🚨 CVE-2022-49176
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bfq: fix use-after-free in bfq_dispatch_request

KASAN reports a use-after-free report when doing normal scsi-mq test

[69832.239032] ==================================================================
[69832.241810] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.243267] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88802622ba88 by task kworker/3:1H/155
[69832.244656]
[69832.245007] CPU: 3 PID: 155 Comm: kworker/3:1H Not tainted 5.10.0-10295-g576c6382529e #8
[69832.246626] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[69832.249069] Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_run_work_fn
[69832.250022] Call Trace:
[69832.250541] dump_stack+0x9b/0xce
[69832.251232] ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.252243] print_address_description.constprop.6+0x3e/0x60
[69832.253381] ? __cpuidle_text_end+0x5/0x5
[69832.254211] ? vprintk_func+0x6b/0x120
[69832.254994] ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.255952] ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.256914] kasan_report.cold.9+0x22/0x3a
[69832.257753] ? bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.258755] check_memory_region+0x1c1/0x1e0
[69832.260248] bfq_dispatch_request+0x1045/0x44b0
[69832.261181] ? bfq_bfqq_expire+0x2440/0x2440
[69832.262032] ? blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queues+0xf9/0x170
[69832.263022] __blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched+0x52f/0x830
[69832.264011] ? blk_mq_sched_request_inserted+0x100/0x100
[69832.265101] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x398/0x4f0
[69832.266206] ? blk_mq_do_dispatch_ctx+0x570/0x570
[69832.267147] ? __switch_to+0x5f4/0xee0
[69832.267898] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xdf/0x140
[69832.268946] __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xc0/0x270
[69832.269840] blk_mq_run_work_fn+0x51/0x60
[69832.278170] process_one_work+0x6d4/0xfe0
[69832.278984] worker_thread+0x91/0xc80
[69832.279726] ? __kthread_parkme+0xb0/0x110
[69832.280554] ? process_one_work+0xfe0/0xfe0
[69832.281414] kthread+0x32d/0x3f0
[69832.282082] ? kthread_park+0x170/0x170
[69832.282849] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[69832.283573]
[69832.283886] Allocated by task 7725:
[69832.284599] kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40
[69832.285385] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.2+0xc1/0xd0
[69832.286350] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x13f/0x460
[69832.287237] bfq_get_queue+0x3d4/0x1140
[69832.287993] bfq_get_bfqq_handle_split+0x103/0x510
[69832.289015] bfq_init_rq+0x337/0x2d50
[69832.289749] bfq_insert_requests+0x304/0x4e10
[69832.290634] blk_mq_sched_insert_requests+0x13e/0x390
[69832.291629] blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x4b4/0x760
[69832.292538] blk_flush_plug_list+0x2c5/0x480
[69832.293392] io_schedule_prepare+0xb2/0xd0
[69832.294209] io_schedule_timeout+0x13/0x80
[69832.295014] wait_for_common_io.constprop.1+0x13c/0x270
[69832.296137] submit_bio_wait+0x103/0x1a0
[69832.296932] blkdev_issue_discard+0xe6/0x160
[69832.297794] blk_ioctl_discard+0x219/0x290
[69832.298614] blkdev_common_ioctl+0x50a/0x1750
[69832.304715] blkdev_ioctl+0x470/0x600
[69832.305474] block_ioctl+0xde/0x120
[69832.306232] vfs_ioctl+0x6c/0xc0
[69832.306877] __se_sys_ioctl+0x90/0xa0
[69832.307629] do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
[69832.308362] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[69832.309382]
[69832.309701] Freed by task 155:
[69832.310328] kasan_save_stack+0x19/0x40
[69832.311121] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30
[69832.311868] kasan_set_free_info+0x1b/0x30
[69832.312699] __kasan_slab_free+0x111/0x160
[69832.313524] kmem_cache_free+0x94/0x460
[69832.314367] bfq_put_queue+0x582/0x940
[69832.315112] __bfq_bfqd_reset_in_service+0x166/0x1d0
[69832.317275] bfq_bfqq_expire+0xb27/0x2440
[69832.318084] bfq_dispatch_request+0x697/0x44b0
[69832.318991] __blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched+0x52f/0x830
[69832.319984] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x398/0x4f0
[69832.321087] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xdf/0x140
[69832.322225] __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0xc0/0x270
[69832.323114] blk_mq_run_work_fn+0x51/0x6
---truncated---

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2022-49179
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

block, bfq: don't move oom_bfqq

Our test report a UAF:

[ 2073.019181] ==================================================================
[ 2073.019188] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __bfq_put_async_bfqq+0xa0/0x168
[ 2073.019191] Write of size 8 at addr ffff8000ccf64128 by task rmmod/72584
[ 2073.019192]
[ 2073.019196] CPU: 0 PID: 72584 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Not tainted 4.19.90-yk #5
[ 2073.019198] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
[ 2073.019200] Call trace:
[ 2073.019203] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x310
[ 2073.019206] show_stack+0x28/0x38
[ 2073.019210] dump_stack+0xec/0x15c
[ 2073.019216] print_address_description+0x68/0x2d0
[ 2073.019220] kasan_report+0x238/0x2f0
[ 2073.019224] __asan_store8+0x88/0xb0
[ 2073.019229] __bfq_put_async_bfqq+0xa0/0x168
[ 2073.019233] bfq_put_async_queues+0xbc/0x208
[ 2073.019236] bfq_pd_offline+0x178/0x238
[ 2073.019240] blkcg_deactivate_policy+0x1f0/0x420
[ 2073.019244] bfq_exit_queue+0x128/0x178
[ 2073.019249] blk_mq_exit_sched+0x12c/0x160
[ 2073.019252] elevator_exit+0xc8/0xd0
[ 2073.019256] blk_exit_queue+0x50/0x88
[ 2073.019259] blk_cleanup_queue+0x228/0x3d8
[ 2073.019267] null_del_dev+0xfc/0x1e0 [null_blk]
[ 2073.019274] null_exit+0x90/0x114 [null_blk]
[ 2073.019278] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x358/0x5a0
[ 2073.019282] el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x320
[ 2073.019287] el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160
[ 2073.019290] el0_svc+0x10/0x218
[ 2073.019291]
[ 2073.019294] Allocated by task 14163:
[ 2073.019301] kasan_kmalloc+0xe0/0x190
[ 2073.019305] kmem_cache_alloc_node_trace+0x1cc/0x418
[ 2073.019308] bfq_pd_alloc+0x54/0x118
[ 2073.019313] blkcg_activate_policy+0x250/0x460
[ 2073.019317] bfq_create_group_hierarchy+0x38/0x110
[ 2073.019321] bfq_init_queue+0x6d0/0x948
[ 2073.019325] blk_mq_init_sched+0x1d8/0x390
[ 2073.019330] elevator_switch_mq+0x88/0x170
[ 2073.019334] elevator_switch+0x140/0x270
[ 2073.019338] elv_iosched_store+0x1a4/0x2a0
[ 2073.019342] queue_attr_store+0x90/0xe0
[ 2073.019348] sysfs_kf_write+0xa8/0xe8
[ 2073.019351] kernfs_fop_write+0x1f8/0x378
[ 2073.019359] __vfs_write+0xe0/0x360
[ 2073.019363] vfs_write+0xf0/0x270
[ 2073.019367] ksys_write+0xdc/0x1b8
[ 2073.019371] __arm64_sys_write+0x50/0x60
[ 2073.019375] el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x320
[ 2073.019380] el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160
[ 2073.019383] el0_svc+0x10/0x218
[ 2073.019385]
[ 2073.019387] Freed by task 72584:
[ 2073.019391] __kasan_slab_free+0x120/0x228
[ 2073.019394] kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18
[ 2073.019397] kfree+0x94/0x368
[ 2073.019400] bfqg_put+0x64/0xb0
[ 2073.019404] bfqg_and_blkg_put+0x90/0xb0
[ 2073.019408] bfq_put_queue+0x220/0x228
[ 2073.019413] __bfq_put_async_bfqq+0x98/0x168
[ 2073.019416] bfq_put_async_queues+0xbc/0x208
[ 2073.019420] bfq_pd_offline+0x178/0x238
[ 2073.019424] blkcg_deactivate_policy+0x1f0/0x420
[ 2073.019429] bfq_exit_queue+0x128/0x178
[ 2073.019433] blk_mq_exit_sched+0x12c/0x160
[ 2073.019437] elevator_exit+0xc8/0xd0
[ 2073.019440] blk_exit_queue+0x50/0x88
[ 2073.019443] blk_cleanup_queue+0x228/0x3d8
[ 2073.019451] null_del_dev+0xfc/0x1e0 [null_blk]
[ 2073.019459] null_exit+0x90/0x114 [null_blk]
[ 2073.019462] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x358/0x5a0
[ 2073.019467] el0_svc_common+0xc8/0x320
[ 2073.019471] el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160
[ 2073.019474] el0_svc+0x10/0x218
[ 2073.019475]
[ 2073.019479] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8000ccf63f00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1024 of size 1024
[ 2073.019484] The buggy address is located 552 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff8000ccf63f00, ffff8000ccf64300)
[ 2073.019486] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 2073.019492] page:ffff7e000333d800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8000c0003a00 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 2073.020123] flags: 0x7ffff0000008100(slab|head)
[ 2073.020403] raw: 07ffff0000008100 ffff7e0003334c08 ffff7e00001f5a08 ffff8000c0003a00
[ 2073.020409] ra
---truncated---

