🚨 CVE-2026-84394
fast-uri accepts a host that contains an unbalanced or misplaced authority bracket without reporting an error. A host that starts with an opening bracket but does not end with a closing bracket is neither validated as an IP literal nor canonicalized as a domain name, so parse() returns it as the host with error undefined, while Node's URL and the HTTP clients built on it resolve the same string to a different host. An application that reads the parsed host to make a host decision, such as an SSRF denylist, a redirect allowlist, or proxy routing, and then passes the original URL to an HTTP client evaluates its policy against a string that is not the host the request reaches. The same host is carried through normalize, equal, and resolve. This affects fast-uri versions 2.4.5, 3.1.6, and 4.1.3, and is fixed in 2.4.6, 3.1.7, and 4.1.4, where parse() reports a malformed host for any host that contains a bracket but is not a valid IPv6 literal.

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🚨 CVE-2026-84851
An uncontrolled recursion issue exists in Amazon Ion-C versions before 1.1.6 that might allow a remote unauthenticated actor to craft Ion data that exhausts the native call stack and crashes the application using the library, resulting in a denial of service.

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🚨 CVE-2026-84885
A vulnerability has been found in simular-ai Agent-S 0.3.1/0.3.2. This impacts an unknown function of the file code_agent.py of the component CodeAgent. Such manipulation leads to denial of service. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

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🚨 CVE-2026-84886
A vulnerability was determined in simular-ai Agent-S up to 0.3.2. Affected by this vulnerability is the function ImageData of the file gui_agents/s1/utils/ocr_server.py of the component OCR HTTP API. Executing a manipulation of the argument img_bytes can lead to resource consumption. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

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🚨 CVE-2026-84887
A vulnerability was identified in simular-ai Agent-S up to 0.3.2. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the file grounding.py of the component Model-generated GUI Action Execution Workflow. The manipulation leads to denial of service. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

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🚨 CVE-2026-84888
A weakness has been identified in RightNow-AI OpenFang up to 0.6.9. This vulnerability affects the function shell_exec of the file crates/openfang-runtime/src/tool_runner.rs. This manipulation causes uncontrolled memory allocation. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

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🚨 CVE-2026-64083
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) reject short block-read responses in the GPIO accessors

adm1266_gpio_get() and adm1266_gpio_get_multiple() both compose the
pin-status word as

pins_status = read_buf[0] + (read_buf[1] << 8);

right after i2c_smbus_read_block_data(), guarding only against an
error return. A well-behaved device returns 2 bytes for
GPIO_STATUS/PDIO_STATUS, but the helper happily reports a 0- or
1-byte response too. If the device returns 0 bytes, both read_buf
slots are uninitialized stack memory; if it returns 1 byte, read_buf[1]
is.

The composed value then flows through set_bit() into the caller's
*bits in adm1266_gpio_get_multiple(), or into the return value of
adm1266_gpio_get(), and ends up in userspace via gpiolib (sysfs and
the char-dev ioctls). That leaks a few bits of kernel stack per
request on any device whose firmware glitch, bus error, or hostile
slave produces a short block-read response.

Add the missing length check to both call sites and surface a short
response as -EIO.

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🚨 CVE-2026-64084
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) cap PDIO scan in get_multiple at ADM1266_PDIO_NR

adm1266_gpio_get_multiple() iterates the PDIO portion of the
caller-supplied mask using

for_each_set_bit_from(gpio_nr, mask,
ADM1266_GPIO_NR + ADM1266_PDIO_STATUS) {
...
}

where ADM1266_PDIO_STATUS is the PMBus command code (0xE9, i.e. 233),
not the number of PDIO pins. The intended upper bound is
ADM1266_GPIO_NR + ADM1266_PDIO_NR = 25.

gpiolib hands in a mask sized for gc.ngpio (= 25 bits on this chip),
so the iteration walks find_next_bit() up to 242, reading up to 217
extra bits (a handful of unsigned-long words: four on 64-bit, seven
on 32-bit) of whatever lives past the end of the mask in the
caller's stack. Any incidental set bit in that range then drives a
set_bit(gpio_nr, bits) call that writes past the end of the
caller-supplied bits array too -- both out-of-bounds.

Substitute ADM1266_PDIO_NR for the constant so the scan stops at the
last real PDIO bit.

