🚨 CVE-2026-18485
There is a local privilege escalation vulnerability recently discovered in the NI-PAL kernel driver.  This may allow a local, authenticated user to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code.  This vulnerability affects NI-PAL 26.3.1 and prior versions running on Microsoft Windows.

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🚨 CVE-2026-48168
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 4.6.40, the bundled Claude GitHub Actions workflow is vulnerable to command injection because it embeds an attacker-controlled pull request branch name into a Bash run: block without quoting or validation. Additionally, the workflow allows any @claude comment to trigger the job regardless of whether the commenter is a trusted collaborator. An outside contributor can open a pull request from a fork whose branch name contains shell metacharacters and comment @claude, causing Bash to execute arbitrary shell code in the GitHub Actions runner. Because these commands run in a job holding a GitHub App token with write permissions, OIDC access, and gh/git access, the injection can be chained through $GITHUB_PATH to compromise later privileged steps, enabling repository writes, pull request and issue manipulation, or OIDC-token abuse. This issue has been fixed in version 4.6.40.

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🚨 CVE-2026-63457
A potential denial of service vulnerability exists in HPE Integrated Lights-Out 6 (iLO 6) prior to v1.78.

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🚨 CVE-2026-70612
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, requests to open external protocol URLs from web content did not take iframe sandbox restrictions into account, so a sandboxed iframe could cause an OS-registered external application to be launched. The frame sandbox state was also not made available to the app permission handlers, affecting apps that render untrusted content in sandboxed iframes and grant the openExternal permission by default when no setPermissionRequestHandler is installed. This issue is fixed in 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3.

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🚨 CVE-2026-8182
IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.3 installations allow anyone on the internet to execute arbitrary code on the server without any credentials via 2 HTTP requests.

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🚨 CVE-2026-8470
IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.3, 1.0.0 through 1.10.3, 1.0.0 through 1.10.3, and 1.0.0 through 1.10.3 use Python's non-cryptographic random module for generating Fernet encryption keys from user secrets under 32 characters. The deterministic Mersenne Twister PRNG produces identical keys for identical seeds, allowing attackers to reproduce encryption keys and decrypt stored API keys and authentication tokens.

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🚨 CVE-2026-8478
IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.3 could allow a remote attacker to inject arbitrary code on the system, due to the improper control of user input code.

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🚨 CVE-2026-9130
IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.3 contain an authorization bypass vulnerability in the MemoryComponent that allows authenticated users to access chat history of other users via session_id collision. The MemoryComponent.retrieve_messages and store_message methods filter on session_id without validating flow_id or user_id ownership, enabling cross-user information disclosure through multiple authenticated API endpoints including /api/v1/run/*, /api/v1/responses, and /api/v2/workflow/*. This vulnerability only affects multi-user deployments with LANGFLOW_AUTO_LOGIN=False.

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🚨 CVE-2026-9201
IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.3 could allow an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to a cryptographic weakness in the custom component validation mechanism. When the optional hardening mode that restricts execution to trusted component templates is enabled, the application validates component code using a truncated SHA‑256 hash. Because the hash comparison relies on only a portion of the digest, an attacker can craft malicious component code that collides with a trusted template hash and bypasses validation. Successful exploitation allows the attacker to introduce and execute unauthorized Python code within the Langflow process, defeating the intended security control and potentially leading to full compromise of the affected instance.

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🚨 CVE-2026-17556
A path traversal vulnerability was identified in GitHub Enterprise Server that allowed an unauthenticated attacker to delete arbitrary files and directories on the instance, including the entire user storage directory containing Git LFS objects, release assets, attachments, and avatars. The X-GitHub-Request-Id request header was used without sanitization as a filesystem path segment for the upload buffer directory, so a traversal value pointed the buffer at an arbitrary path and the deferred cleanup routine recursively removed the traversed target. Exploitation required only network reachability to the instance and no authentication, and it worked even when private mode was enabled. This vulnerability affected all versions of GitHub Enterprise Server prior to 3.22 and was fixed in versions 3.21.4, 3.20.6, 3.19.10, 3.18.13 and 3.17.19. This vulnerability was reported via the GitHub Bug Bounty program.

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🚨 CVE-2026-18953
Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory in the get_resource tool in Amazon awslabs.aws-transform-mcp-server 0.1.0 through 0.1.4 might allow a context-dependent actor to write arbitrary files outside the intended working directory via the savePath parameter.



To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 0.1.5 or later.

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🚨 CVE-2026-18954
Incorrect authorization in the aggregation pipeline tool in Amazon AWS Labs DocumentDB MCP Server before 1.0.12 might allow an authenticated MCP client to perform inappropriate write operations on the connected database via write-capable aggregation pipeline stages that bypass the read-only mode enforcement logic.



To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 1.0.12 or later.

