🚨 CVE-2026-79979
The arm64 MMU backend invalidates a single virtual address from the TLB with invalidate_tlb_page() in arch/arm64/core/mmu.c, which issued TLBI VAE1{IS} with an operand of virt >> 12. That operand encodes the ASID in bits [63:48], so the invalidation only ever matched ASID 0 (the kernel page tables) and global entries. Memory domains, however, are allocated ASIDs starting at 1 in arch_mem_domain_init(), and every domain-private leaf created by private_map() is mapped with MT_NG, i.e. non-global. A domain's cached translation therefore survived the invalidation.
All callers of invalidate_tlb_page() are demand-paging paths. When the eviction algorithm reclaims a frame, page_frame_prepare_locked() in kernel/mmu.c calls arch_mem_page_out(), which marks the kernel leaf invalid, propagates the invalid descriptor into every domain via sync_domains(), and then flushes only ASID 0. do_page_fault() immediately reuses the very same page frame for the incoming mapping through arch_mem_page_in(). A user thread that had already touched the evicted page — a k_mem_partition added with arch_mem_domain_partition_add(), or its own stack mapped by map_thread_stack() — retains a valid EL0 read/write translation to that physical frame under its own ASID.
Unprivileged code running in a user thread can drive memory pressure to force eviction and then keep accessing the stale address, obtaining read and write access to whatever the kernel subsequently placed in that frame: supervisor data, another memory domain's partition, or another thread's stack. This defeats the isolation that CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to enforce, allowing information disclosure and memory corruption up to full compromise of the system.
The fix switches the implementation to TLBI VAAE1{IS}, which matches every ASID and both global and non-global entries, so no domain-tagged translation survives a page out, dirty-bit update or access-flag clear. Exploitation requires an arm64 build with both CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_DEMAND_PAGING enabled, an active backing store, and at least one demand-paged page that is also privately mapped into a user memory domain. The same commit additionally stops globalize_table() from stripping EL0 permission and non-global attributes off domain-private leaves during paging synchronization, which previously caused user threads to lose access to their own partitions and stacks.
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The arm64 MMU backend invalidates a single virtual address from the TLB with invalidate_tlb_page() in arch/arm64/core/mmu.c, which issued TLBI VAE1{IS} with an operand of virt >> 12. That operand encodes the ASID in bits [63:48], so the invalidation only ever matched ASID 0 (the kernel page tables) and global entries. Memory domains, however, are allocated ASIDs starting at 1 in arch_mem_domain_init(), and every domain-private leaf created by private_map() is mapped with MT_NG, i.e. non-global. A domain's cached translation therefore survived the invalidation.
All callers of invalidate_tlb_page() are demand-paging paths. When the eviction algorithm reclaims a frame, page_frame_prepare_locked() in kernel/mmu.c calls arch_mem_page_out(), which marks the kernel leaf invalid, propagates the invalid descriptor into every domain via sync_domains(), and then flushes only ASID 0. do_page_fault() immediately reuses the very same page frame for the incoming mapping through arch_mem_page_in(). A user thread that had already touched the evicted page — a k_mem_partition added with arch_mem_domain_partition_add(), or its own stack mapped by map_thread_stack() — retains a valid EL0 read/write translation to that physical frame under its own ASID.
Unprivileged code running in a user thread can drive memory pressure to force eviction and then keep accessing the stale address, obtaining read and write access to whatever the kernel subsequently placed in that frame: supervisor data, another memory domain's partition, or another thread's stack. This defeats the isolation that CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to enforce, allowing information disclosure and memory corruption up to full compromise of the system.
The fix switches the implementation to TLBI VAAE1{IS}, which matches every ASID and both global and non-global entries, so no domain-tagged translation survives a page out, dirty-bit update or access-flag clear. Exploitation requires an arm64 build with both CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_DEMAND_PAGING enabled, an active backing store, and at least one demand-paged page that is also privately mapped into a user memory domain. The same commit additionally stops globalize_table() from stripping EL0 permission and non-global attributes off domain-private leaves during paging synchronization, which previously caused user threads to lose access to their own partitions and stacks.
