🚨 CVE-2026-64397
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: serialize QUERY_DIRECTORY requests per file
smb2_query_dir() stores a pointer to its stack-allocated private data in
the ksmbd_file readdir_data. Concurrent QUERY_DIRECTORY requests using the
same file handle can overwrite this pointer while an iterate_dir() callback
is still using it, resulting in a stack use-after-free.
Add a per-file mutex and hold it while accessing the shared directory
enumeration state. The lock covers scan restart, dot entry state,
readdir_data setup and iteration, and response construction. This prevents
another request from replacing readdir_data.private before the current
request has finished using it and also serializes the shared file position.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: serialize QUERY_DIRECTORY requests per file
smb2_query_dir() stores a pointer to its stack-allocated private data in
the ksmbd_file readdir_data. Concurrent QUERY_DIRECTORY requests using the
same file handle can overwrite this pointer while an iterate_dir() callback
is still using it, resulting in a stack use-after-free.
Add a per-file mutex and hold it while accessing the shared directory
enumeration state. The lock covers scan restart, dot entry state,
readdir_data setup and iteration, and response construction. This prevents
another request from replacing readdir_data.private before the current
request has finished using it and also serializes the shared file position.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64398
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: add a permission check for FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA
FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA in smb2_ioctl() destroys file data via
ksmbd_vfs_zero_data() -> vfs_fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE/ZERO_RANGE) after
checking only the share-level KSMBD_TREE_CONN_FLAG_WRITABLE, with no
per-handle access check. A handle opened with only FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES
still yields an FMODE_WRITE filp (FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES is part of
FILE_WRITE_DESIRE_ACCESS_LE, so smb2_create_open_flags() opens it
O_WRONLY), so the vfs_fallocate FMODE_WRITE check does not stop it; only
the missing fp->daccess gate would. Reproduced on mainline 7.1-rc7 with
KASAN by an authenticated SMB client: a FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES-only handle
zeroed 4096 bytes of file data it had no FILE_WRITE_DATA right to
(6/6; a FILE_READ_DATA-only handle was correctly denied).
This is the unfixed sibling of commit cc57232cae23 ("ksmbd: fix FSCTL
permission bypass by adding a permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE").
Because SET_ZERO_DATA writes data (not an attribute), require
FILE_WRITE_DATA.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: add a permission check for FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA
FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA in smb2_ioctl() destroys file data via
ksmbd_vfs_zero_data() -> vfs_fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE/ZERO_RANGE) after
checking only the share-level KSMBD_TREE_CONN_FLAG_WRITABLE, with no
per-handle access check. A handle opened with only FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES
still yields an FMODE_WRITE filp (FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES is part of
FILE_WRITE_DESIRE_ACCESS_LE, so smb2_create_open_flags() opens it
O_WRONLY), so the vfs_fallocate FMODE_WRITE check does not stop it; only
the missing fp->daccess gate would. Reproduced on mainline 7.1-rc7 with
KASAN by an authenticated SMB client: a FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES-only handle
zeroed 4096 bytes of file data it had no FILE_WRITE_DATA right to
(6/6; a FILE_READ_DATA-only handle was correctly denied).
This is the unfixed sibling of commit cc57232cae23 ("ksmbd: fix FSCTL
permission bypass by adding a permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE").
Because SET_ZERO_DATA writes data (not an attribute), require
FILE_WRITE_DATA.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64399
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: add permission checks for FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE
The FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE arm of smb2_ioctl() overwrites the
destination file's data via vfs_clone_file_range() with neither the
share-level KSMBD_TREE_CONN_FLAG_WRITABLE check nor a per-handle
fp->daccess check that the other write-bearing arms carry. A client can
overwrite destination data on a read-only share, or from a handle opened
with only FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES (which still yields an FMODE_WRITE filp).
FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES-only destination handle overwrote the file's data via
the clone. Add both checks, matching the FSCTL_SET_SPARSE permission fix;
require FILE_WRITE_DATA since this writes data.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: add permission checks for FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE
The FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE arm of smb2_ioctl() overwrites the
destination file's data via vfs_clone_file_range() with neither the
share-level KSMBD_TREE_CONN_FLAG_WRITABLE check nor a per-handle
fp->daccess check that the other write-bearing arms carry. A client can
overwrite destination data on a read-only share, or from a handle opened
with only FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES (which still yields an FMODE_WRITE filp).
FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES-only destination handle overwrote the file's data via
the clone. Add both checks, matching the FSCTL_SET_SPARSE permission fix;
require FILE_WRITE_DATA since this writes data.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64400
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: prevent path traversal bypass by restricting caseless retry
ksmbd_vfs_path_lookup() enforces LOOKUP_BENEATH to restrict path
resolution within the share root. When a crafted path attempts to
escape the share boundary using parent-directory components ('..'),
vfs_path_parent_lookup() detects this and immediately fails,
returning -EXDEV.
However, a bug exists in __ksmbd_vfs_kern_path() under caseless mode.
The function fails to intercept the -EXDEV error and erroneously
falls through to the caseless retry logic, which is intended only
for genuinely missing files. During this retry process, the path
is reconstructed, leading to an unintended LOOKUP_BENEATH bypass
that allows write-capable users to create zero-length files or
directories outside the exported share.
Fix this by ensuring that the execution only proceeds to the caseless
lookup retry when the error is specifically -ENOENT. Any other errors,
such as -EXDEV from a path traversal attempt, must be returned immediately.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: prevent path traversal bypass by restricting caseless retry
ksmbd_vfs_path_lookup() enforces LOOKUP_BENEATH to restrict path
resolution within the share root. When a crafted path attempts to
escape the share boundary using parent-directory components ('..'),
vfs_path_parent_lookup() detects this and immediately fails,
returning -EXDEV.
However, a bug exists in __ksmbd_vfs_kern_path() under caseless mode.
The function fails to intercept the -EXDEV error and erroneously
falls through to the caseless retry logic, which is intended only
for genuinely missing files. During this retry process, the path
is reconstructed, leading to an unintended LOOKUP_BENEATH bypass
that allows write-capable users to create zero-length files or
directories outside the exported share.
Fix this by ensuring that the execution only proceeds to the caseless
lookup retry when the error is specifically -ENOENT. Any other errors,
such as -EXDEV from a path traversal attempt, must be returned immediately.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64401
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: resolve SWN tcon from live registrations
cifs_swn_notify() looks up a witness registration by id under
cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex, drops the mutex, and then uses the registration's
cached tcon pointer. That pointer is not a lifetime reference, and it is
not a stable representative once cifs_get_swn_reg() lets multiple tcons
for the same net/share name share one registration id.
A same-share second mount can keep the cifs_swn_reg alive after the first
tcon unregisters and is freed. The registration then still points at the
freed first tcon, so taking tc_lock or incrementing tc_count through
swnreg->tcon only moves the use-after-free earlier. Taking tc_lock while
holding cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex also violates the documented CIFS lock
order.
Fix this by making the registration store only the stable witness
identity: id, net name, share name, and notify flags. When a notify
arrives, copy that identity under cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex, drop the mutex,
then find and pin a live witness tcon that currently matches the net/share
pair under the normal cifs_tcp_ses_lock -> tc_lock order. The notification
path uses that pinned tcon directly and drops the reference when done.
Registration and unregister messages now use the live tcon passed by the
caller instead of a cached tcon in the registration. The final unregister
send is folded into cifs_swn_unregister() while the registration is still
protected by cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex. This removes the previous
find/drop/reacquire raw-pointer window. The release path only removes the
idr entry and frees the stable identity strings.
This preserves the intended one-registration/many-tcon behavior: a
registration id represents a net/share pair, and notify handling acts on a
live representative selected at use time. It also preserves CLIENT_MOVE
ordering for the representative tcon because the old-IP unregister is sent
before cifs_swn_register() sends the new-IP register.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: resolve SWN tcon from live registrations
cifs_swn_notify() looks up a witness registration by id under
cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex, drops the mutex, and then uses the registration's
cached tcon pointer. That pointer is not a lifetime reference, and it is
not a stable representative once cifs_get_swn_reg() lets multiple tcons
for the same net/share name share one registration id.
A same-share second mount can keep the cifs_swn_reg alive after the first
tcon unregisters and is freed. The registration then still points at the
freed first tcon, so taking tc_lock or incrementing tc_count through
swnreg->tcon only moves the use-after-free earlier. Taking tc_lock while
holding cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex also violates the documented CIFS lock
order.
