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๐Ÿšจ CVE-2022-4993
HTML::FormHandler versions through 0.40068 for Perl allow attacker selected method dispatch and resource exhaustion because _apply_actions and add_error use error message text built from request data as a Locale::Maketext bracket notation template.

add_error hands its first argument to the language handle as the Locale::Maketext message key, and the default handle's lexicon sets `_AUTO`, so a string that is not a lexicon entry is compiled as a bracket notation template instead of being looked up. In a bracket group the first token names a method called on the language handle and the remaining tokens are its arguments.

Three kinds of text the library did not author reach that position. _apply_actions installs a `$SIG{__WARN__}` handler that stores the warning text in `$error_message`, and a captured warning survives a successful action, so a field carrying a numeric transform turns `Argument "[sprintf,%50000000d,0]" isn't numeric` into the template; a warning quotes the submitted value verbatim, so the group is well formed and dispatches. `$error_message ||= $tobj->validate($new_value)` takes a type constraint's own failure message, which renders the rejected value through a partial dumper in bracket and comma form (Devel::PartialDump when Moose can load it, Type::Tiny's own dumper always), so a field with `apply => [ Str ]` given a parameter sent more than once, which arrives as an array, gets `Reference ["a","b"] did not pass type constraint "Str"` as its template, from a request that carries no bracket character of its own. A coercion or transform exception reaches it the same way. Beyond those, a validator whose message contains the field value puts that value in the template directly, and add_error replaces the message list with the contents of an arrayref first argument (`@message = @{$message[0]} if ref $message[0] eq 'ARRAY'`), so a value arriving as an array fills the argument slots from the same request as well.

A malformed group such as `[0]` makes the compile croak, and HTML::FormHandler::I18N::maketext and add_error each re-raise that as a die, so process() throws. A well formed group naming sprintf reaches CORE::sprintf with an attacker chosen field width. Any caller that applies a type constraint or a transform to an untrusted field, or whose validator passes an untrusted field value to add_error, can be made to throw an unhandled exception out of process(), or to allocate an arbitrary amount of memory in one request, and an application whose language handle subclass defines side effecting public methods makes those callable with attacker chosen arguments. The dumped type constraint message is bounded to the exception, because both dumpers quote non-numeric elements so the method slot is never an attacker chosen name. The built-in messages pass fixed templates with the value in an argument slot, where it stays inert, and the built-in field types attach explicit message callbacks, so neither is affected.

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-19894
A security flaw has been discovered in itsourcecode Hospital Management System 1.0. Affected is an unknown function of the file /viewmedicine.php. Performing a manipulation of the argument delid results in sql injection. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks.

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-73193
DBI versions before 1.652 for Perl allow a heap out-of-bounds write on 32-bit perl via an integer wraparound in the output buffer size computed by preparse.

preparse reserves its output buffer with `newSV(strlen(statement) * 7 + 16)`, budgeting seven output bytes per input byte for the longest ':p99999' expansion. The product is computed in STRLEN, which is 32 bits wide on a 32-bit perl build, so a statement of 613,566,757 bytes multiplies to 4,294,967,299, wraps modulo 2^32 to 3, and reserves 19 bytes. The parser then copies the statement out through a raw pointer with no capacity check, writing the whole 585 MB input past the end of the allocation. The 99,999 placeholder limit does not bound this path, which is reached by ordinary non-placeholder content.

Any caller that passes an untrusted statement of that length to preparse on a 32-bit perl gets a heap out-of-bounds write of attacker controlled bytes. Builds with a 64-bit STRLEN are not affected, since the wrap there needs a statement of about 2.3 exabytes.

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-73194
DBI versions before 1.652 for Perl allow a heap out-of-bounds write via an unvalidated numeric placeholder that sets the binder counter in preparse.

preparse reserves seven output bytes per input byte, the width of the longest ':p99999' expansion. The ':N' branch parses the number with `atoi(src)` and assigns it to the binder counter with no range check, so a statement containing ':2147483648' leaves the counter negative (-2147483648 with glibc, where atoi wraps). Each following '?' then expands through `sprintf(start, ":p%d", idx++)` to ':p-2147483648', 14 bytes with the terminating NUL where the buffer budgets 7. The placeholder limit added in 1.650 tests the counter against 99,999, which a negative counter passes.

Any caller that preparses an untrusted statement into ':pN' style placeholders gets a heap out-of-bounds write that grows with the number of '?' marks following the poisoned placeholder. The '?' and '%s' return styles compare the parsed number against the expected sequence and error out, and are unaffected.

