🚨 CVE-2026-82426
Description
Nimbus accepted the `uploadedJarLocation` argument of `submitTopology` / `submitTopologyWithOpts` as a
server-side path and opened it directly, without checking that it referred to a file the caller had
actually uploaded. The intended flow is that a client first calls `beginFileUpload`, which returns a path
inside the Nimbus inbox, and uploads the jar in chunks to that location; nothing bound submission to that
flow, and the `uploaders` map populated by `beginFileUpload` was never consulted at submit time.
An authenticated user with topology submission rights could therefore submit any path readable by the
Nimbus daemon user as their topology jar. Nimbus copied the file into the topology's jar blob, and the
blob ACL grants the submitting subject read access, so the contents could then be retrieved with the
ordinary blob download RPCs. Candidate targets include the Nimbus Kerberos keytab, Thrift and UI TLS
private keys, and `storm.yaml` with the ZooKeeper authentication payload. Possession of the Nimbus keytab
turns an ordinary tenant into a cluster administrator.
In a deployment configured as the documentation recommends, submission is available to every
authenticated principal when `nimbus.users` is unset, so no elevated privilege is required.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the submitted location is canonicalised and must resolve inside the Nimbus inbox.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals via
`nimbus.users` or `nimbus.groups`, and should treat any file readable by the Nimbus daemon user as
potentially exposed to submitters: rotate the Nimbus keytab and any TLS private keys or ZooKeeper
credentials reachable from that account. Local mode is unaffected.
Credit
Independently reported to the Apache Storm PMC by n0mi1k, with a proof of concept.
Also found by the ASF using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
Description
Nimbus accepted the `uploadedJarLocation` argument of `submitTopology` / `submitTopologyWithOpts` as a
server-side path and opened it directly, without checking that it referred to a file the caller had
actually uploaded. The intended flow is that a client first calls `beginFileUpload`, which returns a path
inside the Nimbus inbox, and uploads the jar in chunks to that location; nothing bound submission to that
flow, and the `uploaders` map populated by `beginFileUpload` was never consulted at submit time.
An authenticated user with topology submission rights could therefore submit any path readable by the
Nimbus daemon user as their topology jar. Nimbus copied the file into the topology's jar blob, and the
blob ACL grants the submitting subject read access, so the contents could then be retrieved with the
ordinary blob download RPCs. Candidate targets include the Nimbus Kerberos keytab, Thrift and UI TLS
private keys, and `storm.yaml` with the ZooKeeper authentication payload. Possession of the Nimbus keytab
turns an ordinary tenant into a cluster administrator.
In a deployment configured as the documentation recommends, submission is available to every
authenticated principal when `nimbus.users` is unset, so no elevated privilege is required.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the submitted location is canonicalised and must resolve inside the Nimbus inbox.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals via
`nimbus.users` or `nimbus.groups`, and should treat any file readable by the Nimbus daemon user as
potentially exposed to submitters: rotate the Nimbus keytab and any TLS private keys or ZooKeeper
credentials reachable from that account. Local mode is unaffected.
Credit
Independently reported to the Apache Storm PMC by n0mi1k, with a proof of concept.
Also found by the ASF using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-82427
Description
A topology's `topology.blobstore.map` lets the submitter choose a local name for each blob that the
supervisor localises. That name was used to build a path under the topology's working directory without
normalisation, in both `AsyncLocalizer` and `Container.createBlobstoreLinks`, and the symlink helper
force-deletes whatever already exists at the target before creating the link.
A submitter could therefore use `../` segments to direct that delete-and-symlink operation at an arbitrary
path, as the supervisor user, on every node the topology is scheduled onto. The consequences include
recursive deletion of supervisor-owned content and planting a symlink that causes a subsequent worker
launch to execute attacker-chosen code as another tenant's operating-system user, which defeats the
isolation that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` is intended to provide.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the resolved target must lie inside the expected root at both call sites.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals, and may
reject submissions whose `topology.blobstore.map` entries contain path separators or `..` segments before
they reach Nimbus.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
Description
A topology's `topology.blobstore.map` lets the submitter choose a local name for each blob that the
supervisor localises. That name was used to build a path under the topology's working directory without
normalisation, in both `AsyncLocalizer` and `Container.createBlobstoreLinks`, and the symlink helper
force-deletes whatever already exists at the target before creating the link.
