🚨 CVE-2026-114395
Trudesk through 1.2.11 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in apiMessages.send that allows authenticated users to post messages as other users due to an incomplete CVE-2022-1931 fix. Attackers can supply arbitrary owner and cId values to POST /api/v1/messages/send to inject spoofed messages into conversations they do not belong to.

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🚨 CVE-2026-114396
Trudesk through 1.2.11 contains a server-side JavaScript injection vulnerability that allows authenticated users to inject code into a MongoDB $where clause via the search parameter. Attackers can close the regular expression in GET /api/v1/tickets/search to loop mongod for denial of service or leak full ticket documents including internal notes.

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🚨 CVE-2026-114397
Trudesk through 1.2.11 contains a missing authentication vulnerability in debug routes enabled whenever NODE_ENV is unset, letting unauthenticated attackers invoke them remotely. Attackers can call /debug/populatedb to delete all groups, tags and tickets, then log in with seeded accounts using the password 'password'.

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🚨 CVE-2026-114398
Trudesk through 1.2.11 contains an unrestricted file upload vulnerability that allows any authenticated user to place HTML or SVG files in the public webroot via the uploadlogo, uploadpagelogo and uploadfavicon endpoints. Attackers can spoof an image MIME type to upload script-bearing files served unauthenticated from /assets/, enabling stored cross-site scripting and replacement of instance branding.

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🚨 CVE-2026-114399
Trudesk through 1.2.11 contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows administrators to delete arbitrary files by supplying encoded traversal sequences to DELETE /api/v1/backup/:backup. Attackers can also pass unvalidated file values to POST /api/v1/backup/restore to restore archives from, or extract to, paths outside the intended directories.

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🚨 CVE-2026-114400
Trudesk through 1.2.11 contains a missing authentication vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to download private ticket attachments under /uploads. Because express.static serves the public/ directory before the hasAuth-guarded /uploads mount, attackers who know or guess a ticket ObjectId and filename can retrieve confidential attachments.

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🚨 CVE-2026-114401
Trudesk through 1.2.11 contains a regular expression injection vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate usernames by submitting regex patterns to POST /api/v1/login. Attackers can send alternations or prefixes like (admin|root) or a.* and distinguish 'Invalid User' from 'Invalid Password' responses to discover valid accounts.

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🚨 CVE-2026-114402
Trudesk through 1.2.11 contains a path traversal and authorization bypass vulnerability in accountsController.uploadImage that allows authenticated users to overwrite other users' avatars via form-supplied _id and username fields. Attackers can supply a username like /../../../x to bypass the incomplete CVE-2022-1752 sanitization and write png, jpg, jpeg, or gif files outside public/uploads/users.

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🚨 CVE-2026-114405
Improper validation of array index vulnerability in Velneo vServer. This issue affects vServer: from 36.0 before 36.6 and from 37.0 before 37.2.

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🚨 CVE-2026-114370
A flaw was found in the PathResourceManager component of the Undertow web server. This component is responsible for serving static files from the file system. The issue occurs because the mechanism used to verify if a symbolic link points to a safe location only checks if the target path starts with a specific string, without ensuring it matches a full directory name. This could allow an attacker to access files in a sibling directory if that directorys name starts with the same characters as an authorized safe directory.

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🚨 CVE-2026-114462
Improper link resolution before file access ('link following') vulnerability in Velneo vServer. This issue affects vServer: from 32.3 before 36.6 and from 37.1 before 37.2.

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🚨 CVE-2026-110744
A flaw was found in multicluster-global-hub-operator-bundle. The operator is configured with overly broad role-based access control (RBAC) permissions that grant cluster-wide impersonation of arbitrary users, groups, and service accounts without restriction. An attacker who compromises the operator or obtains its service account credentials can exploit this flaw to achieve privilege escalation, gaining full administrative control over the cluster.

