🚨 CVE-2026-98483
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: fix use-after-free in nfc_get_local_general_bytes
Commit 6709d4b7bc2e ("net: nfc: Fix use-after-free caused by
nfc_llcp_find_local") attempted to fix a use-after-free (UAF) issue by
invoking nfc_llcp_local_put(local) after accessing local->gb. However,
if the reference count drops to zero, local is freed immediately,
leading to a use-after-free when callers access the returned pointer.
Alternative approaches using dynamic allocation (e.g. kmemdup) introduced
memory leaks because callers consistently treat the returned pointer as
borrowed memory.
Fix this properly by refactoring nfc_llcp_general_bytes() and
nfc_get_local_general_bytes() to accept a caller-provided output buffer
(out_gb) and its maximum length (gb_max_len). The general bytes are
safely copied into out_gb before calling nfc_llcp_local_put(local),
ensuring safe lifetime management without ownership transfer complications.
Update all callers across drivers (microread, pn533, pn544, st21nfca,
digital_dep, and nci) to provide their own destination buffers and pass
them to nfc_get_local_general_bytes().
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: fix use-after-free in nfc_get_local_general_bytes
Commit 6709d4b7bc2e ("net: nfc: Fix use-after-free caused by
nfc_llcp_find_local") attempted to fix a use-after-free (UAF) issue by
invoking nfc_llcp_local_put(local) after accessing local->gb. However,
if the reference count drops to zero, local is freed immediately,
leading to a use-after-free when callers access the returned pointer.
Alternative approaches using dynamic allocation (e.g. kmemdup) introduced
memory leaks because callers consistently treat the returned pointer as
borrowed memory.
Fix this properly by refactoring nfc_llcp_general_bytes() and
nfc_get_local_general_bytes() to accept a caller-provided output buffer
(out_gb) and its maximum length (gb_max_len). The general bytes are
safely copied into out_gb before calling nfc_llcp_local_put(local),
ensuring safe lifetime management without ownership transfer complications.
Update all callers across drivers (microread, pn533, pn544, st21nfca,
digital_dep, and nci) to provide their own destination buffers and pass
them to nfc_get_local_general_bytes().
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98484
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: skip expired catchall elements on insert and delete
nft_setelem_catchall_insert() looks up duplicates with
nft_set_elem_active() only, while nft_set_catchall_lookup() and the
dump path additionally skip expired elements.
Once a catchall element with a timeout expires, this predicate drift
makes it invisible to userspace dumps, yet it still blocks
re-insertion: with NLM_F_EXCL the request fails with -EEXIST, and
without it the request reports success but silently inserts nothing.
The stale entry only goes away when the (user-tunable) gc interval
elapses, so the catchall rule may silently stop matching for an
arbitrarily long time after its first expiration.
The delete path shows the same drift: nft_setelem_catchall_deactivate()
picks the first active-next entry in the catchall list, so with an
expired entry still pending GC it retires the stale entry instead of
the fresh one, and it deactivates an element that userspace no longer
sees instead of failing with -ENOENT.
Align both walks with the lookup and dump predicates: only an element
that is active and not expired counts as a duplicate or delete
candidate, using the per-netns timestamp taken at transaction start,
in line with the set backend .insert/.deactivate and catchall GC sync
paths.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: skip expired catchall elements on insert and delete
nft_setelem_catchall_insert() looks up duplicates with
nft_set_elem_active() only, while nft_set_catchall_lookup() and the
dump path additionally skip expired elements.
Once a catchall element with a timeout expires, this predicate drift
makes it invisible to userspace dumps, yet it still blocks
re-insertion: with NLM_F_EXCL the request fails with -EEXIST, and
without it the request reports success but silently inserts nothing.
The stale entry only goes away when the (user-tunable) gc interval
elapses, so the catchall rule may silently stop matching for an
arbitrarily long time after its first expiration.
The delete path shows the same drift: nft_setelem_catchall_deactivate()
picks the first active-next entry in the catchall list, so with an
expired entry still pending GC it retires the stale entry instead of
the fresh one, and it deactivates an element that userspace no longer
sees instead of failing with -ENOENT.
Align both walks with the lookup and dump predicates: only an element
that is active and not expired counts as a duplicate or delete
candidate, using the per-netns timestamp taken at transaction start,
in line with the set backend .insert/.deactivate and catchall GC sync
paths.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98485
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ip6t_rt: fix zero-address non-strict match out-of-bounds read
rt_mt6_check() permits rules to be configured with rtinfo->addrnr == 0
even when address matching (IP6T_RT_FST_MASK) is requested.
