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๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-72888
Net::OAuth versions before 0.32 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via unbounded caching of failed module loads in smart_require.

smart_require stores results in a process-global hash with no bound and no eviction, and keeps an entry for every class name it is asked about, including names that failed to load, because the return value of the failed eval is stored before the error is checked. The key comes off the wire on the server side: _signature_method_class builds the class name from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message, and verify resolves it before any signature is checked.

A remote client chooses both how many entries are created and how long each key is. In a persistent server the hash grows for the life of the worker process until it exhausts memory. Header size limits bound the key length on the Authorization header path, but not on a POST body.

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๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-73058
stoatchat versions before 0.15.0 fail to block the IPv6 unspecified address (::) in the SSRF blocklist, allowing unauthenticated attackers to bypass protections via the /proxy and /embed endpoints. Attackers can craft requests using IPv6 literal syntax to access services on the loopback interface and retrieve sensitive internal content.

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๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74788
Scriban before 7.0.0 (affected versions <= 6.6.0) contains an uncontrolled memory allocation vulnerability in the string.pad_left and string.pad_right template functions, which perform no validation on the width parameter before delegating to .NET's String.PadLeft/PadRight. When an application exposes Scriban to untrusted template input, an attacker can supply an arbitrarily large width value (e.g., 500,000,000) to trigger ~1GB memory allocations in a single call, resulting in OutOfMemoryException and denial of service. The TemplateContext.LimitToString limit does not prevent this because it is only enforced after the string has been fully allocated.

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๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74794
Scriban before 6.6.0 contains an infinite recursion vulnerability in object rendering when the ObjectRecursionLimit property defaults to unlimited. Attackers can supply circular reference objects to the template context, exhausting stack space and triggering an uncatchable StackOverflowException that terminates the hosting process.

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๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-19956
A vulnerability has been found in gomarble-ai facebook-ads-mcp-server 0.1.0. The impacted element is the function fetch_pagination_url of the file server.py. Such manipulation leads to server-side request forgery. The attack can be launched remotely. The name of the patch is 4e53875aa22e8991c2fa4a7660d86e1caba66659. Applying a patch is advised to resolve this issue.

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๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-64868
New API is a large language mode (LLM) gateway and artificial intelligence (AI) asset management system. Prior to 1.0.0-rc.11, POST /api/stripe/webhook, POST /api/creem/webhook, and POST /api/waffo/webhook read and log full request bodies before signature validation in router/api-router.go and the payment controllers, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to cause memory pressure, container restarts, or disk exhaustion without forging a successful payment. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.0-rc.11.

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๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-73646
PostCSS takes a CSS file and provides an API to analyze and modify its rules by transforming the rules into an Abstract Syntax Tree. Prior to 8.5.18, lib/previous-map.js loadMap() passes attacker-controlled sourceMappingURL values to join(dirname(opts.from), annotation), and loadFile() permits traversed or absolute .map paths, allowing untrusted CSS processed without map: false to disclose sourcesContent from arbitrary reachable .map files through result.map. This issue is fixed in version 8.5.18.

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๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-75044
In JetBrains YouTrack before 2025.3.156085,
2026.1.13914,
2026.2.18095 missing authorisation allowed an authenticated user to delete arbitrary entities via the mailbox endpoint

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๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-75049
In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.1.13903,
2026.2.17950 an authenticated user could read restricted articles from other projects via the draft creation endpoint

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๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-12519
The WNC-M14A2A LTE-M modem driver mishandles unsolicited %NOTIFYEV: events in on_cmd_socknotifyev() (drivers/modem/vendor_standalone/wncm14a2a.c). The response line is linearized into a fixed 40-byte stack buffer via net_buf_linearize(), which caps the copy at 39 bytes and returns out_len <= 39. The two quote-delimiter scanning loops, however, were bounded by len โ€” the full CR/LF-delimited frame length returned by net_buf_findcrlf() โ€” rather than by out_len.