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🚨 CVE-2026-107588
Vaadin Charts renders charts with the Highcharts library and pins an exact version of it, 9.2.2 in Vaadin 22 to 24 and 12.2.0 in Vaadin 25, so an application cannot remove these vulnerabilities by upgrading Highcharts on its own. Highsoft disclosed several vulnerabilities in that library that are reachable through the chart configuration: writes to Object.prototype through dotted series.keys paths, and cross-site scripting through credits.href, through breadcrumbs.style, through HTML text parsing while printing, and through xlink:href attributes in exported charts. An application is affected where data an attacker controls reaches the chart configuration, for example through additionalOptions, through updateConfiguration(), or through text options that accept markup. The fixed Vaadin versions apply Highsoft's recommended workarounds to the bundled Highcharts when it loads, and keep the same Highcharts version.


Users of affected versions should apply the following mitigation or upgrade. Releases that have fixed this issue include:

Product version
Vaadin 22.0.0 - 23.6.15
Vaadin 24.0.0 - 24.4.23
Vaadin 24.5.0 - 24.7.15
Vaadin 24.8.0 - 24.9.22
Vaadin 24.10.0 - 24.10.10
Vaadin 25.0.0 - 25.2.9
Vaadin 25.3.0

Mitigation
Upgrade to 23.6.16
Upgrade to 24.4.24
Upgrade to 24.7.16
Upgrade to 24.9.23
Upgrade to 24.10.11
Upgrade to 25.2.10
Upgrade to 25.3.1 or newer

Please note that Vaadin versions 10-13 and 15-22 are no longer supported and you should update either to the latest 23, 24, 25 version.

Artifacts
Maven coordinates / Vulnerable versions / Fixed version
com.vaadin:vaadin / 22.0.0 - 23.6.15 / >=23.6.16
com.vaadin:vaadin / 24.0.0 - 24.4.23 / >=24.4.24
com.vaadin:vaadin / 24.5.0 - 24.7.15 / >=24.7.16
com.vaadin:vaadin / 24.8.0 - 24.9.22 / >=24.9.23
com.vaadin:vaadin / 24.10.0 - 24.10.10 / >=24.10.11
com.vaadin:vaadin / 25.0.0 - 25.0.13 / >=25.2.10
com.vaadin:vaadin / 25.1.0 - 25.1.13 / >=25.2.10
com.vaadin:vaadin / 25.2.0 - 25.2.9 / >=25.2.10
com.vaadin:vaadin / 25.3.0 / >=25.3.1
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow / 22.0.0 - 23.6.15 / >=23.6.16
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow / 24.0.0 - 24.4.22 / >=24.4.24
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow / 24.5.0 - 24.7.14 / >=24.7.15
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow / 24.8.0 - 24.9.22 / >=24.9.23
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow / 24.10.0 - 24.10.10 / >=24.10.11
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow / 25.0.0 - 25.0.13 / >=25.2.10
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow / 25.1.0 - 25.1.13 / >=25.2.10
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow / 25.2.0 - 25.2.9 / >=25.2.10
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow / 25.3.0 / >=25.3.1
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow-svg-generator / 21.0.0 - 23.6.15 / >=23.6.16
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow-svg-generator / 24.0.0 - 24.4.22 / >=24.4.24
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow-svg-generator / 24.5.0 - 24.7.14 / >=24.7.15
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow-svg-generator / 24.8.0 - 24.9.22 / >=24.9.23
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow-svg-generator / 24.10.0 - 24.10.10 / >=24.10.11
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow-svg-generator / 25.0.0 - 25.0.13 / >=25.2.10
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow-svg-generator / 25.1.0 - 25.1.13 / >=25.2.10
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow-svg-generator / 25.2.0 - 25.2.9 / >=25.2.10
com.vaadin:vaadin-charts-flow-svg-generator / 25.3.0 / >=25.3.1

npm packages
npm package / Vulnerable versions / Fixed version
@vaadin/charts / 22.0.0 - 23.6.6 / >=23.6.7
@vaadin/charts / 24.0.0 - 24.4.18 / >=24.4.19
@vaadin/charts / 24.5.0 - 24.7.12 / >=24.7.13
@vaadin/charts / 24.8.0 - 24.9.18 / >=24.9.19
@vaadin/charts / 24.10.0 - 24.10.6 / >=24.10.7
@vaadin/charts / 25.0.0 - 25.0.13 / >=25.2.14
@vaadin/charts / 25.1.0 - 25.1.14 / >=25.2.14
@vaadin/charts / 25.2.0 - 25.2.13 / >=25.2.14
@vaadin/charts / 25.3.0 / >=25.3.1