A submitter could therefore use `../` segments to direct that delete-and-symlink operation at an arbitrary
path, as the supervisor user, on every node the topology is scheduled onto. The consequences include
recursive deletion of supervisor-owned content and planting a symlink that causes a subsequent worker
launch to execute attacker-chosen code as another tenant's operating-system user, which defeats the
isolation that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` is intended to provide.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the resolved target must lie inside the expected root at both call sites.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals, and may
reject submissions whose `topology.blobstore.map` entries contain path separators or `..` segments before
they reach Nimbus.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-82429
Description
The setuid-root `worker-launcher` binary adjusts ownership and permissions of worker directories by walking
the tree with FTS and calling `lchown` and `chmod` on each entry's full pathname while running with an
effective uid of 0. Both syscalls re-resolve the path at the time of the call, after FTS has classified the
entry, and the trees being walked are owned and writable by the untrusted topology user.
A tenant running code on a supervisor node could therefore replace an intermediate directory component with
a symbolic link between classification and the privileged operation, redirecting the root-owned `lchown` or
`chmod` at an arbitrary file on the host. The operation is repeatable at will, since crashing a worker
forces a relaunch and blob updates re-run the walk, so a failed attempt costs the attacker nothing.
This crosses the boundary that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` and container isolation are intended to
enforce. It is the same defect class as the Hadoop container-executor issues from which this code derives.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the privileged walk operates on file descriptors it has already stat'd rather than
on pathnames re-resolved at call time.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should not run untrusted topology code on supervisors configured with
`supervisor.run.worker.as.user`, since the launcher is the boundary being crossed. Note that the launcher
must be rebuilt and reinstalled after upgrading; replacing the Java artifacts alone is not sufficient.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
Description
The setuid-root `worker-launcher` binary adjusts ownership and permissions of worker directories by walking
the tree with FTS and calling `lchown` and `chmod` on each entry's full pathname while running with an
effective uid of 0. Both syscalls re-resolve the path at the time of the call, after FTS has classified the
entry, and the trees being walked are owned and writable by the untrusted topology user.
A tenant running code on a supervisor node could therefore replace an intermediate directory component with
a symbolic link between classification and the privileged operation, redirecting the root-owned `lchown` or
`chmod` at an arbitrary file on the host. The operation is repeatable at will, since crashing a worker
forces a relaunch and blob updates re-run the walk, so a failed attempt costs the attacker nothing.
This crosses the boundary that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` and container isolation are intended to
enforce. It is the same defect class as the Hadoop container-executor issues from which this code derives.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the privileged walk operates on file descriptors it has already stat'd rather than
on pathnames re-resolved at call time.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should not run untrusted topology code on supervisors configured with
`supervisor.run.worker.as.user`, since the launcher is the boundary being crossed. Note that the launcher
must be rebuilt and reinstalled after upgrading; replacing the Java artifacts alone is not sufficient.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-82430
Description
When launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the
entire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads and acts on the command
file that the supervisor wrote into that same directory. The file is opened without `O_NOFOLLOW` and without
re-verifying its owner, so between the ownership change and the read the tenant can replace its contents.
For the Docker path the parsed command is executed with real uid 0, and the command sanitiser is not a
privilege boundary: it admits `-v` with an arbitrary source, `--device`, `--cap-add`, `--security-opt`,
`--user` and `--net`, and copies positional arguments through verbatim. A rewritten file therefore yields an
attacker-authored, root-equivalent container invocation with the host filesystem available.
