🚨 CVE-2026-47185
Frappe is a full-stack web application framework. Prior to 16.18.0, the Workspace Save API accepts a controlled workspace identifier from any authenticated user without enforcing workspace ownership, allowing modification of another user's private workspace and persistent script injection. This issue is fixed in version 16.18.0.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-47194
Frappe is a full-stack web application framework. Prior to 15.108.0 and 16.18.3, temporary magic login link generation can use an attacker-controlled request Host header, allowing a remote attacker to cause emailed login links to point to an attacker-controlled domain and capture the login token when a recipient follows the link. This issue is fixed in versions 15.108.0 and 16.18.3.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-48054
OpenZeppelin Contracts Wizardis a web application to interactively build a contract out of components from OpenZeppelin Contracts. Versions prior to 0.10.9 generate a Hardhat test file (`test/test.ts`) by interpolating user-supplied `opts.name` (ERC20/ERC721) and `opts.uri` (ERC1155) directly into TypeScript string literals at `zip-hardhat.ts:48` and `:50` without any JavaScript string escaping. No authentication is required: an attacker crafts a URL such as `https[:]//wizard[.]openzeppelin[.]com/#/erc20?name=");require("child_process").execSync("...");("` and shares it with a developer. When the victim downloads the resulting zip archive and runs `npx hardhat test`, the injected Node.js code executes with the developer's local OS privileges. Version 0.10.9 fixes the issue.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-48075
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.5, the `add-to-tunnel` endpoint creates a new appointment row in any client tunnel without any caller authentication. A request that supplies any valid `tunnelId` and any valid `emailHash` (the two need not belong to the same tunnel) results in an inserted appointment with `status = "CONFIRMED"`, attacker-controlled ciphertext fields, attacker-controlled date and duration, and an attacker-chosen agent. The endpoint validates only that some tunnel exists with the given `emailHash`, then writes the appointment using the attacker-supplied `tunnelId` directly. The `emailHash` lookup is effectively an existence check on the tenant; it does not authenticate the caller as the owner of the supplied `tunnelId`. Combined with the absence of any session, Authorization header, booking access token, or PoW, this makes the endpoint accept arbitrary appointment writes into arbitrary tunnels. By contrast, the sibling endpoint `create-new-client` (used to bootstrap a brand-new client tunnel) requires a Bearer bootstrap booking access token issued by the bootstrap-challenge / bootstrap-verify flow. The `add-to-tunnel` endpoint, intended for return-clients booking additional appointments, has no equivalent gate. The application's own middleware confirms this is intentional: `add-to-tunnel` is explicitly listed in the apiAuthHandle public-route allowlist alongside the bootstrap and challenge endpoints (which legitimately have no session). Version 1.0.5 fixes the issue.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-48077
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.1.0, the GET handler at `/api/tenants/{id}/appointments/{appointmentId}` performs no authorization check before returning the appointment record. Any party who knows or obtains a valid appointment UUID receives the full row, including channel and agent IDs, time and timezone, status, and the AES-GCM ciphertext components (`encryptedPayload`, `iv`, `authTag`, `dataKey`). The same file's DELETE handler calls `checkPermission(locals, tenantId, true)` before allowing deletion. The intent is clear: appointment records are tenant-scoped and require authentication to access. The GET handler is missing the equivalent call. The middleware chain (`apiAuthHandle`, `authGuard`) does not compensate: API paths bypass `authGuard` entirely, and `apiAuthHandle` does not block requests to non-admin paths when no token is present. Version 1.1.0 patches the issue.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-48079
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, when a user navigates to the `/logout` page, the page's server-side load handler deletes the `access_token` cookie before calling `/api/auth/logout` via an internal `event.fetch()`. The internal fetch consequently runs without the auth cookie, so `apiAuthHandle` rejects it, the logout handler never executes, and `SessionService.revokeSession()` is never called for the current session. The DB session row remains valid until its natural expiry (one week by default). The user sees a successful logout (cookie gone, UI returns to login), but any party still holding a copy of the now-deleted access token can continue making authenticated API calls until the session naturally expires. The root cause is a simple ordering mistake. The same auth subsystem implements the correct order in `/api/auth/logout`: revoke the current DB session first, then delete the cookie. The page-level wrapper does the opposite. Version 1.0.2 initiates server-side logout before removing authentication cookies and first appears in version 1.0.2. Version 2.0.0 later replaces this with a race-free client-side logout flow.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-48080