When a %NOTIFYEV: line longer than 39 bytes contains no " within the linearized region, the loop indices p1/p2 walk past value[39] and read adjacent stack memory until a stray quote byte is found or the index reaches len. The over-read string is then passed to strncmp()/atoi()/LOG_*, and if a quote byte is found out of bounds the subsequent value[p2] = '\0' performs a single-NUL out-of-bounds stack write at an attacker-influenced offset.

The %NOTIFYEV: payload carries network-derived content (LTIME network time, SIB1 base-station system information, CSPS/RRCSTATE), so a rogue cellular base station, a malicious or compromised modem module, or RF manipulation that induces an over-long notify line reaches the defect without any application interaction; the handler runs automatically on the unsolicited event in the modem RX thread.

The impact is out-of-bounds stack disclosure (into logs and parsing) and stack corruption that can crash the modem RX thread (denial of service). The write offset is only weakly controlled, so memory-safe code execution is not demonstrated. The fix bounds both scanning loops by out_len, keeping all accesses within the linearized buffer.

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๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-12629
The ARM PL011 UART driver in drivers/serial/uart_pl011.c fails to acknowledge receive error interrupts. On the PL011, the framing, parity, break, and overrun error interrupts (PL011_IMSC_ERROR_MASK) are cleared only by writing the interrupt-clear register UARTICR; reading the data register clears the RX interrupt and the per-byte RSR status but not the error interrupt status in MIS. The interrupt service routine pl011_isr() acknowledged only the CTS modem-status interrupt and never wrote icr for the error bits, so an asserted error interrupt remains pending after the ISR returns.

When an application enables error-interrupt reporting via the public uart_irq_err_enable() API, an attacker who controls the serial peer can deterministically assert these error bits by injecting line errors on the RX line โ€” a baud/stop-bit mismatch or mid-character break (framing/break error), a flipped parity bit (parity error), or FIFO flooding (overrun error). Because the error interrupt is never cleared, the interrupt line stays asserted and the CPU re-enters pl011_isr() immediately and indefinitely, producing an interrupt-storm livelock from which the core makes no forward progress.

The impact is an availability-only denial of service (permanent hang), reachable from an external or removable UART peer. Exploitation is gated by configuration: the error interrupt is off by default and no in-tree subsystem enables it, so only applications that explicitly call uart_irq_err_enable() on a PL011-based, interrupt-driven port are affected. The fix makes pl011_isr() acknowledge the pending error bits via uart->icr, breaking the loop, and additionally clears the latched RSR status in pl011_err_check().

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๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-12630
Zephyr's 6LoWPAN IP Header Compression (IPHC) uncompression code contains an out-of-bounds read in get_ihpc_inlined_size() (subsys/net/ip/6lo.c). The destination inline size is looked up in da_inline_size_table, which has 13 entries, using an index built from the M, DAC and DAM bits of the received IPHC dispatch word (iphc & NET_6LO_IPHC_DA_MASK, a 4-bit value of 0-15). The reserved combinations 13, 14 and 15 are not bounds-checked and read past the end of the table.

The iphc word is taken directly from the received frame, and get_ihpc_inlined_size() is reached on every inbound 6LoWPAN frame via net_6lo_uncompress() from the 802.15.4 receive path (subsys/net/l2/ieee802154/ieee802154_6lo.c and ieee802154_6lo_fragment.c). An unauthenticated attacker on the radio/adjacent link can therefore craft a frame whose destination addressing-mode nibble selects an out-of-range index, with no privileges or user interaction.

The out-of-bounds value becomes the computed inline_size, which then drives header reconstruction before the buffer-length check: it is used to dereference *(pkt->buffer->data + sizeof(iphc) + inline_size) and to compute a size_t diff that can underflow, leading to a further out-of-bounds read of the packet buffer and malformed uncompression. The practical impact is a radio-triggerable out-of-bounds read / denial-of-service on the receiver; the leaked byte is not returned to the attacker. The fix rejects any destination index beyond the table, aborting processing of the malformed frame.

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