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GitHub
arch: arm64: mmu: keep domain-private mappings coherent on paging sync · zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr@d732e9f
arch_mem_page_out()/arch_mem_page_in() and the AF/dirty sync paths call
sync_domains(), which globalizes the affected range into every memory
domain. globalize_table() replaced each destination lea...
sync_domains(), which globalizes the affected range into every memory
domain. globalize_table() replaced each destination lea...
🚨 CVE-2026-79980
The DHCPv4 client in subsys/net/lib/dhcpv4/dhcpv4.c maintained its transaction identifier (iface->config.dhcpv4.xid) as a counter rather than as a per-transaction random value. It was seeded once with sys_rand32_get() in dhcpv4_start_internal(), incremented by one in dhcpv4_send_discover() and dhcpv4_send_decline(), and never changed by dhcpv4_send_request() — so every RENEWING and REBINDING exchange reused, unchanged, the identifier that had already appeared on the wire in the broadcast DHCPDISCOVER at boot, and where the identifier did move it moved predictably by one. RFC 2131 4.1 requires a single identifier per transaction, chosen so that clients are unlikely to collide.
This identifier is the client's only unpredictable reply-validation token. net_dhcpv4_input() accepts a BOOTP reply on op, a matching xid, and a matching chaddr (the interface MAC, which is public); the UDP callback is registered with a wildcard remote address and port, and no server-identifier or source-address check is applied. An attacker who learns one identifier — for example any host on the same segment that sees the broadcast DHCPDISCOVER, or a DHCP server or relay on a network the device previously joined — therefore retains a valid token for the device's whole uptime, and can predict the identifiers of later exchanges, without having to observe the unicast renew traffic or race the legitimate server.
A forged reply that passes those checks has effect regardless of client state, because dhcpv4_parse_options() applies its side effects before the state machine gate in dhcpv4_handle_reply(): the router option calls net_if_ipv4_set_gw() and the DNS option calls dns_resolve_reconfigure(). A single accepted datagram can thus repoint the device's default gateway and resolvers at attacker-controlled addresses, redirecting its traffic; during RENEWING or REBINDING a forged DHCPACK re-binds the lease with attacker-chosen parameters and a forged DHCPNAK removes the address and restarts configuration.
The fix draws a fresh sys_rand32_get() value at each point where a transaction begins — entering SELECTING, RENEWING and REBINDING, and at the INIT/INIT-REBOOT entry taken when an interface with a lease goes down — while REQUESTING and DECLINE keep the identifier of the exchange they belong to, as RFC 2131 requires. As a side effect the client also no longer discards a slow server's offer after retransmitting a discover, and the initial-discover backoff now draws its own randomness instead of deriving it from the identifier.
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The DHCPv4 client in subsys/net/lib/dhcpv4/dhcpv4.c maintained its transaction identifier (iface->config.dhcpv4.xid) as a counter rather than as a per-transaction random value. It was seeded once with sys_rand32_get() in dhcpv4_start_internal(), incremented by one in dhcpv4_send_discover() and dhcpv4_send_decline(), and never changed by dhcpv4_send_request() — so every RENEWING and REBINDING exchange reused, unchanged, the identifier that had already appeared on the wire in the broadcast DHCPDISCOVER at boot, and where the identifier did move it moved predictably by one. RFC 2131 4.1 requires a single identifier per transaction, chosen so that clients are unlikely to collide.
This identifier is the client's only unpredictable reply-validation token. net_dhcpv4_input() accepts a BOOTP reply on op, a matching xid, and a matching chaddr (the interface MAC, which is public); the UDP callback is registered with a wildcard remote address and port, and no server-identifier or source-address check is applied. An attacker who learns one identifier — for example any host on the same segment that sees the broadcast DHCPDISCOVER, or a DHCP server or relay on a network the device previously joined — therefore retains a valid token for the device's whole uptime, and can predict the identifiers of later exchanges, without having to observe the unicast renew traffic or race the legitimate server.