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🚨 CVE-2026-18958
A vulnerability was detected in imranrisal-dev Student-Management-System 18ea7904c339e0c7b0234724a79c939ce6191def/a8d43a29aaf267e7ca97171d6dbb44057bcd7f8c. Affected by this vulnerability is an unknown functionality of the file loginCheckTest.php of the component Login. The manipulation of the argument username/password results in sql injection. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. This product does not use versioning. This is why information about affected and unaffected releases are unavailable. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

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🚨 CVE-2026-21766
The default login portlet in HCL Digital Experience and Digital Experience Compose insufficiently protects credentials.  Under certain very specific use cases and specific configurations, sensitive information may be written to web server logs.  This only affects applications using the default login portlet.

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🚨 CVE-2026-55522
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions 3.9.26 through 4.6.57 of praiseonai and 0.12.12 through 1.6.57 of praiseonaiagents, the workflow "include" feature is vulnerable to code execution. Workflow._execute_include() implicitly imports and runs an included recipe's tools.py via a raw importlib.util.spec_from_file_location() and spec.loader.exec_module() call, without honoring the PRAISONAI_ALLOW_TEMPLATE_TOOLS/PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS autoload opt-in gates or routing through the centralized safe loader that protects the other tools.py autoload paths. As a result, a workflow that includes an attacker-controlled local recipe directory executes arbitrary module-level Python code during include setup, before any child workflow parsing or model call, and the same sink is reachable through the higher-level praisonai.recipe.run() recipe API. An attacker who can cause a victim process to run a workflow or recipe that includes an untrusted local recipe achieves arbitrary Python code execution as the PraisonAI process user, a variant that bypasses the hardening applied to the previously disclosed automatic tools.py RCE advisory family. This issue has been fixed in version 4.6.58 of praisonai and 1.6.58 of praisonaiagents.

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🚨 CVE-2026-55523
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions 1.5.128 through 1.6.57, the praisonaiagents.tools.web_crawl_tools.web_crawl() function is vulnerable to server-side request forgery. While it validates the initially supplied URL and blocks direct loopback and private destinations, its default httpx fallback uses httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) and does not revalidate intermediate or final redirect targets. An attacker who can influence a URL passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent or tool workflow, can supply an attacker-controlled public URL that passes the initial host check and then redirects to loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from the host, with the redirected response body returned in the web_crawl() result. This constitutes an incomplete fix and patch bypass for the previously disclosed web_crawl SSRF class (GHSA-qq9r-63f6-v542 / CVE-2026-40160 and GHSA-8f4v-xfm9-3244), since the guard validates only the requested URL and not the destination actually fetched after redirection. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.58.

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🚨 CVE-2026-55524
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 1.6.58, the web_crawl tool performs its SSRF check only on the initially supplied URL, allowing the protection to be bypassed so the tool connects to attacker-chosen internal destinations. The check resolves the hostname once with socket.gethostbyname and rejects private/loopback/link-local results, but then passes the URL to a fetcher using httpx.Client(follow_redirects=True) (or urllib.request.urlopen when httpx is absent, which also follows redirects) that re-resolves the hostname at connect time with no further validation. This validate-here/fetch-there gap is exploitable through both HTTP redirects and DNS rebinding. If an attacker can influence URLs passed to web_crawl(), directly or through an agent/tool workflow, they can cause the PraisonAI host to fetch loopback, private-network, or cloud metadata endpoints reachable from that host, with the response body returned in the web_crawl() result. This issue has been fixed in version 1.6.58.

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🚨 CVE-2026-66297
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (OS Command Injection) vulnerability in livebook-dev livebook allows command injection into generated deployment setup commands.

LivebookWeb.Hub.Teams.DeploymentGroupAgentComponent.docker_instructions/2 and LivebookWeb.Hub.Teams.DeploymentGroupAgentComponent.fly_instructions/4 in lib/livebook_web/live/hub/teams/deployment_group_agent_component.ex interpolate deployment group environment variable values into the generated Docker and Fly.io setup commands without shell escaping. The values originate from the deployment group configuration and reach the sinks through Livebook.Hubs.Dockerfile.online_docker_info/3.

Both sinks place the value inside a double-quoted shell word, so a value containing a command substitution such as $(...) or backticks is evaluated by the shell without any need to break out of the quoting, and a literal double quote terminates the quoted word and allows arbitrary further tokens. The generated command is displayed in the Livebook web interface with a copy button, so a user who copies it and runs it without reviewing it first executes the injected commands on their own machine, under their own account.

An attacker requires privileges sufficient to set deployment group environment variables, while the resulting code execution occurs on the machine of whoever runs the generated command. The Kubernetes instructions are not affected, because they render the same values into a YAML manifest with escaping rather than into a shell command.

This issue affects livebook: from 0.13.0 before 0.18.7 and from 0.19.0 before 0.19.9.

