🚨 CVE-2026-0931
Denial-of-service vulnerability in M-Files Server versions before 26.5.16015.3 allows an authenticated admin user to cause the M-Files Server process to crash and fail to restart.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-12609
In Eclipse Theia versions 1.66.0 and up until including 1.73.1, the `@theia/plugin-ext` backend exposes the `/hostedPlugin/:pluginId/:path(*)` HTTP endpoint, which resolves the requested file path with `path.resolve(localPath, filePath)` without verifying that the resolved path stays within the plugin's directory. An unauthenticated network attacker can send percent-encoded `../` sequences (`%2e%2e%2f`) that decode into the path parameter and escape the plugin directory, allowing arbitrary files readable by the Theia backend process to be retrieved. Plugin IDs are derived deterministically from a plugin's publisher and name, so built-in plugins serve as reliable anchors that require no prior knowledge of the target system.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-14304
In Eclipse Accessibility Tools Framework (ACTF) versions up to 1.6.0 (including source code versions up to v20260630 and ACTF based application miChecker versions up to 3.1.0), it has been identified that an XML External Entity (XXE) vulnerability exists.



If this vulnerability is exploited, a malicious third party could gain access to local resources or internal network resources via computer running applications that use Eclipse ACTF, including miChecker.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-60009
In Eclipse Theia versions up to and including 1.73.1, the `@theia/filesystem` backend binds `POST /file-upload` in every filesystem-enabled deployment. The handler takes an attacker-supplied absolute path from the multipart `uri` field and calls `fs.move(tmp, target, { overwrite: true })` with no workspace confinement and no authentication. In browser (non-Electron) deployments the connection token is enforced only on WebSocket upgrades; the HTTP middleware in `@theia/core` re-issues the cookie and calls `next()` without rejecting tokenless HTTP requests. Because `multipart/form-data` is a CORS-safelisted request type, a cross-origin web page can trigger the write with no preflight and no credentials, resulting in an unauthenticated arbitrary file write outside the workspace to any absolute path the backend process can write. This can escalate to remote code execution, for example by overwriting a startup-executed file such as `~/.bashrc`. Electron mode uses a separate `ElectronSecurityToken` and is not affected via this path.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71231
IOTSmartHome's gui/login.php checkCookie() function builds an authentication query as SELECT * FROM users WHERE ID='<decoded lastLogin cookie>' after base64-decoding the client-supplied lastLogin cookie via safe_decode(), which performs URL-safe base64 decoding with no sanitization of the decoded value before it is concatenated into the SQL string. An unauthenticated attacker can set a lastLogin cookie containing a base64-encoded SQL injection payload (e.g. base64("' OR '1'='1")) to bypass authentication and, via UNION-based injection, extract arbitrary data including user credentials.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71232
MacCMS10's admin template editor (application/admin/controller/Template.php) blocks dangerous PHP functions in template content via a blacklist regex, but the blacklist omitted exec, passthru, popen, show_source, create_function, register_shutdown_function, register_tick_function, and error_log. Combined with ThinkPHP's {if} template tag, which embeds the condition attribute directly into raw PHP (<?php if(condition): ?>), an authenticated administrator could inject a payload such as {if condition="exec('id > /tmp/pwned.txt')"}{/if} to achieve remote code execution. Fixed in commit 71ad3bb29570e110d8e973acff68040a3050ddf0 (2026-06-22), which added the missing functions to the filter.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71233
InvoiceNinja v5-stable renders an invoice or quote's "terms" field in the client portal using Laravel Blade's raw output directive {!! $entity->terms !!} (resources/views/portal/ninja2020/invoices/includes/terms.blade.php) with no HTML sanitization. StoreInvoiceRequest.php only strips newlines from the field and does not purify HTML. An authenticated user with invoice creation access can set the terms field via the REST API (PUT /api/v1/invoices/{id}) to an HTML/JavaScript payload that executes in the client's browser when they view the invoice, enabling session cookie theft and client account takeover. This is a distinct code path from the previously published invoice line-item description field XSS (GHSA-98wm-cxpw-847p / CVE-2026-33628).