For the OCI path the same rewrite window applies, and mount validation is structural only, with no
source or destination allow-list, so arbitrary host paths can be bind-mounted read-write into the
container. The `username` field of the command file is likewise attacker-settable and is checked only
against non-root and minimum-uid rules, permitting execution as another tenant's uid.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the command file is validated before the ownership change and re-verified on open,
and where mount sources and destinations are constrained by configuration.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should disable Docker and OCI worker isolation, or restrict topology
submission on affected supervisors to trusted principals. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and
reinstalled after upgrading.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
Description
When launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the
entire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads and acts on the command
file that the supervisor wrote into that same directory. The file is opened without `O_NOFOLLOW` and without
re-verifying its owner, so between the ownership change and the read the tenant can replace its contents.
For the Docker path the parsed command is executed with real uid 0, and the command sanitiser is not a
privilege boundary: it admits `-v` with an arbitrary source, `--device`, `--cap-add`, `--security-opt`,
`--user` and `--net`, and copies positional arguments through verbatim. A rewritten file therefore yields an
attacker-authored, root-equivalent container invocation with the host filesystem available.
For the OCI path the same rewrite window applies, and mount validation is structural only, with no
source or destination allow-list, so arbitrary host paths can be bind-mounted read-write into the
container. The `username` field of the command file is likewise attacker-settable and is checked only
against non-root and minimum-uid rules, permitting execution as another tenant's uid.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the command file is validated before the ownership change and re-verified on open,
and where mount sources and destinations are constrained by configuration.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should disable Docker and OCI worker isolation, or restrict topology
submission on affected supervisors to trusted principals. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and
reinstalled after upgrading.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-82431
Description
`SimpleACLAuthorizer` evaluated the user-level command set by returning early when `nimbus.users` was empty,
before `nimbus.groups` was considered. An operator who restricted cluster access by group alone, leaving
`nimbus.users` unset, therefore received no restriction at all: every authenticated principal was permitted
every user-level operation, including `submitTopology`, `beginFileUpload` and `getNimbusConf`.
`docs/SECURITY.md` presents `nimbus.groups` as a supported way to lock down a cluster, so a deployment
following the documentation could believe it was restricted while it was not. The failure is silent; nothing
in the logs or the configuration indicates that the group list is being ignored.
Both lists left empty continues to mean that no restriction is configured, which is the shipped default and
is unchanged.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where `nimbus.groups` is evaluated whether or not `nimbus.users` is set.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should additionally populate `nimbus.users` with the intended
principals, since a non-empty user list causes the group list to be evaluated on affected versions.
Operators should review Nimbus access logs for operations by principals outside the intended groups.
Note that after upgrading, a cluster configured with `nimbus.groups` alone becomes restrictive for the first
time. This includes `NimbusClient`, which calls `getLeader` on every connection, so clients outside the
configured groups will begin to be refused.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
Description
`SimpleACLAuthorizer` evaluated the user-level command set by returning early when `nimbus.users` was empty,
before `nimbus.groups` was considered. An operator who restricted cluster access by group alone, leaving
`nimbus.users` unset, therefore received no restriction at all: every authenticated principal was permitted
every user-level operation, including `submitTopology`, `beginFileUpload` and `getNimbusConf`.
`docs/SECURITY.md` presents `nimbus.groups` as a supported way to lock down a cluster, so a deployment
following the documentation could believe it was restricted while it was not. The failure is silent; nothing
in the logs or the configuration indicates that the group list is being ignored.
Both lists left empty continues to mean that no restriction is configured, which is the shipped default and
is unchanged.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where `nimbus.groups` is evaluated whether or not `nimbus.users` is set.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should additionally populate `nimbus.users` with the intended
principals, since a non-empty user list causes the group list to be evaluated on affected versions.
Operators should review Nimbus access logs for operations by principals outside the intended groups.
Note that after upgrading, a cluster configured with `nimbus.groups` alone becomes restrictive for the first
time. This includes `NimbusClient`, which calls `getLeader` on every connection, so clients outside the
configured groups will begin to be refused.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-82432
Description
Nimbus validated `topology.blobstore.map` against the calling subject at submission time only. The rebalance
operation accepts configuration overrides and stripped a small set of keys from them, but never re-ran that
validation, so a caller authorised to rebalance a topology could introduce a blobstore map entry naming a
blob whose ACL does not grant them access. Supervisors localise whatever key the map names, placing the
blob's contents into the topology's working directory.
