🚨 CVE-2026-64260
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: Avoid queue->stopped races and set/read that value under lock
There are several readers of queue->stopped that check the value
under lock, but fuse_uring_commit_fetch() did not and actually
the value was not set under the lock in fuse_uring_abort_end_requests()
either. Especially in fuse_uring_commit_fetch it is important
to check under a lock, because due to races 'struct fuse_req'
might be freed with fuse_request_end, but another thread/cpu
might already do teardown work.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: Avoid queue->stopped races and set/read that value under lock
There are several readers of queue->stopped that check the value
under lock, but fuse_uring_commit_fetch() did not and actually
the value was not set under the lock in fuse_uring_abort_end_requests()
either. Especially in fuse_uring_commit_fetch it is important
to check under a lock, because due to races 'struct fuse_req'
might be freed with fuse_request_end, but another thread/cpu
might already do teardown work.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64261
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: Avoid use-after-free in fuse_uring_async_stop_queues
fuse_uring_async_stop_queues() might run when the last reference
on ring->queue_refs was already dropped.
In order to avoid an early destruction a reference on struct fuse_conn
is now taken before starting fuse_uring_async_stop_queues() and that
reference is only released when that delayed work queue terminates.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: Avoid use-after-free in fuse_uring_async_stop_queues
fuse_uring_async_stop_queues() might run when the last reference
on ring->queue_refs was already dropped.
In order to avoid an early destruction a reference on struct fuse_conn
is now taken before starting fuse_uring_async_stop_queues() and that
reference is only released when that delayed work queue terminates.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64262
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: end fuse_req on io-uring cancel task work
When io_uring delivers task work with tw.cancel set (PF_EXITING,
PF_KTHREAD fallback, or percpu_ref_is_dying on the ring context),
fuse_uring_send_in_task() takes the cancel branch, assigns
-ECANCELED, and falls through to fuse_uring_send(). That path only
flips the entry to FRRS_USERSPACE and completes the io_uring cmd;
it never discharges the ring entry's owning reference to the
fuse_req that fuse_uring_add_req_to_ring_ent() handed it at
dispatch time.
fuse_uring_send_in_task()
tw.cancel == true
err = -ECANCELED
fuse_uring_send(ent, cmd, err, issue_flags)
ent->state = FRRS_USERSPACE
list_move(&ent->list, &queue->ent_in_userspace)
ent->cmd = NULL
io_uring_cmd_done(-ECANCELED)
/* ent->fuse_req still set, req still hashed */
The fuse_req stays linked on fpq->processing[hash] and
fuse_request_end() is never invoked. The originating syscall
thread blocks in D-state in request_wait_answer() until
fuse_abort_conn() runs, which can be the entire connection
lifetime. For FR_BACKGROUND requests fc->num_background is never
decremented either, so repeated cancels inflate the counter until
max_background is hit and all later background ops stall. tw.cancel does
not imply a connection abort (e.g. a single io_uring worker thread exits
while the fuse connection stays up), so this cannot be left for
fuse_abort_conn() to clean up.
Ending the req but still routing the entry through fuse_uring_send()
is not enough: that leaves a req-less entry on ent_in_userspace, and
ent_list_request_expired() dereferences ent->fuse_req unconditionally
on the head of that list, which would then NULL-deref.
Fix the cancel branch to release the entry directly. Remove it from the
queue, complete the io_uring cmd, end the fuse_req, free the entry, and
drop its queue_refs (waking the teardown waiter if it was the last).
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: end fuse_req on io-uring cancel task work
When io_uring delivers task work with tw.cancel set (PF_EXITING,
PF_KTHREAD fallback, or percpu_ref_is_dying on the ring context),
fuse_uring_send_in_task() takes the cancel branch, assigns
-ECANCELED, and falls through to fuse_uring_send(). That path only
flips the entry to FRRS_USERSPACE and completes the io_uring cmd;
it never discharges the ring entry's owning reference to the
fuse_req that fuse_uring_add_req_to_ring_ent() handed it at
dispatch time.
