Hello everyone. In the coming days, our first topic will be the French nuclear triad and its history; we will also discuss the nuclear test that once again enabled Europe to confront the Soviet Union, overturning the post-war balance of power on the continent: Gerboise Bleue 🇪🇺
Ciao a tutti, nei giorni a seguire tratteremo come nostro primo argomento la triade nucleare francese e la sua storia, parlando inoltre del test nucleare che ha permesso nuovamente all'Europa di affrontare l'unione sovietica, ribaltando gli equilibri post bellici nel continente: Gerboise Bleue 🇪🇺
Today's post is about French nuclear doctrine!
Learn something, follow us
Reading time: 10 mins
Learn something, follow us
Reading time: 10 mins
PART 1:
After the end of the Second World War and the restoration of sovereignty over its European territory, France joined the United Nations Security Council (composed of the victors of the war) with a permanent seat and veto power. In a complex political and social situation, the French government sought to regain the position on the international stage that had been lost with the fall of France in 1940 at the hands of Nazi Germany. At the same time, it attempted to pacify its colonial empire—now in turmoil and revolt—which stretched from the African continent to Southeast Asia.
In this context, relations between the USSR and the USA grew increasingly tense, and the global polarization began. France in the 1950s, under the Fourth Republic, realized that in order to elevate the country’s importance and independence between the two blocs, it needed to possess the atomic weapon and the capability to use it. The exclusion—never forgotten—of the Free French government from the Quebec Agreement (1943) on nuclear technology sharing between the USA and the UK pushed the country toward a very rigid doctrinal stance. From the outset, France insisted on the necessity of acquiring the know‑how, the technology, and the capacity to produce the atomic weapon and its delivery systems through an independent industrial chain. By controlling the entirety of production and management of the system, France could guarantee partial—if not total—strategic independence.
This project was pushed to unprecedented levels by the second De Gaulle government, thanks to his political and military theories. French nuclear thought in the 1950s can be condensed in a note from the Quai d’Orsay (the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs):
In an extremely tense international situation—both in Europe and abroad (with the colonial war in Indochina, where France’s enemies were supplied by the USSR and Communist China)—the tension between France and the Soviet Union grew dramatically. De Gaulle’s idea that the United States should not interfere in European affairs, combined with Soviet fears, led to the development of the French defense doctrine “Tous azimuts”, literally: “in all directions.” For the General, the atomic weapon was the means for the country’s self‑determination, allowing France to make its own choices in foreign policy and beyond, returning to a central role in the European security system while distancing itself from the Anglo‑Saxon pillar of power and influence.
The distrust felt by French officers toward the United States was likely caused by the colonial wars France had been fighting since 1946. At that moment, France had no economic or material resources to sustain these conflicts. American support had been essential: small arms, tanks, helicopters, aircraft, trucks, vehicles, clothing, and funds. The Americans’ attitude—often unclear and not always favorable—generated deep mistrust toward the United States. All of this reached its peak with the Suez Crisis. From that moment on, the French realized that the sovereignty of their armed forces was vital to their independence. They applied the same reasoning to the atomic bomb.
After the end of the Second World War and the restoration of sovereignty over its European territory, France joined the United Nations Security Council (composed of the victors of the war) with a permanent seat and veto power. In a complex political and social situation, the French government sought to regain the position on the international stage that had been lost with the fall of France in 1940 at the hands of Nazi Germany. At the same time, it attempted to pacify its colonial empire—now in turmoil and revolt—which stretched from the African continent to Southeast Asia.
In this context, relations between the USSR and the USA grew increasingly tense, and the global polarization began. France in the 1950s, under the Fourth Republic, realized that in order to elevate the country’s importance and independence between the two blocs, it needed to possess the atomic weapon and the capability to use it. The exclusion—never forgotten—of the Free French government from the Quebec Agreement (1943) on nuclear technology sharing between the USA and the UK pushed the country toward a very rigid doctrinal stance. From the outset, France insisted on the necessity of acquiring the know‑how, the technology, and the capacity to produce the atomic weapon and its delivery systems through an independent industrial chain. By controlling the entirety of production and management of the system, France could guarantee partial—if not total—strategic independence.