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2022-49286
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tpm: use try_get_ops() in tpm-space.c

As part of the series conversion to remove nested TPM operations:

https://lore.kernel.org/all/20190205224723.19671-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com/

exposure of the chip->tpm_mutex was removed from much of the upper
level code. In this conversion, tpm2_del_space() was missed. This
didn't matter much because it's usually called closely after a
converted operation, so there's only a very tiny race window where the
chip can be removed before the space flushing is done which causes a
NULL deref on the mutex. However, there are reports of this window
being hit in practice, so fix this by converting tpm2_del_space() to
use tpm_try_get_ops(), which performs all the teardown checks before
acquring the mutex.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2022-49294
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/display: Check if modulo is 0 before dividing.

[How & Why]
If a value of 0 is read, then this will cause a divide-by-0 panic.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2022-49296
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: fix possible deadlock when holding Fwb to get inline_data

1, mount with wsync.
2, create a file with O_RDWR, and the request was sent to mds.0:

ceph_atomic_open()-->
ceph_mdsc_do_request(openc)
finish_open(file, dentry, ceph_open)-->
ceph_open()-->
ceph_init_file()-->
ceph_init_file_info()-->
ceph_uninline_data()-->
{
...
if (inline_version == 1 || /* initial version, no data */
inline_version == CEPH_INLINE_NONE)
goto out_unlock;
...
}

The inline_version will be 1, which is the initial version for the
new create file. And here the ci->i_inline_version will keep with 1,
it's buggy.

3, buffer write to the file immediately:

ceph_write_iter()-->
ceph_get_caps(file, need=Fw, want=Fb, ...);
generic_perform_write()-->
a_ops->write_begin()-->
ceph_write_begin()-->
netfs_write_begin()-->
netfs_begin_read()-->
netfs_rreq_submit_slice()-->
netfs_read_from_server()-->
rreq->netfs_ops->issue_read()-->
ceph_netfs_issue_read()-->
{
...
if (ci->i_inline_version != CEPH_INLINE_NONE &&
ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline(subreq))
return;
...
}
ceph_put_cap_refs(ci, Fwb);

The ceph_netfs_issue_op_inline() will send a getattr(Fsr) request to
mds.1.

4, then the mds.1 will request the rd lock for CInode::filelock from
the auth mds.0, the mds.0 will do the CInode::filelock state transation
from excl --> sync, but it need to revoke the Fxwb caps back from the
clients.

While the kernel client has aleady held the Fwb caps and waiting for
the getattr(Fsr).

It's deadlock!

URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55377

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2022-49309
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drivers: staging: rtl8723bs: Fix deadlock in rtw_surveydone_event_callback()

There is a deadlock in rtw_surveydone_event_callback(),
which is shown below:

(Thread 1) | (Thread 2)
| _set_timer()
rtw_surveydone_event_callback()| mod_timer()
spin_lock_bh() //(1) | (wait a time)
... | rtw_scan_timeout_handler()
del_timer_sync() | spin_lock_bh() //(2)
(wait timer to stop) | ...

We hold pmlmepriv->lock in position (1) of thread 1 and use
del_timer_sync() to wait timer to stop, but timer handler
also need pmlmepriv->lock in position (2) of thread 2.
As a result, rtw_surveydone_event_callback() will block forever.

This patch extracts del_timer_sync() from the protection of
spin_lock_bh(), which could let timer handler to obtain
the needed lock. What`s more, we change spin_lock_bh() in
rtw_scan_timeout_handler() to spin_lock_irq(). Otherwise,
spin_lock_bh() will also cause deadlock() in timer handler.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-16766
Catalyst::View::Wkhtmltopdf versions before 0.6.1 for Perl allow shell command injection (RCE) via PDF render options.

Options are passed directly to the wkhtmltopdf command without sanitization.

Any web application that passes user-controlled options such as the page_size, orientation or margins without validation allows shell command injection.

Version 0.6.0 was released with an incomplete fix for this issue.

Note that the wkhtmltopdf project is no longer being developed, and users of this package should migrate to alternative solutions.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-68088
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

usb: gadget: function: rndis: add length check to response query

Add variable representations for BufLength and BufOffset in
rndis_query_response(), and perform a length check on them.

