in processing of critical minerals. ⏪

🔸 China is on both sides of this mountain. The project is split into two blocks (Northern and Southern): one led by Chinese partners such as Baowu and Weiqiao, and the other by UK-Australian Rio Tinto together with Chinalco (Aluminum Corporation of China). With Rio Tinto the only major non-Chinese lead investor, Chinalco is also the largest single shareholder in Rio Tinto. Guinea’s participation is limited to 15% on the public side.

🔸 With access to high-grade ore (65% Fe) from Simandou, Chinese companies could gain more leverage over market prices — potentially allowing for dumping prices — similar to dynamics seen when Chinese companies doubled cobalt production in the DRC in 2024, bringing other miners with higher costs of production on the verge of austerity.

🔸The project is more than a mine: it has redrawn Guinea’s infrastructure map. A 600–650 km, multi-user railway cuts across the country to a new deep-water port at Morebaya, which is also slated to be accessible for public use.

For Guinea, Simandou’s launch is the start of whole new era.

🔸 The government hopes iron ore will do for Guinea what fossil fuels did for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Reports indicate it has already hired Western advisers on how best to manage future iron-ore revenues, and it is planning to secure its first international sovereign credit rating.

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🇨🇲 Cameroonians Set on Fire Foreign Investments

🌐 Local reports and videos from Tignere mining site in Cameroon show a Chinese-operated gold site set on fire after it ignored the nationwide “stay at home” call. Footage shared on X and Facebook shows flames and crowds of Cameronian citizens (including local youth).

⏩ Young people have figured out that the Cameroonian elites, including the 92-year old and 50-years-in-power President Biya, hardly care about public anger. If the cash spigot from natural resources is open, the regime will keep calm. ⏪

🔸 After the Constitutional Council declared Paul Biya once again the winner of the presidential race on October 27, opposition led by Issa Tchiroma called three days of “ghost town” stay-home action from November 3 to 5 and many cities largely stopped. This is a non-violent tactic chosen after the first days of protest led to 48 people having been killed by police forces.

🔸 Traders and businesses understand that closures could be punished - for large-scale companies that means losing permits, costly facilities and future earnings in Cameroon. The Biya regime thus manages to protect its resource rents against popular discontent.

🔸 The arson shows that some Cameroonians are ready to take more decisive action to pull the plug on the regime. However, so far, this is a single action, and it only concerned gold mining, while in Cameroon oil matters more. In 2023 the country exported about $2.43 billion in crude oil and $1.12 billion in petroleum gas, against $951 million in gold.

Resource-rich dictatorships often dream of fencing off the wells and pits, selling the output, and forgetting the people. That is why citizens must keep reminding rulers they exist. Best do it peacefully, though there may be no other option but breaking the rules.

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💡 Resource Nationalism Index [ NIGER ]

In the light of the recent Niger-CNPC faceoff over local personnel employment, we decided to undertake a comprehensive overview of what Nigerien resource extraction policy framework look like through the prism of our "Resource Nationalism Index" series.

Today Niger mostly exports gold, crude oil and uranium (in the form of yellowcake).

So, how has the Nigerien government been handling the natural wealth of the nation?

🔸 "Process It First" – 6/10 – Miners have an obligation to carry out local processing within reasonable limits in accordance with the capabilities of the national economy, while the exact level of processing is specified in agreements and conventions.

🔸 "Share With the State” – 8/10 – The state reserves the right to purchase a portion of the products in proportion to its share in the mining project, and supplies of strategic minerals must first meet local demand.

🔸 “We’re in Too!” – 9/10 – The state receives 10% of the shares in new enterprises for free, and the state has the right to buy another 30%. Another 30% share is set for local investors at some stages of production, but in general it is fixed in conventions.

🔸 “The Money's Yours, the People Are Ours" – 9/10 – All unqualified positions are reserved for citizens of Niger - for the rest, companies are required to seek to replace all positions with local residents. Also, foreign workers may stay in office for no more than 4 years.

🔸 “Just Pay Up" – 8/10 – In general, solid minerals tax is about 7%, and there is also a 2.5% tax on the exploitation of deposits. Every year, miners pay an additional extra tax, the amount of which is set annually by the state. The tax on oil is 12.5-15%.

🔸 "You Come – You Build" – 6/10 – There are general obligations for the development of local communities, but their specific size is only defined in separate agreements.

🔸 “We’ll Do It Ourselves” – 6/10 – Part of the mining revenue goes to the Fonds de développement minier, which co-finances exploration, state control and supervision, and the development of the mining sector.

🔸 “Come Here, You Bast*rd!” – 6/10 – There are no serious problems with sovereignty over the deposits, but illegal gold mining is almost twice as high as legal (approximately 30t of undeclared gold exports vs. 14t of declared)

Final score is 7.3 out of 10 — a little less that of Tanzania, but fairly good. Obligations to develop local communities, encourage local processing, and combat illegal gold mining are mostly sagging.

#Niger #ResourceNationalism

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⚙️ Nigeria’s Unrealized Potential
Why billion-dollar domestic processing plants never really started

In Nigeria, more than $8 billion has been spent over 50 years on the Ajaokuta steel project and the plant still has no commercial steel output. That fact captures a common pattern of Nigerian resource processing factories built in the 1980s - 2000s, which hardly moved from “commissioned” to “working.”

⏩ How could it be that Nigeria had already created a huge industrial potential, but for some reason has never taken advantage of it?