This project was pushed to unprecedented levels by the second De Gaulle government, thanks to his political and military theories. French nuclear thought in the 1950s can be condensed in a note from the Quai d’Orsay (the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs):
“The orientation of strategy will increasingly belong to the powers in possession of the atomic weapon. Moreover, an armed force deprived of atomic means will no longer be an armed force. It is therefore essential that France undertake a military atomic program. Otherwise, its security will be entirely guaranteed by the Anglo‑Saxons.” (Jean‑Marc Boegner, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Treaty Service, 25 August 1954)
In an extremely tense international situation—both in Europe and abroad (with the colonial war in Indochina, where France’s enemies were supplied by the USSR and Communist China)—the tension between France and the Soviet Union grew dramatically. De Gaulle’s idea that the United States should not interfere in European affairs, combined with Soviet fears, led to the development of the French defense doctrine “Tous azimuts”, literally: “in all directions.” For the General, the atomic weapon was the means for the country’s self‑determination, allowing France to make its own choices in foreign policy and beyond, returning to a central role in the European security system while distancing itself from the Anglo‑Saxon pillar of power and influence.
The distrust felt by French officers toward the United States was likely caused by the colonial wars France had been fighting since 1946. At that moment, France had no economic or material resources to sustain these conflicts. American support had been essential: small arms, tanks, helicopters, aircraft, trucks, vehicles, clothing, and funds. The Americans’ attitude—often unclear and not always favorable—generated deep mistrust toward the United States. All of this reached its peak with the Suez Crisis. From that moment on, the French realized that the sovereignty of their armed forces was vital to their independence. They applied the same reasoning to the atomic bomb.
Gerboise Bleue
PART 1: After the end of the Second World War and the restoration of sovereignty over its European territory, France joined the United Nations Security Council (composed of the victors of the war) with a permanent seat and veto power. In a complex political…
Terminato il secondo conflitto mondiale e ripristinata la sovranità sul proprio territorio in Europa, la Francia entra a far parte del consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite ( composto dai vincitori della seconda guerra mondiale ) con seggio permanente e potere di veto. In una situazione politica e sociale complessa, il governo francese vuole riprendere la posizione sulla scena internazionale che si era persa con la caduta della Francia nel 1940 ad opera della Germania nazista. Oltre a ciò tenta la pacificazione del suo impero coloniale in tumulto e rivolta, il quale si estende dal continente Africano al sud est asiatico. In questa situazione si inaspriscono le relazioni tra URSS e USA e comincia la polarizzazione del globo. La Francia degli anni ‘50 sotto la direzione della quarta repubblica si rende conto che per elevare l’importanza e l’indipendenza del paese tra i due blocchi deve possedere l’arma atomica e la capacità di usarla. L’esclusione, non dimenticata, del governo libero Francese dagli accordi di Quebec (1943) sulla condivisione delle tecnologie nucleari tra USA e UK spinge il paese ad una dottrina di pensiero molto rigida. Infatti fin da subito si sostiene la necessità di possedere il “know-how”, la tecnologia e le capacità di produrre su una filiera indipendente l’arma atomica e i suoi vettori. Possedendo la totalità della produzione e gestione del sistema, si può garantire una parziale (se non totale) indipendenza strategica. Questo progetto viene spinto a livelli mai raggiunti dal secondo governo De Gaulle, grazie alle sue teorie politiche e militari. La filosofia di pensiero Francese degli anni 50 sulla questione nucleare può essere condensata in una nota del Quai D’Orsay ( ministero degli esteri Francesi ): «L’orientamento della strategia apparterrà oramai sempre più alle potenze in possesso dell’arma atomica. Del resto, una forza armata priva di mezzi atomici non sarà più una forza armata. È dunque essenziale che la Francia intraprenda un programma militare atomico. In caso contrario, la sua sicurezza sarà interamente garantita dagli anglosassoni». (Jean-Marc Boegner, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Servizio dei patti, 25 agosto 1954). In una situazione internazionale molto tesa, in Europa e all’estero ( con le guerra coloniale in Indocina dove i nemici dei francesi erano foraggiati da URSS e Cina Comunista) la tensione tra Francia e Unione Sovietica cresce a dismisura. L’idea di de Gaulle che gli Usa non debbano interferire con gli affari europei e il timore dei sovietici porta allo sviluppo delle teoria di difesa Francese “Tous azimuts”, letteralmente: in tutte le direzioni. Per il generale l’arma atomica è il metodo per l’auto-determinazione del paese, in modo che sia libero di fare le proprie scelte in politica estera e non. Tornando alla centralità della Francia nel sistema di sicurezza europeo, allontanandosi dal caposaldo di potere e influenza Anglosassone.