This is identical to how rndis_set_response() handles these parameters.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-68097
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: validate ACE size against SID sub-authorities

set_ntacl_dacl() validates sid.num_subauth before copying an ACE, but
does not verify that the declared ACE size contains all sub-authorities
described by that field. An undersized ACE can therefore be copied
and later make the POSIX ACL deduplication walk inspect data beyond
the copied ACE boundary.

The existing initial bound check is also too small. It only ensures
that the ACE size field is accessible before set_ntacl_dacl() reads
sid.num_subauth farther into the input buffer.

Require enough input for the fixed SID header before accessing
num_subauth, reject ACEs smaller than that header, and skip ACEs
whose declared size cannot contain the complete SID. This makes the
validation consistent with the other ACE walk paths.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-68098
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: bound DACL dedup walk to copied ACEs

set_ntacl_dacl() can stop copying ACEs before consuming the full input
DACL when size accounting overflows.

When that happens, num_aces reflects only the ACEs that were actually
copied into the output DACL, but set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() still
receives nt_num_aces and uses it to walk the existing ACE array during
dedup.

That makes the dedup walk scan past the copied ACE array and inspect
buffer tail that does not contain valid ACEs.

Split the two meanings currently carried by the NT ACE count. Pass the
number of copied NT ACEs to bound the dedup walk, and preserve the
original "input DACL had NT ACEs" state separately for the
Everyone/default ACL fallback.

This keeps the dedup walk aligned with the ACEs that are actually
present in the rebuilt DACL.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-68100
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl

set_ntacl_dacl() copies each ACE from the attacker-controlled stored
security descriptor verbatim into the response DACL without checking
sid.num_subauth. The ACE bytes (including an unchecked num_subauth)
originate from an authenticated SMB2_SET_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) that is
stored raw via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(); parse_dacl() rejects a bad ACE
with `break` rather than an error, so parse_sec_desc() still returns
success and the malformed SD reaches the xattr intact.

On a subsequent SMB2_QUERY_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) for an inode carrying a
POSIX access ACL, build_sec_desc() -> set_ntacl_dacl() ->
set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() walks the copied ACEs and reads

ntace->sid.sub_auth[ntace->sid.num_subauth - 1]

with num_subauth taken straight from the stored SD. Since sub_auth[]
is fixed at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES (15), a crafted num_subauth (e.g.
255) drives an out-of-bounds heap read of ~1 KB with an offset fully
controlled by an authenticated client.

The sibling functions already gate this field:
parse_dacl() -- num_subauth == 0 || > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
parse_sid() -- num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
smb_copy_sid() -- min_t(u8, num_subauth, SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)
set_ntacl_dacl() is the lone inconsistent path that omits the check.

Add the same num_subauth validation in set_ntacl_dacl() before copying
the ACE, matching the gate already enforced by parse_dacl().

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-68103
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdgpu: reject mapping a reserved doorbell to a new queue

When creating an user-queue, the user space
provides a doorbell BO handle and an offset within
the bo to obtain a doorbell.

However current implementation using xa_store_irq()
to store a doorbell, which allows a later queue created
with the same BO and offset parameters to overwrite an
existing queue and doorbell mapping.

This can cause problems like misrouting fence IRQ
processing to a wrong queue, and mislead the cleanup
process of one queue erasing the mapping of another queue.

This commit fixes this issue by replacing xa_store_irq with
xa_insert_irq, which rejects mapping a reserved
doorbell to a newly created queue

(cherry picked from commit 6244eae22966350db52faf9c1369d3b2ffc5de4e)

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-68105
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdgpu: Fix kernel panic during driver load failure

Avoid kernel panic if MES init fails during driver load. The KIQ ring is
falsely marked as ready as ASICs that use MES, KIQ is owned by MES.

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
RIP: 0010:gfx_v12_1_wait_reg_mem+0x5a/0x1f0 [amdgpu]
Call Trace:
gfx_v12_1_ring_emit_reg_write_reg_wait+0x1f/0x30 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_gmc_fw_reg_write_reg_wait+0xb2/0x190 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_gmc_flush_gpu_tlb+0x1cc/0x230 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_gart_invalidate_tlb+0x81/0xa0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_gart_unbind+0x72/0x90 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_ttm_backend_unbind+0xa4/0xb0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_ttm_tt_unpopulate+0x13/0xd0 [amdgpu]
amdttm_tt_unpopulate+0x29/0x70 [amdttm]
ttm_bo_put+0x1eb/0x360 [amdttm]
amdgpu_bo_free_kernel+0xf9/0x1f0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_ih_ring_fini+0x5a/0x90 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_irq_fini_hw+0x58/0x80 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_device_fini_hw+0x4e0/0x5b0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_driver_load_kms+0x60/0xa0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_pci_probe+0x28e/0x6d0 [amdgpu]
pci_device_probe+0x19f/0x220
really_probe+0x1ed/0x340
driver_probe_device+0x1e/0x80
__driver_attach+0xd3/0x1a0
bus_for_each_dev+0x68/0xa0
bus_add_driver+0x19f/0x270
driver_register+0x5d/0xf0
do_one_initcall+0xac/0x200
do_init_module+0x1ec/0x280
__se_sys_finit_module+0x2de/0x310
do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x250
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