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🚨 CVE-2026-110803
VaadinService.requestEnd() in Vaadin Framework 8 locks the session and then reads the v-uiId request parameter outside the block that releases the lock. A request carrying a non-numeric v-uiId makes Integer.parseInt throw while the session lock is held, so the lock is never released and the container thread returns to its pool still owning it. Every later request to that session then blocks forever in VaadinService.lockSession(), and repeating the request exhausts the thread pool and takes the application down. No authentication is required: a session cookie, which any client obtains with a single request, is enough. Vaadin 10 and later are not affected, because Flow releases the lock in a finally block and does not read that parameter there, and Vaadin Framework 7 is not affected either.


Users of affected versions should apply the following mitigation or upgrade. Releases that have fixed this issue include:

Product version
Vaadin Framework 8.16.0 - 8.32.1

Mitigation
Upgrade to 8.32.2

Vaadin Framework 7 and Vaadin 10 and later do not carry this behaviour and need no upgrade for this issue.

Artifacts
Maven coordinates / Vulnerable versions / Fixed version
com.vaadin:vaadin-server / 8.16.0 - 8.32.1 / >=8.32.2
com.vaadin:vaadin-server-mpr-jakarta / 8.18.0 - 8.32.1 / >=8.32.2

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🚨 CVE-2026-18748
The Bluetooth Classic A2DP host stores a codec Information Element (IE) in struct bt_a2dp_codec_ie, a one-byte len field plus a fixed 8-byte codec_ie[] array. When an AVDTP peer sent a codec IE longer than 8 bytes, a2dp_process_config_ind() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/a2dp.c copied only the first 8 bytes but assigned the full, attacker-chosen length to len, and then persisted that inconsistent structure into the application's struct bt_a2dp_stream via stream->codec_config. bt_a2dp_get_config_cb() and bt_a2dp_set_config_cb() had the same truncate-the-copy-but-keep-the-length pattern.

Every later consumer trusts len. In particular the responder for an incoming AVDTP GET_CONFIGURATION, a2dp_get_config_ind(), executes net_buf_add_mem(rsp_buf, &ep->stream->codec_config.codec_ie[0], ep->stream->codec_config.len), so a paired BR/EDR peer that first sends a SET_CONFIGURATION carrying an oversized codec IE and then requests the configuration back causes the stack to read up to roughly 245 bytes past the end of the 8-byte array and transmit them in the response. codec_config is the last member of struct bt_a2dp_stream, so the read runs into memory adjacent to the application's stream object. The same inconsistency is also handed to the config_req(), reconfig_req() and get_config_rsp() application callbacks, where a natural memcpy() of len bytes performs a further out-of-bounds read.

Reaching the on-air disclosure requires CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC with CONFIG_BT_A2DP, an AVDTP peer that has completed pairing (the AVDTP L2CAP channel requires BT_SECURITY_L2), and a local endpoint registered for a non-SBC codec — BT_A2DP_MPEG1/BT_A2DP_MPEG2/BT_A2DP_ATRAC/BT_A2DP_VENDOR via BT_A2DP_EP_INIT() — because the SBC branch already pins the IE length to 4 bytes. The bt_a2dp_get_config_cb() response path has no such gate and hands the lying length to any application. There is no out-of-bounds write: the net_buf tailroom check bounds the destination, so the impact is limited to disclosure of a bounded region of adjacent RAM to the peer.

The fix replaces the hardcoded BT_A2DP_MAX_IE_LENGTH with the configurable CONFIG_BT_A2DP_CODEC_MAX_IE_LEN (default 8, range 4–253), sizes codec_ie[] from it, and rejects any received IE that exceeds it instead of silently truncating, so len can no longer exceed the number of valid bytes.