La diffidenza provata dagli ufficiali francesi verso gli Stati uniti é probabilmente stata causata dalle guerre coloniali portate avanti dalla Francia dal 46. In quel preciso momento storico la Francia non aveva nessuna disponibilità economica o materiale per sostenere queste guerre. Il supporto americano era stato essenziale: armi leggere, carri, elicotteri, aerei, camion, auto, vestiti e fondi. L'atteggiamento non del tutto chiaro e non sempre favorevole causò grandi diffidenze nei confronti degli Stati Uniti. Tutto questo raggiunse il suo apice con la crisi di Suez. Da quel momento i francesi si resero conto che la sovranità della loro forza armata era vitale per la loro indipendenza. Lo stesso ragionamento applicarono alla bomba atomica.
ITALIAN VERSION
PART 2:
The first nuclear test (Gerboise bleue) took place in Reggane on 13 February 1960. With a yield of 70 kilotons and a fission rate above 50 percent, it was considered a major success. The device was detonated in the air rather than on the ground, and four additional atmospheric tests followed. Another thirteen were conducted at an underground site. “AN 11” was the name of the first nuclear bomb accepted into service in the French arsenal (1964), with a yield of 40 kilotons and capable of being delivered in free‑fall by a Mirage IV.
The development of the nuclear device must be understood as a collective French effort to achieve autonomy on the European strategic level. The weapons system itself became the cornerstone of national defense and autonomy, making France—during the Cold War—a particularly difficult obstacle to confront. This was demonstrated by the very plan conceived by Soviet generals for invading the heart of Europe. Known as “Seven Days to the River Rhine”, it was an operational plan meant as a response to a hypothetical NATO “attack” on the Warsaw Pact. Its execution envisioned the dropping of atomic bombs at various points in West Germany to slow the influx of Atlantic Alliance personnel to the front. However, it explicitly stated that France should not be struck on its own territory, as it would certainly respond in a total and devastating manner. The plan foresaw negotiations after Soviet forces reached the Rhine, which would then serve as a natural barrier and border between the two blocs. Striking France would eliminate any possibility of negotiation. This highlights the effectiveness of the French arsenal’s deterrent, which would have guaranteed at least a certain degree of “security” for the national territory.
French nuclear doctrine, both during the Cold War and today, revolves around a single concept: We French are disadvantaged in means, resources, and space in the event of a nuclear confrontation. Therefore, we must make ourselves destructive only to the extent necessary to inflict the greatest possible damage. It was General de Gaulle himself who stated: “Deterrence begins when one has the ability to cause enough casualties to convince the aggressor that it is not worth it” (dissuasion du faible au fort). The objective of retaliation is purely civilian in nature: cities must be struck—that is, the population and the economy of the aggressor. This logic and its execution produce greater damage at lower cost compared to striking sensitive military sites.
Thus, sophistication or precision is not necessary; what matters is destructiveness and reliability. There is no need to engage in an arms race, but rather to possess the minimum necessary (functional and always ready) to deliver a blow that makes the cost‑benefit balance of attacking France negative. It is not necessary to have the most advanced ballistic surveillance system, but it is essential to have the ability to hide nuclear assets so as to carry out devastating retaliation against the attacker—even if the Élysée Palace were reduced to rubble.
