🚨 CVE-2026-68138
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: serialize qdisc_rtab_list against concurrent get/put
qdisc_get_rtab() and qdisc_put_rtab() mutate the process-global singly
linked list qdisc_rtab_list and a plain non-atomic 'int refcnt' with no
lock. This was only safe because every caller historically held the RTNL
mutex, which serialized all rate-table lookups, inserts and frees.
That invariant no longer holds. cls_flower sets
TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED, so tc_new_tfilter() keeps rtnl_held == false
for it and sets TCA_ACT_FLAGS_NO_RTNL. That flag propagates through
tcf_exts_validate_ex() -> tcf_action_init() -> tcf_action_init_1() ->
tcf_police_init(), which calls qdisc_get_rtab()/qdisc_put_rtab() with the
RTNL mutex NOT held. Two RTM_NEWTFILTER requests on different CPUs, each
adding a flower filter with a police action carrying the same rate, then
race on qdisc_rtab_list and on the non-atomic refcnt, leading to a
use-after-free / double-free of the kmalloc-2k struct qdisc_rate_table.
qdisc_rtab_list is a single global (not per-netns), so the corrupted
object is shared system-wide.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in qdisc_put_rtab+0x12f/0x160
qdisc_put_rtab+0x12f/0x160
tcf_police_init+0xda9/0x1590
tcf_action_init_1+0x460/0x6b0
tcf_action_init+0x439/0xa40
tcf_exts_validate_ex+0x42d/0x550
fl_change+0xddd/0x7da0
tc_new_tfilter+0xaa7/0x2420
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x95e/0xe90
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
Protect qdisc_rtab_list and the refcount with a dedicated spinlock. The
(sleeping, GFP_KERNEL) allocation in qdisc_get_rtab() is performed before
taking the lock; if a concurrent inserter added an identical table in the
meantime the freshly allocated one is freed under the lock, so no
duplicate is leaked. qdisc_put_rtab() now decrements the refcount and
unlinks under the same lock.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: serialize qdisc_rtab_list against concurrent get/put
qdisc_get_rtab() and qdisc_put_rtab() mutate the process-global singly
linked list qdisc_rtab_list and a plain non-atomic 'int refcnt' with no
lock. This was only safe because every caller historically held the RTNL
mutex, which serialized all rate-table lookups, inserts and frees.
That invariant no longer holds. cls_flower sets
TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED, so tc_new_tfilter() keeps rtnl_held == false
for it and sets TCA_ACT_FLAGS_NO_RTNL. That flag propagates through
tcf_exts_validate_ex() -> tcf_action_init() -> tcf_action_init_1() ->
tcf_police_init(), which calls qdisc_get_rtab()/qdisc_put_rtab() with the
RTNL mutex NOT held. Two RTM_NEWTFILTER requests on different CPUs, each
adding a flower filter with a police action carrying the same rate, then
race on qdisc_rtab_list and on the non-atomic refcnt, leading to a
use-after-free / double-free of the kmalloc-2k struct qdisc_rate_table.
qdisc_rtab_list is a single global (not per-netns), so the corrupted
object is shared system-wide.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in qdisc_put_rtab+0x12f/0x160
qdisc_put_rtab+0x12f/0x160
tcf_police_init+0xda9/0x1590
tcf_action_init_1+0x460/0x6b0
tcf_action_init+0x439/0xa40
tcf_exts_validate_ex+0x42d/0x550
fl_change+0xddd/0x7da0
tc_new_tfilter+0xaa7/0x2420
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x95e/0xe90
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
Protect qdisc_rtab_list and the refcount with a dedicated spinlock. The
(sleeping, GFP_KERNEL) allocation in qdisc_get_rtab() is performed before
taking the lock; if a concurrent inserter added an identical table in the
meantime the freshly allocated one is freed under the lock, so no
duplicate is leaked. qdisc_put_rtab() now decrements the refcount and
unlinks under the same lock.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68139
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Use sender devcom for MPV master-up
After PCIe DPC recovery, mlx5 reloads the affected functions and
replays multiport affiliation events. In the reported failure, the
first relevant device error was:
pcieport 0000:10:01.1: DPC: containment event
pcieport 0000:10:01.1: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Fatal)
pcieport 0000:10:01.1: [ 5] SDES (First)
mlx5 recovered the PCI functions and resumed 0000:11:00.1. During
that resume, RDMA multiport binding replayed
MLX5_DRIVER_EVENT_AFFILIATION_DONE and mlx5e sent
MPV_DEVCOM_MASTER_UP. The host then panicked with:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
RIP: mlx5_devcom_comp_set_ready+0x5/0x40 [mlx5_core]
RDI: 0000000000000000
Call trace included:
mlx5_devcom_comp_set_ready
mlx5e_devcom_event_mpv
mlx5_devcom_send_event
mlx5_ib_bind_slave_port
mlx5r_mp_probe
mlx5_pci_resume
MPV devcom registration publishes mlx5e private data to the component
peer list before mlx5e_devcom_init_mpv() stores the returned component
device in priv->devcom. A concurrent master-up event can therefore
reach a peer whose private data is visible but whose priv->devcom
backpointer is still NULL.
MPV_DEVCOM_MASTER_UP already carries the sender/master mlx5e private
data as event_data. The ready bit is stored on the shared devcom
component, not on an individual peer. Use the sender devcom when
marking the MPV component ready.