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, the `GET /api/tenants/{id}` endpoint returns the full tenant record to any authenticated `TENANT_ADMIN` of that tenant, including the `databaseUrl` field. This field contains the live PostgreSQL connection string the application uses to connect to that tenant's database. In the tested official `docker-compose.prod.yml` deployment, the connection string contained the user `postgres` with `rolsuper=true` and the plaintext password from `secrets/postgres_password.txt`. Operators who configure a non-superuser PostgreSQL user via `secrets/postgres_user.txt` would expose a less privileged credential, but the disclosure of the connection string itself is independent of that choice. The same credential applies to every database managed by that PostgreSQL instance: the central `appointment_booking` database, every per-tenant database (one per tenant), and the postgres administrative database. A `TENANT_ADMIN` of one tenant who can reach `postgres:5432` (directly via internal network, indirectly via any SSRF, RCE, or file-read in the application) can read every other tenant's appointment ciphertexts, key shares, and metadata; read the central user table, including all `GLOBAL_ADMIN` accounts, password hashes, and session records; modify or delete any data in any tenant database; and/or i a superuser-scoped deployment: use PostgreSQL's `pg_read_server_files`, `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM`, and `CREATE EXTENSION` for further escalation inside the database container. This breaks the per-tenant database isolation that is otherwise the primary cross-tenant control in the application. The application code carefully scopes most queries to the calling tenant's database, but those scopings are irrelevant once the attacker holds the credentials that bypass the application entirely. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-48082
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.6, the bootstrap challenge endpoint at `/api/tenants/{id}/appointments/bootstrap-challenge` issues a SHA-256 proof-of-work with `difficulty=4` hex zeros, equivalent to 16 bits of work. Modern hardware solves this in under 200 milliseconds, providing essentially no friction against automated abuse of the patient booking flow. Proof-of-work is used in the booking flow as a rate-limiter for unauthenticated clients establishing tunnels and submitting appointments. At 16 bits of difficulty, the construct is decorative rather than effective. An attacker can solve PoW challenges as fast as the server can issue them, defeating the rate-limiting purpose. The handler also calls `challengeThrottleService.checkThrottle(binding, "passkey")`, but the binding includes attacker-controlled values (`tunnelId`, `clientPublicKey`, and optional `emailHash`). For each fresh attempt, the attacker can supply new values, producing a new throttle key and bypassing the per-binding accumulation. Practical abuse friction is therefore the PoW difficulty itself, not a stable per-IP or per-email server-side throttle. Version 1.0.6 fixes the issue.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-48084
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Versions prior to 1.0.2 don't throttle failed passphrase login attempts. An attacker can submit unlimited wrong passphrase guesses against any known email address, capped only by the Argon2 verification cost (about 100 milliseconds per attempt on the tested host, giving 10 attempts per second sustained). The same backend implements a working per-account throttle on the WebAuthn challenge endpoint, which returns HTTP 429 after roughly 19 attempts. The passphrase branch simply does not invoke that throttle, leaving a supported high-value login path unprotected against credential stuffing and dictionary attacks. The asymmetry confirms this is an oversight rather than a design choice. The throttle infrastructure exists, is wired into the same auth backend, and works on the WebAuthn path. The passphrase branch in `/api/auth/login` was not updated to record failed attempts. Combined with the application's minimum-passphrase policy (12 characters, no entropy or dictionary checks), accounts using common base patterns such as `Spring2026!XX` or words from a leak corpus are realistically reachable in days on a single CPU, hours on a small GPU farm. Version 1.0.2 patches the issue.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-48087
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, the registration handler at `POST /api/auth/register/{userId}` validates the relationship between the WebAuthn challenge and the registration cookie's email but never validates that the `userId` in the URL belongs to that email. An unauthenticated attacker requests a challenge for their own email, generates a registration response with their own authenticator, and submits it against any victim user's URL. The challenge-vs-cookie email match passes, the WebAuthn ceremony validates, and `addPasskey` writes the attacker's credential into the victim's `user_passkey` rows. The next victim-email login accepts a passkey assertion from the attacker's authenticator and issues a session as the victim. User IDs are not strictly secret on this platform, but the exact set of exposure surfaces should be assessed by the maintainers. Staff-list endpoints return user IDs to authenticated tenant members per the route signature; live verification of all exposure surfaces (whether user IDs leak through any unauthenticated route, through invite-confirmation URLs, or through other administrative views) is part of the pending live PoC. Where the attacker knows the victim's email and userId, the analysis below becomes account takeover. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-49391
Frappe is a full-stack web application framework. Prior to 16.19.0 and 15.109.0, Data Import does not escape imported column headers before rendering previews and results, allowing an authenticated importer to persist script content that executes when another user views the import interface. This issue is fixed in versions 16.19.0 and 15.109.0.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-50159
Mermaid is a JavaScript tool that uses Markdown-inspired text to create and modify diagrams and charts. Prior to 10.9.8 and 11.16.1, Mermaid is vulnerable to CSS injection via sibling combinator selectors generated from diagram-supplied class or id names. An attacker who can supply diagram text can inject arbitrary CSS into the rendered page, potentially altering the appearance or behavior of unrelated page elements. This issue is fixed in versions 10.9.8 and 11.16.1.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-5856