Fix this by making the registration store only the stable witness
identity: id, net name, share name, and notify flags. When a notify
arrives, copy that identity under cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex, drop the mutex,
then find and pin a live witness tcon that currently matches the net/share
pair under the normal cifs_tcp_ses_lock -> tc_lock order. The notification
path uses that pinned tcon directly and drops the reference when done.
Registration and unregister messages now use the live tcon passed by the
caller instead of a cached tcon in the registration. The final unregister
send is folded into cifs_swn_unregister() while the registration is still
protected by cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex. This removes the previous
find/drop/reacquire raw-pointer window. The release path only removes the
idr entry and frees the stable identity strings.
This preserves the intended one-registration/many-tcon behavior: a
registration id represents a net/share pair, and notify handling acts on a
live representative selected at use time. It also preserves CLIENT_MOVE
ordering for the representative tcon because the old-IP unregister is sent
before cifs_swn_register() sends the new-IP register.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64402
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
coresight: ultrasoc-smb: Fix OOB write in smb_sync_perf_buffer()
When the SMB sink is used as a perf AUX sink, smb_update_buffer() calls
smb_sync_perf_buffer() to copy hardware trace data into the perf AUX ring
buffer pages. It derives pg_idx = head >> PAGE_SHIFT from @head, which is
handle->head, and indexes dst_pages[pg_idx]. The pg_idx %= nr_pages
normalization is only applied after the first loop iteration.
This leaves the initial page index underived from the buffer size, which
can result in an out-of-bounds write past dst_pages[] when head exceeds
the AUX buffer size.
Normalize head modulo the AUX buffer size before deriving the page index
and offset, mirroring tmc_etr_sync_perf_buffer().
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
coresight: ultrasoc-smb: Fix OOB write in smb_sync_perf_buffer()
When the SMB sink is used as a perf AUX sink, smb_update_buffer() calls
smb_sync_perf_buffer() to copy hardware trace data into the perf AUX ring
buffer pages. It derives pg_idx = head >> PAGE_SHIFT from @head, which is
handle->head, and indexes dst_pages[pg_idx]. The pg_idx %= nr_pages
normalization is only applied after the first loop iteration.
This leaves the initial page index underived from the buffer size, which
can result in an out-of-bounds write past dst_pages[] when head exceeds
the AUX buffer size.
Normalize head modulo the AUX buffer size before deriving the page index
and offset, mirroring tmc_etr_sync_perf_buffer().
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64403
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value
l2cap_get_conf_opt() derives the option length from the
attacker-controlled opt->len field and immediately dereferences
opt->val (as u8, get_unaligned_le16() or get_unaligned_le32(), or a
raw pointer for the default case) before any caller has confirmed
that opt->len bytes are present in the buffer. The callers
(l2cap_parse_conf_req(), l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() and
l2cap_conf_rfc_get()) only detect a malformed option afterwards, once
the running length has gone negative, by which point the
out-of-bounds read has already executed.
An existing post-hoc length check keeps the garbage value from being
consumed, so this is not a data leak in the current control flow. It
is still a validate-after-use ordering bug: up to 4 bytes are read
past the end of the buffer before it is known to contain them, and it
is fragile to future changes in the callers.
Fix it at the source. Pass the end of the buffer into
l2cap_get_conf_opt() and refuse to touch opt->val unless the full
option (header + value) fits. Each caller computes an end pointer
once before the loop and checks the return value directly instead of
inferring the error from a negative length.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value
l2cap_get_conf_opt() derives the option length from the
attacker-controlled opt->len field and immediately dereferences
opt->val (as u8, get_unaligned_le16() or get_unaligned_le32(), or a
raw pointer for the default case) before any caller has confirmed
that opt->len bytes are present in the buffer. The callers
(l2cap_parse_conf_req(), l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() and
l2cap_conf_rfc_get()) only detect a malformed option afterwards, once
the running length has gone negative, by which point the
out-of-bounds read has already executed.
An existing post-hoc length check keeps the garbage value from being
consumed, so this is not a data leak in the current control flow. It
is still a validate-after-use ordering bug: up to 4 bytes are read
past the end of the buffer before it is known to contain them, and it
is fragile to future changes in the callers.
Fix it at the source. Pass the end of the buffer into
l2cap_get_conf_opt() and refuse to touch opt->val unless the full
option (header + value) fits. Each caller computes an end pointer
once before the loop and checks the return value directly instead of
inferring the error from a negative length.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64404
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: avoid NULL deref of conn in iso_conn_big_sync()
iso_conn_big_sync() drops the socket lock to call hci_get_route() and
then re-acquires it, but dereferences iso_pi(sk)->conn->hcon afterwards
without re-checking that conn is still valid.