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🚨 CVE-2026-19676
The user-mode verifier for the peci_transfer() system call, z_vrfy_peci_transfer() in drivers/peci/peci_handlers.c, checked only the device object permission and copied the caller-supplied struct peci_msg with k_usermode_from_copy(). That copy validates the outer structure only; the buf pointers and len values inside the embedded struct peci_buf members tx_buffer and rx_buffer remained fully caller-controlled and were passed unchecked to the driver.

Every in-tree PECI driver dereferences those pointers in supervisor mode: peci_npcx_transfer() in drivers/peci/peci_npcx.c and peci_it8xxx2_transfer() in drivers/peci/peci_ite_it8xxx2.c copy hardware bytes into rx_buffer.buf[i] and read command bytes out of tx_buffer.buf[i], and peci_xec_read()/peci_xec_write() in drivers/peci/peci_mchp_xec.c do the same with no bound on rx_buffer.len at all. A user-mode thread that has been granted the PECI device object — the normal way an application exposes a device under CONFIG_USERSPACE — could therefore point rx_buffer.buf at kernel data structures and have the driver write hardware-supplied bytes there, or point tx_buffer.buf at kernel memory and have its contents pushed onto the PECI/eSPI out-of-band bus.

The impact is a full user-mode-to-kernel escape: an arbitrary kernel write primitive (integrity and, through it, code execution at supervisor privilege), an arbitrary kernel read disclosed to a PECI bus observer, and a trivially reachable supervisor-mode fault if an unmapped address is supplied. Exploitation requires CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, one of the PECI drivers enabled (CONFIG_PECI_NPCX, CONFIG_PECI_XEC or CONFIG_PECI_ITE_IT8XXX2), and local code execution in a user-mode thread holding the PECI device.

The fix adds K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ() and K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE() checks over the two embedded buffers, with a size_add_overflow() guard on the frame-check-sequence byte accounted for in the RX length.

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🚨 CVE-2026-19947
The device multiplexer pseudo-driver in drivers/misc/devmux/devmux.c exposes two system calls, devmux_select_get() and devmux_select_set(). When CONFIG_USERSPACE is enabled, their user-mode verifiers z_vrfy_devmux_select_get() and z_vrfy_devmux_select_set() forwarded directly to the kernel implementations without performing any kernel-object validation — no k_object_access_check() and no driver object check. Compounding this, DEVICE_DT_INST_DEFINE() registered devmux instances with a NULL driver API pointer, which causes scripts/build/gen_kobject_list.py to skip them entirely, so a devmux device had no struct k_object and no permission on it could be granted or withheld in the first place.

Any thread running in user mode can reach the defect: device pointers such as DEVICE_DT_GET(DT_NODELABEL(devmux0)) are compile-time constants available to application code, and the syscall accepted them from a thread that had never been granted access to the device. The kernel implementations do validate the pointer against the static devmux instance table and bounds-check the selection index, so this is not a memory-safety issue; the failure is purely one of authorization. Exposure requires CONFIG_USERSPACE=y together with the experimental CONFIG_DEVMUX=y (which depends on CONFIG_DEVICE_MUTABLE) and a zephyr,devmux devicetree node.

An unprivileged user-mode thread can read and change which downstream device a multiplexer forwards to, bypassing the userspace object-permission model. Because a devmux forwards the data, configuration and API of the selected device — its documented use being zephyr,console and zephyr,shell-uart switching — an attacker can suppress console, log and shell output, redirect that output to a downstream device it is able to observe, or flip the selection underneath another thread that is legitimately using the multiplexer. The impact is bounded to the devicetree-fixed set of downstream devices; no out-of-bounds access or arbitrary pointer dereference is reachable.

The fix declares __subsystem struct devmux_driver_api and attaches a DEVICE_API(devmux, devmux_api) instance to each devmux device so that it becomes a tracked K_OBJ_DRIVER_DEVMUX kernel object, and adds K_OOPS(devmux_inst_get(dev) == SIZE_MAX) plus K_OOPS(k_object_access_check(dev) != 0) to both verifiers.

