🚨 CVE-2026-70370
Koha's reports/catalogue_stats.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by interpolating the user-controlled Line and Column request parameters directly into identifier positions of the query (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY) with no whitelist validation. When Line contains itemcallnumber and the cotedigits parameter is truthy, cotedigits is additionally concatenated raw as the numeric argument of a LEFT() call. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions.

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🚨 CVE-2026-70371
Koha's reports/issues_avg_stats.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the query string. The Line and Column parameters are not validated against any whitelist and land verbatim in identifier positions (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY), and each Filter slot is concatenated raw into single-quoted LIKE, BETWEEN, and comparison fragments with no bound parameters. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions.

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🚨 CVE-2026-70372
Koha's reports/bor_issues_top.pl builds dynamic SQL in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the query string. The Criteria parameter is only normalized by a table-name prefix and is never whitelisted, landing verbatim in identifier positions (SELECT DISTINCTROW, GROUP BY, ORDER BY); Filter values are concatenated raw into single-quoted LIKE, BETWEEN, and comparison fragments, and the Limit parameter is appended raw to a LIMIT clause. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions.

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🚨 CVE-2026-70373
Koha's reports/issues_stats.pl (the circulation statistics report) builds its calculation query in sub calculate by concatenating several user-controlled request parameters directly into the SQL string. The PeriodTypeSel, PeriodDaySel, and PeriodMonthSel parameters are interpolated raw into single-quoted equality and function-comparison fragments, and the Filter slots plus the Line and Column identifiers are likewise interpolated with no whitelist and no placeholder binding. An authenticated staff user holding the reports module permission can inject arbitrary SQL and read any table reachable by the Koha database user, including borrowers (password hashes, two-factor secrets, personal data), api_keys, and sessions.

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🚨 CVE-2026-70374
HashBrown CMS through 1.4.6 contains an OS Command Injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the media upload thumbnail generation routine. Media.generateThumbnail() in src/Server/Entity/Resource/Media.js builds a temporary file path as 'thumbnail' + Path.extname(filename) and passes it, unescaped, into a shell command executed via AppService.exec() ('convert ' + tempFile + ...). The MIME-type filter in getMIMEType() (src/Common/utilities.js) truncates the extracted extension at the first '?' character, while Path.extname() does not, allowing a filename such as 'x.jpg?$(command)' to pass the image-type check while still injecting a shell command substitution into the exec() call. An authenticated user holding the media resource scope can achieve arbitrary OS command execution in the context of the Node.js process via POST /api/{project}/{environment}/media/new.

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🚨 CVE-2026-70375
HashBrown CMS through 1.4.6 contains an OS Command Injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the Git deployer component. GitDeployer.pullRepo() in src/Server/Entity/Deployer/GitDeployer.js executes AppService.exec(`git checkout ${this.branch || 'master'}`), interpolating the configured branch value directly into a shell command with no escaping. GitDeployer.validate() only rejects a single-quote character in the repo, branch, username, and password fields; shell metacharacters such as ';', '&&', '|', backticks, and '$()' are not filtered. A user able to configure a project's Git deployer settings can set a malicious branch value (e.g. 'master;<command>#') that executes automatically on every subsequent deployer operation (media upload, content save, etc.), since pullRepo() is invoked unconditionally at the start of each such operation. This is related to CVE-2020-6948, which addressed single-quote escaping of the repo, username, and password fields in the same file's git clone invocation; the branch field used in the unquoted git checkout command was not covered by that fix and remains injectable.

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🚨 CVE-2026-54418
Leantime through 3.6.2 exposes the JSON-RPC methods leantime.rpc.TwoFA.TwoFA.getSetupData, saveSecret, verifyAndEnable, and disable2FA, which act on a caller-supplied userId parameter with no ownership check, session pinning, or permission-attribute gate (unlike other RPC-exposed methods in the same dispatcher). Any authenticated user can invoke getSetupData with an arbitrary userId to read that user's live TOTP secret, or disable2FA to strip another account's two-factor authentication entirely, fully defeating account-level 2FA protection. This is related to CVE-2026-15509, which covers a similar missing-authorization pattern in the JSON-RPC editUser/addUser role-assignment path in the same application; the TwoFA service methods addressed here are a distinct, independently fixable set of RPC endpoints.

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🚨 CVE-2026-0931
Denial-of-service vulnerability in M-Files Server versions before 26.5.16015.3 allows an authenticated admin user to cause the M-Files Server process to crash and fail to restart.

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🚨 CVE-2026-12609
In Eclipse Theia versions 1.66.0 and up until including 1.73.1, the `@theia/plugin-ext` backend exposes the `/hostedPlugin/:pluginId/:path(*)` HTTP endpoint, which resolves the requested file path with `path.resolve(localPath, filePath)` without verifying that the resolved path stays within the plugin's directory. An unauthenticated network attacker can send percent-encoded `../` sequences (`%2e%2e%2f`) that decode into the path parameter and escape the plugin directory, allowing arbitrary files readable by the Theia backend process to be retrieved. Plugin IDs are derived deterministically from a plugin's publisher and name, so built-in plugins serve as reliable anchors that require no prior knowledge of the target system.

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🚨 CVE-2026-14304
In Eclipse Accessibility Tools Framework (ACTF) versions up to 1.6.0 (including source code versions up to v20260630 and ACTF based application miChecker versions up to 3.1.0), it has been identified that an XML External Entity (XXE) vulnerability exists.



If this vulnerability is exploited, a malicious third party could gain access to local resources or internal network resources via computer running applications that use Eclipse ACTF, including miChecker.