fuse_uring_send_in_task()
tw.cancel == true
err = -ECANCELED
fuse_uring_send(ent, cmd, err, issue_flags)
ent->state = FRRS_USERSPACE
list_move(&ent->list, &queue->ent_in_userspace)
ent->cmd = NULL
io_uring_cmd_done(-ECANCELED)
/* ent->fuse_req still set, req still hashed */
The fuse_req stays linked on fpq->processing[hash] and
fuse_request_end() is never invoked. The originating syscall
thread blocks in D-state in request_wait_answer() until
fuse_abort_conn() runs, which can be the entire connection
lifetime. For FR_BACKGROUND requests fc->num_background is never
decremented either, so repeated cancels inflate the counter until
max_background is hit and all later background ops stall. tw.cancel does
not imply a connection abort (e.g. a single io_uring worker thread exits
while the fuse connection stays up), so this cannot be left for
fuse_abort_conn() to clean up.
Ending the req but still routing the entry through fuse_uring_send()
is not enough: that leaves a req-less entry on ent_in_userspace, and
ent_list_request_expired() dereferences ent->fuse_req unconditionally
on the head of that list, which would then NULL-deref.
Fix the cancel branch to release the entry directly. Remove it from the
queue, complete the io_uring cmd, end the fuse_req, free the entry, and
drop its queue_refs (waking the teardown waiter if it was the last).
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64263
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: fix moving cancelled entry to ent_in_userspace list
fuse_uring_cancel() moves entries that are available (these have no reqs
attached) to the ent_in_userspace list. ent_list_request_expired()
checks the first entry on ent_in_userspace and dereferences
ent->fuse_req unconditionally, which will crash on a cancelled entry
that was moved to this list.
Fix this by freeing the entry and dropping queue_refs directly in
fuse_uring_cancel(). This is safe because cancel is the cancel handler
itself - after io_uring_cmd_done(), no more cancels will be dispatched
for this command, and teardown serializes with cancel via queue->lock.
Since cancel now decrements queue_refs, fuse_uring_abort() must no
longer gate fuse_uring_abort_end_requests() on queue_refs > 0, as
cancelled entries may have already dropped queue_refs while requests are
still queued. Remove the gate so abort always flushes requests and stops
queues.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: fix moving cancelled entry to ent_in_userspace list
fuse_uring_cancel() moves entries that are available (these have no reqs
attached) to the ent_in_userspace list. ent_list_request_expired()
checks the first entry on ent_in_userspace and dereferences
ent->fuse_req unconditionally, which will crash on a cancelled entry
that was moved to this list.
Fix this by freeing the entry and dropping queue_refs directly in
fuse_uring_cancel(). This is safe because cancel is the cancel handler
itself - after io_uring_cmd_done(), no more cancels will be dispatched
for this command, and teardown serializes with cancel via queue->lock.
Since cancel now decrements queue_refs, fuse_uring_abort() must no
longer gate fuse_uring_abort_end_requests() on queue_refs > 0, as
cancelled entries may have already dropped queue_refs while requests are
still queued. Remove the gate so abort always flushes requests and stops
queues.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64264
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: fix EFAULT clobber in fuse_uring_commit
copy_from_user() returns the number of bytes not copied as an unsigned
residual on failure (1..sizeof(struct fuse_out_header)). fuse_uring_commit
stores that residual in ssize_t err, sets req->out.h.error to -EFAULT,
then jumps to out: with err still holding the positive residual.
err = copy_from_user(&req->out.h, &ent->headers->in_out,
sizeof(req->out.h));
if (err) {
req->out.h.error = -EFAULT;
goto out; /* err is the positive residual */
}
...
out:
fuse_uring_req_end(ent, req, err);
fuse_uring_req_end() then runs
if (error)
req->out.h.error = error;
which overwrites the just-assigned -EFAULT with the positive residual.
FUSE callers such as fuse_simple_request() test err < 0 to detect
failure, so the positive value is interpreted as success and the
caller proceeds with an uninitialised or partial req->out.args.