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74440
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/xe: Wait on external BO kernel fences in exec IOCTL

Before arming a user job, xe_exec_ioctl() only added the VM's
dma-resv KERNEL slot as a dependency. That slot covers rebinds and
the kernel operations of the VM's private BOs, but not external BOs
(bo->vm == NULL), which carry their kernel operations (evictions,
moves, ...) in their own dma-resv KERNEL slot.

The DMA_RESV_USAGE_KERNEL slot is the cross-driver contract for
memory management operations that must complete before the BO or its
backing store may be used: any accessor is required to wait on the
KERNEL fences before touching the resv. By skipping the external BOs'
KERNEL slots, the exec path violated that contract and could schedule
a user job while a kernel operation on an external BO mapped by the VM
was still in flight, racing against it and potentially reading or
writing memory that was being moved.

Replace the VM-only dependency with an iteration over every object
locked by the exec, adding each object's KERNEL slot as a job
dependency. This covers the VM resv (rebinds and private BOs) as well
as every external BO, mirroring the drm_gpuvm_resv_add_fence() call
that later publishes the job fence to the same set of objects.
Long-running mode continues to skip this, as before.

(cherry picked from commit a6b842acf3ddd1efc53a56de9260cfa718fb35e7)

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74441
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: typec: ucsi: Fix race condition and ordering in port unregistration

A synchronization issue exists during port unregistration where pending
partner work items can race against workqueue destruction, leading to
use-after-free conditions:

cros_ec_ucsi cros_ec_ucsi.3.auto: error -ETIMEDOUT: PPM init failed
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0x83/0x4a0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__cfi_delayed_work_timer_fn+0x10/0x10
run_timer_softirq+0x3b6/0xbd0
sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0x110
irq_exit_rcu+0x18d/0x330
fred_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x5e/0x80

Fix this by ensuring strict ordering and proper serialization during
teardown:

1. Move ucsi_unregister_partner() to the beginning of the teardown
sequence and protect it under the connector mutex lock.
2. Ensure all pending partner tasks are explicitly flushed and finished
before the workqueue is destroyed.
3. Switch from mod_delayed_work() to a cancel_delayed_work() and
queue_delayed_work() sequence. This guarantees that items currently marked
as pending won't be scheduled an additional time, preventing a double
release of resources which leads to the following crash:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdead000000000122: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
Workqueue: cros_ec_ucsi.3.auto-con2 ucsi_poll_worker
RIP: 0010:ucsi_poll_worker+0x65/0x1e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
process_scheduled_works+0x218/0x6d0
worker_thread+0x188/0x3f0
__cfi_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x226/0x2a0

To ensure these rules are applied identically across both the normal
teardown and the ucsi_init() error paths, consolidate the cleanup logic
into a new helper, ucsi_unregister_port().

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74442
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/vmwgfx: avoid destroy_workqueue(NULL) on vkms init failure

Two paths through vmw_vkms_init() can leave vmw->crc_workq NULL while
still leaving the rest of the driver in a state that calls
vmw_vkms_cleanup() at module unload:

1. vmw_host_get_guestinfo(GUESTINFO_VBLANK, ...) failing or
returning an oversized buffer -- the common case on hosts
without a VBLANK guestinfo entry -- early-returned before the
workqueue allocation.
2. alloc_ordered_workqueue() returning NULL on memory pressure.

vmw_vkms_cleanup() then calls destroy_workqueue(NULL), which
dereferences wq->name and panics.

Fix the first case by removing the early return: vmw->vkms_enabled
is already false on the rpci-failure path so no work will ever be
queued, and allocating the workqueue unconditionally keeps the
control flow simple. Fix the second case by guarding the cleanup
with a NULL check, since alloc_ordered_workqueue() can still fail
under low memory.

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74443
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/vmwgfx: bound DMA command body size against suffix pointer

vmw_cmd_dma() locates the DMA suffix at

(unsigned long) &cmd->body + header->size - sizeof(*suffix)

without checking that header->size is large enough to contain both
cmd->body and the suffix. An undersized header makes the suffix
pointer underflow back into the previous command in the bounce
buffer. The verifier later writes suffix->maximumOffset, clobbering
verified fields of an already-relocated earlier command -- a TOCTOU
on the device-visible command stream that lets one command rewrite
another's GMR id, surface id, or other authenticated fields.

Reject the command if the body is too small for the suffix to fit.

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74444
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/vmwgfx: validate DRAW_PRIMITIVES header size before division

vmw_cmd_draw() computes

maxnum = (header->size - sizeof(cmd->body)) / sizeof(*decl);

where header->size is u32 and is taken straight from the user-supplied
command stream. When header->size is less than sizeof(cmd->body) the
unsigned subtraction wraps to nearly 4 GiB, producing a huge maxnum.
Any user-controlled cmd->body.numVertexDecls then passes the bound and
the loop dereferences decl[i] far past the end of the kernel command
bounce buffer, producing an out-of-bounds read of kernel memory.