In the IP6T_RT_FST_NSTRICT path, rt_mt6() evaluates packet routing
addresses against rtinfo->addrs[i] and terminates backwards at the bottom
of the loop:
if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &rtinfo->addrs[i])) {
i++;
}
if (i == rtinfo->addrnr)
break;
When addrnr is 0, if the first packet address matches rtinfo->addrs[0],
i is incremented to 1. Because i is now strictly greater than addrnr (0),
the loop termination condition (i == rtinfo->addrnr) is bypassed and will
never be satisfied.
If a crafted IPv6 packet contains matching routing addresses, i will
advance past IP6T_RT_HOPS (16). The subsequent call to ipv6_addr_equal()
reads beyond struct ip6t_rt, triggering UBSAN/KASAN out-of-bounds warnings
or kernel panics.
Fix this by:
1. Rejecting rules in rt_mt6_check() where IP6T_RT_FST_MASK is set but
rtinfo->addrnr is zero.
2. In rt_mt6(), moving the termination condition (i < rtinfo->addrnr)
into the for-loop header condition and removing the backwards break
at the end of the loop body.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ip6t_rt: fix zero-address non-strict match out-of-bounds read
rt_mt6_check() permits rules to be configured with rtinfo->addrnr == 0
even when address matching (IP6T_RT_FST_MASK) is requested.
In the IP6T_RT_FST_NSTRICT path, rt_mt6() evaluates packet routing
addresses against rtinfo->addrs[i] and terminates backwards at the bottom
of the loop:
if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &rtinfo->addrs[i])) {
i++;
}
if (i == rtinfo->addrnr)
break;
When addrnr is 0, if the first packet address matches rtinfo->addrs[0],
i is incremented to 1. Because i is now strictly greater than addrnr (0),
the loop termination condition (i == rtinfo->addrnr) is bypassed and will
never be satisfied.
If a crafted IPv6 packet contains matching routing addresses, i will
advance past IP6T_RT_HOPS (16). The subsequent call to ipv6_addr_equal()
reads beyond struct ip6t_rt, triggering UBSAN/KASAN out-of-bounds warnings
or kernel panics.
Fix this by:
1. Rejecting rules in rt_mt6_check() where IP6T_RT_FST_MASK is set but
rtinfo->addrnr is zero.
2. In rt_mt6(), moving the termination condition (i < rtinfo->addrnr)
into the for-loop header condition and removing the backwards break
at the end of the loop body.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98486
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ena: fix MMIO read buffer leak on probe failure
ena_device_init() initializes the MMIO read mechanism with
ena_com_mmio_reg_read_request_init(), which allocates a coherent DMA
buffer for MMIO read responses.
The normal removal path releases this buffer through
ena_com_mmio_reg_read_request_destroy(). However, if ena_probe() fails
after ena_device_init() succeeds, the error path destroys the admin
resources and eventually frees ena_dev without destroying the MMIO read
request, leaving the coherent DMA buffer allocated.
Call ena_com_mmio_reg_read_request_destroy() in the probe error path
before releasing the remaining device resources.
This issue was found by manual code inspection.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ena: fix MMIO read buffer leak on probe failure
ena_device_init() initializes the MMIO read mechanism with
ena_com_mmio_reg_read_request_init(), which allocates a coherent DMA
buffer for MMIO read responses.
The normal removal path releases this buffer through
ena_com_mmio_reg_read_request_destroy(). However, if ena_probe() fails
after ena_device_init() succeeds, the error path destroys the admin
resources and eventually frees ena_dev without destroying the MMIO read
request, leaving the coherent DMA buffer allocated.
Call ena_com_mmio_reg_read_request_destroy() in the probe error path
before releasing the remaining device resources.
This issue was found by manual code inspection.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98487
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: mdb: restart port group walk after deletion
br_mdb_flush_pgs() keeps a pointer-to-pointer cursor while walking
mp->ports. br_multicast_del_pg() can re-enter the same MDB entry through
br_multicast_sg_del_exclude_ports() and unlink other port groups. If the
cursor points into one of those groups, the next iteration dereferences a
stale cursor and can leave mp->ports pointing at freed memory.