The same advisory covers `listBlobs`, which performed no authorization check and passed no subject, unlike
the neighbouring `getBlobMeta` and `beginBlobDownload` operations. It therefore returned every key in the
blobstore to any caller able to reach the Nimbus Thrift port, which provides the key names that make the
above practical. On its own the disclosure is metadata only.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where rebalance configuration overrides are validated exactly as submission-time
configuration is, against the rebalancing caller, and where `listBlobs` applies the configured
authorization.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict rebalance rights to trusted principals, keeping in mind
that membership of a topology's `topology.users` or `topology.groups` confers them.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
Description
Nimbus validated `topology.blobstore.map` against the calling subject at submission time only. The rebalance
operation accepts configuration overrides and stripped a small set of keys from them, but never re-ran that
validation, so a caller authorised to rebalance a topology could introduce a blobstore map entry naming a
blob whose ACL does not grant them access. Supervisors localise whatever key the map names, placing the
blob's contents into the topology's working directory.
The same advisory covers `listBlobs`, which performed no authorization check and passed no subject, unlike
the neighbouring `getBlobMeta` and `beginBlobDownload` operations. It therefore returned every key in the
blobstore to any caller able to reach the Nimbus Thrift port, which provides the key names that make the
above practical. On its own the disclosure is metadata only.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where rebalance configuration overrides are validated exactly as submission-time
configuration is, against the rebalancing caller, and where `listBlobs` applies the configured
authorization.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict rebalance rights to trusted principals, keeping in mind
that membership of a topology's `topology.users` or `topology.groups` confers them.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-82433
Description
`getNimbusConf` returned the complete daemon configuration without redaction after only a user-level
authorization check. Where the cluster is configured with them, that response includes
`storm.zookeeper.auth.payload` and the keystore and truststore passwords for the Thrift, Netty and
ZooKeeper TLS configuration. The project masks passwords elsewhere before display, so the omission here is
inconsistent rather than intended.
The UI endpoint `/api/v1/cluster/configuration` compounded this. It carried no `@AuthNimbusOp` annotation,
and the authorization filter treated a missing annotation as "no gate required" and returned immediately, so
the endpoint applied no per-user check at all and proxied the request under the UI daemon's own principal.
Any user able to pass `ui.filter` therefore received the full configuration, including principals that
Nimbus itself would have refused.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where credential-bearing values are masked before the configuration is served and where
every UI API endpoint must declare its authorization explicitly.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should place the UI behind an authenticating reverse proxy that
restricts `/api/v1/cluster/configuration`, and should rotate the ZooKeeper authentication payload and any
TLS keystore or truststore passwords that were reachable through it.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
Description
`getNimbusConf` returned the complete daemon configuration without redaction after only a user-level
authorization check. Where the cluster is configured with them, that response includes
`storm.zookeeper.auth.payload` and the keystore and truststore passwords for the Thrift, Netty and
ZooKeeper TLS configuration. The project masks passwords elsewhere before display, so the omission here is
inconsistent rather than intended.
The UI endpoint `/api/v1/cluster/configuration` compounded this. It carried no `@AuthNimbusOp` annotation,
and the authorization filter treated a missing annotation as "no gate required" and returned immediately, so
the endpoint applied no per-user check at all and proxied the request under the UI daemon's own principal.
Any user able to pass `ui.filter` therefore received the full configuration, including principals that
Nimbus itself would have refused.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where credential-bearing values are masked before the configuration is served and where
every UI API endpoint must declare its authorization explicitly.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should place the UI behind an authenticating reverse proxy that
restricts `/api/v1/cluster/configuration`, and should rotate the ZooKeeper authentication payload and any
TLS keystore or truststore passwords that were reachable through it.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-82434
Description
When ZooKeeper authentication is configured, Storm deliberately retains
`storm.zookeeper.topology.auth.payload` in the topology configuration, because workers need it. Nimbus then
served that configuration verbatim to any caller holding read-only topology permissions, so a user whose
only grant was the ability to view a topology received its ZooKeeper credential.