While the lock is dropped, the connection can be torn down under the
same socket lock: iso_disconn_cfm() -> iso_conn_del() -> iso_chan_del()
sets iso_pi(sk)->conn to NULL (and the broadcast teardown path can also
clear conn->hcon on its own). When iso_conn_big_sync() re-acquires the
lock and reads conn->hcon, conn may be NULL, causing a NULL pointer
dereference (hcon is the first member of struct iso_conn).
This path is reached from iso_sock_recvmsg() for a PA-sync broadcast
sink socket (BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP | BT_SK_PA_SYNC), so the dropped-lock
window can race with connection teardown driven by controller events.
Re-validate iso_pi(sk)->conn and its hcon after re-acquiring the socket
lock and bail out if the connection went away, as already done in the
sibling iso_sock_rebind_bc().
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: avoid NULL deref of conn in iso_conn_big_sync()
iso_conn_big_sync() drops the socket lock to call hci_get_route() and
then re-acquires it, but dereferences iso_pi(sk)->conn->hcon afterwards
without re-checking that conn is still valid.
While the lock is dropped, the connection can be torn down under the
same socket lock: iso_disconn_cfm() -> iso_conn_del() -> iso_chan_del()
sets iso_pi(sk)->conn to NULL (and the broadcast teardown path can also
clear conn->hcon on its own). When iso_conn_big_sync() re-acquires the
lock and reads conn->hcon, conn may be NULL, causing a NULL pointer
dereference (hcon is the first member of struct iso_conn).
This path is reached from iso_sock_recvmsg() for a PA-sync broadcast
sink socket (BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP | BT_SK_PA_SYNC), so the dropped-lock
window can race with connection teardown driven by controller events.
Re-validate iso_pi(sk)->conn and its hcon after re-acquiring the socket
lock and bail out if the connection went away, as already done in the
sibling iso_sock_rebind_bc().
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-7405
A maliciously crafted TIF file, when parsed through certain Autodesk products during image import, can cause an Out-of-Bounds Read in the image handling library. A malicious actor can leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial of service
🎖@cveNotify
A maliciously crafted TIF file, when parsed through certain Autodesk products during image import, can cause an Out-of-Bounds Read in the image handling library. A malicious actor can leverage this vulnerability to cause a denial of service
🎖@cveNotify
Autodesk
Autodesk Access | Formerly Autodesk Desktop App | Autodesk
Autodesk Access simplifies the update experience. Quickly and easily install updates for your desktop products from the app. Download now for free.
🚨 CVE-2026-7406
A maliciously crafted BMP file, when parsed through certain Autodesk products, can force a Untrusted Pointer Dereference vulnerability. A malicious actor can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current process.
🎖@cveNotify
A maliciously crafted BMP file, when parsed through certain Autodesk products, can force a Untrusted Pointer Dereference vulnerability. A malicious actor can leverage this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current process.
🎖@cveNotify
Autodesk
Autodesk Access | Formerly Autodesk Desktop App | Autodesk
Autodesk Access simplifies the update experience. Quickly and easily install updates for your desktop products from the app. Download now for free.
🚨 CVE-2026-8325
A maliciously crafted PDF file, when parsed through Autodesk Revit, can force an Out-of-Bounds Write vulnerability. A malicious actor may leverage this vulnerability to cause a crash, cause data corruption, or execute arbitrary code in the context of the current process.
🎖@cveNotify
A maliciously crafted PDF file, when parsed through Autodesk Revit, can force an Out-of-Bounds Write vulnerability. A malicious actor may leverage this vulnerability to cause a crash, cause data corruption, or execute arbitrary code in the context of the current process.
🎖@cveNotify
Autodesk
Autodesk Access | Formerly Autodesk Desktop App | Autodesk
Autodesk Access simplifies the update experience. Quickly and easily install updates for your desktop products from the app. Download now for free.
🚨 CVE-2026-12261
A vulnerability in `nltk.downloader` in nltk/nltk versions <= 3.9.4 allows for cross-package resource and model poisoning. The downloader extracts package archives into shared namespaces such as `corpora/` and `taggers/` instead of package-isolated roots, and validates package integrity only after the archive has been written and extracted. This design flaw enables one package to overwrite another package's trusted resources within the same namespace, making the changes immediately active through ordinary NLTK APIs. This issue persists across fresh interpreter restarts and can affect downstream workflows, including machine learning pipelines and reproducibility-sensitive environments.