A following RTM_GETMDB exposes the dangling pointer:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in br_mdb_dump
Read of size 8
br_mdb_dump
rtnl_mdb_dump
rtnl_dumpit
netlink_dump
Reset the cursor to mp->ports after every deletion. The deletion removes at
least the selected group, so the restarted walk always makes progress.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: mdb: restart port group walk after deletion
br_mdb_flush_pgs() keeps a pointer-to-pointer cursor while walking
mp->ports. br_multicast_del_pg() can re-enter the same MDB entry through
br_multicast_sg_del_exclude_ports() and unlink other port groups. If the
cursor points into one of those groups, the next iteration dereferences a
stale cursor and can leave mp->ports pointing at freed memory.
A following RTM_GETMDB exposes the dangling pointer:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in br_mdb_dump
Read of size 8
br_mdb_dump
rtnl_mdb_dump
rtnl_dumpit
netlink_dump
Reset the cursor to mp->ports after every deletion. The deletion removes at
least the selected group, so the restarted walk always makes progress.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98488
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atl1e: fix soft lockup on out-of-range hw_next_to_clean read
Same issue as atl1c (see the first commit in this series, "net:
atl1c: fix soft lockup on out-of-range tpd_cons read"): the hardware
can report an out-of-range hw_next_to_clean (seen as 0xffff) while
the PCIe link/MAC is resetting. An out-of-range value can never be
reached and the loop below would spin forever. Treat it as "nothing
new to clean" instead.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atl1e: fix soft lockup on out-of-range hw_next_to_clean read
Same issue as atl1c (see the first commit in this series, "net:
atl1c: fix soft lockup on out-of-range tpd_cons read"): the hardware
can report an out-of-range hw_next_to_clean (seen as 0xffff) while
the PCIe link/MAC is resetting. An out-of-range value can never be
reached and the loop below would spin forever. Treat it as "nothing
new to clean" instead.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98489
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atl1c: fix soft lockup on out-of-range tpd_cons read
The hardware can report an out-of-range tpd_cons (seen as 0xffff)
while the PCIe link/MAC is resetting. An out-of-range value can
never be reached and the loop below would spin forever. To avoid
a soft lockup treat it as "nothing new to clean" instead.
Reproduced on two machines, same NIC (Qualcomm Atheros AR8151 v2.0,
4-port), triggered by rebooting a Mikrotik CCR2004 PCIe card that
the ports are directly linked to:
- Ubuntu 26.04.1 LTS, kernel 7.0.0-31-generic. The link-flap
precursor, before the lockup was captured with a full trace
elsewhere:
atl1c 0000:05:00.0 enp5s0f0: NETDEV WATCHDOG: CPU: 4: transmit queue 2 timed out 489984 ms
atl1c 0000:05:00.0: MAC state machine can't be idle since disabled for 10ms second
atl1c 0000:05:00.0: atl1c: enp5s0f0 NIC Link is Up<65535 Mbps Full Duplex>
65535 (0xffff) here is the same value tpd_cons reads back once the
loop below gets stuck.
- Proxmox VE, kernel 7.0.14-11-pve. Same NIC/trigger, this time
caught by the soft lockup watchdog with a full stack trace:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#12 stuck for 354s! [napi/eth%d-0:329]
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 329 Comm: napi/eth%d-0 Tainted: P O L 7.0.14-11-pve #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
RIP: 0010:atl1c_clean_tx+0x142/0x2d0 [atl1c]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__napi_poll+0x32/0x1e0
napi_threaded_poll_loop+0x286/0x2e0
napi_threaded_poll+0xfd/0x140
kthread+0xf7/0x130
ret_from_fork+0x2da/0x3a0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atl1c: fix soft lockup on out-of-range tpd_cons read
The hardware can report an out-of-range tpd_cons (seen as 0xffff)
while the PCIe link/MAC is resetting. An out-of-range value can
never be reached and the loop below would spin forever. To avoid
a soft lockup treat it as "nothing new to clean" instead.
Reproduced on two machines, same NIC (Qualcomm Atheros AR8151 v2.0,
4-port), triggered by rebooting a Mikrotik CCR2004 PCIe card that
the ports are directly linked to:
- Ubuntu 26.04.1 LTS, kernel 7.0.0-31-generic. The link-flap
precursor, before the lockup was captured with a full trace
elsewhere:
atl1c 0000:05:00.0 enp5s0f0: NETDEV WATCHDOG: CPU: 4: transmit queue 2 timed out 489984 ms
atl1c 0000:05:00.0: MAC state machine can't be idle since disabled for 10ms second
atl1c 0000:05:00.0: atl1c: enp5s0f0 NIC Link is Up<65535 Mbps Full Duplex>
65535 (0xffff) here is the same value tpd_cons reads back once the
loop below gets stuck.
