Gerboise Bleue
LAST PART! French nuclear capabilities emerged in 1967, when the General planned to equip the French armed forces with a nuclear triad capable of delivering strikes from air, sea, and land. These capabilities would later materialize in the systems: Mirage…
Le capacità nucleari nascono nel 1967 quando il Generale pianifica di dotare le forze armate Francesi di una triade nucleare, capace di sferrare attacchi da aria, mare e terra. Si realizzeranno in seguito nei sistemi: Mirage IV (bombardiere), Redoutable (sottomarino SSBN), S2/S3 ( MRBM). Da evidenziare che nella dottrina nucleare lo stato Francese deve detenere la piena sovranità sulla produzione sullo sviluppo e gestione della triade nucleare, che è ad uso esclusivo del Presidente della repubblica e dopo il 1966 con il ritiro dal comando unificato della NATO, totalmente in mano allo stato. La Triade nucleare verrà chiamata poi da De Gaulle come “Force de Frappe”, letteralmente: forza d’urto. In molti documenti rilasciati viene specificato che la deterrenza nucleare riguarda anche la difesa di quelle parti “vitali” del paese come la sua indipendenza, integrità territoriali o capacità di scegliere la propria strategia. Non viene specificata però l’entità della minaccia o il livello (nucleare o convenzionale), quindi si può trarre la conclusione che anche un attacco convenzionale ad un sistema vitale del paese potrebbe essere affrontato con l’arma nucleare. Questo è evidenziato anche attualmente dallo sviluppo e produzione del ASMP (di cui si parlerà in seguito). Nel 2006 Jacques Chirac presidente della Repubblica francese esordisce affermando: “ I leader di altri paesi che utilizzano mezzi terroristici contro di noi devono capire che si espongono a una risposta ferma e adeguata da parte nostra. E questa risposta può essere convenzionale. Può anche essere di natura diversa”. L’arma atomica è il fulcro della difesa Francese, tutto ciò che minaccia la Repubblica e la sua integrità potrebbe ricevere come risposta “moderata” un fungo atomico sul territorio. Questo concetto di colpo di avvertimento (nucleare) nasce nel 1970 con l’avvento di sempre più potenze “regionali”. La Francia si riserva la scelta di lanciare per prima un avvertimento al nemico, facendogli capire quali sono i limiti invalicabili. Il bersaglio di questo colpo potrebbero essere siti militari o industriali e non viene esclusa la detonazione ad altitudine molto elevate per creare un EMP. Il concetto, che poi viene richiamato anche nella dottrina convenzionale francese (esposto da grandi generali in diversi libri di tattica e strategia) è quello di limitare la libertà d’azione del nemico in modo da mantenere l’iniziativa negandola all’avversario. Nel 2020 il Presidente Macron dichiara: “Qualora sorgessero malintesi circa la determinazione della Francia a proteggere i propri interessi vitali, si potrebbe emettere un avvertimento nucleare unico e irripetibile nei confronti dello Stato aggressore per dimostrare chiaramente che la natura del conflitto è cambiata e per ristabilire la deterrenza”.
Oggi nel 2026 la Francia crede che l’arma atomica non possa essere utilizzata come arma tattica, ma rimane l’idea e la dottrina pensata dal Generale De Gaulle negli anni 50. Rimane il concetto di sufficienza, necessaria per la distruzione del nemico e viene aggiunto che tutto il comparto produttivo e tecnologico (di altissimo livello) rimane totalmente in mano allo stato francese come il processo decisionale che non è subordinato a nessuno se non al presidente stesso. Anche nel documento del ministero della difesa francese, datato Marzo 2026, viene specificato che non saranno dichiarati quali sono gli interessi vitali del paese e che lo stato in caso di qualsiasi aggressione convenzionale e non, si riserva il diritto di lanciare un colpo di avvertimento nucleare, specificando che sono le forze convenzionali ad accompagnare quelle nucleari e non il contrario. Concludo dicendo che la capacità industriale, decisionale e strategica ha permesso alla Francia di rimanere l’unico paese in Europa a mantenere un operatività , convenzionale e non, in grado di dettare strategie sul lungo periodo e porsi come “terzo polo” in Europa. Potrebbe essere in un futuro capace di prendere il posto americano nel caso questi decidessero di concentrarsi verso oriente.
Gerboise Bleue pinned «Today's post is about French nuclear doctrine! Learn something, follow us Reading time: 10 mins»
A brief introduction to STRATUS, the MBDA missile program defining the future of European defense.