A forged reply that passes those checks has effect regardless of client state, because dhcpv4_parse_options() applies its side effects before the state machine gate in dhcpv4_handle_reply(): the router option calls net_if_ipv4_set_gw() and the DNS option calls dns_resolve_reconfigure(). A single accepted datagram can thus repoint the device's default gateway and resolvers at attacker-controlled addresses, redirecting its traffic; during RENEWING or REBINDING a forged DHCPACK re-binds the lease with attacker-chosen parameters and a forged DHCPNAK removes the address and restarts configuration.
The fix draws a fresh sys_rand32_get() value at each point where a transaction begins — entering SELECTING, RENEWING and REBINDING, and at the INIT/INIT-REBOOT entry taken when an interface with a lease goes down — while REQUESTING and DECLINE keep the identifier of the exchange they belong to, as RFC 2131 requires. As a side effect the client also no longer discards a slow server's offer after retransmitting a discover, and the initial-discover backoff now draws its own randomness instead of deriving it from the identifier.
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GitHub
net: dhcpv4: Use one transaction identifier per transaction · zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr@6a96770
RFC 2131 4.1 asks a client to use the same 'xid' for every message of a
transaction. The client counted it up by one on each message instead, so
a retransmitted discover carried a d...
transaction. The client counted it up by one on each message instead, so
a retransmitted discover carried a d...
🚨 CVE-2026-79981
The DNS stub resolver in subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c binds one UDP socket per configured server when the resolver context is initialised (dns_resolve_init_locked() -> register_dispatcher() -> dns_dispatcher_register()), with the local port left at 0 so the stack picks an ephemeral port exactly once. dns_write() then sends every subsequent query from that same socket without re-binding, so the source port is constant for the lifetime of the resolver context while only the 16-bit transaction identifier (ctx->queries[i].id, drawn with sys_rand16_get()) varies per query. RFC 5452 section 9.2 requires both to vary; with a fixed port, an off-path attacker has to guess only the identifier.
The stable port is cheap to learn. Any single observed query reveals it permanently, and it can also be found by probing the ephemeral UDP range: subsys/net/ip/connection.c answers unmatched unicast UDP with an ICMP port-unreachable, so the resolver's socket is the one port in that range that stays silent. Acceptance of a reply is decided solely by get_slot_by_id() matching the transaction identifier and a CRC-16 of the queried name — the reply's source address is never checked (dispatcher_cb() does ARG_UNUSED(addr)), so forged answers need not even be spoofed to appear to come from the configured server; they only need to reach the resolver's port.
An attacker with UDP reachability to the device (same LAN, Wi-Fi or mesh segment, or a globally routable device address) can therefore flood answers for a predictable query name across the 16-bit identifier space during a query window and race the legitimate server. A win makes the application resolve an attacker-chosen address, and with CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_CACHE enabled the forged record is retained for its attacker-chosen TTL. The attack still requires winning that race, and applications that validate TLS certificates for the resolved endpoint are largely protected.
The fix draws a fresh local port before each query to a server that has nothing outstanding: dns_randomize_source_port() unregisters the dispatcher, closes and reopens the socket, and re-registers it bound to port 0 so the system selects a new port, raising the per-query guessing space from roughly 16 to roughly 31 bits. Multicast DNS and LLMNR are excluded because their ports are protocol-fixed. The behaviour is controlled by CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_RANDOMIZE_SOURCE_PORT (default y).
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The DNS stub resolver in subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c binds one UDP socket per configured server when the resolver context is initialised (dns_resolve_init_locked() -> register_dispatcher() -> dns_dispatcher_register()), with the local port left at 0 so the stack picks an ephemeral port exactly once. dns_write() then sends every subsequent query from that same socket without re-binding, so the source port is constant for the lifetime of the resolver context while only the 16-bit transaction identifier (ctx->queries[i].id, drawn with sys_rand16_get()) varies per query. RFC 5452 section 9.2 requires both to vary; with a fixed port, an off-path attacker has to guess only the identifier.