(cherry picked from commit 4623b958dd6da0f4c3026afdf330626a09ecb0f0)

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-68106
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdgpu: fix division by zero with invalid uvd dimensions

When width or height is less than 16, width_in_mb or height_in_mb
becomes 0, leading to fs_in_mb being 0. This causes a division by
zero when calculating num_dpb_buffer in H264 and H264 Perf decode
paths.

Add validation to reject frames with width < 16 or height < 16
before performing any calculations that depend on these values.

V2: Format change - move up all vaiable definitions.
V3: Use warn_once to avoid spam.

(cherry picked from commit 3e41d26c70b0a459d041cc19482a226c4b7423cb)

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-68107
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdgpu/vcn4: avoid rereading IB param length

Reuse the parameter length returned by
vcn_v4_0_enc_find_ib_param() instead of rereading it from
the IB.

This avoids a potential TOCTOU issue if the IB contents
change between reads.

(cherry picked from commit dbb02b4755f8c1f3773263f2d779872c1c0c073a)

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-68108
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdgpu/vce: fix integer overflow in image size

Fix a security vulnerability where malicious VCE command streams
with oversized dimensions (e.g. 65536×65536) cause 32-bit integer
overflow, wrapping the calculated buffer size to 0. This bypasses
validation and allows GPU firmware to perform out-of-bound memory
access.

The fix uses 64-bit arithmetic to detect overflow and rejects
invalid dimensions before they reach the hardware.

V2: remove redundant check
V3: modify max height value
V4: remove size64

(cherry picked from commit cbe408dba581755ad1279a487ec786d8927d778d)

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-68109
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdgpu/sdma7.1: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON()

There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.

(cherry picked from commit c4f230b51cf2d3e7e8b1c800331f3dbed2a9e3f5)

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-68110
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdgpu/sdma4.4.2: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON()

There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.

(cherry picked from commit fa4f86a148271e325e95287630a3a15a9cd35fdc)

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-68111
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdgpu/gfx9: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON()

There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.

(cherry picked from commit b71604f8685b0eba07866f4e8dc30f93e1931054)

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-16770
PDF::WebKit versions through 1.2 for Perl allow argument injection into wkhtmltopdf via meta tags in the source document.

For an HTML string or file source, the constructor collects every <meta name="pdf-webkit-KEY" content="VALUE"> element in the document head through _pdf_webkit_meta_tags and turns each one into a wkhtmltopdf command line option. KEY is normalized to an option name matching --[a-z0-9-]+ but is not checked against an allow list, VALUE is passed through unchanged as the argument that follows it, and a VALUE of "yes" emits the option as a bare flag. BUILD merges the meta derived options last, so they also override the module defaults and the options passed to new. Switches such as --enable-local-file-access and --cookie-jar are reachable this way. The renderer is executed with an argument list rather than a shell command, so this is argument injection and not shell injection.

Any caller that renders untrusted HTML lets the document choose the renderer's options and override those set by the application, including options that read local files into the resulting PDF or write to a chosen path. A URL source is not scanned, and the scan is skipped when XML::LibXML, a recommended dependency, is not installed.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-17431
PDF::WebKit versions through 1.2 for Perl allow OS command injection via a 2-arg open() of the output path in to_pdf and of stylesheet paths in _style_tag_for.

to_pdf reads the generated PDF back from its path argument, and _style_tag_for reads each entry of the stylesheets list, by assigning the path to a local @ARGV and reading it with the diamond operator, which opens each @ARGV element with Perl's 2-arg open(). A value that begins or ends with a pipe ("| cmd", "cmd |") is run as a command rather than opened as a file, and one that begins with a redirect ("> path", ">> path") opens that path for write or append. to_file forwards its path argument to to_pdf and reaches the same read.

Any caller that forwards untrusted input as the output path or as a stylesheets entry can run a command under the process UID; with the "cmd |" form the command's output is returned in place of the PDF, and with the "> path" form the named file is truncated. Stylesheets may only be added to an HTML source, so a URL or file source exposes the output path alone.

🎖@cveNotify