That credential is not read-only. The cluster state implementation uses write-capable ACLs for worker
heartbeats, backpressure and error state, so a recipient can forge or remove that state for the topology
concerned. It is not a write credential on assignments.
The same advisory covers the submission client, which logged the generated payload at INFO on every
submission that generated one, and the SASL handlers, which logged it at DEBUG. The credential therefore
also reached any log aggregation or support bundle collected from the cluster.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the payload is removed from the configuration served to read-only callers and is no
longer written to logs.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should rotate `storm.zookeeper.topology.auth.payload` for existing
topologies, review retained logs and support bundles for the value, and restrict read-only topology
permissions to trusted principals.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
Description
When ZooKeeper authentication is configured, Storm deliberately retains
`storm.zookeeper.topology.auth.payload` in the topology configuration, because workers need it. Nimbus then
served that configuration verbatim to any caller holding read-only topology permissions, so a user whose
only grant was the ability to view a topology received its ZooKeeper credential.
That credential is not read-only. The cluster state implementation uses write-capable ACLs for worker
heartbeats, backpressure and error state, so a recipient can forge or remove that state for the topology
concerned. It is not a write credential on assignments.
The same advisory covers the submission client, which logged the generated payload at INFO on every
submission that generated one, and the SASL handlers, which logged it at DEBUG. The credential therefore
also reached any log aggregation or support bundle collected from the cluster.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the payload is removed from the configuration served to read-only callers and is no
longer written to logs.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should rotate `storm.zookeeper.topology.auth.payload` for existing
topologies, review retained logs and support bundles for the value, and restrict read-only topology
permissions to trusted principals.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-82435
Description
The worker's Netty message decoder is installed ahead of the SASL authentication handlers in the pipeline
and acts on frames before any authentication has taken place. It allocated buffers sized from a
length field carried in the frame, so a single frame from an unauthenticated peer able to reach a worker
slot port could drive a large allocation.
`storm.messaging.netty.authentication` defaults to false, and the decoder runs before the handler that
enforces it in any case, so no credentials are required. The attacker needs only TCP reachability to a
worker port.
The effect of a single frame at the default 768 MB worker heap has not been measured to distinguish
sustained worker loss from transient garbage-collection pressure. The severity assigned to this advisory
reflects the more conservative reading; consumers who require a precise figure should test against their own
worker heap configuration.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where frames are decoded only after the handshake completes.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that worker slot ports are reachable only from within the
cluster, as the security model already recommends, and should enable
`storm.messaging.netty.authentication` where the deployment permits it.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
Description
The worker's Netty message decoder is installed ahead of the SASL authentication handlers in the pipeline
and acts on frames before any authentication has taken place. It allocated buffers sized from a
length field carried in the frame, so a single frame from an unauthenticated peer able to reach a worker
slot port could drive a large allocation.
`storm.messaging.netty.authentication` defaults to false, and the decoder runs before the handler that
enforces it in any case, so no credentials are required. The attacker needs only TCP reachability to a
worker port.
The effect of a single frame at the default 768 MB worker heap has not been measured to distinguish
sustained worker loss from transient garbage-collection pressure. The severity assigned to this advisory
reflects the more conservative reading; consumers who require a precise figure should test against their own
worker heap configuration.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where frames are decoded only after the handshake completes.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that worker slot ports are reachable only from within the
cluster, as the security model already recommends, and should enable
`storm.messaging.netty.authentication` where the deployment permits it.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-82437
Description
The Logviewer offers `logs.users` and `logs.groups` so operators can control who may read log content. For
daemon logs those settings were not applied: the access decision combined the "this is a daemon log" flag
with the authorizer result in a way that discarded the authorizer's answer whenever the flag was set, and
the daemon log page and download endpoints reached the handler without consulting an authorizer at all. Any
user able to pass the configured servlet filter could therefore read `nimbus.log`, `supervisor.log` and the
other daemon logs on every reachable node, which contain other tenants' topology names, owners and
configuration fragments.