The stable port is cheap to learn. Any single observed query reveals it permanently, and it can also be found by probing the ephemeral UDP range: subsys/net/ip/connection.c answers unmatched unicast UDP with an ICMP port-unreachable, so the resolver's socket is the one port in that range that stays silent. Acceptance of a reply is decided solely by get_slot_by_id() matching the transaction identifier and a CRC-16 of the queried name — the reply's source address is never checked (dispatcher_cb() does ARG_UNUSED(addr)), so forged answers need not even be spoofed to appear to come from the configured server; they only need to reach the resolver's port.
An attacker with UDP reachability to the device (same LAN, Wi-Fi or mesh segment, or a globally routable device address) can therefore flood answers for a predictable query name across the 16-bit identifier space during a query window and race the legitimate server. A win makes the application resolve an attacker-chosen address, and with CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_CACHE enabled the forged record is retained for its attacker-chosen TTL. The attack still requires winning that race, and applications that validate TLS certificates for the resolved endpoint are largely protected.
The fix draws a fresh local port before each query to a server that has nothing outstanding: dns_randomize_source_port() unregisters the dispatcher, closes and reopens the socket, and re-registers it bound to port 0 so the system selects a new port, raising the per-query guessing space from roughly 16 to roughly 31 bits. Multicast DNS and LLMNR are excluded because their ports are protocol-fixed. The behaviour is controlled by CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_RANDOMIZE_SOURCE_PORT (default y).
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GitHub
net: dns: Use a fresh source port for each query · zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr@289c14b
RFC 5452 9.2 asks a resolver to vary the source port of its queries as
well as the identifier. Both together are what an off path attacker has
to guess to forge an answer to a query it cannot see. ...
well as the identifier. Both together are what an off path attacker has
to guess to forge an answer to a query it cannot see. ...
🚨 CVE-2026-79982
The Bluetooth HCI USB transport class of the new USB device stack, subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c, copies every controller-to-host HCI packet into a USB transfer buffer before enqueuing it on an endpoint. bt_hci_tx_sync_in() allocated that buffer from bt_hci_ep_pool, a fixed pool whose slots are only USBD_MAX_BULK_MPS bytes (64 on full-speed-only builds), and then performed net_buf_add_mem(buf, bt_buf->data, bt_buf->len) with no length check. HCI event and ACL buffers are sized by CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE and CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE and can be far larger, so the copy runs past the end of the 64-byte slot into the adjacent slots and into whatever follows the statically allocated pool.
The device runs the local Bluetooth controller in raw HCI mode (CONFIG_BT_HCI_RAW), so the oversized packets originate over the air. With the HCI buffer sizes recommended for full-featured controllers, an unauthenticated attacker within Bluetooth range can supply the overflowing bytes: a connected peer that negotiates Data Length Extension can send ACL fragments up to CONFIG_BT_CTLR_DATA_LENGTH_MAX bytes, and an attacker that merely broadcasts extended advertising data reaches the same path through LE Extended Advertising Report events, which the controller fragments only to CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE. In the stock configuration the overflow is already reached without any radio traffic: the mandatory Read Supported Commands command-complete event is 70 bytes and overruns the 64-byte slot by six bytes on every host initialization.
Because net_buf_add_mem() validates tailroom only through an assertion unless CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING is enabled, builds with CONFIG_ASSERT=n — the usual production setting — silently corrupt memory adjacent to the USB buffer pool with attacker-chosen contents, which on a target without memory protection between subsystems can lead to arbitrary code execution. Builds with assertions enabled fail the assertion instead and panic, giving a remotely triggerable denial of service. The fix introduces a separate bt_hci_tx_pool sized to MAX(BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE, BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE) for the controller-to-host direction while leaving the host-to-device pool at the endpoint packet size, which is already bounds-checked during reassembly.