This preserves the readiness transition while avoiding a NULL
dereference of the peer devcom pointer during affiliation replay after
PCI error recovery.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Use sender devcom for MPV master-up
After PCIe DPC recovery, mlx5 reloads the affected functions and
replays multiport affiliation events. In the reported failure, the
first relevant device error was:
pcieport 0000:10:01.1: DPC: containment event
pcieport 0000:10:01.1: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Fatal)
pcieport 0000:10:01.1: [ 5] SDES (First)
mlx5 recovered the PCI functions and resumed 0000:11:00.1. During
that resume, RDMA multiport binding replayed
MLX5_DRIVER_EVENT_AFFILIATION_DONE and mlx5e sent
MPV_DEVCOM_MASTER_UP. The host then panicked with:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
RIP: mlx5_devcom_comp_set_ready+0x5/0x40 [mlx5_core]
RDI: 0000000000000000
Call trace included:
mlx5_devcom_comp_set_ready
mlx5e_devcom_event_mpv
mlx5_devcom_send_event
mlx5_ib_bind_slave_port
mlx5r_mp_probe
mlx5_pci_resume
MPV devcom registration publishes mlx5e private data to the component
peer list before mlx5e_devcom_init_mpv() stores the returned component
device in priv->devcom. A concurrent master-up event can therefore
reach a peer whose private data is visible but whose priv->devcom
backpointer is still NULL.
MPV_DEVCOM_MASTER_UP already carries the sender/master mlx5e private
data as event_data. The ready bit is stored on the shared devcom
component, not on an individual peer. Use the sender devcom when
marking the MPV component ready.
This preserves the readiness transition while avoiding a NULL
dereference of the peer devcom pointer during affiliation replay after
PCI error recovery.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68140
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/iucv: fix use-after-free of a severed iucv_path
af_iucv queues not-yet-received message notifications on iucv->message_q,
each holding a raw pointer to the connection's iucv_path. When the peer
severs the connection, iucv_sever_path() frees that path with
iucv_path_free() but leaves the notifications queued. A later recvmsg()
drains message_q via iucv_process_message_q() and hands the stale path to
message_receive() -- a use-after-free of the freed iucv_path.
Drop the queued notifications when the path is severed; once the path is
gone they can no longer be received. This also frees the notifications
leaked when a socket is closed with messages still queued.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/iucv: fix use-after-free of a severed iucv_path
af_iucv queues not-yet-received message notifications on iucv->message_q,
each holding a raw pointer to the connection's iucv_path. When the peer
severs the connection, iucv_sever_path() frees that path with
iucv_path_free() but leaves the notifications queued. A later recvmsg()
drains message_q via iucv_process_message_q() and hands the stale path to
message_receive() -- a use-after-free of the freed iucv_path.
Drop the queued notifications when the path is severed; once the path is
gone they can no longer be received. This also frees the notifications
leaked when a socket is closed with messages still queued.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68141
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/af_iucv: fix NULL deref in afiucv_hs_callback_syn()
afiucv_hs_callback_syn() allocates the child socket with GFP_ATOMIC.
If the allocation fails, nsk is NULL.
The connection-refused path is entered when the listen state check
fails, the accept backlog is full, or nsk is NULL. The code
unconditionally calls iucv_sock_kill(nsk) in that path.
iucv_sock_kill() does not accept a NULL socket pointer and immediately
dereferences sk via sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED). When nsk is NULL,
calling iucv_sock_kill(nsk) results in a NULL pointer dereference.
Only call iucv_sock_kill() when a child socket was successfully
allocated.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/af_iucv: fix NULL deref in afiucv_hs_callback_syn()
afiucv_hs_callback_syn() allocates the child socket with GFP_ATOMIC.
If the allocation fails, nsk is NULL.
The connection-refused path is entered when the listen state check
fails, the accept backlog is full, or nsk is NULL. The code
unconditionally calls iucv_sock_kill(nsk) in that path.
iucv_sock_kill() does not accept a NULL socket pointer and immediately
dereferences sk via sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED). When nsk is NULL,
calling iucv_sock_kill(nsk) results in a NULL pointer dereference.
Only call iucv_sock_kill() when a child socket was successfully
allocated.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68142
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
geneve: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and
the sticky underlay netns geneve->net. They differ once the device is
created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in.
The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev),
so a caller privileged there but not in geneve->net can rewrite a geneve
device whose underlay lives in geneve->net.
geneve_changelink() applies the new configuration against geneve->net:
geneve_link_config() and the geneve_quiesce()/geneve_unquiesce() pair
reopen the underlay sockets in that netns (geneve_sock_add() uses
geneve->net), so the same reasoning as the tunnel changelink series
applies here.
Gate geneve_changelink() with rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(), at the top of
the op before any attribute is parsed, matching ipgre_changelink() and
the rest of the "require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for
changelink" series.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
geneve: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and
the sticky underlay netns geneve->net. They differ once the device is
created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in.
The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev),
so a caller privileged there but not in geneve->net can rewrite a geneve
device whose underlay lives in geneve->net.
geneve_changelink() applies the new configuration against geneve->net:
geneve_link_config() and the geneve_quiesce()/geneve_unquiesce() pair
reopen the underlay sockets in that netns (geneve_sock_add() uses
geneve->net), so the same reasoning as the tunnel changelink series
applies here.