Reject undersized headers up front.

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74446
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdkfd: hold event_mutex while checkpointing CRIU events

kfd_criu_checkpoint_events() counts the entries in p->event_idr via
kfd_get_num_events(), allocates an array sized to that count, and then
walks the same IDR to fill it. Neither the count nor the walk holds
p->event_mutex.

The CRIU checkpoint caller holds only p->mutex. Event create and destroy
(kfd_event_create()/kfd_event_destroy()) take p->event_mutex and do not
take p->mutex, so a second thread in the same process can insert or remove
events between the count and the walk. If an event is inserted, the walk
iterates more entries than were counted and writes past the end of the
ev_privs allocation; if an event is removed, the walk dereferences an
entry that is being freed.

Hold p->event_mutex across the count and the walk so both observe a
consistent view of p->event_idr. The lock is released before
copy_to_user(), which only touches the local buffer. The caller already
holds p->mutex and the create/destroy paths never take p->mutex, so the
p->mutex -> p->event_mutex order is not inverted and no deadlock is
introduced.

(cherry picked from commit ff57e223ab105795b05d3ef3f3c35a5a441bcbaa)

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74447
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdkfd: fix uint32_t overflow in EOP ring buffer size alignment

eop_ring_buffer_size in struct queue_properties is a u32. In
kfd_queue_acquire_buffers() the expected EOP buffer size is computed as
ALIGN(eop_ring_buffer_size, PAGE_SIZE); ALIGN uses typeof(x), so the
addition is done in 32-bit. A user-supplied size of 0xFFFFF001 wraps to
0, causing kfd_queue_buffer_get() to skip its exact-size check (gated on
size != 0) and accept any BO mapped at the address. On GFX8/GFX9 the MQD
cp_hqd_eop_control is then programmed for an 8KB EOP ring backed by a 4KB
BO, so CP EOP writes can land past the buffer and fault the GPU.

Cast the operand to u64 so the alignment is computed in 64-bit; the size
check in kfd_queue_buffer_get() then rejects the oversized request.

(cherry picked from commit ae443117b742c357bfef3a7bddabf76fcf86e9ef)

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74448
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdkfd: fix QID bit leak in pqm_create_queue()

When MES is enabled and amdgpu_amdkfd_alloc_kernel_mem() fails during
the first queue creation for a process, pqm_create_queue() returns
early via 'return retval' without going through the err_create_queue
cleanup label.

This means clear_bit(*qid, pqm->queue_slot_bitmap) is never called,
leaving the reserved QID bit permanently set in queue_slot_bitmap.
Over time this leaks QID slots, potentially exhausting all available
queue slots.

Fix this by replacing 'return retval' with 'goto err_allocate_pqn'
so that clear_bit() is always called on the error path without
touching the uninitialized pqn pointer.

AILIKFD-813

(cherry picked from commit a107f74c38edbb80d6ab64dcaeeb292c14e9779f)

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74449
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/display: Fix divide-by-zero in calculate_mcache_setting on zero viewport

If a plane reaches calculate_mcache_setting with a zero-area viewport,
calculate_mcache_setting exits early with num_mcaches == 0 and
mvmpg_width/height == 0. This will cause a divide-by-zero panic and can
also cause an underflow on num_mcaches.

Fix this by changing calculate_mcache_setting to bool and adding guards
after each calculate_mcache_row_bytes call. If num_mcaches or
mvmpg_width/height is zero, return a false. Callers will propagate the
failure as a rejected mode, which prevents the panic.

(cherry picked from commit 29c0f7c655f47bcbd575ff75e58480df6ec3c9da)

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74450
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/pm: fix pptable use-after-free

amdgpu_dpm_get_pp_table() returns a pointer to a driver-owned power table
after dropping adev->pm.mutex. The sysfs path then copies from that pointer.
A concurrent pp_table write can replace and free the allocation during the
copy, causing a use-after-free.

Change the DPM interface to copy into caller-provided storage while the mutex
is held. Keep the size-only query for attribute discovery without exposing
the driver-owned pointer.

(cherry picked from commit f6eed7acfd30099ef7baeb6ba45bb59daad80631)

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74451
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/panthor: validate firmware interface structure sizes

iface_fw_to_cpu_addr() only checks that the firmware-provided MCU virtual
address points inside the shared section. The returned pointer is later
used as a full firmware interface structure, so accepting an address near
the end of the shared section can still lead to out-of-bounds accesses.

Pass the expected object size to iface_fw_to_cpu_addr() and reject ranges
that do not fit entirely in the shared section.