De Gaulle argued for the need to possess delivery systems capable of destroying at least twenty Soviet cities, thereby reducing by roughly 60 percent the economy of the socialist republics. In 1970, the French Air Force had the capability to eliminate around twenty million Soviet citizens—still far from the intended objective. In the 1980s, the potential number of victims rose to fifty million, alongside roughly forty cities.
The first nuclear test (Gerboise bleue) took place in Reggane on 13 February 1960. With a yield of 70 kilotons and a fission rate above 50 percent, it was considered a major success. The device was detonated in the air rather than on the ground, and four additional atmospheric tests followed. Another thirteen were conducted at an underground site. “AN 11” was the name of the first nuclear bomb accepted into service in the French arsenal (1964), with a yield of 40 kilotons and capable of being delivered in free‑fall by a Mirage IV.
The development of the nuclear device must be understood as a collective French effort to achieve autonomy on the European strategic level. The weapons system itself became the cornerstone of national defense and autonomy, making France—during the Cold War—a particularly difficult obstacle to confront. This was demonstrated by the very plan conceived by Soviet generals for invading the heart of Europe. Known as “Seven Days to the River Rhine”, it was an operational plan meant as a response to a hypothetical NATO “attack” on the Warsaw Pact. Its execution envisioned the dropping of atomic bombs at various points in West Germany to slow the influx of Atlantic Alliance personnel to the front. However, it explicitly stated that France should not be struck on its own territory, as it would certainly respond in a total and devastating manner. The plan foresaw negotiations after Soviet forces reached the Rhine, which would then serve as a natural barrier and border between the two blocs. Striking France would eliminate any possibility of negotiation. This highlights the effectiveness of the French arsenal’s deterrent, which would have guaranteed at least a certain degree of “security” for the national territory.
French nuclear doctrine, both during the Cold War and today, revolves around a single concept: We French are disadvantaged in means, resources, and space in the event of a nuclear confrontation. Therefore, we must make ourselves destructive only to the extent necessary to inflict the greatest possible damage. It was General de Gaulle himself who stated: “Deterrence begins when one has the ability to cause enough casualties to convince the aggressor that it is not worth it” (dissuasion du faible au fort). The objective of retaliation is purely civilian in nature: cities must be struck—that is, the population and the economy of the aggressor. This logic and its execution produce greater damage at lower cost compared to striking sensitive military sites.
Thus, sophistication or precision is not necessary; what matters is destructiveness and reliability. There is no need to engage in an arms race, but rather to possess the minimum necessary (functional and always ready) to deliver a blow that makes the cost‑benefit balance of attacking France negative. It is not necessary to have the most advanced ballistic surveillance system, but it is essential to have the ability to hide nuclear assets so as to carry out devastating retaliation against the attacker—even if the Élysée Palace were reduced to rubble.
De Gaulle argued for the need to possess delivery systems capable of destroying at least twenty Soviet cities, thereby reducing by roughly 60 percent the economy of the socialist republics. In 1970, the French Air Force had the capability to eliminate around twenty million Soviet citizens—still far from the intended objective. In the 1980s, the potential number of victims rose to fifty million, alongside roughly forty cities.
Gerboise Bleue
PART 2: The first nuclear test (Gerboise bleue) took place in Reggane on 13 February 1960. With a yield of 70 kilotons and a fission rate above 50 percent, it was considered a major success. The device was detonated in the air rather than on the ground, and…
Il primo test nucleare (Gerboise bleue) ebbe luogo a Reggane il 13 febbraio 1960. Con una potenza di 70 chilotoni e un tasso di fissione superiore al 50 per cento, fu considerato un grande successo. L’ordigno venne fatto brillare in aria e non al suolo e a questo test ne susseguirono altri 4 atmosferici. Altri 13 vennero condotti in un sito sotterraneo. “AN 11” questo era il nome della prima bomba nucleare accettata in servizio nell’arsenale Francese (1964), con una potenza di 40 chilotoni e capace di essere lanciata a caduta libera da un Mirage IV. Lo sviluppo in se del ordigno nucleare va visto come un sforzo collettivo francese per ottenere un’autonomia sul piano strategico europeo. Il sistema d’arma in se è il perno della difesa e dell’autonomia nazionale, questo pose la Francia (durante la guerra Fredda) ad essere un ostacolo molto impegnativo da affrontare. Ciò venne dimostrato dal piano stesso disegnato e pensato dai generali sovietici per invadere il cuore dell’Europa. Denominato “Sette Giorni al Fiume Reno”, era un piano operativo di risposta ad un “attacco” NATO al patto di Varsavia. L’esecuzione prevedeva lo sgancio di bombe atomiche in punti diversi della Germania Ovest in modo da rallentare l’afflusso di personale del Patto Atlantico al confine. Veniva però specificato che la Francia non doveva essere colpita sul suo territorio, perché avrebbe sicuramente risposto in maniera totale e distruttiva. Il Piano prevedeva una trattativa dopo l’arrivo dei sovietici al Reno che avrebbe funto poi da barriera e confine naturale tra i due blocchi. Colpendo i Francesi avrebbero eliminato ogni possibilità di trattativa. Questo evidenzia l’efficacia di deterrenza dell’arsenale Francese che avrebbe garantito almeno al territorio un certo grado di “sicurezza”.