Gate geneve_changelink() with rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(), at the top of
the op before any attribute is parsed, matching ipgre_changelink() and
the rest of the "require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for
changelink" series.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68143
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: slip: serialize receive against buffer reallocation
sl_realloc_bufs() replaces rbuff and updates buffsize while holding
sl->lock. slip_receive_buf() reads those fields and writes through rbuff
without holding the lock.
An MTU change can therefore race with receive processing. An MTU shrink
can expose the new smaller rbuff with the old larger bound, causing an
out-of-bounds write. A receive callback which already loaded the old
rbuff can instead continue writing after that buffer has been freed.
Serialize receive processing with sl_realloc_bufs() by holding sl->lock
while consuming each receive batch.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: slip: serialize receive against buffer reallocation
sl_realloc_bufs() replaces rbuff and updates buffsize while holding
sl->lock. slip_receive_buf() reads those fields and writes through rbuff
without holding the lock.
An MTU change can therefore race with receive processing. An MTU shrink
can expose the new smaller rbuff with the old larger bound, causing an
out-of-bounds write. A receive callback which already loaded the old
rbuff can instead continue writing after that buffer has been freed.
Serialize receive processing with sl_realloc_bufs() by holding sl->lock
while consuming each receive batch.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68144
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phonet: pep: fix use-after-free in pep_get_sb()
pep_get_sb() doesn't consider that pskb_may_pull() might have relocated
the skb data, and continue to access the older pointer, causing UAF.
Reproduced under KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pep_get_sb+0x234/0x3b0
Read of size 1 at addr ff11000105510f50 by task repro/157
pep_get_sb+0x234/0x3b0
pipe_handler_do_rcv+0x5f7/0xa10
pep_do_rcv+0x203/0x410
__sk_receive_skb+0x471/0x4a0
phonet_rcv+0x5b3/0x6c0
__netif_receive_skb+0xcc/0x1d0
Refetch the header with skb_header_pointer() after pskb_may_pull(), so
the possibly stale pointer is no longer dereferenced. There are better
ways to solve this, but, this is the less instrusive one.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phonet: pep: fix use-after-free in pep_get_sb()
pep_get_sb() doesn't consider that pskb_may_pull() might have relocated
the skb data, and continue to access the older pointer, causing UAF.
Reproduced under KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pep_get_sb+0x234/0x3b0
Read of size 1 at addr ff11000105510f50 by task repro/157
pep_get_sb+0x234/0x3b0
pipe_handler_do_rcv+0x5f7/0xa10
pep_do_rcv+0x203/0x410
__sk_receive_skb+0x471/0x4a0
phonet_rcv+0x5b3/0x6c0
__netif_receive_skb+0xcc/0x1d0
Refetch the header with skb_header_pointer() after pskb_may_pull(), so
the possibly stale pointer is no longer dereferenced. There are better
ways to solve this, but, this is the less instrusive one.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68145
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iomap: fix out-of-bounds bitmap_set() with zero-length range
ifs_set_range_dirty() and ifs_set_range_uptodate() compute last_blk
as (off + len - 1) >> i_blkbits. When off is 0 and len is 0, the
unsigned subtraction underflows to SIZE_MAX, producing a huge
last_blk and nr_blks value that causes bitmap_set() to write far
beyond the ifs->state allocation.
Regarding ifs_set_range_uptodate(), it is temporarily safe because len
cannot be passed in as 0. However, for ifs_set_range_dirty() this is
reachable from __iomap_write_end(): when copy_folio_from_iter_atomic()
returns 0 (e.g. user buffer fault) and the folio is already uptodate,
the guard at the top of __iomap_write_end() does not trigger because
!folio_test_uptodate() is false, and iomap_set_range_dirty() is called
with copied == 0.
Add a !len guard to both functions before the computation, so that a
zero-length range is a no-op.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iomap: fix out-of-bounds bitmap_set() with zero-length range
ifs_set_range_dirty() and ifs_set_range_uptodate() compute last_blk
as (off + len - 1) >> i_blkbits. When off is 0 and len is 0, the
unsigned subtraction underflows to SIZE_MAX, producing a huge
last_blk and nr_blks value that causes bitmap_set() to write far
beyond the ifs->state allocation.
Regarding ifs_set_range_uptodate(), it is temporarily safe because len
cannot be passed in as 0. However, for ifs_set_range_dirty() this is
reachable from __iomap_write_end(): when copy_folio_from_iter_atomic()
returns 0 (e.g. user buffer fault) and the folio is already uptodate,
the guard at the top of __iomap_write_end() does not trigger because
!folio_test_uptodate() is false, and iomap_set_range_dirty() is called
with copied == 0.
Add a !len guard to both functions before the computation, so that a
zero-length range is a no-op.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68146
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Add global mutex to serialize trace_parser access
In ftrace, the trace_parser structure is allocated and initialized when
a trace file is opened, and is subsequently used across write and release
handlers to parse user input.
The affected handler paths and their specific functions are:
- Open paths: ftrace_regex_open(), ftrace_graph_open()
- Write paths: ftrace_regex_write(), ftrace_graph_write()
- Release paths: ftrace_regex_release(), ftrace_graph_release()
If userspace opens a trace file descriptor and shares it across multiple
threads, concurrent write calls will race on the parser's internal state,
specifically the 'idx', 'cont', and 'buffer' fields, leading to corrupted
input or undefined behavior.