Fix by assigning err = -EFAULT in the failure branch before jumping
to out, so fuse_uring_req_end() receives a negative errno and sets
req->out.h.error to -EFAULT.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: fix EFAULT clobber in fuse_uring_commit
copy_from_user() returns the number of bytes not copied as an unsigned
residual on failure (1..sizeof(struct fuse_out_header)). fuse_uring_commit
stores that residual in ssize_t err, sets req->out.h.error to -EFAULT,
then jumps to out: with err still holding the positive residual.
err = copy_from_user(&req->out.h, &ent->headers->in_out,
sizeof(req->out.h));
if (err) {
req->out.h.error = -EFAULT;
goto out; /* err is the positive residual */
}
...
out:
fuse_uring_req_end(ent, req, err);
fuse_uring_req_end() then runs
if (error)
req->out.h.error = error;
which overwrites the just-assigned -EFAULT with the positive residual.
FUSE callers such as fuse_simple_request() test err < 0 to detect
failure, so the positive value is interpreted as success and the
caller proceeds with an uninitialised or partial req->out.args.
Fix by assigning err = -EFAULT in the failure branch before jumping
to out, so fuse_uring_req_end() receives a negative errno and sets
req->out.h.error to -EFAULT.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64265
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: clear intr_entry in fuse_resend and fuse_remove_pending_req
When fuse_resend() moves a request from fpq->processing back to
fiq->pending, it sets FR_PENDING and clears FR_SENT but does not
remove the requests intr_entry from fiq->interrupts. If the
request had FR_INTERRUPTED set from a prior signal, intr_entry
remains dangling on fiq->interrupts. When the requesting task
then receives a fatal signal, fuse_remove_pending_req() sees
FR_PENDING=1, removes the request from fiq->pending and frees it
via the refcount path, also without cleaning intr_entry. The
stale intr_entry causes use-after-free when fuse_read_interrupt()
iterates fiq->interrupts:
- list_del_init(&req->intr_entry) -> UAF write on freed slab
- req->in.h.unique -> UAF read, data leaked to userspace
Remove intr_entry from fiq->interrupts in fuse_resend() for
interrupted requests before they are placed back on fiq->pending.
Add a WARN_ON if the intr_entry is not empty on request destruction.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: clear intr_entry in fuse_resend and fuse_remove_pending_req
When fuse_resend() moves a request from fpq->processing back to
fiq->pending, it sets FR_PENDING and clears FR_SENT but does not
remove the requests intr_entry from fiq->interrupts. If the
request had FR_INTERRUPTED set from a prior signal, intr_entry
remains dangling on fiq->interrupts. When the requesting task
then receives a fatal signal, fuse_remove_pending_req() sees
FR_PENDING=1, removes the request from fiq->pending and frees it
via the refcount path, also without cleaning intr_entry. The
stale intr_entry causes use-after-free when fuse_read_interrupt()
iterates fiq->interrupts:
- list_del_init(&req->intr_entry) -> UAF write on freed slab
- req->in.h.unique -> UAF read, data leaked to userspace
Remove intr_entry from fiq->interrupts in fuse_resend() for
interrupted requests before they are placed back on fiq->pending.
Add a WARN_ON if the intr_entry is not empty on request destruction.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64266
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: re-lock request before returning from fuse_ref_folio()
fuse_ref_folio() unlocks the request but does not re-lock it before
returning. fuse_chan_abort() can end the request and the async end
callback (eg fuse_writepage_free()) can free the args while the
subsequent copy chain logic after fuse_ref_folio() accesses them,
leading to use-after-free issues.
Fix this by locking the request in fuse_ref_folio() before returning.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: re-lock request before returning from fuse_ref_folio()
fuse_ref_folio() unlocks the request but does not re-lock it before
returning. fuse_chan_abort() can end the request and the async end
callback (eg fuse_writepage_free()) can free the args while the
subsequent copy chain logic after fuse_ref_folio() accesses them,
leading to use-after-free issues.
Fix this by locking the request in fuse_ref_folio() before returning.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64267
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: avoid 32-bit prune notification count wrap
FUSE_NOTIFY_PRUNE validates the nodeid payload length with:
size - sizeof(outarg) != outarg.count * sizeof(u64)
On 32-bit kernels, size_t is also 32 bits, so the daemon-controlled
count multiplication can wrap. A prune notification with count
0x20000000 and no nodeid payload passes the check, enters the copy
loop, and asks the device copy path to read nodeids that are not
present in the userspace write buffer. In QEMU this reaches the
fuse_copy_fill() BUG_ON(!err) path.