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🚨 CVE-2026-64085
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) bounce blackbox records through a protocol-sized buffer

adm1266_pmbus_block_xfer() copies the device-supplied block payload
into the caller-provided buffer using the device-supplied length:

memcpy(data_r, &msgs[1].buf[1], msgs[1].buf[0]);

The helper does not know how large data_r is and trusts the device to
return at most one record's worth of bytes. adm1266_nvmem_read_blackbox()
violates that contract: it advances read_buff inside data->dev_mem in
ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE (64-byte) strides while the helper is willing to
write up to ADM1266_PMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (255) bytes. A device that returns
more than 64 bytes on the trailing record (read_buff offset 1984 in
the 2048-byte dev_mem allocation) overflows dev_mem by up to 191 bytes
before the post-call

if (ret != ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE)
return -EIO;

can reject the response.

Contain the fix in the caller without changing the helper signature:
read each record into a 255-byte local bounce buffer that matches the
helper's maximum output, validate the returned length, and only then
copy exactly ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE bytes into the dev_mem slot.

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🚨 CVE-2026-84145
Internally found bugs present in Thunderbird 154, Thunderbird ESR 153.1 and Thunderbird ESR 140.14. Some of these bugs showed evidence of memory corruption or another security-relevant defect and we presume that with enough effort some of these could have been exploited. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 155, Firefox ESR 115.40, Firefox ESR 140.15, Firefox ESR 153.2, Thunderbird 155, Thunderbird 140.15, and Thunderbird 153.2.

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🚨 CVE-2025-29923
go-redis is the official Redis client library for the Go programming language. Prior to 9.5.5, 9.6.3, and 9.7.2, go-redis potentially responds out of order when `CLIENT SETINFO` times out during connection establishment. This can happen when the client is configured to transmit its identity, there are network connectivity issues, or the client was configured with aggressive timeouts. The problem occurs for multiple use cases. For sticky connections, you receive persistent out-of-order responses for the lifetime of the connection. All commands in the pipeline receive incorrect responses. When used with the default ConnPool once a connection is returned after use with ConnPool#Put the read buffer will be checked and the connection will be marked as bad due to the unread data. This means that at most one out-of-order response before the connection is discarded. This issue is fixed in 9.5.5, 9.6.3, and 9.7.2; however, 9.7.2 has been yanked and 9.7.3 is the lowest available patched version on the 9.7.x branch. As a workaround, set the flag `DisableIndentity` to `true` when constructing the client instance.

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🚨 CVE-2025-11234
A flaw was found in QEMU. If the QIOChannelWebsock object is freed while it is waiting to complete a handshake, a GSource is leaked. This can lead to the callback firing later on and triggering a use-after-free in the use of the channel. This can be abused by a malicious client with network access to the VNC WebSocket port to cause a denial of service during the WebSocket handshake prior to the VNC client authentication.

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🚨 CVE-2026-23111
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nf_tables: fix inverted genmask check in nft_map_catchall_activate()

nft_map_catchall_activate() has an inverted element activity check
compared to its non-catchall counterpart nft_mapelem_activate() and
compared to what is logically required.

nft_map_catchall_activate() is called from the abort path to re-activate
catchall map elements that were deactivated during a failed transaction.
It should skip elements that are already active (they don't need
re-activation) and process elements that are inactive (they need to be
restored). Instead, the current code does the opposite: it skips inactive
elements and processes active ones.

Compare the non-catchall activate callback, which is correct:

nft_mapelem_activate():
if (nft_set_elem_active(ext, iter->genmask))
return 0; /* skip active, process inactive */

With the buggy catchall version:

nft_map_catchall_activate():
if (!nft_set_elem_active(ext, genmask))
continue; /* skip inactive, process active */

The consequence is that when a DELSET operation is aborted,
nft_setelem_data_activate() is never called for the catchall element.
For NFT_GOTO verdict elements, this means nft_data_hold() is never
called to restore the chain->use reference count. Each abort cycle
permanently decrements chain->use. Once chain->use reaches zero,
DELCHAIN succeeds and frees the chain while catchall verdict elements
still reference it, resulting in a use-after-free.

This is exploitable for local privilege escalation from an unprivileged
user via user namespaces + nftables on distributions that enable
CONFIG_USER_NS and CONFIG_NF_TABLES.

Fix by removing the negation so the check matches nft_mapelem_activate():
skip active elements, process inactive ones.

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🚨 CVE-2026-25679
url.Parse insufficiently validated the host/authority component and accepted some invalid URLs.

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🚨 CVE-2026-1526
The undici WebSocket client is vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack via unbounded memory consumption during permessage-deflate decompression. When a WebSocket connection negotiates the permessage-deflate extension, the client decompresses incoming compressed frames without enforcing any limit on the decompressed data size. A malicious WebSocket server can send a small compressed frame (a "decompression bomb") that expands to an extremely large size in memory, causing the Node.js process to exhaust available memory and crash or become unresponsive.

The vulnerability exists in the PerMessageDeflate.decompress() method, which accumulates all decompressed chunks in memory and concatenates them into a single Buffer without checking whether the total size exceeds a safe threshold.

