🚨 CVE-2026-58441
SSRF in restore-repo via unsanitized pull_request.yml Head.CloneURL

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🚨 CVE-2026-58442
Repository migration SSRF via multi-answer DNS allow-list bypass

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🚨 CVE-2026-58443
Public-only repository tokens can update private PR head branches

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🚨 CVE-2026-58444
Personal access token scope enforcement bypass on the repository home page (`GET /{owner}/{repo}`) discloses private repository contents

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🚨 CVE-2026-58445
Cross-repository label-ID enumeration oracle via unscoped DeleteIssueLabel API

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🚨 CVE-2026-58507
Private Repository Existence Disclosure via go-get Meta Endpoint

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🚨 CVE-2026-58508
Two SSRF vulnerabilities in Gitea migration/mirror (DNS rebinding + missing re-validation)

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🚨 CVE-2026-58510
GHSA-8fwc-qjw5-rvgp ClearRepoWatches fix not applied to API EditRepo path — sister code path retains stale watches on public->private

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🚨 CVE-2026-58511
Webhook Authorization Header Returned in Plaintext via API

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🚨 CVE-2026-59763
Unbounded Arch package file metadata can cause resource amplification in Gitea package uploads

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🚨 CVE-2026-59765
SSRF via Migration Asset Downloads Bypasses hostmatcher — Reads Internal Files and Cloud Metadata

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🚨 CVE-2026-12236
The Bluetooth host GATT client function parse_read_std_char_desc() in subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c parses an ATT Read By Type Response received from a remote GATT server during BT_GATT_DISCOVER_STD_CHAR_DESC discovery. The per-entry stride rsp->len is taken directly from the peer's PDU, and the parse loop both tests its exit condition (length >= rsp->len) and advances (length -= rsp->len, pdu += rsp->len) using that value. The minimum value of rsp->len was never validated before the loop.

A malicious or malfunctioning peer can reply with rsp->len = 0. Because length is unsigned and never decreases, the loop condition stays true forever and the read pointer never advances; as long as the body is at least a few bytes with a non-zero handle and a matching descriptor UUID, the host repeatedly re-parses the same bytes and invokes the discovery callback, never terminating. This hangs the Bluetooth host processing thread (CWE-835, loop with unreachable exit condition).

The condition is reachable by any connected peer once the local device initiates standard-descriptor-value discovery; GATT discovery does not require bonding or encryption, so an unauthenticated adjacent attacker that the device connects to can trigger it. The impact is denial of service of the Bluetooth subsystem (and likely a watchdog reset on constrained targets); there is no memory disclosure or corruption.

The fix adds a rsp->len < sizeof(struct bt_att_data) check before the loop, rejecting under-length responses so the stride is always non-zero and the loop terminates. The sibling parsers parse_include() and parse_characteristic() already validated rsp->len and are unaffected.

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🚨 CVE-2026-73669
The Signify Philips Hue Bridge Pro firmware embeds a Mosquitto MQTT broker service that listens on all network interfaces without authentication. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the MQTT service on a vulnerable system can read data and control connected lights. Fixed in 1.77.2071318010.

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🚨 CVE-2026-72810
SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 contain a publish-boundary bypass vulnerability in WebSocket broadcast sessions that allows anonymous readers to receive unfiltered edits. Attackers can establish a WebSocket connection to the publish surface and passively receive real-time content events including password-protected and forbidden documents without authentication.

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🚨 CVE-2026-72811
SiYuan versions <= v3.7.2 contain a SQL injection vulnerability in the backlink/mention search query (kernel/model/backlink.go), which concatenates stored block metadata (title, name, alias, anchor text) and the client-supplied keyword into a SQL MATCH/search statement while escaping only the double-quote character and not the single quote. A single quote in the client keyword (first-order, reachable by an anonymous or RoleReader user on the publish surface) or in stored document metadata (second-order) breaks out of the string literal. Because the query runs on the main read-write siyuan.db handle via a statement-stacking-capable driver, an attacker can execute arbitrary SQL, enabling cross-notebook read and write. Fixed in v3.7.4.