La dottrina nucleare Francese riguardante il periodo della guerra fredda e quello attuale ruota attorno ad un singolo concetto: Noi Francesi siamo svantaggiati in mezzi, risorse, spazio nel caso di un confronto nucleare. Quindi, dobbiamo renderci distruttivi solo quel che basta per recare più danni possibili. Fu lo stesso Generale De Gaulle a dire: “La deterrenza inizia quando si ha la possibilità di causare abbastanza vittime, per convincere l’aggressore che non ne valga la pena”[dissuasion du faible au fort]. L’obbiettivo della ritorsione è puramente di natura civile, devono essere colpite città, cioè popolazione ed economia dell’aggressore. Questo pensiero e la sua esecuzione comportano danni maggiori e costi minori rispetto a colpire siti militari sensibili del nemico. Quindi non è necessario essere sofisticati o precisi, ma distruttivi e affidabili. Non serve condurre una corsa agli armamenti ma avere il minimo necessario (funzionante e sempre pronto) per sferrare un colpo che renda negativo il bilancio di un attacco contro la Francia. Non è necessario avere il sistema di sorveglianza balistica più avanzata, ma è necessario avere la capacità di nascondere gli asset nucleari per condurre un ritorsione devastante per l'attaccante, anche nel momento in cui l’Eliseo venga raso al suolo. De Gaulle sosteneva la necessità di avere i vettori per la distruzione di almeno 20 città sovietiche, la riduzione in questo modo del 60% dell’economia delle repubbliche socialiste. Nel 1970 l’aviazione possedeva la capacità di eliminare circa 20 milioni di cittadini sovietici, ancora lontano dall’obbiettivo prefissato. Negli anni 80 divennero 50 milioni le possibili vitttime accanto a circa 40 città.
LAST PART!
French nuclear capabilities emerged in 1967, when the General planned to equip the French armed forces with a nuclear triad capable of delivering strikes from air, sea, and land. These capabilities would later materialize in the systems: Mirage IV (bomber), Redoutable (SSBN), and S2/S3 (MRBM). It is important to highlight that, within French nuclear doctrine, the state must retain full sovereignty over the production, development, and management of the nuclear triad, which is under the exclusive authority of the President of the Republic. After 1966, with France’s withdrawal from NATO’s unified command, this control became entirely national. The nuclear triad would later be referred to by De Gaulle as the Force de Frappe, literally: “strike force.”
Many official documents specify that nuclear deterrence also concerns the defense of the country’s “vital” interests, such as its independence, territorial integrity, or the ability to choose its own strategy. However, the nature of the threat or its level (nuclear or conventional) is not defined. One may therefore conclude that even a conventional attack on a vital national system could be met with nuclear force. This is also evident today in the development and production of the ASMP (discussed later).
In 2006, Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, declared: “The leaders of other countries who use terrorist means against us must understand that they expose themselves to a firm and appropriate response on our part. And this response may be conventional. It may also be of a different nature.” The atomic weapon is the core of French defense; anything that threatens the Republic and its integrity could receive a “moderate” response in the form of a nuclear mushroom cloud on its territory.