Fix this by adding a global mutex, parser_lock, to serialize all access
to trace_parser across write and release paths, preventing concurrent
corruption of parser state.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Add global mutex to serialize trace_parser access
In ftrace, the trace_parser structure is allocated and initialized when
a trace file is opened, and is subsequently used across write and release
handlers to parse user input.
The affected handler paths and their specific functions are:
- Open paths: ftrace_regex_open(), ftrace_graph_open()
- Write paths: ftrace_regex_write(), ftrace_graph_write()
- Release paths: ftrace_regex_release(), ftrace_graph_release()
If userspace opens a trace file descriptor and shares it across multiple
threads, concurrent write calls will race on the parser's internal state,
specifically the 'idx', 'cont', and 'buffer' fields, leading to corrupted
input or undefined behavior.
Fix this by adding a global mutex, parser_lock, to serialize all access
to trace_parser across write and release paths, preventing concurrent
corruption of parser state.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68147
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices()
When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls
fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem's list of block devices,
then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(),
blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one.
Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically
allocated array. This dynamic allocation is problematic because:
- It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call
site when it's invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim.
- fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn't handle the failure. It
just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling
blk_crypto_evict_key(). That causes a use-after-free.
For now, let's fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable
way by switching to an on-stack array. Currently the fscrypt
multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded
limit of 8 block devices. An on-stack array works fine for that.
(Of course, this solution won't scale up to large number of block
devices. For that we'd need a different solution, like moving the block
device iteration into the filesystem. Or in the case of btrfs, which
will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call
blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won't be needed.)
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fscrypt: Avoid dynamic allocation in fscrypt_get_devices()
When a blk_crypto_key starts being used or is evicted, fs/crypto/ calls
fscrypt_get_devices() to get the filesystem's list of block devices,
then iterates over them and calls blk_crypto_config_supported(),
blk_crypto_start_using_key(), or blk_crypto_evict_key() on each one.
Currently, the block device pointers are placed in a dynamically
allocated array. This dynamic allocation is problematic because:
- It can fail, especially at the fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() call
site when it's invoked for inode eviction under direct reclaim.
- fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() doesn't handle the failure. It
just zeroizes and frees the blk_crypto_key without calling
blk_crypto_evict_key(). That causes a use-after-free.
For now, let's fix this in the straightforward and easily-backportable
way by switching to an on-stack array. Currently the fscrypt
multi-device functionality is used only by f2fs, which has a hardcoded
limit of 8 block devices. An on-stack array works fine for that.
(Of course, this solution won't scale up to large number of block
devices. For that we'd need a different solution, like moving the block
device iteration into the filesystem. Or in the case of btrfs, which
will only support blk-crypto-fallback, we should make it just call
blk-crypto-fallback directly, so the block devices won't be needed.)
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68148
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fscrypt: Add missing superblock check in find_or_insert_direct_key()
The legacy 'fscrypt_direct_keys' table caches master keys that are used
by v1 encryption policies that have FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY.
It's just a global table for all filesystems (since the keys can be
provided by the legacy process-subscribed keyrings mechanism, which
makes it difficult to reuse super_block::s_master_keys).
The entries in it ('struct fscrypt_direct_key') do contain a super_block
pointer, though, for passing to fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() when
the last inode that references the key is evicted.
However, when finding the fscrypt_direct_key for an inode, we weren't
actually comparing the super_block pointer. As a result, inodes with
different super_blocks could point to the same fscrypt_direct_key. That
could extend the lifetime of a fscrypt_direct_key beyond the
super_block it points to, causing a use-after-free later.
Fix this by creating distinct fscrypt_direct_key structs for distinct
super_block structs.
Note that this problem doesn't exist in the v2 policy equivalent
("per-mode keys"), since the data structures there are per super_block.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fscrypt: Add missing superblock check in find_or_insert_direct_key()
The legacy 'fscrypt_direct_keys' table caches master keys that are used
by v1 encryption policies that have FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY.
It's just a global table for all filesystems (since the keys can be
provided by the legacy process-subscribed keyrings mechanism, which
makes it difficult to reuse super_block::s_master_keys).
The entries in it ('struct fscrypt_direct_key') do contain a super_block
pointer, though, for passing to fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() when
the last inode that references the key is evicted.
However, when finding the fscrypt_direct_key for an inode, we weren't
actually comparing the super_block pointer. As a result, inodes with
different super_blocks could point to the same fscrypt_direct_key. That
could extend the lifetime of a fscrypt_direct_key beyond the
super_block it points to, causing a use-after-free later.
Fix this by creating distinct fscrypt_direct_key structs for distinct
super_block structs.
Note that this problem doesn't exist in the v2 policy equivalent
("per-mode keys"), since the data structures there are per super_block.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68149
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: preserve ACL_DONT_CACHE state in forget_cached_acl()
The ACL_DONT_CACHE state is meant to be a constant state for the inode
for filesystems that want to opt out of posix acl caching.
Commit facd61053cff1 ("fuse: fixes after adapting to new posix acl api")
used this facility to opt out of posix acl caching for fuse inodes with
fuse server that does not negotiate FUSE_POSIX_ACL (fc->posix_acl).