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The Bluetooth HCI USB transport class of the new USB device stack, subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c, copies every controller-to-host HCI packet into a USB transfer buffer before enqueuing it on an endpoint. bt_hci_tx_sync_in() allocated that buffer from bt_hci_ep_pool, a fixed pool whose slots are only USBD_MAX_BULK_MPS bytes (64 on full-speed-only builds), and then performed net_buf_add_mem(buf, bt_buf->data, bt_buf->len) with no length check. HCI event and ACL buffers are sized by CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE and CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE and can be far larger, so the copy runs past the end of the 64-byte slot into the adjacent slots and into whatever follows the statically allocated pool.
The device runs the local Bluetooth controller in raw HCI mode (CONFIG_BT_HCI_RAW), so the oversized packets originate over the air. With the HCI buffer sizes recommended for full-featured controllers, an unauthenticated attacker within Bluetooth range can supply the overflowing bytes: a connected peer that negotiates Data Length Extension can send ACL fragments up to CONFIG_BT_CTLR_DATA_LENGTH_MAX bytes, and an attacker that merely broadcasts extended advertising data reaches the same path through LE Extended Advertising Report events, which the controller fragments only to CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE. In the stock configuration the overflow is already reached without any radio traffic: the mandatory Read Supported Commands command-complete event is 70 bytes and overruns the 64-byte slot by six bytes on every host initialization.
Because net_buf_add_mem() validates tailroom only through an assertion unless CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING is enabled, builds with CONFIG_ASSERT=n — the usual production setting — silently corrupt memory adjacent to the USB buffer pool with attacker-chosen contents, which on a target without memory protection between subsystems can lead to arbitrary code execution. Builds with assertions enabled fail the assertion instead and panic, giving a remotely triggerable denial of service. The fix introduces a separate bt_hci_tx_pool sized to MAX(BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE, BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE) for the controller-to-host direction while leaving the host-to-device pool at the endpoint packet size, which is already bounds-checked during reassembly.
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GitHub
usb: device_next: bt_hci: size buffers for complete HCI packets · zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr@0419def
The BT HCI endpoint buffers are limited to USBD_MAX_BULK_MPS, which is
64 bytes on full-speed controllers. Configured HCI ACL or event packets
can be larger, causing an assertion or buffer overflow...
64 bytes on full-speed controllers. Configured HCI ACL or event packets
can be larger, causing an assertion or buffer overflow...
🚨 CVE-2026-110830
FreeRDP before 3.32.0 fails to close prior serial handles in serial_process_irp_create, allowing a malicious RDP server to exhaust file descriptors. Attackers can send repeated serial IRP_MJ_CREATE requests to accumulate descriptors and terminate the client at the CommReadFile FD_SETSIZE assertion.
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FreeRDP before 3.32.0 fails to close prior serial handles in serial_process_irp_create, allowing a malicious RDP server to exhaust file descriptors. Attackers can send repeated serial IRP_MJ_CREATE requests to accumulate descriptors and terminate the client at the CommReadFile FD_SETSIZE assertion.
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GitHub
Repeated serial create requests retain descriptors and can terminate the FreeRDP client
A remote RDP server can repeatedly send serial-device `IRP_MJ_CREATE` requests after a FreeRDP client has enabled serial redirection. `serial_process_irp_create` replaces `serial->hComm` without...
🚨 CVE-2026-110831
FreeRDP versions 3.13.0 before 3.32.0 contain a resource retention flaw in drive_process_irp_create, which registers an opened local file in the drive dictionary before applying the allocation size and does not remove it when that operation fails. A malicious RDP server connected to a client with drive redirection enabled can send IRP_MJ_CREATE with AllocationSize set to UINT64_MAX, forcing the seek to fail and leaking the file object and operating-system handle until drive teardown.
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FreeRDP versions 3.13.0 before 3.32.0 contain a resource retention flaw in drive_process_irp_create, which registers an opened local file in the drive dictionary before applying the allocation size and does not remove it when that operation fails. A malicious RDP server connected to a client with drive redirection enabled can send IRP_MJ_CREATE with AllocationSize set to UINT64_MAX, forcing the seek to fail and leaking the file object and operating-system handle until drive teardown.