STRATUS is the name of the missile program launched by France and the United Kingdom in 2017 to replace the Storm Shadow, Harpoon, and Exocet missiles, with Italy joining the program in 2023. Initially, the development of a hypersonic missile called Perseus was planned, but it was later decided to develop two different and complementary missiles: the STRATUS LO ("Low Observability") and the STRATUS RS ("Rapid Strike").STRATUS LO utilizes a new turbojet engine named TP15, developed primarily by the United Kingdom. This is an unusual choice for a missile of this type compared to the stealthier turbofan, which also guarantees greater range—a decision likely driven by economic reasons. It also features a New Gen Infrared seeker for target visualization during the terminal phase. The missile has been subjected to extreme radar and electronic warfare scenarios while maintaining its stealth capabilities. Its subsonic speed plays a fundamental role in this, facilitating low-altitude flight, allowing for stealthier and less aerodynamically stringent designs, and above all, significantly reducing the engine's thermal signature. This missile specializes in striking land targets and, secondarily, anti-ship operations. Its range is likely over 1000 km at very low altitudes, and it uses a 450 kg multi-stage bunker-buster warhead similar to the Storm Shadow's BROACH, which has already been extensively proven in Russia.STRATUS RS is much more extravagant. It uses a niche propulsion technology that few countries in the world can deploy: the Ramjet engine, a principle already used for the European Meteor and ASMPA missiles. It is an engine with zero rotating parts; it simply exploits the airflow entering the Air Intake. Because of this, the missile cannot start from a standstill or at low speeds because it is not self-sufficient for propulsion. The air enters, and the specific geometry of the missile's air intake slows it down to subsonic speed, increasing the pressure generated by the air impact. At this point, fuel is injected into this compressed air space, and the air combustion generates thrust. The advantages of this engine are that it experiences no mechanical failures since there are no moving parts—it is literally a shaped tube—and it weighs very little. Lacking blades that could melt, it allows the missile to reach extremely high speeds and sustain them throughout the flight by riding the airflow, unlike a standard missile that loses kinetic energy with every maneuver and becomes very slow at the end of its run.The RS will primarily be an anti-ship and anti-air defense missile with anti-aircraft capabilities (an absolutely unique feature) targeted at high-value strategic aircraft such as AWACS and Tankers. It is expected to have a range of under 500 km and a very high speed between Mach 3 and Mach 5, meaning from about 1 km/s to 1.7 km/s for the entire duration of the flight. The air-launched range is likely significantly higher. It will use a 250 kg semi-armor-piercing high-explosive anti-ship warhead, to which must be added the massive accumulated kinetic energy. For a missile weighing at least 1000 kg, this energy alone is equivalent to hundreds of kilograms of TNT at Mach 3, let alone Mach 5. It would certainly annihilate any Russian frigate or destroyer with a single strike, and likely even cruisers like the Slava class.They will enter service between 2028 and 2030.
The Pluton missile, a French short-range ballistic missile, was part of the "nuclear warning shot." idea. Entering service with the French Army's *Artillerie Nucléaire Tactique* (ANT) in 1974, it was conceived as last resource weapon—a tactical nuclear system capable of striking advancing Soviet forces within West German territory with reasonable precision, thereby safeguarding French territorial integrity. Technically, the Pluton system had a range of 17 to 120 km, meaning that—when launched from French soil—it could strike only West Germany. Its warhead yield ranged from 10 to 25 kt; it was capable of airburst (at altitudes between 180 and 600 meters) or ground-impact detonation and had a circular error probable (CEP) of between 200 and 400 meters. The solid-fueled missile utilized an internal inertial guidance system, rendering it immune to electromagnetic interference. Consequently, the adversary was forced to use only kinetic means to neutralize the missile.
The launch vehicle was based on the AMX-30 chassis, modified to include a loading crane; this platform was selected for its off-road capabilities, even when fully loaded. A single vehicle could handle the loading, communications (within a complex transmission network), and launching of the Pluton missile. However, it was not merely a single vehicle but a complete system comprising the TEL (Transporter-Erector-Launcher), an escort vehicle, a support vehicle, a command vehicle (for communications), a transmission station, and a cryptographic telegraphy system. The system was broken down into three components, which were transported on accompanying trucks. Assembly on-site took approximately 45 minutes, with an additional 10 minutes required for transmission and coordination prior to the missile's launch.
In addition to the AMX-30 TEL, the system included Berliet GBC8 6x6 Gazelle transport trucks, VABs (and initially AMX-10P vehicles), and a command vehicle equipped with medium-range communications and a ballistic computer (TRMC 2A station)—similar to the one found at the command, regimental command, and individual battery levels—as well as a long-range communication system. The IRIS 35M ballistic computer handled the launch calculations and was deployed at the Command, Regimental Command, and battery levels.
Long-range communication relied on the TRVM 15 station. Five regiments were equipped with the PLUTON system, supported by two logistics support regiments. Each regiment consisted of five batteries: one command battery, three firing batteries (each with two TELs), and one surveillance and transport battery. In wartime, each regiment had a strength of approximately 1,000 personnel.