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🚨 CVE-2026-78116
The Broadcom AFBR-S50 time-of-flight sensor driver double-completes an RTIO submission when sensor data evaluation fails. In data_ready_work_handler() (drivers/sensor/broadcom/afbr_s50/afbr_s50.c), a non-STATUS_OK return from Argus_EvaluateData() calls handle_error_on_result(), which finalises the request with rtio_iodev_sqe_err(), but execution then fell through to the tail of the function and finalised the very same struct rtio_iodev_sqe a second time with rtio_iodev_sqe_ok(). Unlike the other error branches in the same function, this one did not return.

Both completion helpers reach rtio_executor_done() in subsys/rtio/rtio_executor.c, which returns the submission to the pool via rtio_sqe_pool_free() and, for streaming (multishot) submissions, also releases the RX buffer with rtio_release_buffer(). The second completion therefore reads a freed rtio_iodev_sqe, pushes the same mpsc node onto the submission queue while it is already on the pool free list — splicing the two lists together — and re-submits the freed request so the next measurement is written through an already-released buffer. For one-shot submissions it emits a spurious success completion carrying stale userdata and frees the same pool entry twice.

The failure branch is driven by sensor conditions rather than by host software. The vendor API documents statuses such as ERROR_ARGUS_BIAS_VOLTAGE_REINIT and ERROR_ARGUS_LASER_MONITOR_INACTIVE as transient results of harsh ambient light, so a party in front of the optical sensor can provoke the invalid-data condition without any physical contact with the board or any software access; SPI transfer errors reach the same branch. In releases before the payload.Status check was dropped, ordinary sharp distance transitions in the sensor's field of view were sufficient.

Impact is corruption of the RTIO submission pool and mempool bookkeeping: aliased submissions, writes through released buffers, and duplicate completions delivered to the application. The attacker does not control the corrupted content, so the practical consequence is memory corruption and loss of availability on devices that instantiate brcm,afbr-s50, rather than directed code execution. Only builds that enable this driver are affected.

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🚨 CVE-2026-78118
The kernel helper z_waitq_head() (kernel/include/wait_q.h) reads the head of a thread wait queue, but on SMP systems it was called from several places without holding the scheduler spinlock _sched_spinlock that serializes wait-queue mutation. The consequential call site is z_timer_expiration_handler() in kernel/timer.c, which held only the timer subsystem lock timer_lock while reading timer->wait_q and then unpending, setting the return value of, and readying the thread it obtained. halt_thread() in kernel/sched.c removes an aborted thread from its wait queue while holding only _sched_spinlock, so the two paths are not mutually exclusive.

When the last waiter is removed on another CPU inside that window, sys_dlist_peek_head() can return the list sentinel — a pointer into the k_timer object itself — typed as a struct k_thread * (with CONFIG_WAITQ_SCALABLE, rb_get_min() can return an arbitrary node of a tree being restructured), or it can return a pointer to a thread that has already been unpended and, for dynamically allocated threads, freed. The handler then calls unpend_thread_no_timeout(), which performs a sys_dlist_remove() through pointers read from that object, and arch_thread_return_value_set(), which writes unconditionally through the pointer.

The result is out-of-bounds and use-after-free writes in supervisor context, plus scheduler state corruption; a milder outcome is a thread that has re-pended elsewhere being woken with a success return value from an unrelated blocking call. All of the primitives needed to drive the interleaving — k_timer_start(), k_timer_status_sync(), k_thread_create() and k_thread_abort() — are system calls, so with CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled an unprivileged user-mode thread can attempt the race against kernel-owned data.

Exploitation requires a multi-CPU build (CONFIG_MP_MAX_NUM_CPUS greater than one; the affected region is a no-op on uniprocessor targets), local code execution, and winning a narrow timing window, so the practical outcome is most often a kernel crash rather than controlled corruption. The fix splits the helper into z_waitq_head_locked() for callers that already hold the scheduler spinlock and a z_waitq_head() that acquires it, and brings the timer expiration handler's head read, unpend and ready under a single LOCK_SCHED_SPINLOCK region.