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71234
Documize Community's attachment download route (domain/attachment/endpoint.go, Download function, registered via AddPublic with no auth middleware) accepts a `secure` query parameter and grants access whenever the parameter is simply non-empty (len(secureToken) > 0), without comparing it to any server-stored value. Any non-empty string, such as ?secure=x, bypasses authentication entirely and allows downloading any organization's attachments. Sibling handlers in the same file (togglePublish, delete) correctly enforce session-based authorization, confirming this is an inconsistency rather than intended design.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71235
Magistrala's Rules Engine allows authenticated users to create rules with embedded Go or Lua scripts executed server-side when IoT messages arrive. The Go script engine (re/golang.go) runs scripts through the Yaegi interpreter with stdlib.Symbols, exposing the full Go standard library (including os and net/http) with validation limited to a regex blocking goroutines and panic() calls; dangerous functions such as os.ReadFile, os.WriteFile, os.Remove, and os.Environ remain fully accessible. The Lua script engine (re/lua.go) performs no input validation at all and preloads dangerous libraries: db (arbitrary database access), ioutil (file I/O), an HTTP client (SSRF), and filepath (traversal). An authenticated low-privileged user can achieve arbitrary file read/write, environment variable leakage, database access, and SSRF against internal microservices.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71236
Grocy's API request-body parser (controllers/Api/BaseApiController.php, GetParsedAndFilteredRequestBody) purifies incoming field values with HTMLPurifier, then manually reverses HTML-entity encoding of the resulting output by replacing &amp;lt;, &amp;gt;, and &amp;amp; back to <, >, and & immediately after purification. This double-decode reconstructs live HTML/script tags from the entity-encoded form that HTMLPurifier produced to neutralize them, re-introducing stored XSS across API-writable fields (products, recipes, stock, users, chores, and others) that are rendered elsewhere without re-sanitization.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71237
Miantang/IoT-PHP's index.php implements a POST /userlogin route that reads the password directly from $_POST['pwd'] with no sanitization and concatenates it into a raw SQL string: mysql_query("select * from userlists where username='$username' and password='$password' limit 1"). The username value is passed through htmlspecialchars(), which does not encode single quotes by default and therefore does not prevent SQL injection through the password field. An unauthenticated attacker can submit a payload such as pwd=' OR '1'='1 to bypass authentication and, via UNION-based injection, extract arbitrary data from the database.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71238
DjangoCRM ships with its Django SECRET_KEY hardcoded directly in the committed webcrm/settings.py rather than read from an environment variable. Since this key is used for session signing, CSRF token generation, and password reset tokens, anyone who reads the public repository can forge valid session cookies (including for the superadmin account), forge CSRF tokens, and forge password reset tokens, achieving full account takeover. The repository also ships with DEBUG=True as the default, causing error pages to leak database credentials, email credentials, OAuth data, and internal file paths.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71240
DjangoCRM's toggle_default_sorting view is the only route in common/urls.py that is not wrapped in login_required or staff_member_required, and it redirects to a caller-supplied next_url GET parameter after only checking secure_url(next_url), which merely verifies the target host matches the current site's domain (blocking only cross-domain redirects) while allowing any same-site path with no authentication required to reach the view. This enables unauthenticated phishing redirects and referrer-based token leakage via redirect chains.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71241
Book-Management-System's Flask API endpoints /student, /record, /books, /find_stu_book, and /find_not_return_book are missing the @login_required decorator that protects sibling routes (/search_student, /storage) in the same file. This allows any unauthenticated remote user to retrieve student PII (name, gender, card validity, debt status) and full book-borrowing history by supplying a card_id. Because card_id values are sequential integers, the entire student database can be enumerated without authentication.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71242
Crater's NotePolicy checks only a blanket Bouncer ability (manage-all-notes / view-all-notes) with no company-ownership comparison, unlike InvoicePolicy and other sibling policies which additionally verify $user->hasCompany($model->company_id). NotesController's show(), update(), and destroy() actions authorize via $this->authorize('view notes'/'manage notes') without passing the target Note model, and Note's company-scoping (scopeWhereCompany) is applied only in the list endpoint, not in show/update/destroy. Any authenticated user of one company can read, edit, or delete another company's notes by ID. This is a distinct finding from the previously reported CustomerPolicy company-ownership omission (a different policy class and controller).