Contiki-NG's DNS/mDNS resolver skip_name() in os/services/resolv/resolv.c walks DNS wire-format name labels with no packet-boundary check, and the caller in newdata() invokes it in a loop iterating nquestions times from the attacker-controlled DNS header before validating the transaction ID. An attacker who sets nquestions higher than the number of complete questions present causes skip_name() to walk past the UDP packet buffer, and the returned pointer is cast to struct dns_answer * for further memory reads. On builds with RESOLV_CONF_SUPPORTS_MDNS enabled, any peer on the local segment can trigger the read unauthenticated via a multicast UDP 5353 packet with no outstanding query required; on standard DNS builds an attacker who can inject a UDP response from port 53 during an outstanding query can trigger the same read. Impact is out-of-bounds read of uip_buf and adjacent memory, disclosing memory contents or crashing the resolver.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-61632
PyMdown Extensions is a set of extensions for the Python-Markdown markdown project. In versions up to and including 10.21.3, the b64 extension is vulnerable to a path traversal that discloses arbitrary files: it inlines images referenced by <img src="..."> by joining the src onto the configured base_path with os.path.normpath and opening the result directly, without verifying that the resolved path stays inside base_path. As a result, an src containing ../ sequences or an absolute path reads a file outside base_path as long as it has an allowed image extension (.png, .jpg, .jpeg, .gif, .svg), and the file's contents are then base64-encoded into the rendered output, disclosing them. An application that renders untrusted Markdown with pymdownx.b64 enabled can therefore leak the contents of image-extension files readable by the process to whoever controls the Markdown or views the output, a targeted file-read bounded by the extension check. This issue has been fixed in version 11.0.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-64652
GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub's official command line tool. Prior to version 2.97.0, gh auth status masked only the characters after the last underscore in certain fine-grained personal access tokens and GitHub App tokens. As a result, part of an affected token could appear in terminal or CI output that is captured or shared. Authenticated users are affected if they ran gh auth status (without the --show-token flag) with a token type whose format contains an underscore after the prefix. This includes fine-grained personal access tokens (github_pat_*) and GitHub App installation and user access tokens (ghs_*, ghu_*; for example, ghs_<APPID>_<JWT>), as well as the Actions GITHUB_TOKEN. Classic tokens such as gho_* and ghp_* have an underscore-free body and are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-64654
GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub's official command line tool. Prior to version 2.97.0, multiple GitHub CLI commands printed externally controlled gist, API, pull request, release, codespace, skill, or agent-task content without neutralizing terminal escape sequences. An attacker who can influence that content can embed escape sequences that are interpreted by the terminal of a user who runs an affected command, with impact ranging from cosmetic manipulation of the title or on-screen content to, on some terminal emulators, command execution. This extends the same class of issue as CVE-2026-45803—which addressed only gh run view --log—to the other affected command paths. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-64663
Statamic is a Laravel and Git powered content management system (CMS). Prior to 5.74.1 and 6.24.0, manipulating user-supplied input incorporated into Antlers templates could result in the loss of content and assets, on sites whose templates pass untrusted input into affected areas, and exploitation did not require authentication. This issue is fixed in versions 5.74.1 and 6.24.0.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-64665
Statamic is a Laravel and Git powered content management system (CMS). Prior to 5.74.1 and 6.24.0, when OAuth login was enabled with a provider that does not guarantee verified email addresses, an unauthenticated attacker could sign in as an existing user, potentially including a super admin, without knowing that user's password, because the application matched OAuth identities to accounts by email address alone. Exploitation requires OAuth to be explicitly enabled with such a provider. This issue is fixed in versions 5.74.1 and 6.24.0.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-67621
Flowise through 3.1.4 contains a missing authorization vulnerability that allows authenticated workspace members to perform unauthorized document store operations by accessing unprotected mutation endpoints. Attackers holding only view-level permissions can send direct HTTP requests to the upsert and refresh document store routes to trigger document ingestion, refresh vector database contents, consume embedding API credits, and modify knowledge bases used by downstream chatflows.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-67622
Flowise through 3.1.4 contains an insecure direct object reference vulnerability in the OpenAI Assistants integration that allows authenticated attackers to access credentials belonging to other workspaces by supplying an arbitrary credential UUID to Assistants endpoints without workspace ownership verification. Attackers can enumerate cross-workspace assistant metadata, retrieve file and vector store listings, and upload files into victim workspaces by exploiting the missing workspace-scoped authorization check in the credential lookup logic.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-70557
diboot-core's POST /common/load-related-data endpoint resolves caller-supplied field names to any @TableField column of any entity and returns those values for all rows, with no field or entity allowlist. The only guard, relatedDataSecurityCheck(), returns true unconditionally, so any authenticated user (including a zero-role account) can read @JsonIgnore-annotated secret fields such as IamAccount.authSecret and IamAccount.secretSalt for every account, or arbitrary secret fields of any other entity. Shiro's two-iteration MD5 with an 8-character salt is trivially crackable offline, so the disclosed admin password hashes convert to full administrative takeover. The endpoint is not example code; the official diboot-admin-ui frontend requires it, so deployments following the vendor's recommended integration expose it. The mechanism was renamed relatedData* to attachMore* on the development branch, but attachMoreSecurityCheck() also returns true unconditionally.

🎖@cveNotify