🎖@cveNotify
A vulnerability in `nltk.downloader` in nltk/nltk versions <= 3.9.4 allows for cross-package resource and model poisoning. The downloader extracts package archives into shared namespaces such as `corpora/` and `taggers/` instead of package-isolated roots, and validates package integrity only after the archive has been written and extracted. This design flaw enables one package to overwrite another package's trusted resources within the same namespace, making the changes immediately active through ordinary NLTK APIs. This issue persists across fresh interpreter restarts and can affect downstream workflows, including machine learning pipelines and reproducibility-sensitive environments.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2024-5971
A vulnerability was found in Undertow, where the chunked response hangs after the body was flushed. The response headers and body were sent but the client would continue waiting as Undertow does not send the expected 0\r\n termination of the chunked response. This results in uncontrolled resource consumption, leaving the server side to a denial of service attack. This happens only with Java 17 TLSv1.3 scenarios.
🎖@cveNotify
A vulnerability was found in Undertow, where the chunked response hangs after the body was flushed. The response headers and body were sent but the client would continue waiting as Undertow does not send the expected 0\r\n termination of the chunked response. This results in uncontrolled resource consumption, leaving the server side to a denial of service attack. This happens only with Java 17 TLSv1.3 scenarios.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2025-1244
A command injection flaw was found in the text editor Emacs. It could allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands on a vulnerable system. Exploitation is possible by tricking users into visiting a specially crafted website or an HTTP URL with a redirect.
🎖@cveNotify
A command injection flaw was found in the text editor Emacs. It could allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands on a vulnerable system. Exploitation is possible by tricking users into visiting a specially crafted website or an HTTP URL with a redirect.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-10840
A flaw was found in the OpenShift Pipelines operator. The tekton-scheduler-rolebinding ClusterRoleBinding grants the system:authenticated group write access to Kueue and cert-manager custom resources via the tekton-scheduler-role ClusterRole. When Kueue or cert-manager CRDs are present on the cluster, any authenticated user can disrupt workload scheduling, tamper with scheduling priorities, delete other tenants' Workload objects, or induce cert-manager to overwrite TLS Secrets including the default ingress controller certificate.
🎖@cveNotify
A flaw was found in the OpenShift Pipelines operator. The tekton-scheduler-rolebinding ClusterRoleBinding grants the system:authenticated group write access to Kueue and cert-manager custom resources via the tekton-scheduler-role ClusterRole. When Kueue or cert-manager CRDs are present on the cluster, any authenticated user can disrupt workload scheduling, tamper with scheduling priorities, delete other tenants' Workload objects, or induce cert-manager to overwrite TLS Secrets including the default ingress controller certificate.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-56152
Incorrect Authorization (CWE-863) in Kibana can lead to unauthorized information disclosure via Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs (CAPEC-1). Under certain conditions, a low-privileged authenticated user can access response action data that they are not authorized to view.
🎖@cveNotify
Incorrect Authorization (CWE-863) in Kibana can lead to unauthorized information disclosure via Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs (CAPEC-1). Under certain conditions, a low-privileged authenticated user can access response action data that they are not authorized to view.
🎖@cveNotify
Discuss the Elastic Stack
Kibana 8.19.13, 9.2.7, 9.3.2 Security Update (ESA-2026-46)
Incorrect Authorization in Kibana Leading to Information Disclosure Incorrect Authorization (CWE-863) in Kibana can lead to unauthorized information disclosure via Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs (CAPEC-1). Under certain conditions…
🚨 CVE-2026-64322
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate sparing table length as an entry count, not a byte count
udf_load_sparable_map() accepts a sparing table when
sizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen) > sb->s_blocksize
is false, i.e. it treats reallocationTableLen as a number of BYTES that
must fit in the block. But the table is walked as an array of 8-byte
sparingEntry elements:
for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen); i++) {
struct sparingEntry *entry = &st->mapEntry[i];
... entry->origLocation ...