- Proxmox VE, kernel 7.0.14-11-pve. Same NIC/trigger, this time
caught by the soft lockup watchdog with a full stack trace:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#12 stuck for 354s! [napi/eth%d-0:329]
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 329 Comm: napi/eth%d-0 Tainted: P O L 7.0.14-11-pve #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
RIP: 0010:atl1c_clean_tx+0x142/0x2d0 [atl1c]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__napi_poll+0x32/0x1e0
napi_threaded_poll_loop+0x286/0x2e0
napi_threaded_poll+0xfd/0x140
kthread+0xf7/0x130
ret_from_fork+0x2da/0x3a0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98490
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: conntrack: fix helper UAF due to extensions realloc
While calling the helpers, a raw pointer to the extensions area is
wired into expectations list:
-> nf_ct_helper()
-> helper->help()
-> nf_ct_expect_related_report()
-> nf_ct_expect_insert()
-> hlist_add_head_rcu(&exp->lnode, &master_help->expectations)
In case the connection is not confirmed yet, more extensions can be
added afterwards with *_ext_add() calls reallocating the extension
space and leaving the now invalid pointer in the expectations list
that is later accessed while removing the expectation.
Make sure that helpers are called at the end after all the other
extensions are already added.
Note that the helper rejection now leaves the mark and labels set,
but that's not different from how the NAT was handled before or how
the mark and the labels were handled on confirmation failure. And
there are no atomicity guarantees provided by the API anyway.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: conntrack: fix helper UAF due to extensions realloc
While calling the helpers, a raw pointer to the extensions area is
wired into expectations list:
-> nf_ct_helper()
-> helper->help()
-> nf_ct_expect_related_report()
-> nf_ct_expect_insert()
-> hlist_add_head_rcu(&exp->lnode, &master_help->expectations)
In case the connection is not confirmed yet, more extensions can be
added afterwards with *_ext_add() calls reallocating the extension
space and leaving the now invalid pointer in the expectations list
that is later accessed while removing the expectation.
Make sure that helpers are called at the end after all the other
extensions are already added.
Note that the helper rejection now leaves the mark and labels set,
but that's not different from how the NAT was handled before or how
the mark and the labels were handled on confirmation failure. And
there are no atomicity guarantees provided by the API anyway.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98491
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: conntrack: avoid modifying shared unconfirmed ct entry
In a case where skb with an unconfirmed ct entry gets cloned, we may
end up committing both but with different sets of extensions.
The series of events:
1. The first clone wants to commit and runs the helpers wiring up
the extension pointer into the expectation list.
2. Then it looses the confirmation keeping the entry unconfirmed.
3. Second clone now wants to commit labels and adds the new extension
for that breaking the pointer in the expectation list causing
UAF on the destruction path later.
While this is possible to trigger, there should be no practical
network pipeline where committing both clones without modifications
into the same zone is needed. So, let's just reset the entry in case
for some reason we got an skb with a shared one during commit. This
doesn't affect any known use cases, but avoids any potential problems
with sharing and modification of the unconfirmed ct entry.
The fixes tag points to the introduction of helpers, since that's the
main UAF trigger for the sharing.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: openvswitch: conntrack: avoid modifying shared unconfirmed ct entry
In a case where skb with an unconfirmed ct entry gets cloned, we may
end up committing both but with different sets of extensions.
The series of events:
1. The first clone wants to commit and runs the helpers wiring up
the extension pointer into the expectation list.
2. Then it looses the confirmation keeping the entry unconfirmed.
3. Second clone now wants to commit labels and adds the new extension
for that breaking the pointer in the expectation list causing
UAF on the destruction path later.
While this is possible to trigger, there should be no practical
network pipeline where committing both clones without modifications
into the same zone is needed. So, let's just reset the entry in case
for some reason we got an skb with a shared one during commit. This
doesn't affect any known use cases, but avoids any potential problems
with sharing and modification of the unconfirmed ct entry.
The fixes tag points to the introduction of helpers, since that's the
main UAF trigger for the sharing.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98492
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: macb: fix dma_alloc_coherent() leak on macb_alloc() error paths
Fix 3 leaks in macb_alloc() error paths:
- Tx buffer allocated but crossing a 4G boundary: Tx leaked.
- Rx buffer allocation fails: Tx leaked.
- Rx buffer allocated but crossing a 4G boundary: Tx & Rx leaked.