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🚨 CVE-2026-66298
Origin Validation Error vulnerability in livebook-dev livebook allows untrusted notebook output JavaScript to trigger session-wide keyboard shortcuts, including forced evaluation of all cells and runtime restart.

Livebook's JS-view feature renders notebook-defined JavaScript inside a sandboxed, cross-origin iframe specifically because that JavaScript is untrusted. The trusted iframe shell in iframe/priv/static/iframe/v5.html forwards every keydown event fired in its own window to the parent page without consulting Event.isTrusted, so an event synthesized by the untrusted script through window.dispatchEvent is forwarded exactly as a genuine keystroke would be. The parent-side relay in assets/js/hooks/js_view.js reconstructs and re-dispatches it on the live page with no further validation, and because assets/js/hooks/session.js registers the global shortcut handler on the document in the capture phase, that handler acts on the replicated event regardless of how it was produced.

Sandboxed output JavaScript can therefore drive Livebook's session-wide keyboard shortcuts. Two of them reach LivebookWeb.SessionLive and execute immediately with no confirmation: the shortcut for queueing full evaluation runs every cell in the notebook, and the shortcut for reconnecting the runtime disconnects and reconnects it, discarding in-memory state. A third shortcut deletes the focused cell behind a confirmation dialog that the user can permanently dismiss, after which it too executes silently.

Forced full evaluation is the significant consequence, because it causes the notebook's own Elixir code to run without the user choosing to evaluate anything. A user who merely opens a notebook obtained from a third party, or reached from published documentation, can have its code executed on their runtime. Livebook also mirrors cell outputs to every connected client, so a malicious output triggers in a collaborator's browser as soon as it renders.

This issue affects livebook: from 0.5.0 before 0.18.7 and from 0.19.0 before 0.19.9.

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🚨 CVE-2026-66881
Relative Path Traversal vulnerability in livebook-dev livebook allows an attacker-authored notebook to write a file with attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary path.

A .livemd notebook can declare file_entries metadata, each entry carrying a name. Every path that creates a file entry through the user interface validates that name with Livebook.Notebook.validate_file_entry_name/2, which requires a flat filename of alphanumerics, dashes, underscores and dots, ending in an extension. The import path does not: Livebook.LiveMarkdown.Import.file_entry_metadata_to_attrs/1 in lib/livebook/live_markdown/import.ex takes the name verbatim from the notebook source.

For a URL-type file entry, Livebook.Session.file_entry_cache_file/2 in lib/livebook/session.ex resolves that name beneath the session's temporary directory without checking that the result stays inside it, and Livebook.FileSystem.Utils.resolve_unix_like_path/2 collapses parent-directory segments while clamping only at the filesystem root. When the entry's content is requested and no cached copy exists, Livebook fetches the entry's URL and writes the response body to the resolved path, creating parent directories as needed. The attacker therefore controls both the destination and the contents of the written file, which may land anywhere the Livebook process can write. The same missing containment check is present in Livebook.Session.to_attachment_file_entry/2.

A victim who opens an attacker-supplied notebook and causes the entry to be fetched triggers the write within their own authenticated session; the attacker needs no account on the target instance. URL-type entries are also not placed under notebook stamping quarantine on import, so no warning is shown.

This issue affects livebook: from 0.11.0 before 0.18.7 and from 0.19.0 before 0.19.9.

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🚨 CVE-2026-66885
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in livebook-dev livebook allows an attacker to authenticate a victim's browser session under the attacker's own Livebook Teams identity.

When Livebook is configured to use Livebook Teams for identity, Livebook.ZTA.LivebookTeams.handle_request/4 in lib/livebook/zta/livebook_teams.ex handles the OAuth-style callback carrying a teams_identity marker and a code parameter. The clause exchanges that code for an access token and writes the token into the browser session without verifying any value that ties the callback to the browser session that started the login. No state or nonce is generated when the flow is initiated: Livebook.Teams.Requests.create_auth_request/1 in lib/livebook/teams/requests.ex sends an empty request body, so no per-attempt value is ever registered, and the callback clause has nothing to compare against.

An attacker who holds membership in the same Livebook Teams organisation as the target instance can therefore begin the login flow themselves, retain the resulting authorization code without redeeming it, and induce a victim to open a crafted URL carrying that code. The victim's browser completes the exchange and the resulting session is bound to the attacker's identity rather than the victim's. The victim is not required to hold any particular privilege, and no credential belonging to the victim is involved. The vulnerability does not allow the attacker to authenticate as the victim.

The consequence is that a user believes they are working in their own authenticated session while they are in fact operating as another identity. Work performed in that session is attributed to the attacker's account, and secrets, uploaded data, or notebook results the victim produces are exposed to the attacker rather than kept in the victim's own account. The authorization code must be redeemed within a short window after the login flow begins, which constrains the timing of the attack but not its feasibility.

This issue affects livebook: from 0.15.0 before 0.18.7 and from 0.19.0 before 0.19.9.

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