Finally, it should be noted that the regiments were equipped with the CT20 drone, providing an organic capability for target-area observation.
Seventy delivery vehicles were produced, corresponding to the seventy warheads. They would have impacted potential bottlenecks, such as logistical hubs, bridges, and troop assembly areas—thereby slowing down logistics and troop movements and making them far more costly. In conclusion, the system was highly integrated with the command structure through numerous redundant communication systems. Offering great tactical versatility, it provided the French defense with an additional asset for delivering the warning shot required by military doctrine.
The launch vehicle was based on the AMX-30 chassis, modified to include a loading crane; this platform was selected for its off-road capabilities, even when fully loaded. A single vehicle could handle the loading, communications (within a complex transmission network), and launching of the Pluton missile. However, it was not merely a single vehicle but a complete system comprising the TEL (Transporter-Erector-Launcher), an escort vehicle, a support vehicle, a command vehicle (for communications), a transmission station, and a cryptographic telegraphy system. The system was broken down into three components, which were transported on accompanying trucks. Assembly on-site took approximately 45 minutes, with an additional 10 minutes required for transmission and coordination prior to the missile's launch.
In addition to the AMX-30 TEL, the system included Berliet GBC8 6x6 Gazelle transport trucks, VABs (and initially AMX-10P vehicles), and a command vehicle equipped with medium-range communications and a ballistic computer (TRMC 2A station)—similar to the one found at the command, regimental command, and individual battery levels—as well as a long-range communication system. The IRIS 35M ballistic computer handled the launch calculations and was deployed at the Command, Regimental Command, and battery levels.
Long-range communication relied on the TRVM 15 station. Five regiments were equipped with the PLUTON system, supported by two logistics support regiments. Each regiment consisted of five batteries: one command battery, three firing batteries (each with two TELs), and one surveillance and transport battery. In wartime, each regiment had a strength of approximately 1,000 personnel.
Finally, it should be noted that the regiments were equipped with the CT20 drone, providing an organic capability for target-area observation.
Seventy delivery vehicles were produced, corresponding to the seventy warheads. They would have impacted potential bottlenecks, such as logistical hubs, bridges, and troop assembly areas—thereby slowing down logistics and troop movements and making them far more costly. In conclusion, the system was highly integrated with the command structure through numerous redundant communication systems. Offering great tactical versatility, it provided the French defense with an additional asset for delivering the warning shot required by military doctrine.
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Il missile Pluton, un missile balistico a corto raggio francese, faceva parte dell'idea del colpo d'avvertimento nucleare. Entrato in servizio con l'Artillerie Nucléaire Tactique (ANT) dell'Esercito Francese nel 1974, fu concepito come arma di ultima istanza: un sistema nucleare tattico capace di colpire le forze sovietiche in avanzamento all'interno del territorio della Germania Ovest con una ragionevole precisione, salvaguardando così l'integrità territoriale francese. Tecnicamente, il sistema Pluton aveva una gittata compresa tra 17 e 120 km, il che significava che — se lanciato dal suolo francese — poteva colpire solo la Germania Ovest. La potenza della sua testata variava da 10 a 25 kt; era capace di detonazione aerea (ad altitudini comprese tra 180 e 600 metri) o da impatto al suolo e aveva un errore circolare probabile (CEP) compreso tra 200 e 400 metri. Il missile a propellente solido utilizzava un sistema di guida inerziale interno, che lo rendeva immune alle interferenze elettromagnetiche. Di conseguenza, l'avversario era costretto a usare solo mezzi cinetici per neutralizzare il missile. Il veicolo di lancio era basato sullo chassis dell'AMX-30, modificato per includere una gru di carico; questa piattaforma fu selezionata per le sue capacità fuoristrada, anche a pieno carico. Un singolo veicolo poteva gestire il carico, le comunicazioni (all'interno di una complessa rete di trasmissione) e il lancio del missile Pluton. Tuttavia, non si trattava semplicemente di un singolo veicolo ma di un sistema completo comprendente il TEL (Trasportatore-Erettore-Lanciatore), un veicolo di scorta, un veicolo di supporto, un veicolo comando (per le comunicazioni), una stazione di trasmissione e un sistema di telegrafia crittografica. Il sistema era suddiviso in tre componenti, che venivano trasportati su autocarri di accompagnamento. L'assemblaggio in loco richiedeva circa 45 minuti, con ulteriori 10 minuti necessari per la trasmissione e il coordinamento prima del lancio del missile. Oltre al TEL AMX-30, il sistema includeva autocarri da trasporto Berliet GBC8 6x6 Gazelle, VAB (e inizialmente veicoli AMX-10P) e un veicolo comando equipaggiato con comunicazioni a medio raggio e un computer balistico (stazione TRMC 2A) — simile a quello presente a livello di comando, di comando di reggimento e di singola batteria — oltre a un sistema di comunicazione a lungo raggio. Il computer balistico IRIS 