This is because our error handling calls macb_free(bp) which in turn
frees the buffers stored in bp->queues[0], but nothing has been stored
in there. Fix by storing allocated buffers into bp->queues[0] ASAP.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: macb: fix dma_alloc_coherent() leak on macb_alloc() error paths
Fix 3 leaks in macb_alloc() error paths:
- Tx buffer allocated but crossing a 4G boundary: Tx leaked.
- Rx buffer allocation fails: Tx leaked.
- Rx buffer allocated but crossing a 4G boundary: Tx & Rx leaked.
This is because our error handling calls macb_free(bp) which in turn
frees the buffers stored in bp->queues[0], but nothing has been stored
in there. Fix by storing allocated buffers into bp->queues[0] ASAP.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98494
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atl1: fix soft lockup on out-of-range cmb_tpd_next_to_clean read
Same issue as atl1c (see the first commit in this series, "net:
atl1c: fix soft lockup on out-of-range tpd_cons read"): the hardware
can report an out-of-range cmb_tpd_next_to_clean (seen as 0xffff)
while the PCIe link/MAC is resetting. An out-of-range value can
never be reached and the loop below would spin forever. Treat it as
"nothing new to clean" instead.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: atl1: fix soft lockup on out-of-range cmb_tpd_next_to_clean read
Same issue as atl1c (see the first commit in this series, "net:
atl1c: fix soft lockup on out-of-range tpd_cons read"): the hardware
can report an out-of-range cmb_tpd_next_to_clean (seen as 0xffff)
while the PCIe link/MAC is resetting. An out-of-range value can
never be reached and the loop below would spin forever. Treat it as
"nothing new to clean" instead.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98495
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: arp: terminate device name before lookup
The ARP ioctl copies a user-provided struct arpreq into a stack object. Its
arp_dev field may contain IFNAMSIZ bytes without a NUL terminator.
Such input is passed to dev_get_by_name_rcu() or __dev_get_by_name(), where
strcmp() can read past the end of the stack object when a matching
alternative interface name exists.
Terminate the field before the lookup to prevent the out-of-bounds read.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: arp: terminate device name before lookup
The ARP ioctl copies a user-provided struct arpreq into a stack object. Its
arp_dev field may contain IFNAMSIZ bytes without a NUL terminator.
Such input is passed to dev_get_by_name_rcu() or __dev_get_by_name(), where
strcmp() can read past the end of the stack object when a matching
alternative interface name exists.
Terminate the field before the lookup to prevent the out-of-bounds read.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98496
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: airoha: npu: cancel wdt_work after releasing the WDT IRQ
airoha_npu_remove() calls cancel_work_sync() on each core's wdt_work,
but the watchdog IRQ that queues it is requested with devm_request_irq()
and is freed only after .remove() returns. airoha_npu_wdt_handler() can
therefore schedule_work() again once the cancel has returned. struct
airoha_npu, which contains the work, is devm_kzalloc()'d and is freed in
that same unwind, so the late work dereferences freed memory.
Register the work with devm_work_autocancel() before devm_request_irq()
and drop .remove(). Devres runs in reverse order, so the IRQ is freed
before cancel_work_sync(), including when probe fails. A cancel left in
.remove() cannot get that order. Initializing the work first also stops
a pending watchdog interrupt from queuing an uninitialized work item.
Probe currently calls INIT_WORK() only after devm_request_irq().
This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research
while reviewing kernel code.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: airoha: npu: cancel wdt_work after releasing the WDT IRQ
airoha_npu_remove() calls cancel_work_sync() on each core's wdt_work,
but the watchdog IRQ that queues it is requested with devm_request_irq()
and is freed only after .remove() returns. airoha_npu_wdt_handler() can
therefore schedule_work() again once the cancel has returned. struct
airoha_npu, which contains the work, is devm_kzalloc()'d and is freed in
that same unwind, so the late work dereferences freed memory.
Register the work with devm_work_autocancel() before devm_request_irq()
and drop .remove(). Devres runs in reverse order, so the IRQ is freed
before cancel_work_sync(), including when probe fails. A cancel left in
.remove() cannot get that order. Initializing the work first also stops
a pending watchdog interrupt from queuing an uninitialized work item.
Probe currently calls INIT_WORK() only after devm_request_irq().
This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research
while reviewing kernel code.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98497
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: fix swapped IPv6 IPsec policy masks
IPv6 XFRM policies may use different source and destination prefix
lengths. mlx5e_ipsec_policy_mask() builds the corresponding masks
independently, but setup_fte_addr6() installs each mask in the opposite
address field.