What kind of industry Nigeria built in the 1980-1990s:

Steel and Aluminium:
🔸 Ajaokuta Steel Company — idle since 1994 to present;
🔸 ALSCON (Aluminium Smelter) — largely dormant since 2007 with brief revival attempts;
🔸 National Ore Mining Company — effectively moribund for many years after 2008;
🔸 Delta Steel Company — mostly idle until a private restart effort after 2018;
🔸 Jos Steel Rolling Company — moribund by the 2000s;
🔸 Osogbo Steel Rolling Mill — plant left idle since 2005;
🔸 Katsina Steel Rolling Mill — moribund by mid-2000s and sold in 2006 after closures;

Oil:
🔸 Warri Refining & Petrochemical Company — repeated stoppages, largely idle from late 2010s onward;
🔸 Port Harcourt Refining Company — prolonged shutdowns, largely idle from 2019 onward;
🔸 Kaduna Refining & Petrochemical Company — prolonged shutdowns and very low utilisation, especially from late 2010s onward.

Paper and Pulp:
🔸 Iwopin Pulp & Paper — stopped by 1996–1998 and idle thereafter;
🔸 Newsprint Manufacturing Company — shut in 1994, long-term dormancy followed;

Sugar:
🔸 Savannah Sugar Company — stoppages through the 1990s–2000s, later privatized.

⏩ All this accounts for almost $90 billion in investments.

But why so many plants never truly started?

🔸 Liberal reforms in 1985-1990s (aka "Structural Adjustment") facilitated imports of foreign end products, making newly built domestic factories unprofitable.

🔸 The government failed to maintain policy consistency and predictability. In 1988-1993 and from 1999 onwards the government embarked on privatization, with concessions and privatizations often becoming court fights. Years of arbitration froze assets and scared off operators.

🔸 Poor planning: too often project designs relied mainly on imported spares, chemicals, and equipment, which made them idle each time when foreign exchange dried up nationwide.

🔸Factory projects also often required that additional infrastructure be built, without which they could not operate due to the lack of existing facilities. When subcontractors or the government failed, enterprises were deprived of gas and power, rail links, raw materials.

The government has tried to fix the situation through new partnerships, further privatization, sector and individual reactivation plans.

This, however did not fix fuel, feedstock, and poor logistics. Many of the factories that have been staying idle since the 1990s are now technologically obsolete and covered with rust - once you touch them, you will hear a lot of noise.

Nigeria’s “commissioned-but-never-launched” factories were not accidents. They were outcomes of projects built without reliable inputs, power, and logistics, which dropped into volatile policy weather and weak governance. This needs to be taken into account if the country plans to move from resource extraction to domestic value-addition.

#PolicyReview #Nigeria

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🇱🇷 Who Is Liberia's New Mines Minister

Last week Liberia's President Joseph Boakai has replaced Wilmot J. M. Paye with R. Matenokay Tingban at Mines and Energy as the government courts U.S. capital for lithium, cobalt, manganese and rare earths.

We've discussed who was the former minister, but who leads Liberian mines now?

🔸 Tingban worked for years inside the Ministry of Mines and Energy and later served as Deputy Minister under President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, giving him hands-on experience with concessions and the ministry’s daily operations. He also got elected in the legislature, representing Nimba District #9 and in 2016 he chaired the House Committee on Lands, Mines, Energy and Natural Resources.

⏩ This appointment will speed up deal-making and shape the flow of new mining investment into Liberia.

🔸 In contrast to his predecessor, he is a system technocrat, and not a manifesto politician. He knows concession paperwork and how ministries interact with investors, which makes him an easy counterpart for companies exploring new critical-minerals projects. The timing, alongside a broader reshuffle, is meant to project predictability to investors.

🔸 The country's ministerial reshuffle is openly aimed at attracting foreing investors in mining, with iron ore still being the main source of country's exports revenues. On October 16 Liberia’s Foreign Minister Nyanti met US' Marco Rubio to discuss Washington’s interest in Liberia’s critical minerals sector.

Bringing in investment and diversifying beyond iron ore is good, but Liberia also needs to grow non-extractive sectors. For now, the government’s clearest signal is deeper cooperation with the United States on minerals, not a whole-economy diversification drive.

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🇿🇲 I’m American. Trust me.

🌐 How much do you like donuts? Lately mining comapnies started to change their legal address to the US to get a slice of Trump's push for critical minerals. That is the story behind Indian group Vedanta that just created a US company to hold its copper ambitions in Zambia.

🔸 Vedanta Group, which has been the central player at Zambia's Konkola Copper Mines for years, announced a US-domiciled vehicle called CopperTech Metals, which will take control of all its assets in Zambia, framing it as part of America’s copper security. The creation of CopperTech Metals comes as companies look to capitalise on renewed US government support for the mining sector.

🔸 The company needs to raise $1.5B, which will cover the company’s commitment to invest $1bn to revive KCM under a deal it made in 2023 to regain control of the mine after Zambia’s government seized it in 2019. They did not spell out the exact mechanism that will help find the funds in the US, but the most likely considerations are easier access to the US stock listing, access to American institutional investors, eligibility for federal loans and guarantees, the chance to apply for grants.

⏩ While foreign holdings move their subsidiaries to the US, genuinely American investors are not that eager to invest in Africa ⏪

🔸 Recently the US has shown interest in the critical mineral wealth of the DRC, Liberia, Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, South Africa. However, bare interest isn't enough, while American companies have not made any large investment committments in mining or beneficiation.

Even if all was avout real American investment, the US will not outrun China soon. China’s strength is not only in the mines. It dominates the next steps - concentrates, refining, cathodes, chemicals, components. The US does not have this full industrial base yet.

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