The same advisory covers the log listing endpoints, which accepted a user argument and never applied it, so
`/listLogs` and `/searchLogs` returned every tenant's topology and worker log file names regardless of the
caller. That part is metadata only.
There was no configuration that closed either behaviour.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the daemon log paths evaluate the same configured user and group lists that the
worker log paths already used, and the listing endpoints filter by the requesting user.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should place the Logviewer behind a reverse proxy that restricts the
daemon log endpoints, and should treat daemon log content as readable by any filter-authenticated user.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
Description
The Logviewer offers `logs.users` and `logs.groups` so operators can control who may read log content. For
daemon logs those settings were not applied: the access decision combined the "this is a daemon log" flag
with the authorizer result in a way that discarded the authorizer's answer whenever the flag was set, and
the daemon log page and download endpoints reached the handler without consulting an authorizer at all. Any
user able to pass the configured servlet filter could therefore read `nimbus.log`, `supervisor.log` and the
other daemon logs on every reachable node, which contain other tenants' topology names, owners and
configuration fragments.
The same advisory covers the log listing endpoints, which accepted a user argument and never applied it, so
`/listLogs` and `/searchLogs` returned every tenant's topology and worker log file names regardless of the
caller. That part is metadata only.
There was no configuration that closed either behaviour.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the daemon log paths evaluate the same configured user and group lists that the
worker log paths already used, and the listing endpoints filter by the requesting user.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should place the Logviewer behind a reverse proxy that restricts the
daemon log endpoints, and should treat daemon log content as readable by any filter-authenticated user.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-82438
Description
Three separate mechanisms allowed a web page on an unrelated origin to read responses that Storm's HTTP
components served to an authenticated user.
The Logviewer reflected the request's `Origin` header back in `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` while also
sending `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. The published security model documents a permissive
`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` posture as accepted, which is safe precisely because browsers refuse to
honour `*` together with credentials; reflecting the concrete origin removes that protection.
The shared CORS filter used by the UI, the Logviewer and DRPC was configured with a response header name
where an initialisation parameter name was expected. The container ignored the setting and applied its own
defaults, which allow credentials.
Finally, the UI and Logviewer wrapped API responses in a caller-supplied JSONP callback for every GET
request. A script element on any origin can load such a response, which bypasses the same-origin policy
entirely rather than negotiating it, and there was no way to turn the behaviour off.
In each case the effect is that a page visited by an authenticated operator can read cluster, topology and
log data on their behalf.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the Logviewer no longer reflects the request origin in a credentialed response, the
CORS filter is configured explicitly, and JSONP wrapping is governed by `ui.enable.jsonp`, which defaults to
false.
Note that disabling JSONP is a behaviour change for tooling that passes a `callback` query parameter; such
tooling should be moved to ordinary JSON requests.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should place the UI, Logviewer and DRPC HTTP endpoints behind a reverse
proxy that strips `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` and `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials` from responses and
rejects requests carrying a `callback` parameter.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
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Description
Three separate mechanisms allowed a web page on an unrelated origin to read responses that Storm's HTTP
components served to an authenticated user.
The Logviewer reflected the request's `Origin` header back in `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` while also
sending `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. The published security model documents a permissive
`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` posture as accepted, which is safe precisely because browsers refuse to
honour `*` together with credentials; reflecting the concrete origin removes that protection.
The shared CORS filter used by the UI, the Logviewer and DRPC was configured with a response header name
where an initialisation parameter name was expected. The container ignored the setting and applied its own
defaults, which allow credentials.
Finally, the UI and Logviewer wrapped API responses in a caller-supplied JSONP callback for every GET
request. A script element on any origin can load such a response, which bypasses the same-origin policy
entirely rather than negotiating it, and there was no way to turn the behaviour off.