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GitHub
Failed redirected-drive creates retain file objects and operating-system handles
### Summary
When a FreeRDP client connects to a malicious or compromised RDP server with local drive redirection enabled, the server can send `IRP_MJ_CREATE` with `AllocationSize=UINT64_MAX`. Fr...
When a FreeRDP client connects to a malicious or compromised RDP server with local drive redirection enabled, the server can send `IRP_MJ_CREATE` with `AllocationSize=UINT64_MAX`. Fr...
🚨 CVE-2026-110832
FreeRDP from 2.0.0 before 3.32.0 contains a memory exhaustion vulnerability in wts_read_drdynvc_data_first that allows authenticated clients to force servers to commit large memory allocations. Attackers can send a seven-byte DATA_FIRST message on an opened DVC declaring a large 32-bit length, causing zeroed resident memory growth and server resource exhaustion.
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FreeRDP from 2.0.0 before 3.32.0 contains a memory exhaustion vulnerability in wts_read_drdynvc_data_first that allows authenticated clients to force servers to commit large memory allocations. Attackers can send a seven-byte DATA_FIRST message on an opened DVC declaring a large 32-bit length, causing zeroed resident memory growth and server resource exhaustion.
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GitHub
FreeRDP server DRDYNVC DATA_FIRST permits declaration-driven memory commitment
## Summary
Once a FreeRDP server application has opened a DVC, `wts_read_drdynvc_data_first` trusts the client's 32-bit declared message length and grows the DVC receive stream to that total...
Once a FreeRDP server application has opened a DVC, `wts_read_drdynvc_data_first` trusts the client's 32-bit declared message length and grows the DVC receive stream to that total...
🚨 CVE-2026-110833
FreeRDP from 3.0.0-beta1 before 3.32.0 fails to enforce cumulative or absolute size limits when reassembling RDPDR channel fragments in the proxy. Attackers can send a FIRST fragment followed by continuation fragments without LAST, growing per-session heap streams proportional to traffic and exhausting proxy memory.
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FreeRDP from 3.0.0-beta1 before 3.32.0 fails to enforce cumulative or absolute size limits when reassembling RDPDR channel fragments in the proxy. Attackers can send a FIRST fragment followed by continuation fragments without LAST, growing per-session heap streams proportional to traffic and exhausting proxy memory.
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GitHub
Unterminated RDPDR messages cause unbounded memory retention in the FreeRDP proxy
When the FreeRDP proxy is configured to intercept the RDPDR static virtual channel, its front- and back-side handlers append every incoming fragment to a per-session heap stream. `CHANNEL_FLAG_FIRS...
🚨 CVE-2026-110836
FreeRDP from 3.0.0 before 3.32.0 contains an infinite loop vulnerability in http_response_recv() that allows malicious gateways to exhaust client CPU via crafted Content-Type headers. Attackers controlling a gateway can return a nonzero Content-Length with a semicolon-containing unrecognized Content-Type, pinning a client thread at full CPU indefinitely.
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FreeRDP from 3.0.0 before 3.32.0 contains an infinite loop vulnerability in http_response_recv() that allows malicious gateways to exhaust client CPU via crafted Content-Type headers. Attackers controlling a gateway can return a nonzero Content-Length with a semicolon-containing unrecognized Content-Type, pinning a client thread at full CPU indefinitely.
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GitHub
A crafted gateway Content-Type header causes an infinite CPU loop in FreeRDP
## Executive Summary
Mallory operates a gateway that Alice selects for a FreeRDP connection, or Mallory has compromised Alice's configured gateway. After the transport is established, Mallor...
Mallory operates a gateway that Alice selects for a FreeRDP connection, or Mallory has compromised Alice's configured gateway. After the transport is established, Mallor...
🚨 CVE-2026-110837
FreeRDP 2.0.0 before 3.32.0, when built with WITH_LAME=ON and WITH_DSP_FFMPEG=OFF, has a heap-based buffer overflow in freerdp_dsp_decode_mp3 because the right-channel PCM pointer is offset by a byte count treated as short elements. A malicious RDP server can send MP3 audio over rdpsnd so decoded samples cross the heap allocation, crashing the client.