When the prefix lengths differ, this makes the source match use the
destination prefix and the destination match use the source prefix. The
resulting hardware rule can both miss traffic covered by the policy and
match traffic outside it.
Install each mask in its corresponding match field.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: fix swapped IPv6 IPsec policy masks
IPv6 XFRM policies may use different source and destination prefix
lengths. mlx5e_ipsec_policy_mask() builds the corresponding masks
independently, but setup_fte_addr6() installs each mask in the opposite
address field.
When the prefix lengths differ, this makes the source match use the
destination prefix and the destination match use the source prefix. The
resulting hardware rule can both miss traffic covered by the policy and
match traffic outside it.
Install each mask in its corresponding match field.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98498
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix rev_entry reference leak in mlx5_tc_ct_shared_counter_get()
When the reverse entry is found but its counter is already being
released, refcount_inc_not_zero() fails and the reference taken by
mlx5_tc_ct_entry_get() is never dropped before falling through to
create_counter. Drop it so the reverse entry is not kept alive forever
by a shared counter lookup that did not use it.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix rev_entry reference leak in mlx5_tc_ct_shared_counter_get()
When the reverse entry is found but its counter is already being
released, refcount_inc_not_zero() fails and the reference taken by
mlx5_tc_ct_entry_get() is never dropped before falling through to
create_counter. Drop it so the reverse entry is not kept alive forever
by a shared counter lookup that did not use it.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98499
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: fix OOB read in wacom_wac_pen_serial_enforce()
The 'wacom_wac_pen_serial_enforce()' function may calculate and pass an
invalid offset to hid_field_extract(), resulting in memory reads at
incorrect addresses -- possibly beyond the end of the report. If a
field in the HID descriptor lists more usages than its Report Count
actually reserves space for, the function's inner 'j' will walk past
the end of the field:
for (i = 0; i < report->maxfield; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < report->field[i]->maxusage; j++) {
...
value = hid_field_extract(hdev, raw_data + 1,
offset + j * size, size);
A descriptor listing 12288 usages against Report Count 1 has the loop
extract the usage at index 12287 from bit offset 98296 -- about 12 KB
past a 2-byte received report. The value is stored in
wacom_wac->serial[0] and can reach userspace as an MSC_SERIAL event,
making this an information disclosure.
Clamp the loop to field->report_count, the number of value slots the
report holds. Value slots past the last declared usage are still
scanned; they reuse that usage (HID 1.11, 6.2.2.8).
Verified on v6.12.105 with a UHID reproducer: a 2-byte report from
such a descriptor trips KASAN before the patch and not after it.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: fix OOB read in wacom_wac_pen_serial_enforce()
The 'wacom_wac_pen_serial_enforce()' function may calculate and pass an
invalid offset to hid_field_extract(), resulting in memory reads at
incorrect addresses -- possibly beyond the end of the report. If a
field in the HID descriptor lists more usages than its Report Count
actually reserves space for, the function's inner 'j' will walk past
the end of the field:
for (i = 0; i < report->maxfield; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < report->field[i]->maxusage; j++) {
...
value = hid_field_extract(hdev, raw_data + 1,
offset + j * size, size);
A descriptor listing 12288 usages against Report Count 1 has the loop
extract the usage at index 12287 from bit offset 98296 -- about 12 KB
past a 2-byte received report. The value is stored in
wacom_wac->serial[0] and can reach userspace as an MSC_SERIAL event,
making this an information disclosure.
Clamp the loop to field->report_count, the number of value slots the
report holds. Value slots past the last declared usage are still
scanned; they reuse that usage (HID 1.11, 6.2.2.8).
Verified on v6.12.105 with a UHID reproducer: a 2-byte report from
such a descriptor trips KASAN before the patch and not after it.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98500
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: hid-oxp: use cancel_delayed_work_sync() in remove
oxp_hid_remove() uses cancel_delayed_work() for all three delayed work
items. cancel_delayed_work() only dequeues a pending work item without
waiting for a currently executing callback to finish. If any of the
work callbacks (oxp_rgb_queue_fn, oxp_btn_queue_fn, oxp_mcu_init_fn) is
running at the time of removal, the callback continues executing
concurrently with hid_hw_close() and hid_hw_stop(), accessing the HID
device after it has been closed and stopped.