In each case the effect is that a page visited by an authenticated operator can read cluster, topology and
log data on their behalf.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the Logviewer no longer reflects the request origin in a credentialed response, the
CORS filter is configured explicitly, and JSONP wrapping is governed by `ui.enable.jsonp`, which defaults to
false.
Note that disabling JSONP is a behaviour change for tooling that passes a `callback` query parameter; such
tooling should be moved to ordinary JSON requests.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should place the UI, Logviewer and DRPC HTTP endpoints behind a reverse
proxy that strips `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` and `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials` from responses and
rejects requests carrying a `callback` parameter.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
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🚨 CVE-2026-90789
A weakness has been identified in itsourcecode Leave Management System 1.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /login.php. Executing a manipulation of the argument user_email can lead to sql injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks.
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A weakness has been identified in itsourcecode Leave Management System 1.0. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file /login.php. Executing a manipulation of the argument user_email can lead to sql injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks.
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GitHub
itsourcecode Leave Management System V1.0 SQL Injection Vulnerability · Issue #1 · Relax-1626/submit
itsourcecode Leave Management System V1.0 SQL Injection Vulnerability NAME OF AFFECTED PRODUCT(S) Leave Management System Vendor Homepage https://itsourcecode.com/free-projects/php-project/leave-ma...
🚨 CVE-2026-90790
A security vulnerability has been detected in a2aproject a2a-python up to 1.1.3. This affects the function _dispatch_notification of the file src/a2a/server/tasks/base_push_notification_sender.py of the component Push Notification Sender. The manipulation of the argument push_info.url leads to server-side request forgery. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. Upgrading to version 1.1.4 is able to mitigate this issue. It is suggested to upgrade the affected component.
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A security vulnerability has been detected in a2aproject a2a-python up to 1.1.3. This affects the function _dispatch_notification of the file src/a2a/server/tasks/base_push_notification_sender.py of the component Push Notification Sender. The manipulation of the argument push_info.url leads to server-side request forgery. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. Upgrading to version 1.1.4 is able to mitigate this issue. It is suggested to upgrade the affected component.
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GitHub
GitHub - a2aproject/a2a-python: Official Python SDK for the Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol
Official Python SDK for the Agent2Agent (A2A) Protocol - a2aproject/a2a-python
🚨 CVE-2026-90791
A vulnerability was detected in GPAC up to f1219cde. This vulnerability affects the function gf_node_unregister of the file scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c of the component MP4Box. The manipulation results in use after free. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. Upgrading to version abi-16.23 is able to resolve this issue. The patch is identified as 9eb40df4448b88d6a6ce3454657c06f47eff0b24. Upgrading the affected component is recommended.
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A vulnerability was detected in GPAC up to f1219cde. This vulnerability affects the function gf_node_unregister of the file scenegraph/base_scenegraph.c of the component MP4Box. The manipulation results in use after free. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. Upgrading to version abi-16.23 is able to resolve this issue. The patch is identified as 9eb40df4448b88d6a6ce3454657c06f47eff0b24. Upgrading the affected component is recommended.
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GitHub
CVE_submit/gpac_3801.md at main · Ech06/CVE_submit
Contribute to Ech06/CVE_submit development by creating an account on GitHub.
🚨 CVE-2023-25499
When adding non-visible components to the UI in server side, content is sent to the browser in Vaadin 10.0.0 through 10.0.22, 11.0.0 through 14.10.0, 15.0.0 through 22.0.28, 23.0.0 through 23.3.12, 24.0.0 through 24.0.5 and 24.1.0.alpha1 to 24.1.0.beta1, resulting in potential information disclosure.
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When adding non-visible components to the UI in server side, content is sent to the browser in Vaadin 10.0.0 through 10.0.22, 11.0.0 through 14.10.0, 15.0.0 through 22.0.28, 23.0.0 through 23.3.12, 24.0.0 through 24.0.5 and 24.1.0.alpha1 to 24.1.0.beta1, resulting in potential information disclosure.