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FreeRDP 2.0.0 before 3.32.0, when built with WITH_LAME=ON and WITH_DSP_FFMPEG=OFF, has a heap-based buffer overflow in freerdp_dsp_decode_mp3 because the right-channel PCM pointer is offset by a byte count treated as short elements. A malicious RDP server can send MP3 audio over rdpsnd so decoded samples cross the heap allocation, crashing the client.
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GitHub
LAME MP3 decoding places right-channel PCM beyond FreeRDP's heap reservation
### Summary
A malicious RDP server can supply MP3 audio to a FreeRDP client built with `WITH_LAME=ON` and `WITH_DSP_FFMPEG=OFF`. When the local audio backend uses FreeRDP's DSP fallback, `fr...
A malicious RDP server can supply MP3 audio to a FreeRDP client built with `WITH_LAME=ON` and `WITH_DSP_FFMPEG=OFF`. When the local audio backend uses FreeRDP's DSP fallback, `fr...
🚨 CVE-2026-110838
FreeRDP shadow server from 3.0.0 before 3.32.0 dispatches input PDUs during the Confirm Active state before authentication, allowing unauthenticated attackers to inject keyboard input. Attackers can negotiate TLS-only RDP and send an input PDU without Confirm Active to inject synthetic keystrokes into the host user's X11 session via XTEST.
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FreeRDP shadow server from 3.0.0 before 3.32.0 dispatches input PDUs during the Confirm Active state before authentication, allowing unauthenticated attackers to inject keyboard input. Attackers can negotiate TLS-only RDP and send an input PDU without Confirm Active to inject synthetic keystrokes into the host user's X11 session via XTEST.
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GitHub
FreeRDP shadow accepts host input before Confirm Active and authentication
### Summary
An unauthenticated network client can negotiate TLS with `freerdp-shadow-cli`, complete setup through Client Info, receive Demand Active, and send an input PDU without sending Confir...
An unauthenticated network client can negotiate TLS with `freerdp-shadow-cli`, complete setup through Client Info, receive Demand Active, and send an input PDU without sending Confir...
🚨 CVE-2025-11184
Cross-site scripting vulnerability in QGIS QWC2 Registration GUI <=v2025.03.31
allows an authorized attacker to plant arbitrary JavaScript code in the page
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Cross-site scripting vulnerability in QGIS QWC2 Registration GUI <=v2025.03.31
allows an authorized attacker to plant arbitrary JavaScript code in the page
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hub.ntc.swiss
Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability in QGIS QWC2 registration GUI (CVE-2025-11184)
Details about a cross-site ccripting vulnerability in QGIS QWC2 registration GUI (CVE-2025-11184)
🚨 CVE-2025-40773
A vulnerability has been identified in SiPass integrated (All versions < V3.0). Affected server applications contains a broken access control vulnerability. The authorization mechanism lacks sufficient server-side checks, allowing an attacker to execute a specific API request.
Successful exploitation allows an attacker to potentially manipulate data belonging to other users.
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A vulnerability has been identified in SiPass integrated (All versions < V3.0). Affected server applications contains a broken access control vulnerability. The authorization mechanism lacks sufficient server-side checks, allowing an attacker to execute a specific API request.
Successful exploitation allows an attacker to potentially manipulate data belonging to other users.
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🚨 CVE-2025-49935
Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion') vulnerability in xtemos WoodMart woodmart allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects WoodMart: from n/a through < 8.3.2.
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Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion') vulnerability in xtemos WoodMart woodmart allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects WoodMart: from n/a through < 8.3.2.
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🚨 CVE-2025-62058
Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in favethemes Houzez Theme - Functionality houzez-theme-functionality.This issue affects Houzez Theme - Functionality: from n/a through < 4.2.0.
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Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in favethemes Houzez Theme - Functionality houzez-theme-functionality.This issue affects Houzez Theme - Functionality: from n/a through < 4.2.0.
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🚨 CVE-2025-58627
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in kamleshyadav Miraculous Core Plugin miraculouscore allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Miraculous Core Plugin: from n/a through < 2.0.9.