Use cancel_delayed_work_sync() instead to ensure that any in-progress
work callback completes before device teardown proceeds.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: hid-oxp: use cancel_delayed_work_sync() in remove
oxp_hid_remove() uses cancel_delayed_work() for all three delayed work
items. cancel_delayed_work() only dequeues a pending work item without
waiting for a currently executing callback to finish. If any of the
work callbacks (oxp_rgb_queue_fn, oxp_btn_queue_fn, oxp_mcu_init_fn) is
running at the time of removal, the callback continues executing
concurrently with hid_hw_close() and hid_hw_stop(), accessing the HID
device after it has been closed and stopped.
Use cancel_delayed_work_sync() instead to ensure that any in-progress
work callback completes before device teardown proceeds.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98501
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: alps: fix use-after-free on input2 registration failure
alps_input_configured() stores data->input2 before calling
input_register_device(). If registration fails, input_free_device()
frees the input device but data->input2 still points to the freed memory.
alps_input_configured() calls hid_hw_open() before allocating input2, so
URBs are already active and raw_event can fire during the failure window.
A U1_SP_ABSOLUTE_REPORT_ID report arriving then causes u1_raw_event()
to dereference the freed data->input2 -> use-after-free.
Fix by only storing input2 into drvdata after successful registration
and adding a NULL guard in the raw_event path.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: alps: fix use-after-free on input2 registration failure
alps_input_configured() stores data->input2 before calling
input_register_device(). If registration fails, input_free_device()
frees the input device but data->input2 still points to the freed memory.
alps_input_configured() calls hid_hw_open() before allocating input2, so
URBs are already active and raw_event can fire during the failure window.
A U1_SP_ABSOLUTE_REPORT_ID report arriving then causes u1_raw_event()
to dereference the freed data->input2 -> use-after-free.
Fix by only storing input2 into drvdata after successful registration
and adding a NULL guard in the raw_event path.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98502
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: alps: unregister DualPoint Stick input device on remove
alps_input_configured() allocates a second input device ("DualPoint
Stick") with input_allocate_device() and registers it, but the
alps_driver struct has no .remove handler and input2 is not tracked in
hdev->inputs. The default remove path (hid_hw_stop -> hidinput_disconnect)
only iterates hdev->inputs, so input2 is never unregistered and leaks
on every device removal.
Add a .remove handler that stops the device first (preventing URB
callbacks from touching input2 during teardown) and then unregisters
input2.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: alps: unregister DualPoint Stick input device on remove
alps_input_configured() allocates a second input device ("DualPoint
Stick") with input_allocate_device() and registers it, but the
alps_driver struct has no .remove handler and input2 is not tracked in
hdev->inputs. The default remove path (hid_hw_stop -> hidinput_disconnect)
only iterates hdev->inputs, so input2 is never unregistered and leaks
on every device removal.
Add a .remove handler that stops the device first (preventing URB
callbacks from touching input2 during teardown) and then unregisters
input2.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98503
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
packet: use ubuf_info completion for TX_RING packets
tpacket_snd sends skbs with frags pointing into its ring slots. Slots
are released when skb->destructor is called.
A call to skb_orphan calls skb->destructor before the skb is freed.
This can cause the slot to be reused while still linked into the skb.
Switch to standard zerocopy completion (ubuf_info) so the slot is only
released once all references to the payload are freed or copied.
Restore skb->destructor to standard sock_wfree.
The ubuf_info completion callback can be called with a NULL skb, but
only from net_zcopy_put and related API, used by zerocopy implementations
that hold their own reference on the uarg, such as MSG_ZEROCOPY. This
uarg is only ever completed from skb_zcopy_clear, so skb is always set.
To prevent userspace from aliasing in-flight state on shared ring
slots, allocate tpacket_uarg per packet, rather than per slot. This
adds a small allocation to the transmit path. Use standard kmalloc to
allow backporting to stable kernels.
The uarg holds an sk_wmem_alloc reference, rather than an sk_refcnt
reference. packet_free_tx_ring waits on sk_wmem_alloc before freeing
the ring pages. Always allocate vec->deferred for tx_ring so page-backed
rings also wait on sk_wmem_alloc when skb_copy_ubufs drops page refs
before calling tpacket_ubuf_complete.
Drop the tx_ring.pg_vec test that tpacket_destruct_skb performed before
accessing the slot. The sk_wmem_alloc reference now guarantees that the
slot is valid. The test is also not sufficient by itself, as it reads
pg_vec without pg_vec_lock, so it can race with packet_set_ring.