This concept of a nuclear warning strike emerged in 1970 with the rise of increasingly numerous “regional powers.” France reserves the right to launch a first warning strike against an adversary, making clear what the inviolable limits are. The target of such a strike could be military or industrial sites, and a high‑altitude detonation to generate an EMP is not excluded. The underlying concept—also present in French conventional doctrine, articulated by major generals in various works on tactics and strategy—is to limit the enemy’s freedom of action in order to maintain initiative and deny it to the adversary.
In 2020, President Macron stated: “Should misunderstandings arise regarding France’s determination to protect its vital interests, a single, non‑repeatable nuclear warning could be issued against the aggressor state to clearly demonstrate that the nature of the conflict has changed and to reestablish deterrence.”
Today, in 2026, France maintains that the atomic weapon cannot be used as a tactical instrument, yet the core idea and doctrine conceived by General De Gaulle in the 1950s remain. The concept of sufficiency—necessary to ensure the destruction of the enemy—persists, and it is reaffirmed that the entire industrial and technological sector (of extremely high level) remains fully under French state control, as does the decision‑making process, which is subordinate to no one except the President himself.
A document from the French Ministry of Defense, dated March 2026, specifies that the country’s vital interests will not be publicly defined, and that the state reserves the right to launch a nuclear warning strike in response to any aggression, conventional or otherwise. It further clarifies that conventional forces accompany nuclear forces, and not the other way around.
In conclusion, France’s industrial, decision‑making, and strategic capacity has allowed it to remain the only country in Europe capable of maintaining both conventional and nuclear operational readiness sufficient to shape long‑term strategy and position itself as a “third pole” in Europe. In the future, it could potentially assume the role currently held by the United States, should the latter choose to shift its strategic focus eastward.
French nuclear capabilities emerged in 1967, when the General planned to equip the French armed forces with a nuclear triad capable of delivering strikes from air, sea, and land. These capabilities would later materialize in the systems: Mirage IV (bomber), Redoutable (SSBN), and S2/S3 (MRBM). It is important to highlight that, within French nuclear doctrine, the state must retain full sovereignty over the production, development, and management of the nuclear triad, which is under the exclusive authority of the President of the Republic. After 1966, with France’s withdrawal from NATO’s unified command, this control became entirely national. The nuclear triad would later be referred to by De Gaulle as the Force de Frappe, literally: “strike force.”
Many official documents specify that nuclear deterrence also concerns the defense of the country’s “vital” interests, such as its independence, territorial integrity, or the ability to choose its own strategy. However, the nature of the threat or its level (nuclear or conventional) is not defined. One may therefore conclude that even a conventional attack on a vital national system could be met with nuclear force. This is also evident today in the development and production of the ASMP (discussed later).
In 2006, Jacques Chirac, President of the French Republic, declared: “The leaders of other countries who use terrorist means against us must understand that they expose themselves to a firm and appropriate response on our part. And this response may be conventional. It may also be of a different nature.” The atomic weapon is the core of French defense; anything that threatens the Republic and its integrity could receive a “moderate” response in the form of a nuclear mushroom cloud on its territory.
This concept of a nuclear warning strike emerged in 1970 with the rise of increasingly numerous “regional powers.” France reserves the right to launch a first warning strike against an adversary, making clear what the inviolable limits are. The target of such a strike could be military or industrial sites, and a high‑altitude detonation to generate an EMP is not excluded. The underlying concept—also present in French conventional doctrine, articulated by major generals in various works on tactics and strategy—is to limit the enemy’s freedom of action in order to maintain initiative and deny it to the adversary.
In 2020, President Macron stated: “Should misunderstandings arise regarding France’s determination to protect its vital interests, a single, non‑repeatable nuclear warning could be issued against the aggressor state to clearly demonstrate that the nature of the conflict has changed and to reestablish deterrence.”
Today, in 2026, France maintains that the atomic weapon cannot be used as a tactical instrument, yet the core idea and doctrine conceived by General De Gaulle in the 1950s remain. The concept of sufficiency—necessary to ensure the destruction of the enemy—persists, and it is reaffirmed that the entire industrial and technological sector (of extremely high level) remains fully under French state control, as does the decision‑making process, which is subordinate to no one except the President himself.