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🚨 CVE-2026-1528
ImpactA server can reply with a WebSocket frame using the 64-bit length form and an extremely large length. undici's ByteParser overflows internal math, ends up in an invalid state, and throws a fatal TypeError that terminates the process.

Patches

Patched in the undici version v7.24.0 and v6.24.0. Users should upgrade to this version or later.

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🚨 CVE-2026-2229
ImpactThe undici WebSocket client is vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack due to improper validation of the server_max_window_bits parameter in the permessage-deflate extension. When a WebSocket client connects to a server, it automatically advertises support for permessage-deflate compression. A malicious server can respond with an out-of-range server_max_window_bits value (outside zlib's valid range of 8-15). When the server subsequently sends a compressed frame, the client attempts to create a zlib InflateRaw instance with the invalid windowBits value, causing a synchronous RangeError exception that is not caught, resulting in immediate process termination.

The vulnerability exists because:

* The isValidClientWindowBits() function only validates that the value contains ASCII digits, not that it falls within the valid range 8-15
* The createInflateRaw() call is not wrapped in a try-catch block
* The resulting exception propagates up through the call stack and crashes the Node.js process

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🚨 CVE-2026-33186
gRPC-Go is the Go language implementation of gRPC. Versions prior to 1.79.3 have an authorization bypass resulting from improper input validation of the HTTP/2 `:path` pseudo-header. The gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting requests where the `:path` omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g., `Service/Method` instead of `/Service/Method`). While the server successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization interceptors (including the official `grpc/authz` package) evaluated the raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, "deny" rules defined using canonical paths (starting with `/`) failed to match the incoming request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback "allow" rule was present. This affects gRPC-Go servers that use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official RBAC implementation in `google.golang.org/grpc/authz` or custom interceptors relying on `info.FullMethod` or `grpc.Method(ctx)`; AND that have a security policy contains specific "deny" rules for canonical paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback "allow" rule). The vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames with malformed `:path` headers directly to the gRPC server. The fix in version 1.79.3 ensures that any request with a `:path` that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected with a `codes.Unimplemented` error, preventing it from reaching authorization interceptors or handlers with a non-canonical path string. While upgrading is the most secure and recommended path, users can mitigate the vulnerability using one of the following methods: Use a validating interceptor (recommended mitigation); infrastructure-level normalization; and/or policy hardening.

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🚨 CVE-2026-4800
Impact:

The fix for CVE-2021-23337 (https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-35jh-r3h4-6jhm) added validation for the variable option in _.template but did not apply the same validation to options.imports key names. Both paths flow into the same Function() constructor sink.

When an application passes untrusted input as options.imports key names, an attacker can inject default-parameter expressions that execute arbitrary code at template compilation time.

Additionally, _.template uses assignInWith to merge imports, which enumerates inherited properties via for..in. If Object.prototype has been polluted by any other vector, the polluted keys are copied into the imports object and passed to Function().

Patches:

Users should upgrade to version 4.18.0.

Workarounds:

Do not pass untrusted input as key names in options.imports. Only use developer-controlled, static key names.

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🚨 CVE-2026-34982
Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0276, a modeline sandbox bypass in Vim allows arbitrary OS command execution when a user opens a crafted file. The `complete`, `guitabtooltip` and `printheader` options are missing the `P_MLE` flag, allowing a modeline to be executed. Additionally, the `mapset()` function lacks a `check_secure()` call, allowing it to be abused from sandboxed expressions. Commit 9.2.0276 fixes the issue.

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🚨 CVE-2026-34986
Go JOSE provides an implementation of the Javascript Object Signing and Encryption set of standards in Go, including support for JSON Web Encryption (JWE), JSON Web Signature (JWS), and JSON Web Token (JWT) standards. Prior to 4.1.4 and 3.0.5, decrypting a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) object will panic if the alg field indicates a key wrapping algorithm (one ending in KW, with the exception of A128GCMKW, A192GCMKW, and A256GCMKW) and the encrypted_key field is empty. The panic happens when cipher.KeyUnwrap() in key_wrap.go attempts to allocate a slice with a zero or negative length based on the length of the encrypted_key. This code path is reachable from ParseEncrypted() / ParseEncryptedJSON() / ParseEncryptedCompact() followed by Decrypt() on the resulting object. Note that the parse functions take a list of accepted key algorithms. If the accepted key algorithms do not include any key wrapping algorithms, parsing will fail and the application will be unaffected. This panic is also reachable by calling cipher.KeyUnwrap() directly with any ciphertext parameter less than 16 bytes long, but calling this function directly is less common. Panics can lead to denial of service. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.1.4 and 3.0.5.

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