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🚨 CVE-2026-78119
The Nuvoton NPCX eSPI driver parses Target-Attached-Flash (TAF) requests in espi_taf_parse() (drivers/espi/espi_npcx.c), taking the 12-bit length field directly out of the request header in the FLASHRXBUF FIFO. For write and RPMC OP1 requests it copied DIV_ROUND_UP(len, 4) words into struct espi_taf_pckt.src, a fixed 16-word (64-byte) member of a static structure, without ever comparing the length against that buffer or against the negotiated eSPI receive payload size (rx-plsize, 64 bytes on all in-tree NPCX/NPCK SoCs). Both the loop counter and the word count were uint8_t, so the copy ran up to 255 iterations.

An eSPI controller that emits a flash request whose header claims a payload larger than the negotiated maximum therefore drives up to 239 32-bit stores past the end of the structure — roughly 956 bytes of out-of-bounds write into .bss — from the eSPI flash receive interrupt handler, while the source reads walk past the end of the 18-word FLASHRXBUF register array into neighbouring eSPI registers. The same unvalidated length was then passed on to flash_write() in espi_taf_npcx_flash_write() with the 64-byte src buffer as source, reading up to 4 KB of adjacent controller SRAM into SPI flash at a host-chosen address, where the host can read it back. A related fixed-size stack buffer in taf_npcx_completion_handler() was overflowed by four bytes on the maximum-size completion path on SoCs whose tx-plsize is 64.

The defect is reachable only from the eSPI host side, and only by a request that violates the negotiated payload size, so it requires host firmware or bus-level control rather than ordinary host software; a compliant maximum-length write fits the buffer exactly and is handled correctly. Because TAF exists specifically so that the embedded controller arbitrates host access to shared flash (espi_taf_check_read_protect() / espi_taf_check_write_protect()), corrupting controller memory from a host-supplied field crosses the trust boundary the feature asserts; consequences range from controller crash or hang to corruption of driver state that gates the flash protection regions.

The fix widens the counters, rejects any request whose word count exceeds both ARRAY_SIZE(FLASHRXBUF) - NPCX_ESPI_FLASH_HEADER_ADDRESS_LEN and NPCX_TAF_RX_PAYLOAD_WORDS (derived from the devicetree rx-plsize), marks such packets with a new invalid_flag so espi_taf_work() answers them with an unsuccessful completion instead of processing them, bounds the transmit payload against FLASHTXBUF, and adds a default case for unsupported cycle types. Only configurations with CONFIG_ESPI_TAF enabled on an NPCX/NPCK target are affected; no in-tree board enables it by default.

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🚨 CVE-2026-79976
The MCTP-over-I2C+GPIO target binding in subsys/pmci/mctp/mctp_i2c_gpio_target.c emulates a small pseudo-register file, where the bus controller first writes a register number and then writes or reads payload bytes. The selected register (b->reg_addr) and the data-phase flag (b->rxtx) were never cleared when the controller issued an I2C STOP, so after a completed transfer the target still had a data register selected while the packet buffer that register refers to had already been consumed and set to NULL by mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop().

A controller on the bus can re-enter the same branch of mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop() with a NULL buffer using two ordinary transactions and no authentication: first a normal packet write to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_RX_MSG_ADDR followed by STOP (which delivers and frees b->rx_pkt), then a bare read transaction followed by STOP. The failing read_requested() call leaves the stale state untouched and the I2C driver still delivers the STOP callback, which then calls mctp_bus_rx() with a NULL packet. The symmetric case exists on the transmit side, where the stale MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TX_MSG_ADDR selection dereferences b->tx_pkt->end after b->tx_pkt has been cleared and additionally signals b->tx_complete a second time, causing the next outbound packet to be dropped.

The dereference happens in the I2C target interrupt handler, so on any target that traps accesses to address 0 the result is a fatal exception and a device reset or halt — a denial of service inflicted by any device able to act as controller on the shared management bus (for example compromised firmware on a peer MCTP endpoint or on the BMC). On parts where address 0 is readable, the impact degrades to a malformed packet buffer being handed to the MCTP stack and lost transmit packets. No attacker-controlled value is written and no confidentiality or integrity boundary is crossed.

The fix resets b->reg_addr to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_INVALID_ADDR and clears b->rxtx at every STOP, so a new register must be selected before any data phase can run again. Only builds that opt into the experimental CONFIG_MCTP subsystem with CONFIG_MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TARGET=y are affected.

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