35M gestiva i calcoli di lancio ed era schierato a livello di Comando, di Comando di Reggimento e di batteria. La comunicazione a lungo raggio si affidava alla stazione TRVM 15. Cinque reggimenti erano equipaggiati con il sistema PLUTON, supportati da due reggimenti di supporto logistico. Ogni reggimento era composto da cinque batterie: una batteria comando, tre batterie di tiro (ciascuna con due TEL) e una batteria di sorveglianza e trasporto. In tempo di guerra, ogni reggimento aveva una forza di circa 1.000 effettivi. Infine, va notato che i reggimenti erano equipaggiati con il drone CT20, che forniva una capacità organica di osservazione dell'area bersaglio. Furono prodotti settanta veicoli di consegna, corrispondenti alle settanta testate. Avrebbero colpito potenziali colli di bottiglia, come snodi logistici, ponti e aree di ammassamento delle truppe — rallentando così la logistica e i movimenti delle truppe e rendendoli molto più costosi. In conclusione, il sistema era altamente integrato con la struttura di comando attraverso numerosi sistemi di comunicazione ridondanti. Offrendo una grande versatilità tattica, forniva alla difesa francese una risorsa aggiuntiva per sferrare il colpo d'avvertimento richiesto dalla dottrina militare
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Gerboise Bleue pinned «Il missile Pluton, un missile balistico a corto raggio francese, faceva parte dell'idea del colpo d'avvertimento nucleare. Entrato in servizio con l'Artillerie Nucléaire Tactique (ANT) dell'Esercito Francese nel 1974, fu concepito come arma di ultima istanza:…»
Let us discuss the legendary Redoutable class—the first six French nuclear-powered submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles, forming the naval strategic component of the Force de Frappe.
The photos show the submarine under construction at the Cherbourg naval base, the launch hatches for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and some of the submarine's interior.
The class was built during Charles de Gaulle's presidency, a time when France had withdrawn from NATO's integrated military command and was seeking to emerge as a power independent of the Russian and American blocs. Constructing the Redoutable class was therefore vital for France; it guaranteed the ability to launch a nuclear retaliatory strike, as it was impossible to destroy the submarines in a preemptive first strike.
The submarine is powered by a light-water nuclear reactor, granting it virtually unlimited endurance for 20 to 25 years; it measures 128 meters in length and weighs 8,000 tons, requiring 14 million man-hours and 6 kilometers of welding to build.
France obtained highly enriched uranium from the United States and developed a test reactor to verify the project's feasibility; all six submarines entered service between 1971 and 1985 and were progressively decommissioned between 1991 and 2008.
Its nuclear armament initially consisted of 16 launch tubes for M1 SLBMs, which were gradually replaced by M2 and finally M4 missiles—systems we will discuss later.
While the United Kingdom was doing the same with crucial American aid, France chose the path of isolation, developing and manufacturing every single component on its own; it embarked on a genuine engineering feat that paid off, resulting in exceptionally high operational readiness—with nearly half of their service time spent submerged—and a system where each vessel had two identical crews (Red and Blue) alternating operations to ensure the submarine remained in continuous active service. France became the fourth country in the world capable of launching nuclear missile strikes from nuclear-powered submarines; during the 1970s and 1980s, the Redoutable class was not particularly quiet in terms of propulsion—making it easier to detect than American and British submarines, though not by Soviet ones until the introduction of the Akula class in the 1980s.
Between the late 1980s and the 1990s, the Redoutable class underwent gradual upgrades—starting with the Inflexible, which entered service in 1985—to improve stealth and modernize the missile systems, effectively creating a transitional subclass of vessels. To minimize sonar detectability, the Redoutable class employed elastic and rubber mountings for the noisiest or vibration-prone components; furthermore, it was powered by an electric turbine driven by the nuclear reactor—rather than being directly connected to the shaft—to prevent vibrations from propagating into the water.
The propellers themselves were angled to avoid generating surface bubbles and to prevent cavitation. All of this was the result of the "Coelacanthe" inter-ministerial program launched by De Gaulle to develop the submarine component of the nuclear deterrent force; this initiative drastically streamlined bureaucracy and enabled the rapid miniaturization of a nuclear reactor and the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
In the mid-1950s, France was already planning the construction of a nuclear submarine—the Q 244—with US support, but the program was cancelled following De Gaulle's rise to power and the deterioration of relations with the United States.
In 1959, France possessed only 440 kg of uranium—barely enough for a land-based reactor—yet a marine nuclear reactor was built the following year as a testbed; in 1964, the Gymnote, a conventional ballistic missile submarine, entered service and contributed to the program's development.
It was not until 1965 that 50% of the defense budget was allocated to the Coelacanthe program.