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Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in kamleshyadav Miraculous Core Plugin miraculouscore allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Miraculous Core Plugin: from n/a through < 2.0.9.
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🚨 CVE-2025-64213
Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in StylemixThemes MasterStudy LMS Pro masterstudy-lms-learning-management-system-pro allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data.This issue affects MasterStudy LMS Pro: from n/a through < 4.7.16.
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Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data vulnerability in StylemixThemes MasterStudy LMS Pro masterstudy-lms-learning-management-system-pro allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data.This issue affects MasterStudy LMS Pro: from n/a through < 4.7.16.
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🚨 CVE-2026-8833
Improper neutralization of HTML-encoded characters in the URL validation function in Checkmk <2.5.0p5, <2.4.0p31, <2.3.0p48, and all 2.2.0 versions allows an authenticated user to bypass URL validation and inject malicious URLs such as javascript: URIs, resulting in cross-site scripting when another user interacts with the crafted link.
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Improper neutralization of HTML-encoded characters in the URL validation function in Checkmk <2.5.0p5, <2.4.0p31, <2.3.0p48, and all 2.2.0 versions allows an authenticated user to bypass URL validation and inject malicious URLs such as javascript: URIs, resulting in cross-site scripting when another user interacts with the crafted link.
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Checkmk
Werk #20002: XSS in urls
The function to determine if a URL is allowed or not did not consider html encoded characters.
🚨 CVE-2026-24349
A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC WinCC Unified PC Runtime V16 (All versions), SIMATIC WinCC Unified PC Runtime V17 (All versions), SIMATIC WinCC Unified PC Runtime V18 (All versions), SIMATIC WinCC Unified PC Runtime V19 (All versions), SIMATIC WinCC Unified PC Runtime V20 (All versions), SIMATIC WinCC Unified PC Runtime V21 (All versions < V21 Update 2). Insufficient protection of key material in WinCC Certificate Manager that could allow an attacker to extract sensitive information.
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A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC WinCC Unified PC Runtime V16 (All versions), SIMATIC WinCC Unified PC Runtime V17 (All versions), SIMATIC WinCC Unified PC Runtime V18 (All versions), SIMATIC WinCC Unified PC Runtime V19 (All versions), SIMATIC WinCC Unified PC Runtime V20 (All versions), SIMATIC WinCC Unified PC Runtime V21 (All versions < V21 Update 2). Insufficient protection of key material in WinCC Certificate Manager that could allow an attacker to extract sensitive information.
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🚨 CVE-2026-56608
HCL iControl is affected by Missing Access Control vulnerability. The application failed to enforce proper granular access controls, allowing users to access or view administrator-level functionalities without appropriate authorization.
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HCL iControl is affected by Missing Access Control vulnerability. The application failed to enforce proper granular access controls, allowing users to access or view administrator-level functionalities without appropriate authorization.
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Hcl-Software
Security Bulletin: Multiple security vulnerabilities affect HCL iControl (CVE-2026-56608 and CVE-2026-56609) - Customer Support
HCL iControl is affected by multiple security vulnerabilities(CVE-2026-56608 and CVE-2026-56609).
🚨 CVE-2026-56609
HCL iControl is affected by Weak SSL/TLS Version Supported vulnerability. It was observed that the application was using weak TLS versions such as TLS 1.0 and 1.1. These outdated protocols lack modern security features, making them vulnerable to known attacks and exposing sensitive information during data transmission.
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HCL iControl is affected by Weak SSL/TLS Version Supported vulnerability. It was observed that the application was using weak TLS versions such as TLS 1.0 and 1.1. These outdated protocols lack modern security features, making them vulnerable to known attacks and exposing sensitive information during data transmission.
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Hcl-Software
Security Bulletin: Multiple security vulnerabilities affect HCL iControl (CVE-2026-56608 and CVE-2026-56609) - Customer Support
HCL iControl is affected by multiple security vulnerabilities(CVE-2026-56608 and CVE-2026-56609).