Validate the payload length with array_size() instead. That accepts
exactly the same valid messages, but avoids wrapping arithmetic before
the copy loop consumes the count.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: avoid 32-bit prune notification count wrap
FUSE_NOTIFY_PRUNE validates the nodeid payload length with:
size - sizeof(outarg) != outarg.count * sizeof(u64)
On 32-bit kernels, size_t is also 32 bits, so the daemon-controlled
count multiplication can wrap. A prune notification with count
0x20000000 and no nodeid payload passes the check, enters the copy
loop, and asks the device copy path to read nodeids that are not
present in the userspace write buffer. In QEMU this reaches the
fuse_copy_fill() BUG_ON(!err) path.
Validate the payload length with array_size() instead. That accepts
exactly the same valid messages, but avoids wrapping arithmetic before
the copy loop consumes the count.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64268
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: bound Read Response placement to the RREAD length
In drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp_rx.c, siw_proc_rresp() places each
inbound Read Response DDP segment at sge->laddr + wqe->processed and then
accumulates wqe->processed, but it never checks the running total against
the sink buffer length on continuation segments. siw_check_sge() resolves
and validates the sink memory only on the first fragment (the if (!*mem)
branch), and siw_rresp_check_ntoh() compares the cumulative length against
wqe->bytes only on the final segment (the !frx->more_ddp_segs guard).
A connected siw peer that answers an outstanding RREAD with Read Response
segments that keep the DDP Last flag clear, carrying more total payload
than the RREAD requested, drives wqe->processed past the validated sink
buffer; the next siw_rx_data() call writes out of bounds at
sge->laddr + wqe->processed. siw runs iWARP over ordinary routable TCP,
so the peer is the remote end of an established RDMA connection and needs
no local privilege.
Bound every segment before placement, exactly as siw_proc_send() and
siw_proc_write() already do for their tagged and untagged paths, and
terminate the connection with a base-or-bounds DDP error when the
Read Response would overrun the sink buffer.
This is the second receive-path length fix for this file. A separate
change rejects an MPA FPDU length that underflows the per-fragment
remainder in the header decode; that guard does not cover this case,
because here each individual segment length is self-consistent and only
the accumulated placement offset overruns the buffer.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/siw: bound Read Response placement to the RREAD length
In drivers/infiniband/sw/siw/siw_qp_rx.c, siw_proc_rresp() places each
inbound Read Response DDP segment at sge->laddr + wqe->processed and then
accumulates wqe->processed, but it never checks the running total against
the sink buffer length on continuation segments. siw_check_sge() resolves
and validates the sink memory only on the first fragment (the if (!*mem)
branch), and siw_rresp_check_ntoh() compares the cumulative length against
wqe->bytes only on the final segment (the !frx->more_ddp_segs guard).
A connected siw peer that answers an outstanding RREAD with Read Response
segments that keep the DDP Last flag clear, carrying more total payload
than the RREAD requested, drives wqe->processed past the validated sink
buffer; the next siw_rx_data() call writes out of bounds at
sge->laddr + wqe->processed. siw runs iWARP over ordinary routable TCP,
so the peer is the remote end of an established RDMA connection and needs
no local privilege.
Bound every segment before placement, exactly as siw_proc_send() and
siw_proc_write() already do for their tagged and untagged paths, and
terminate the connection with a base-or-bounds DDP error when the
Read Response would overrun the sink buffer.
This is the second receive-path length fix for this file. A separate
change rejects an MPA FPDU length that underflows the per-fragment
remainder in the header decode; that guard does not cover this case,
because here each individual segment length is self-consistent and only
the accumulated placement offset overruns the buffer.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-64290
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Break the loop on failure in iommufd_fault_fops_read()
On a copy_to_user() failure inside the inner list_for_each_entry, only the
inner loop breaks; the outer while re-fetches the just-restored fault group
and retries the failing copy_to_user() forever, spinning the reader at 100%
CPU with fault->mutex held.
Check rc after the inner loop and break the outer while as well.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Break the loop on failure in iommufd_fault_fops_read()
On a copy_to_user() failure inside the inner list_for_each_entry, only the
inner loop breaks; the outer while re-fetches the just-restored fault group
and retries the failing copy_to_user() forever, spinning the reader at 100%
CPU with fault->mutex held.
Check rc after the inner loop and break the outer while as well.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68796
Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally.