The commit also takes care to gate the forget_all_cached_acls() call in
fuse_set_acl() on fc->posix_acl because there is no need for it, but
there are other placed in fuse code which call forget_all_cached_acls()
unconditional to fc->posix_acl and those cause the loss of the
ACL_DONT_CACHE state.
This is not only a functional bug. Properly timed, a get_acl() from this
fuse filesystem can return a stale cached value, as was observed in tests,
because set_acl() does not invalidate the unintentional acl cache.
We could fix this in fuse, but it actually makes no sense for the vfs
helper forget_cached_acl() to invalidate the ACL_DONT_CACHE state, so
let it not do that to fix fuse and future users of ACL_DONT_CACHE.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: preserve ACL_DONT_CACHE state in forget_cached_acl()
The ACL_DONT_CACHE state is meant to be a constant state for the inode
for filesystems that want to opt out of posix acl caching.
Commit facd61053cff1 ("fuse: fixes after adapting to new posix acl api")
used this facility to opt out of posix acl caching for fuse inodes with
fuse server that does not negotiate FUSE_POSIX_ACL (fc->posix_acl).
The commit also takes care to gate the forget_all_cached_acls() call in
fuse_set_acl() on fc->posix_acl because there is no need for it, but
there are other placed in fuse code which call forget_all_cached_acls()
unconditional to fc->posix_acl and those cause the loss of the
ACL_DONT_CACHE state.
This is not only a functional bug. Properly timed, a get_acl() from this
fuse filesystem can return a stale cached value, as was observed in tests,
because set_acl() does not invalidate the unintentional acl cache.
We could fix this in fuse, but it actually makes no sense for the vfs
helper forget_cached_acl() to invalidate the ACL_DONT_CACHE state, so
let it not do that to fix fuse and future users of ACL_DONT_CACHE.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68150
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/super: fix emergency thaw double-unlock of s_umount
do_thaw_all() iterates over all superblocks via __iterate_supers()
with SUPER_ITER_EXCL, which acquires s_umount exclusively before
calling the callback and releases it afterwards. However, the
callback do_thaw_all_callback() calls thaw_super_locked() which
unconditionally releases s_umount on every code path. This results
in a second unlock attempt in __iterate_supers() that corrupts the
rwsem state, triggering a DEBUG_RWSEMS warning:
[ 182.601148] sysrq: Emergency Thaw of all frozen filesystems
[ 182.601865] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 182.602375] DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && !rwsem_test_oflags(sem, RWSEM_NONSPINNABLE)): count = 0x0, magic = 0xffff99b1011e5870, owner = 0x0, curr 0xffff99b101b06c80, list not empty
[ 182.603817] WARNING: kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1412 at up_write+0xa3/0x170, CPU#2: kworker/2:1/53
[ 182.604578] Modules linked in:
[ 182.604864] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4-00001-gbd3bd93ea98a-dirty #4 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 182.605711] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1kylin1 04/01/2014
[ 182.606417] Workqueue: events do_thaw_all
[ 182.606750] RIP: 0010:up_write+0xaf/0x170
[ 182.607076] Code: 19 3a 92 48 0f 44 c2 48 8b 55 08 48 8b 55 00 4c 8b 45 08 48 8b 55 00 48 8d 3d ad 91 e0 01 48 8b 4d 20 50 48 c7 c6 f0 8c 26 92 <67> 48 0f b9 3a e8 d7 93 4e 00 58 eb 81 48 83 7f 18 00 48 c7 c2 8d
[ 182.608563] RSP: 0018:ffffb670001d7e08 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 182.609007] RAX: ffffffff92349e8d RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff99b1011e5870
[ 182.609595] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff92268cf0 RDI: ffffffff92914d10
[ 182.610283] RBP: ffff99b1011e5870 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff99b101b06c80
[ 182.610847] R10: ffff99b10139a808 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: 0000000000000000
[ 182.611414] R13: ffffffff90cf74d0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff99b1011e5800
[ 182.612009] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff99b1eaaee000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 182.612670] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 182.613146] CR2: 00000000005c631c CR3: 00000000013ee000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 182.613722] Call Trace:
[ 182.613946] <TASK>
[ 182.614130] __iterate_supers+0x128/0x150
[ 182.614463] do_thaw_all+0x1b/0x30
[ 182.614759] process_scheduled_works+0xbb/0x3f0
[ 182.615150] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.615499] worker_thread+0x129/0x270
[ 182.615816] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.616201] kthread+0xe2/0x120
[ 182.616469] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.616792] ret_from_fork+0x15b/0x240
[ 182.617115] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.617426] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 182.617761] </TASK>
[ 182.617968] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 182.618412] Emergency Thaw complete
Fix this by switching to SUPER_ITER_UNLOCKED and acquiring s_umount
in the callback via super_lock_excl() before calling
thaw_super_locked(). This matches the locking pattern expected by
thaw_super_locked() and eliminates the double unlock.
While at it, remove the dead 'return;' at the end of
do_thaw_all_callback().