As a result a slot is released when its payload is copied, which can
be before transmission (e.g., in skb_orphan_frags_rx). If copied
before skb_tx_timestamp() is called, no slot timestamp is recorded,
similar to when skb_orphan() was called early in the datapath before
this patch.
Revert the now unused previous skb_zcopy_.._nouarg infra.
Depends on commit 992cc9f94ca9 ("net/packet: defer vmalloc TX_RING
free until skbs finish").
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
packet: use ubuf_info completion for TX_RING packets
tpacket_snd sends skbs with frags pointing into its ring slots. Slots
are released when skb->destructor is called.
A call to skb_orphan calls skb->destructor before the skb is freed.
This can cause the slot to be reused while still linked into the skb.
Switch to standard zerocopy completion (ubuf_info) so the slot is only
released once all references to the payload are freed or copied.
Restore skb->destructor to standard sock_wfree.
The ubuf_info completion callback can be called with a NULL skb, but
only from net_zcopy_put and related API, used by zerocopy implementations
that hold their own reference on the uarg, such as MSG_ZEROCOPY. This
uarg is only ever completed from skb_zcopy_clear, so skb is always set.
To prevent userspace from aliasing in-flight state on shared ring
slots, allocate tpacket_uarg per packet, rather than per slot. This
adds a small allocation to the transmit path. Use standard kmalloc to
allow backporting to stable kernels.
The uarg holds an sk_wmem_alloc reference, rather than an sk_refcnt
reference. packet_free_tx_ring waits on sk_wmem_alloc before freeing
the ring pages. Always allocate vec->deferred for tx_ring so page-backed
rings also wait on sk_wmem_alloc when skb_copy_ubufs drops page refs
before calling tpacket_ubuf_complete.
Drop the tx_ring.pg_vec test that tpacket_destruct_skb performed before
accessing the slot. The sk_wmem_alloc reference now guarantees that the
slot is valid. The test is also not sufficient by itself, as it reads
pg_vec without pg_vec_lock, so it can race with packet_set_ring.
As a result a slot is released when its payload is copied, which can
be before transmission (e.g., in skb_orphan_frags_rx). If copied
before skb_tx_timestamp() is called, no slot timestamp is recorded,
similar to when skb_orphan() was called early in the datapath before
this patch.
Revert the now unused previous skb_zcopy_.._nouarg infra.
Depends on commit 992cc9f94ca9 ("net/packet: defer vmalloc TX_RING
free until skbs finish").
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-98504
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: of_property: Omit bus properties without a subordinate bus
A bridge (a device with a Type 1 header) may not have a secondary bus
allocated (pdev->subordinate), e.g., if there are no available bus numbers
or the bridge secondary/subordinate bus numbers are not writable.
The dynamic OF helpers of_pci_prop_bus_range() and of_pci_prop_intr_map()
dereference pdev->subordinate without checking it. When
CONFIG_PCI_DYNAMIC_OF_NODES is enabled, this can cause a NULL pointer
dereference and early boot hang.
Generate 'bus-range' and 'interrupt-map' properties only when a subordinate
bus exists. Keep the node and its remaining properties for bridges without
one.
The problem was latent since 407d1a51921e ("PCI: Create device tree node
for bridge"), but wasn't reachable until 1f340724419e ("PCI: of: Create
device tree PCI host bridge node"), which appeared in v6.15. Before
1f340724419e, of_pci_make_dev_node() returned early because the parent OF
node was missing.
[bhelgaas: move pdev->subordinate test to callees, commit log]
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: of_property: Omit bus properties without a subordinate bus
A bridge (a device with a Type 1 header) may not have a secondary bus
allocated (pdev->subordinate), e.g., if there are no available bus numbers
or the bridge secondary/subordinate bus numbers are not writable.
The dynamic OF helpers of_pci_prop_bus_range() and of_pci_prop_intr_map()
dereference pdev->subordinate without checking it. When
CONFIG_PCI_DYNAMIC_OF_NODES is enabled, this can cause a NULL pointer
dereference and early boot hang.
Generate 'bus-range' and 'interrupt-map' properties only when a subordinate
bus exists. Keep the node and its remaining properties for bridges without
one.
The problem was latent since 407d1a51921e ("PCI: Create device tree node
for bridge"), but wasn't reachable until 1f340724419e ("PCI: of: Create
device tree PCI host bridge node"), which appeared in v6.15. Before
1f340724419e, of_pci_make_dev_node() returned early because the parent OF
node was missing.
[bhelgaas: move pdev->subordinate test to callees, commit log]
🎖@cveNotify