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74452
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/panthor: reject firmware sections with oversized data

In panthor_fw_load_section_entry(), the data size to copy is calculated
without validating it against the allocated section_size:

section->data.size = hdr.data.end - hdr.data.start;

If a crafted firmware sets data.size larger than the allocated memory,
this could cause a heap buffer overflow in panthor_fw_init_section_mem()

memcpy(section->mem->kmap, section->data.buf, section->data.size);

Additionally, if the section->data.size exceeds the BO size, could this
memset underflow the size calculation, leading to a massive out-of-bounds
zeroing of kernel memory?

memset(section->mem->kmap + section->data.size, 0,
panthor_kernel_bo_size(section->mem) - section->data.size);

Reject section entries whose initial data is larger than the section size.

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74453
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/vc4: Zero the tile state data array before each BIN job

The binner BO is a single 16MB buffer split into 512KB slots that are
handed out to jobs at submission time and recycled as jobs complete,
without ever being cleared. Each slot holds the job's Tile State Data
Array (TSDA) at its start, followed by the tile allocation pool.

While the tile allocation pool is only walked by the render thread
through branches the binner generated during the current job, the
TSDA is the PTB's own per-tile bookkeeping and is consumed by the
hardware itself. Although the kernel sets the "Auto-initialise Tile
State Data Array" flag in the tile binning mode configuration, the
PTB demonstrably still acts on stale tile state left by the slot's
previous user: the binner ends up creating invalid command streams
with invalid primitive streams and branches, which can cause GPU hangs
as observed in [1][2].

Zero the TSDA when the job's binning slot is configured. This clears
48 bytes per tile (~24KB for a 1080p frame) in the submission path, and
guarantees the PTB never sees another job's tile state.

The tile count is only checked for being non-zero today, so the 8-bit
fields it comes from can describe a tile state array almost six times
larger than the slot it has to live in. Bound it before the slot is
handed out, since such size decides how much of the slot is left for
the tile alloc pool.

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74454
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/vc4: Supply the overflow slot size in BPOS, not the whole bin BO size

vc4_overflow_mem_work() points BPOA at a 512KB slot inside the 16MB
binner BO, but writes the size of the whole BO to BPOS. On every binner
out-of-memory event the PTB is therefore authorized to write tile lists
across all the other slots (which may hold the tile state, tile alloc and
overflow memory of in-flight jobs) and, for any slot but the first, past
the end of the binner BO into unrelated CMA memory.

Since CMA pages are recycled into page cache and user allocations, this
is arbitrary memory corruption by GPU DMA. In practice it shows up as GPU
hangs with corrupted control list pointers, userspace heap corruption, a
GPU that stays permanently wedged after the first hang, and occasional
full system crashes, whenever a job overflows the initial binner slot.

The bug dates back to the conversion from a dedicated overflow BO (where
writing the full BO size was correct) to the slotted binner BO.

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74455
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

can: peak_usb: validate uCAN receive record lengths

pcan_usb_fd_decode_buf() walks uCAN records packed in one USB
receive buffer.

Require each record to contain the fixed header for its type, and verify
CAN payload bytes before copying them into the skb.

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74456
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

can: peak_usb: peak_usb_start(): fix double free of transfer buffer on URB submit error

In peak_usb_start(), each RX URB transfer buffer is allocated with kmalloc()
and the URB is flagged URB_FREE_BUFFER so that the final usb_free_urb() also
frees the transfer buffer.

If usb_submit_urb() fails, the error path frees the buffer explicitly with
kfree(buf) and then calls usb_free_urb(urb). Because URB_FREE_BUFFER is set,
usb_free_urb() -> urb_destroy() frees the same buffer a second time, a double
free of the transfer buffer.

BUG: KASAN: double-free in usb_free_urb.part.0+0x91/0xb0
Free of addr ffff8881069ccb80 by task trigger.sh/285

Call Trace:
kfree+0x113/0x3c0
usb_free_urb.part.0+0x91/0xb0

Drop the redundant kfree(buf); usb_free_urb() already releases the transfer
buffer. This mirrors commit 03819abbeb11 ("net: usb: lan78xx: Fix double free
issue with interrupt buffer allocation").

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify
๐Ÿšจ CVE-2026-74457
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

can: peak_usb: add bounds check for USB channel index

The channel control index ctrl_idx is derived from rx->len which comes
directly from a device USB payload. The mask 0x0f allows values 0-15, but
the array size of usb_if->dev[] is only 2. Values 2-15 cause heap
out-of-bounds read, eventually causing kernel panic in the IRQ context.

Add bounds checking for ctrl_idx before the array access in both
pcan_usb_pro_handle_canmsg() and pcan_usb_pro_handle_error().

๐ŸŽ–@cveNotify