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/super: fix emergency thaw double-unlock of s_umount
do_thaw_all() iterates over all superblocks via __iterate_supers()
with SUPER_ITER_EXCL, which acquires s_umount exclusively before
calling the callback and releases it afterwards. However, the
callback do_thaw_all_callback() calls thaw_super_locked() which
unconditionally releases s_umount on every code path. This results
in a second unlock attempt in __iterate_supers() that corrupts the
rwsem state, triggering a DEBUG_RWSEMS warning:
[ 182.601148] sysrq: Emergency Thaw of all frozen filesystems
[ 182.601865] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 182.602375] DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && !rwsem_test_oflags(sem, RWSEM_NONSPINNABLE)): count = 0x0, magic = 0xffff99b1011e5870, owner = 0x0, curr 0xffff99b101b06c80, list not empty
[ 182.603817] WARNING: kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1412 at up_write+0xa3/0x170, CPU#2: kworker/2:1/53
[ 182.604578] Modules linked in:
[ 182.604864] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4-00001-gbd3bd93ea98a-dirty #4 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 182.605711] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1kylin1 04/01/2014
[ 182.606417] Workqueue: events do_thaw_all
[ 182.606750] RIP: 0010:up_write+0xaf/0x170
[ 182.607076] Code: 19 3a 92 48 0f 44 c2 48 8b 55 08 48 8b 55 00 4c 8b 45 08 48 8b 55 00 48 8d 3d ad 91 e0 01 48 8b 4d 20 50 48 c7 c6 f0 8c 26 92 <67> 48 0f b9 3a e8 d7 93 4e 00 58 eb 81 48 83 7f 18 00 48 c7 c2 8d
[ 182.608563] RSP: 0018:ffffb670001d7e08 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 182.609007] RAX: ffffffff92349e8d RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff99b1011e5870
[ 182.609595] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff92268cf0 RDI: ffffffff92914d10
[ 182.610283] RBP: ffff99b1011e5870 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff99b101b06c80
[ 182.610847] R10: ffff99b10139a808 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: 0000000000000000
[ 182.611414] R13: ffffffff90cf74d0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff99b1011e5800
[ 182.612009] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff99b1eaaee000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 182.612670] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 182.613146] CR2: 00000000005c631c CR3: 00000000013ee000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 182.613722] Call Trace:
[ 182.613946] <TASK>
[ 182.614130] __iterate_supers+0x128/0x150
[ 182.614463] do_thaw_all+0x1b/0x30
[ 182.614759] process_scheduled_works+0xbb/0x3f0
[ 182.615150] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.615499] worker_thread+0x129/0x270
[ 182.615816] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.616201] kthread+0xe2/0x120
[ 182.616469] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.616792] ret_from_fork+0x15b/0x240
[ 182.617115] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.617426] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 182.617761] </TASK>
[ 182.617968] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 182.618412] Emergency Thaw complete
Fix this by switching to SUPER_ITER_UNLOCKED and acquiring s_umount
in the callback via super_lock_excl() before calling
thaw_super_locked(). This matches the locking pattern expected by
thaw_super_locked() and eliminates the double unlock.
While at it, remove the dead 'return;' at the end of
do_thaw_all_callback().
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68151
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binfmt_elf_fdpic: only honour the first PT_INTERP
The program header scan handles PT_INTERP from a switch nested in the
scan loop, so its break leaves the switch and not the loop. A binary
carrying more than one PT_INTERP runs the case again and overwrites both
interpreter_name and interpreter. The previous name allocation leaks and
so does the previous interpreter reference, along with the write denial
open_exec() took on it. The denial is never released, so the file stays
unwritable for as long as the system runs.
An unprivileged caller reaches this with a crafted binary and repeats it
at will. binfmt_elf stops at the first PT_INTERP. Do the same here.
The flaw dates back to the driver's introduction in the pre-git history
tree introduced in v2.6.11 by 91808d6ebe39 ("[PATCH] FRV: Add FDPIC ELF
binary format driver").
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binfmt_elf_fdpic: only honour the first PT_INTERP
The program header scan handles PT_INTERP from a switch nested in the
scan loop, so its break leaves the switch and not the loop. A binary
carrying more than one PT_INTERP runs the case again and overwrites both
interpreter_name and interpreter. The previous name allocation leaks and
so does the previous interpreter reference, along with the write denial
open_exec() took on it. The denial is never released, so the file stays
unwritable for as long as the system runs.
An unprivileged caller reaches this with a crafted binary and repeats it
at will. binfmt_elf stops at the first PT_INTERP. Do the same here.
The flaw dates back to the driver's introduction in the pre-git history
tree introduced in v2.6.11 by 91808d6ebe39 ("[PATCH] FRV: Add FDPIC ELF
binary format driver").
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68152
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
amt: fix use-after-free in AMT delayed works
When an AMT device is removed, pending delayed works can still access
the freed amt_dev structure, which may result in kernel crashes or
memory corruption.
amt_dev_stop() cancels req_wq and discovery_wq with
cancel_delayed_work_sync(), but these works can be scheduled again
from event_wq after the cancellation. This allows delayed works to
access the freed amt_dev structure after the netdev has been released.
The following is a simple race scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
amt_dev_stop()
cancel_delayed_work_sync()
amt_event_work()
mod_delayed_work(req_wq)
free netdev
req_wq accesses freed amt_dev
Use disable_delayed_work_sync() in amt_dev_stop() to prevent req_wq and
discovery_wq from being queued again and wait for running work items
to complete.
The delayed works are disabled after initialization in
amt_newlink() and enabled only when the device is successfully opened.