}
in udf_get_pblock_spar15() and udf_relocate_blocks(). A
reallocationTableLen of N therefore passes the check whenever
sizeof(*st) + N <= blocksize, yet the consumers index
sizeof(*st) + N * sizeof(struct sparingEntry) bytes -- up to ~8x the
block. On a crafted UDF image this is an out-of-bounds read in
udf_get_pblock_spar15(); udf_relocate_blocks() additionally feeds the
same length to udf_update_tag(), whose crc_itu_t() reads far past the
block, and its memmove() through st->mapEntry[] is an out-of-bounds
write.
Validate reallocationTableLen as the entry count it is, with
struct_size().
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate sparing table length as an entry count, not a byte count
udf_load_sparable_map() accepts a sparing table when
sizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen) > sb->s_blocksize
is false, i.e. it treats reallocationTableLen as a number of BYTES that
must fit in the block. But the table is walked as an array of 8-byte
sparingEntry elements:
for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen); i++) {
struct sparingEntry *entry = &st->mapEntry[i];
... entry->origLocation ...
}
in udf_get_pblock_spar15() and udf_relocate_blocks(). A
reallocationTableLen of N therefore passes the check whenever
sizeof(*st) + N <= blocksize, yet the consumers index
sizeof(*st) + N * sizeof(struct sparingEntry) bytes -- up to ~8x the
block. On a crafted UDF image this is an out-of-bounds read in
udf_get_pblock_spar15(); udf_relocate_blocks() additionally feeds the
same length to udf_update_tag(), whose crc_itu_t() reads far past the
block, and its memmove() through st->mapEntry[] is an out-of-bounds
write.
Validate reallocationTableLen as the entry count it is, with
struct_size().
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64323
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size
udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from
the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode
size:
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset =
le16_to_cpu(vat20->lengthHeader);
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries =
(sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size -
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) >> 2;
lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds
the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge
count, which defeats the "block > s_num_entries" bound in
udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads
((__le32 *)(iinfo->i_data + s_start_offset))[block]
so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data. Mounting
a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an
out-of-bounds read.
Reject a VAT whose header length does not leave room for at least one
entry within the VAT inode.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size
udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from
the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode
size:
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset =
le16_to_cpu(vat20->lengthHeader);
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries =
(sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size -
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) >> 2;
lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds
the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge
count, which defeats the "block > s_num_entries" bound in
udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads
((__le32 *)(iinfo->i_data + s_start_offset))[block]
so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data. Mounting
a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an
out-of-bounds read.
Reject a VAT whose header length does not leave room for at least one
entry within the VAT inode.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64324
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate free block extents against the partition length
udf_free_blocks() checks the logical block number and count against the
partition length, but drops the extent offset from that final bound. A
crafted extent can pass the guard while logicalBlockNum + offset + count
points past the partition, which later indexes past the space bitmap
array.
A single ftruncate(2) on a file backed by such an extent reliably
panics the kernel. This is a local availability issue. On desktop
systems where UDisks/polkit allows the active user to mount removable
UDF media without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, an unprivileged local user can supply
the crafted filesystem and trigger the panic by truncating a writable
file on it. Systems that require root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount the
image have a higher prerequisite.
No confidentiality or integrity impact is claimed: the reproduced
primitive is an out-of-bounds read of a bitmap pointer slot followed by
a kernel panic.
Use the already computed logicalBlockNum + offset + count value for the
partition length check. Also make load_block_bitmap() reject an
out-of-range block group before indexing s_block_bitmap[], so corrupted
callers cannot walk past the flexible array.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate free block extents against the partition length
udf_free_blocks() checks the logical block number and count against the
partition length, but drops the extent offset from that final bound. A
crafted extent can pass the guard while logicalBlockNum + offset + count
points past the partition, which later indexes past the space bitmap
array.
A single ftruncate(2) on a file backed by such an extent reliably
panics the kernel. This is a local availability issue. On desktop
systems where UDisks/polkit allows the active user to mount removable
UDF media without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, an unprivileged local user can supply
the crafted filesystem and trigger the panic by truncating a writable
file on it. Systems that require root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount the
image have a higher prerequisite.
No confidentiality or integrity impact is claimed: the reproduced
primitive is an out-of-bounds read of a bitmap pointer slot followed by
a kernel panic.