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71243
The backmeup npm package assembles shell command strings by directly concatenating its option values (name, source, destination, filter) - e.g. cmd = "mkdir -p " + path.join(info.destination, info.name) + "; " - and executes the resulting string through a shell via ssh2-exec (locally via child_process, or remotely via SSH when an ssh handle is supplied), rather than using execFile/spawn with an argument array. The only processing applied is path.normalize()/path.join(), which do not neutralize shell metacharacters (;, |, &, $(), backticks, newline). Any application that passes attacker-influenced values into these options (e.g. a user-chosen backup name) is vulnerable to arbitrary OS command execution on the backup host, or on the remote SSH target when one is configured.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71244
Paperless-ngx's MailAccountViewSet.test() action, when called with an existing account's ID and a masked password field, reuses the stored password, account_type, refresh_token, and expiration from that existing account while allowing the caller to supply a different imap_server, imap_port, and imap_security in the same request. The test connection then authenticates to the caller-specified server using the real stored credentials. A user holding only object-level change_mailaccount permission on the target account (not full admin) can redirect the test connection to an attacker-controlled IMAP host, causing the real stored IMAP password or OAuth token to be sent to that host.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71245
Mautic's getLeadIdsByFieldValueAction (LeadBundle/Controller/AjaxController.php) reads a field parameter from the request, sanitizes it only with InputHelper::clean() (which HTML-entity-encodes quotes and angle brackets but does not restrict other characters), and passes it into LeadRepository::buildQueryForGetLeadsByFieldValue() where it is concatenated directly as a raw SQL column identifier ($col = 'l.'.$field) rather than being validated against a whitelist of real column names or passed as a bound parameter. Since Doctrine cannot parameterize identifiers, and the sanitizer does not block spaces, parentheses, or other SQL-relevant characters, an attacker can inject SQL via the field name itself. The action requires only a valid session (any authenticated user), unlike sibling actions in the same controller that carry additional permission checks.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71246
Pixelfed's SearchController (behind the auth middleware) accepts a URL via its remote-search parameters and fetches it server-side through ActivityPubFetchService, whose validateUrl() only blocks the literal hosts 127.0.0.1, localhost, and ::1 and requires https, without checking the resolved IP against private, internal, or link-local ranges (e.g. 169.254.169.254). Optional DNS validation is disabled by default and, when enabled, only confirms a DNS record exists without filtering by IP range. The fetch response body is returned to the requester only when the Content-Type matches an ActivityPub content type, making this a semi-blind but authenticated SSRF primitive reachable by any logged-in user.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71247
Documenso's sign-field-with-token.ts, used by the live document-signing UI, allows a recipient with the ASSISTANT role to fetch and complete fields belonging to any later-or-equal-order, not-yet-signed recipient in the same envelope, with no restriction on field type. The handler upserts a Signature record tied to the target field's recipientId with no check that field.type is SIGNATURE and the acting recipient owns it. A newer V2 signing path (sign-envelope-field.ts) explicitly blocks assistants from completing SIGNATURE fields, and the project's own test suite comments confirm this guard is absent from the V1 path used here. In a sequential-signing document, an assistant recipient can therefore forge another signer's signature field.

🎖@cveNotify

🚨 CVE-2026-71248
Inventory-Management-System-PHP's login.php constructs its authentication query via direct string concatenation of raw POST parameters: $sql = "select * from user where email = '$email' and password = '$password'", with no escaping or parameterization, allowing authentication bypass via a payload such as email=' OR 1=1 LIMIT 1-- -. Separately, delete.php executes mysqli_query($db, "DELETE FROM product WHERE product_id=" . $_GET['id']) with no authentication check and no validation of the id parameter, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to delete arbitrary product rows or perform blind SQL injection via payloads such as id=0 OR SLEEP(5).

🎖@cveNotify