🎖@cveNotify
Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68797
Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally.
🎖@cveNotify
Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68798
Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally.
🎖@cveNotify
Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68799
Use of uninitialized resource in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally.
🎖@cveNotify
Use of uninitialized resource in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68800
Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally.
🎖@cveNotify
Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2024-5042
A flaw was found in the Submariner project. Due to unnecessary role-based access control permissions, a privileged attacker can run a malicious container on a node that may allow them to steal service account tokens and further compromise other nodes and potentially the entire cluster.
🎖@cveNotify
A flaw was found in the Submariner project. Due to unnecessary role-based access control permissions, a privileged attacker can run a malicious container on a node that may allow them to steal service account tokens and further compromise other nodes and potentially the entire cluster.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2025-4373
A flaw was found in GLib, which is vulnerable to an integer overflow in the g_string_insert_unichar() function. When the position at which to insert the character is large, the position will overflow, leading to a buffer underwrite.
🎖@cveNotify
A flaw was found in GLib, which is vulnerable to an integer overflow in the g_string_insert_unichar() function. When the position at which to insert the character is large, the position will overflow, leading to a buffer underwrite.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-1166
Open Redirect vulnerability in Hitachi Ops Center Administrator.This issue affects Hitachi Ops Center Administrator: from 10.2.0 before 11.0.8.
🎖@cveNotify
Open Redirect vulnerability in Hitachi Ops Center Administrator.This issue affects Hitachi Ops Center Administrator: from 10.2.0 before 11.0.8.
🎖@cveNotify
Hitachi
hitachi-sec-2026-113: Open Redirect Vulnerability in Hitachi Ops Center Administrator
Open Redirect Vulnerability(CVE-2026-1166) exists in Hitachi Ops Center Administrator.
🚨 CVE-2026-2072
Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in Hitachi Infrastructure Analytics Advisor (Analytics probe component), Hitachi Ops Center Analyzer.This issue affects Hitachi Infrastructure Analytics Advisor:; Hitachi Ops Center Analyzer: from 10.0.0-00 before 11.0.5-00.
🎖@cveNotify
Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability in Hitachi Infrastructure Analytics Advisor (Analytics probe component), Hitachi Ops Center Analyzer.This issue affects Hitachi Infrastructure Analytics Advisor:; Hitachi Ops Center Analyzer: from 10.0.0-00 before 11.0.5-00.
🎖@cveNotify
Hitachi
hitachi-sec-2026-114: Vulnerability in Hitachi Infrastructure Analytics Advisor and Hitachi Ops Center Analyzer
Vulnerability exists in Hitachi Infrastructure Analytics Advisor and Hitachi Ops Center Analyzer.
🚨 CVE-2025-9497
Use of Hard-coded Credentials vulnerability in Microchip Time Provider 4100 allows Malicious Manual Software Update.This issue affects Time Provider 4100: before 2.5.0.
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Use of Hard-coded Credentials vulnerability in Microchip Time Provider 4100 allows Malicious Manual Software Update.This issue affects Time Provider 4100: before 2.5.0.
🎖@cveNotify
www.gruppotim.it
Vulnerability Research & Advisor
🚨 CVE-2026-6245
A flaw was found in the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD). The pam_passkey_child_read_data() function within the PAM passkey responder fails to properly handle raw bytes received from a pipe. Because the data is treated as a NUL-terminated C string without explicit termination, it results in an out-of-bounds read when processed by functions like snprintf(). A local attacker could potentially trigger this vulnerability by initiating a crafted passkey authentication request, causing the SSSD PAM responder to crash, resulting in a local Denial of Service (DoS).
🎖@cveNotify
A flaw was found in the System Security Services Daemon (SSSD). The pam_passkey_child_read_data() function within the PAM passkey responder fails to properly handle raw bytes received from a pipe. Because the data is treated as a NUL-terminated C string without explicit termination, it results in an out-of-bounds read when processed by functions like snprintf(). A local attacker could potentially trigger this vulnerability by initiating a crafted passkey authentication request, causing the SSSD PAM responder to crash, resulting in a local Denial of Service (DoS).
🎖@cveNotify
Redhat
CVE-2026-6245 - Red Hat Customer Portal
CVE Details App