Use the already computed logicalBlockNum + offset + count value for the
partition length check. Also make load_block_bitmap() reject an
out-of-range block group before indexing s_block_bitmap[], so corrupted
callers cannot walk past the flexible array.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64325
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7921/mt7925: fix NULL dereference in CSA beacon
This patch is based on a BUG as reported by Bongani Hlope at
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260502125824.425d7159@bongani-mini.home.org.za/
When a channel-switch announcement (CSA) beacon is received,
cfg80211 queues a wiphy work item that eventually calls
mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon(). If the station disconnects
(or the channel context is otherwise torn down) between the
time the work is queued and the time it runs, the driver's
dev->new_ctx pointer can already have been cleared to NULL.
mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon() then dereferences new_ctx
unconditionally, triggering a NULL pointer dereference at
address 0x0:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
RIP: 0010:mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon+0x1f/0x100 [mt7921_common]
The same missing guard exists in mt7925_channel_switch_rx_beacon(),
which shares the same code pattern introduced by the same commit.
Add an early-return NULL check for dev->new_ctx in both
mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon() and
mt7925_channel_switch_rx_beacon(). When new_ctx is NULL there is
no pending channel switch to process, so returning immediately is
the correct and safe action.
Oops-Analysis: http://oops.fenrus.org/reports/lkml/20260502125824.425d7159@bongani-mini.home.org.za/report.html
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7921/mt7925: fix NULL dereference in CSA beacon
This patch is based on a BUG as reported by Bongani Hlope at
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260502125824.425d7159@bongani-mini.home.org.za/
When a channel-switch announcement (CSA) beacon is received,
cfg80211 queues a wiphy work item that eventually calls
mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon(). If the station disconnects
(or the channel context is otherwise torn down) between the
time the work is queued and the time it runs, the driver's
dev->new_ctx pointer can already have been cleared to NULL.
mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon() then dereferences new_ctx
unconditionally, triggering a NULL pointer dereference at
address 0x0:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
RIP: 0010:mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon+0x1f/0x100 [mt7921_common]
The same missing guard exists in mt7925_channel_switch_rx_beacon(),
which shares the same code pattern introduced by the same commit.
Add an early-return NULL check for dev->new_ctx in both
mt7921_channel_switch_rx_beacon() and
mt7925_channel_switch_rx_beacon(). When new_ctx is NULL there is
no pending channel switch to process, so returning immediately is
the correct and safe action.
Oops-Analysis: http://oops.fenrus.org/reports/lkml/20260502125824.425d7159@bongani-mini.home.org.za/report.html
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64326
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: skip sync_blockdev() on surprise removal in bdev_mark_dead()
bdev_mark_dead()'s @surprise == true means the device is already gone.
The filesystem callback fs_bdev_mark_dead() honours this and skips
sync_filesystem(), but the bare block device path (no ->mark_dead op)
lost its !surprise guard when the holder ->mark_dead callback was wired
up (see Fixes), and now calls sync_blockdev() unconditionally, which can
hang forever waiting on writeback that can no longer complete.
syzkaller hit this via nvme_reset_work()'s "I/O queues lost" path:
nvme_mark_namespaces_dead() -> blk_mark_disk_dead() ->
bdev_mark_dead(bdev, true) -> sync_blockdev() blocks in
folio_wait_writeback(), wedging the reset worker and every task waiting
on it.
Skip the sync on surprise removal, matching fs_bdev_mark_dead();
invalidate_bdev() still runs. Orderly removal (surprise == false) is
unchanged.
Found by FuzzNvme(Syzkaller with FEMU fuzzing framework).
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: skip sync_blockdev() on surprise removal in bdev_mark_dead()
bdev_mark_dead()'s @surprise == true means the device is already gone.
The filesystem callback fs_bdev_mark_dead() honours this and skips
sync_filesystem(), but the bare block device path (no ->mark_dead op)
lost its !surprise guard when the holder ->mark_dead callback was wired
up (see Fixes), and now calls sync_blockdev() unconditionally, which can
hang forever waiting on writeback that can no longer complete.
syzkaller hit this via nvme_reset_work()'s "I/O queues lost" path:
nvme_mark_namespaces_dead() -> blk_mark_disk_dead() ->
bdev_mark_dead(bdev, true) -> sync_blockdev() blocks in
folio_wait_writeback(), wedging the reset worker and every task waiting
on it.
Skip the sync on surprise removal, matching fs_bdev_mark_dead();
invalidate_bdev() still runs. Orderly removal (surprise == false) is
unchanged.
Found by FuzzNvme(Syzkaller with FEMU fuzzing framework).
🎖@cveNotify