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GitHub
Disable sending updates to client for effectively non-visible nodes by tepi · Pull Request #15885 · vaadin/flow
Vaadin Flow is a Java framework binding Vaadin web components to Java. This is part of Vaadin 10+. - Disable sending updates to client for effectively non-visible nodes by tepi · Pull Request #15885 · vaadin/flow
🚨 CVE-2026-57825
In the opam package before 2.5.2 for OCaml, the sandbox protection mechanism can be bypassed because symlinks are mishandled during use of .install files.
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In the opam package before 2.5.2 for OCaml, the sandbox protection mechanism can be bypassed because symlinks are mishandled during use of .install files.
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GitHub
Releases · ocaml/opam
opam is a source-based package manager. It supports multiple simultaneous compiler installations, flexible package constraints, and a Git-friendly development workflow. - ocaml/opam
🚨 CVE-2026-87736
An issue was discovered in the mirage-crypto-ec package before 2.3.0 for OCaml. There is an EC public key out-of-bounds read for compressed points.
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An issue was discovered in the mirage-crypto-ec package before 2.3.0 for OCaml. There is an EC public key out-of-bounds read for compressed points.
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osv.dev
OSV - Open Source Vulnerabilities
Comprehensive vulnerability database for your open source projects and dependencies.
🚨 CVE-2026-61907
An issue was discovered in Cyrus IMAP before 3.12.4. JMAP snooze bypasses the destination-mailbox ACL. An authenticated user with insert permissions on another user's snoozed mailbox could cause insertion of mail to that user's inbox, or any other of their mailboxes whose id was known to the user, despite having no insert permissions to the target mailbox.
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An issue was discovered in Cyrus IMAP before 3.12.4. JMAP snooze bypasses the destination-mailbox ACL. An authenticated user with insert permissions on another user's snoozed mailbox could cause insertion of mail to that user's inbox, or any other of their mailboxes whose id was known to the user, despite having no insert permissions to the target mailbox.
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🚨 CVE-2026-61909
An issue was discovered in Cyrus IMAP before 3.12.4. CalDAV/CardDAV multiget bypasses a per-href ACL. An authenticated DAV user with some shared access to another user's calendar or address book could read even unshared events or contacts by including the target hrefs in a calendar-multiget or addressbook-multiget REPORT.
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An issue was discovered in Cyrus IMAP before 3.12.4. CalDAV/CardDAV multiget bypasses a per-href ACL. An authenticated DAV user with some shared access to another user's calendar or address book could read even unshared events or contacts by including the target hrefs in a calendar-multiget or addressbook-multiget REPORT.
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🚨 CVE-2026-61910
An issue was discovered in Cyrus IMAP before 3.12.4. Mailbox/set let a sharee change a special-use role on shared mailboxes. An authenticated user with maySetKeywords on another user's mailbox could change that mailbox's specialuse annotation. This could allow the sharee to change the shared mailbox to perform the archived, snoozed, or other role, which might cause mail mail to be written to the shared mailbox, sharing more content than intended. (This is likely to be an unusual situation, made more unusual because if the target already has an non-shared mailbox with that role, role duplication suppression will prevent the update.)
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An issue was discovered in Cyrus IMAP before 3.12.4. Mailbox/set let a sharee change a special-use role on shared mailboxes. An authenticated user with maySetKeywords on another user's mailbox could change that mailbox's specialuse annotation. This could allow the sharee to change the shared mailbox to perform the archived, snoozed, or other role, which might cause mail mail to be written to the shared mailbox, sharing more content than intended. (This is likely to be an unusual situation, made more unusual because if the target already has an non-shared mailbox with that role, role duplication suppression will prevent the update.)
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🚨 CVE-2026-81051
Dell ThinOS 10, versions prior to 2605_10.2616, contain a Security Version Number Mutable to Older Versions vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with physical access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Protection mechanism bypass.
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Dell ThinOS 10, versions prior to 2605_10.2616, contain a Security Version Number Mutable to Older Versions vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with physical access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Protection mechanism bypass.
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