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🚨 CVE-2026-72812
SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 contain a missing authorization vulnerability in the /api/ref/refreshBacklink endpoint that allows anonymous readers to trigger persistent server-side writes. Attackers can invoke the endpoint with an attacker-controlled block ID to flush transaction queues, scan all references globally, and enqueue database writes, bypassing read-only protections and enabling resource amplification attacks.

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🚨 CVE-2026-73048
SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in the getRefIDsByFileAnnotationID endpoint that returns block identifiers citing PDF annotations without publish-access filtering. Attackers can extract block identifiers from restricted documents by supplying annotation identifiers visible in published pages, revealing citation relationships across forbidden and password-protected tiers.

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🚨 CVE-2026-73049
SiYuan versions before v3.7.4 contain an information disclosure vulnerability in the getAttributeViewBacklinks endpoint that consults the forbidden access list instead of the visibility list when filtering backlinks. Anonymous readers can supply a publicly visible database row identifier to discover hidden-tier documents that reference it, receiving the database name, row title, and document path of hidden documents.

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🚨 CVE-2026-73630
SiYuan before v3.7.4 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the /api/filetree/authFilePublishAccess endpoint, which is registered with CheckAuth only and is reachable anonymously. The endpoint never sets a failure code, so its outcome is signalled entirely by the response message and by the presence of a Set-Cookie header, and these signals differ across access tiers. By submitting requests with an empty password for a candidate document identifier, an anonymous attacker can distinguish whether a document is public/nonexistent, password-protected, or exists at the hidden or forbidden tier, thereby confirming the existence of documents they are not permitted to access. Because hidden and forbidden entries store an empty password, such requests also cause the server to issue a publish-auth cookie for forbidden documents.

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🚨 CVE-2026-13002
A flow has been identified into dnssec.c library, causing an infinite loop to dnsmasq service. An attacker who controls any DNSSEC-signed zone can hang the dnsmasq process with a single crafted response, killing all DNS resolution for its clients.

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🚨 CVE-2026-12363
The LoRaWAN Fragmented Data Block Transport service (subsys/lorawan/services/frag_transport.c) does not validate the fragment counter in a received DATA_FRAGMENT command before forwarding it to the configured decoder. In frag_transport_package_callback() the value frag_counter = hdr->frag_index_n & 0x3FFF is taken directly from the downlink payload and passed to the decoder, which derives an array index and flash offset as frag_counter - 1. DataFragment fragments are 1-indexed, so a frag_counter of 0 underflows that arithmetic.

With the default Semtech/LoRaMAC-node decoder, this reaches FragDecoder.FragNbMissingIndex[fragCounter - 1] = 0; in FragDecoderProcess(), where fragCounter - 1 evaluates to -1 and writes a uint16_t zero out of bounds, just before the array and into the adjacent MatrixM2B recovery-matrix state of the static decoder object (CWE-787). A companion write derives a wild flash offset, but that path is rejected by the flash_area_write() bounds check. The in-tree low-memory decoder (frag_dec()) is not corrupted: its out-of-range bit-array and flash accesses are caught by sys_bitarray_ and flash_area_ bounds checks.

The handler is the registered downlink callback for the fragmentation transport port, reachable whenever an active fragmentation session exists, so the triggering byte is attacker-influenceable LoRaWAN/FUOTA network input. Triggering it requires authenticated downlinks (LoRaWAN MAC session keys or a malicious/compromised network or FUOTA server) and an active fragmentation session. The impact is contained: corruption of decoder state and denial of the firmware-update (FUOTA) session rather than controllable memory corruption or code execution. The fix adds a transport-layer check that rejects frag_counter == 0, closing the defect for both decoder backends.

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