This keeps the delayed work lifecycle synchronized with the lifetime
of the AMT device.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
amt: fix use-after-free in AMT delayed works
When an AMT device is removed, pending delayed works can still access
the freed amt_dev structure, which may result in kernel crashes or
memory corruption.
amt_dev_stop() cancels req_wq and discovery_wq with
cancel_delayed_work_sync(), but these works can be scheduled again
from event_wq after the cancellation. This allows delayed works to
access the freed amt_dev structure after the netdev has been released.
The following is a simple race scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
amt_dev_stop()
cancel_delayed_work_sync()
amt_event_work()
mod_delayed_work(req_wq)
free netdev
req_wq accesses freed amt_dev
Use disable_delayed_work_sync() in amt_dev_stop() to prevent req_wq and
discovery_wq from being queued again and wait for running work items
to complete.
The delayed works are disabled after initialization in
amt_newlink() and enabled only when the device is successfully opened.
This keeps the delayed work lifecycle synchronized with the lifetime
of the AMT device.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68153
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: remove debugfs files before client teardown
ceph_destroy_client() tears down the monitor client before removing
the per-client debugfs files. A concurrent read of the monmap debugfs
file can enter monmap_show() after ceph_monc_stop() has freed
monc->monmap, triggering a use-after-free.
Remove the debugfs files before stopping the OSD and monitor clients.
debugfs_remove() drains active handlers and prevents new accesses, so
the debugfs callbacks can no longer race the rest of client teardown.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: remove debugfs files before client teardown
ceph_destroy_client() tears down the monitor client before removing
the per-client debugfs files. A concurrent read of the monmap debugfs
file can enter monmap_show() after ceph_monc_stop() has freed
monc->monmap, triggering a use-after-free.
Remove the debugfs files before stopping the OSD and monitor clients.
debugfs_remove() drains active handlers and prevents new accesses, so
the debugfs callbacks can no longer race the rest of client teardown.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68155
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Reject monmaps advertising zero monitors
A message of type CEPH_MSG_MON_MAP contains a monmap that is sent from a
monitor to the client. This monmap contains information about the
existing monitors in the cluster. Currently, a monmap indicating that
there are zero monitors in the cluster is treated as valid. However, it
is impossible to have zero monitors in the cluster and still receive a
valid monmap from a monitor. Therefore, such a monmap must be corrupted
and should be treated as invalid. Furthermore, a monmap with a monitor
count of zero can subsequently crash the client when attempting to open
a session with a monitor in __open_session(). This happens because the
"BUG_ON(monc->monmap->num_mon < 1)" assertion in pick_new_mon() is
triggered.
This patch extends a check in ceph_monmap_decode() to also reject
arriving mon_maps with num_mon == 0 rather than only with
num_mon > CEPH_MAX_MON.
[ idryomov: drop "log output for unusual values of num_mon" part ]
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Reject monmaps advertising zero monitors
A message of type CEPH_MSG_MON_MAP contains a monmap that is sent from a
monitor to the client. This monmap contains information about the
existing monitors in the cluster. Currently, a monmap indicating that
there are zero monitors in the cluster is treated as valid. However, it
is impossible to have zero monitors in the cluster and still receive a
valid monmap from a monitor. Therefore, such a monmap must be corrupted
and should be treated as invalid. Furthermore, a monmap with a monitor
count of zero can subsequently crash the client when attempting to open
a session with a monitor in __open_session(). This happens because the
"BUG_ON(monc->monmap->num_mon < 1)" assertion in pick_new_mon() is
triggered.
This patch extends a check in ceph_monmap_decode() to also reject
arriving mon_maps with num_mon == 0 rather than only with
num_mon > CEPH_MAX_MON.
[ idryomov: drop "log output for unusual values of num_mon" part ]
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68156
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: refresh auth->authorizer_buf{,_len} after authorizer update
ceph_x_create_authorizer() caches au->buf->vec.iov_base and
au->buf->vec.iov_len in struct ceph_auth_handshake. These
cached values are then used by the messenger connect code when
sending the authorizer.
ceph_x_update_authorizer() can rebuild the authorizer when a newer
service ticket is available. If the rebuilt authorizer no longer
fits in the existing buffer, ceph_x_build_authorizer() drops its
reference to au->buf and allocates a new one. If this is the final
reference, ceph_buffer_put() frees the old ceph_buffer and its
vec.iov_base, but auth->authorizer_buf still points at that freed
memory.
A subsequent msgr1 reconnect can therefore queue the stale pointer
and trigger a KASAN slab-use-after-free in _copy_from_iter() while
tcp_sendmsg() copies the authorizer.
Refresh auth->authorizer_buf and auth->authorizer_buf_len after a
successful authorizer rebuild so the messenger sends the current
buffer.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: refresh auth->authorizer_buf{,_len} after authorizer update
ceph_x_create_authorizer() caches au->buf->vec.iov_base and
au->buf->vec.iov_len in struct ceph_auth_handshake. These
cached values are then used by the messenger connect code when
sending the authorizer.
ceph_x_update_authorizer() can rebuild the authorizer when a newer
service ticket is available. If the rebuilt authorizer no longer
fits in the existing buffer, ceph_x_build_authorizer() drops its
reference to au->buf and allocates a new one. If this is the final
reference, ceph_buffer_put() frees the old ceph_buffer and its
vec.iov_base, but auth->authorizer_buf still points at that freed
memory.