A document from the French Ministry of Defense, dated March 2026, specifies that the country’s vital interests will not be publicly defined, and that the state reserves the right to launch a nuclear warning strike in response to any aggression, conventional or otherwise. It further clarifies that conventional forces accompany nuclear forces, and not the other way around.
In conclusion, France’s industrial, decision‑making, and strategic capacity has allowed it to remain the only country in Europe capable of maintaining both conventional and nuclear operational readiness sufficient to shape long‑term strategy and position itself as a “third pole” in Europe. In the future, it could potentially assume the role currently held by the United States, should the latter choose to shift its strategic focus eastward.
Gerboise Bleue
LAST PART! French nuclear capabilities emerged in 1967, when the General planned to equip the French armed forces with a nuclear triad capable of delivering strikes from air, sea, and land. These capabilities would later materialize in the systems: Mirage…
Le capacità nucleari nascono nel 1967 quando il Generale pianifica di dotare le forze armate Francesi di una triade nucleare, capace di sferrare attacchi da aria, mare e terra. Si realizzeranno in seguito nei sistemi: Mirage IV (bombardiere), Redoutable (sottomarino SSBN), S2/S3 ( MRBM). Da evidenziare che nella dottrina nucleare lo stato Francese deve detenere la piena sovranità sulla produzione sullo sviluppo e gestione della triade nucleare, che è ad uso esclusivo del Presidente della repubblica e dopo il 1966 con il ritiro dal comando unificato della NATO, totalmente in mano allo stato. La Triade nucleare verrà chiamata poi da De Gaulle come “Force de Frappe”, letteralmente: forza d’urto. In molti documenti rilasciati viene specificato che la deterrenza nucleare riguarda anche la difesa di quelle parti “vitali” del paese come la sua indipendenza, integrità territoriali o capacità di scegliere la propria strategia. Non viene specificata però l’entità della minaccia o il livello (nucleare o convenzionale), quindi si può trarre la conclusione che anche un attacco convenzionale ad un sistema vitale del paese potrebbe essere affrontato con l’arma nucleare. Questo è evidenziato anche attualmente dallo sviluppo e produzione del ASMP (di cui si parlerà in seguito). Nel 2006 Jacques Chirac presidente della Repubblica francese esordisce affermando: “ I leader di altri paesi che utilizzano mezzi terroristici contro di noi devono capire che si espongono a una risposta ferma e adeguata da parte nostra. E questa risposta può essere convenzionale. Può anche essere di natura diversa”. L’arma atomica è il fulcro della difesa Francese, tutto ciò che minaccia la Repubblica e la sua integrità potrebbe ricevere come risposta “moderata” un fungo atomico sul territorio. Questo concetto di colpo di avvertimento (nucleare) nasce nel 1970 con l’avvento di sempre più potenze “regionali”. La Francia si riserva la scelta di lanciare per prima un avvertimento al nemico, facendogli capire quali sono i limiti invalicabili. Il bersaglio di questo colpo potrebbero essere siti militari o industriali e non viene esclusa la detonazione ad altitudine molto elevate per creare un EMP. Il concetto, che poi viene richiamato anche nella dottrina convenzionale francese (esposto da grandi generali in diversi libri di tattica e strategia) è quello di limitare la libertà d’azione del nemico in modo da mantenere l’iniziativa negandola all’avversario. Nel 2020 il Presidente Macron dichiara: “Qualora sorgessero malintesi circa la determinazione della Francia a proteggere i propri interessi vitali, si potrebbe emettere un avvertimento nucleare unico e irripetibile nei confronti dello Stato aggressore per dimostrare chiaramente che la natura del conflitto è cambiata e per ristabilire la deterrenza”.