A subsequent msgr1 reconnect can therefore queue the stale pointer
and trigger a KASAN slab-use-after-free in _copy_from_iter() while
tcp_sendmsg() copies the authorizer.
Refresh auth->authorizer_buf and auth->authorizer_buf_len after a
successful authorizer rebuild so the messenger sends the current
buffer.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68157
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: guard missing CRUSH type name lookup
Localized read selection can walk a parent bucket whose name exists in
the CRUSH map while its type has no matching entry in type_names.
get_immediate_parent() then dereferences a NULL type_cn and passes an
invalid pointer into strcmp(), causing a null-ptr-deref.
Skip such malformed parent buckets unless both the bucket name and type
name metadata are present. This keeps malformed hierarchy data from
crashing locality lookup and safely falls back to "not local".
[ idryomov: add WARN_ON_ONCE ]
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: guard missing CRUSH type name lookup
Localized read selection can walk a parent bucket whose name exists in
the CRUSH map while its type has no matching entry in type_names.
get_immediate_parent() then dereferences a NULL type_cn and passes an
invalid pointer into strcmp(), causing a null-ptr-deref.
Skip such malformed parent buckets unless both the bucket name and type
name metadata are present. This keeps malformed hierarchy data from
crashing locality lookup and safely falls back to "not local".
[ idryomov: add WARN_ON_ONCE ]
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68158
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Fix multiplication overflow in decode_new_up_state_weight()
If a message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP contains a (maliciously) corrupted
osdmap, out-of-bounds memory accesses may occur in
decode_new_up_state_weight(). This happens because the bounds check for
the new_state part is based on calculating its length depending on a len
value read from the incoming message. This calculation may overflow
leading to an incorrect bounds check. Subsequently, out-of-bounds reads
may occur when decoding this part.
This patch switches the multiplication to use check_mul_overflow() to
abort processing the osdmap if an overflow occurred. Therefore,
osdmaps/messages containing large values for len that result in a
multiplication overflow are treated as invalid.
[ idryomov: rename new_state_len -> new_state_item_size, formatting ]
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Fix multiplication overflow in decode_new_up_state_weight()
If a message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP contains a (maliciously) corrupted
osdmap, out-of-bounds memory accesses may occur in
decode_new_up_state_weight(). This happens because the bounds check for
the new_state part is based on calculating its length depending on a len
value read from the incoming message. This calculation may overflow
leading to an incorrect bounds check. Subsequently, out-of-bounds reads
may occur when decoding this part.
This patch switches the multiplication to use check_mul_overflow() to
abort processing the osdmap if an overflow occurred. Therefore,
osdmaps/messages containing large values for len that result in a
multiplication overflow are treated as invalid.
[ idryomov: rename new_state_len -> new_state_item_size, formatting ]
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-68159
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: bound pg_{temp,upmap,upmap_items} length to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE
__decode_pg_temp() decodes an user-controlled length but only rejects
values large enough to overflow the allocation; it does not bound it to
CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE. The helper backs both pg_temp and pg_upmap decoding, and
apply_upmap()/get_temp_osds() later copy the decoded list into the fixed-size
on-stack array struct ceph_osds.osds[CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE]. A monitor that sends
an OSDMap with a pg_temp/pg_upmap entry longer than 32 thus causes a stack
out-of-bounds write.
An OSD set for a single PG can never exceed CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE, so reject longer
entries at decode time. The bound is well below the old overflow threshold, so
it also covers the allocation-size overflow the previous check guarded against.
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds
Write of size 4 ... by task exploit
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds (net/ceph/osdmap.c:2617 net/ceph/osdmap.c:2833)
calc_target (net/ceph/osd_client.c:1638)
__submit_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2394)
ceph_osdc_start_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2490)
ceph_osdc_call (net/ceph/osd_client.c:5164)
rbd_dev_image_probe (drivers/block/rbd.c:6899)
do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7138)
...
kernel BUG at net/ceph/osdmap.c:2670!
[ idryomov: do the same in __decode_pg_upmap_items() ]
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: bound pg_{temp,upmap,upmap_items} length to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE
__decode_pg_temp() decodes an user-controlled length but only rejects
values large enough to overflow the allocation; it does not bound it to
CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE. The helper backs both pg_temp and pg_upmap decoding, and
apply_upmap()/get_temp_osds() later copy the decoded list into the fixed-size
on-stack array struct ceph_osds.osds[CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE]. A monitor that sends
an OSDMap with a pg_temp/pg_upmap entry longer than 32 thus causes a stack
out-of-bounds write.
An OSD set for a single PG can never exceed CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE, so reject longer
entries at decode time. The bound is well below the old overflow threshold, so
it also covers the allocation-size overflow the previous check guarded against.
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds
Write of size 4 ... by task exploit
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds (net/ceph/osdmap.c:2617 net/ceph/osdmap.c:2833)
calc_target (net/ceph/osd_client.c:1638)
__submit_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2394)
ceph_osdc_start_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2490)
ceph_osdc_call (net/ceph/osd_client.c:5164)
rbd_dev_image_probe (drivers/block/rbd.c:6899)
do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7138)
...
kernel BUG at net/ceph/osdmap.c:2670!
[ idryomov: do the same in __decode_pg_upmap_items() ]
🎖@cveNotify