Oggi nel 2026 la Francia crede che l’arma atomica non possa essere utilizzata come arma tattica, ma rimane l’idea e la dottrina pensata dal Generale De Gaulle negli anni 50. Rimane il concetto di sufficienza, necessaria per la distruzione del nemico e viene aggiunto che tutto il comparto produttivo e tecnologico (di altissimo livello) rimane totalmente in mano allo stato francese come il processo decisionale che non è subordinato a nessuno se non al presidente stesso. Anche nel documento del ministero della difesa francese, datato Marzo 2026, viene specificato che non saranno dichiarati quali sono gli interessi vitali del paese e che lo stato in caso di qualsiasi aggressione convenzionale e non, si riserva il diritto di lanciare un colpo di avvertimento nucleare, specificando che sono le forze convenzionali ad accompagnare quelle nucleari e non il contrario. Concludo dicendo che la capacità industriale, decisionale e strategica ha permesso alla Francia di rimanere l’unico paese in Europa a mantenere un operatività, convenzionale e non, in grado di dettare strategie sul lungo periodo e porsi come “terzo polo” in Europa. Potrebbe essere in un futuro capace di prendere il posto americano nel caso questi decidessero di concentrarsi verso oriente.
Gerboise Bleue pinned «Today's post is about French nuclear doctrine! Learn something, follow us Reading time: 10 mins»
A brief introduction to STRATUS, the MBDA missile program defining the future of European defense.
STRATUS is the name of the missile program launched by France and the United Kingdom in 2017 to replace the Storm Shadow, Harpoon, and Exocet missiles, with Italy joining the program in 2023. Initially, the development of a hypersonic missile called Perseus was planned, but it was later decided to develop two different and complementary missiles: the STRATUS LO ("Low Observability") and the STRATUS RS ("Rapid Strike").STRATUS LO utilizes a new turbojet engine named TP15, developed primarily by the United Kingdom. This is an unusual choice for a missile of this type compared to the stealthier turbofan, which also guarantees greater range—a decision likely driven by economic reasons. It also features a New Gen Infrared seeker for target visualization during the terminal phase. The missile has been subjected to extreme radar and electronic warfare scenarios while maintaining its stealth capabilities. Its subsonic speed plays a fundamental role in this, facilitating low-altitude flight, allowing for stealthier and less aerodynamically stringent designs, and above all, significantly reducing the engine's thermal signature. This missile specializes in striking land targets and, secondarily, anti-ship operations. Its range is likely over 1000 km at very low altitudes, and it uses a 450 kg multi-stage bunker-buster warhead similar to the Storm Shadow's BROACH, which has already been extensively proven in Russia.STRATUS RS is much more extravagant. It uses a niche propulsion technology that few countries in the world can deploy: the Ramjet engine, a principle already used for the European Meteor and ASMPA missiles. It is an engine with zero rotating parts; it simply exploits the airflow entering the Air Intake. Because of this, the missile cannot start from a standstill or at low speeds because it is not self-sufficient for propulsion. The air enters, and the specific geometry of the missile's air intake slows it down to subsonic speed, increasing the pressure generated by the air impact. At this point, fuel is injected into this compressed air space, and the air combustion generates thrust. The advantages of this engine are that it experiences no mechanical failures since there are no moving parts—it is literally a shaped tube—and it weighs very little. Lacking blades that could melt, it allows the missile to reach extremely high speeds and sustain them throughout the flight by riding the airflow, unlike a standard missile that loses kinetic energy with every maneuver and becomes very slow at the end of its run.The RS will primarily be an anti-ship and anti-air defense missile with anti-aircraft capabilities (an absolutely unique feature) targeted at high-value strategic aircraft such as AWACS and Tankers. It is expected to have a range of under 500 km and a very high speed between Mach 3 and Mach 5, meaning from about 1 km/s to 1.7 km/s for the entire duration of the flight. The air-launched range is likely significantly higher. It will use a 250 kg semi-armor-piercing high-explosive anti-ship warhead, to which must be added the massive accumulated kinetic energy. For a missile weighing at least 1000 kg, this energy alone is equivalent to hundreds of kilograms of TNT at Mach 3, let alone Mach 5. It would certainly annihilate any Russian frigate or destroyer with a single strike, and likely even cruisers like the Slava class.They will enter service between 2028 and 2030.