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🚨 CVE-2026-60009
In Eclipse Theia versions up to and including 1.73.1, the `@theia/filesystem` backend binds `POST /file-upload` in every filesystem-enabled deployment. The handler takes an attacker-supplied absolute path from the multipart `uri` field and calls `fs.move(tmp, target, { overwrite: true })` with no workspace confinement and no authentication. In browser (non-Electron) deployments the connection token is enforced only on WebSocket upgrades; the HTTP middleware in `@theia/core` re-issues the cookie and calls `next()` without rejecting tokenless HTTP requests. Because `multipart/form-data` is a CORS-safelisted request type, a cross-origin web page can trigger the write with no preflight and no credentials, resulting in an unauthenticated arbitrary file write outside the workspace to any absolute path the backend process can write. This can escalate to remote code execution, for example by overwriting a startup-executed file such as `~/.bashrc`. Electron mode uses a separate `ElectronSecurityToken` and is not affected via this path.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71231
IOTSmartHome's gui/login.php checkCookie() function builds an authentication query as SELECT * FROM users WHERE ID='<decoded lastLogin cookie>' after base64-decoding the client-supplied lastLogin cookie via safe_decode(), which performs URL-safe base64 decoding with no sanitization of the decoded value before it is concatenated into the SQL string. An unauthenticated attacker can set a lastLogin cookie containing a base64-encoded SQL injection payload (e.g. base64("' OR '1'='1")) to bypass authentication and, via UNION-based injection, extract arbitrary data including user credentials.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71232
MacCMS10's admin template editor (application/admin/controller/Template.php) blocks dangerous PHP functions in template content via a blacklist regex, but the blacklist omitted exec, passthru, popen, show_source, create_function, register_shutdown_function, register_tick_function, and error_log. Combined with ThinkPHP's {if} template tag, which embeds the condition attribute directly into raw PHP (<?php if(condition): ?>), an authenticated administrator could inject a payload such as {if condition="exec('id > /tmp/pwned.txt')"}{/if} to achieve remote code execution. Fixed in commit 71ad3bb29570e110d8e973acff68040a3050ddf0 (2026-06-22), which added the missing functions to the filter.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71233
InvoiceNinja v5-stable renders an invoice or quote's "terms" field in the client portal using Laravel Blade's raw output directive {!! $entity->terms !!} (resources/views/portal/ninja2020/invoices/includes/terms.blade.php) with no HTML sanitization. StoreInvoiceRequest.php only strips newlines from the field and does not purify HTML. An authenticated user with invoice creation access can set the terms field via the REST API (PUT /api/v1/invoices/{id}) to an HTML/JavaScript payload that executes in the client's browser when they view the invoice, enabling session cookie theft and client account takeover. This is a distinct code path from the previously published invoice line-item description field XSS (GHSA-98wm-cxpw-847p / CVE-2026-33628).

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🚨 CVE-2026-71234
Documize Community's attachment download route (domain/attachment/endpoint.go, Download function, registered via AddPublic with no auth middleware) accepts a `secure` query parameter and grants access whenever the parameter is simply non-empty (len(secureToken) > 0), without comparing it to any server-stored value. Any non-empty string, such as ?secure=x, bypasses authentication entirely and allows downloading any organization's attachments. Sibling handlers in the same file (togglePublish, delete) correctly enforce session-based authorization, confirming this is an inconsistency rather than intended design.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71235
Magistrala's Rules Engine allows authenticated users to create rules with embedded Go or Lua scripts executed server-side when IoT messages arrive. The Go script engine (re/golang.go) runs scripts through the Yaegi interpreter with stdlib.Symbols, exposing the full Go standard library (including os and net/http) with validation limited to a regex blocking goroutines and panic() calls; dangerous functions such as os.ReadFile, os.WriteFile, os.Remove, and os.Environ remain fully accessible. The Lua script engine (re/lua.go) performs no input validation at all and preloads dangerous libraries: db (arbitrary database access), ioutil (file I/O), an HTTP client (SSRF), and filepath (traversal). An authenticated low-privileged user can achieve arbitrary file read/write, environment variable leakage, database access, and SSRF against internal microservices.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71236
Grocy's API request-body parser (controllers/Api/BaseApiController.php, GetParsedAndFilteredRequestBody) purifies incoming field values with HTMLPurifier, then manually reverses HTML-entity encoding of the resulting output by replacing &amp;lt;, &amp;gt;, and &amp;amp; back to <, >, and & immediately after purification. This double-decode reconstructs live HTML/script tags from the entity-encoded form that HTMLPurifier produced to neutralize them, re-introducing stored XSS across API-writable fields (products, recipes, stock, users, chores, and others) that are rendered elsewhere without re-sanitization.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71237
Miantang/IoT-PHP's index.php implements a POST /userlogin route that reads the password directly from $_POST['pwd'] with no sanitization and concatenates it into a raw SQL string: mysql_query("select * from userlists where username='$username' and password='$password' limit 1"). The username value is passed through htmlspecialchars(), which does not encode single quotes by default and therefore does not prevent SQL injection through the password field. An unauthenticated attacker can submit a payload such as pwd=' OR '1'='1 to bypass authentication and, via UNION-based injection, extract arbitrary data from the database.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71238
DjangoCRM ships with its Django SECRET_KEY hardcoded directly in the committed webcrm/settings.py rather than read from an environment variable. Since this key is used for session signing, CSRF token generation, and password reset tokens, anyone who reads the public repository can forge valid session cookies (including for the superadmin account), forge CSRF tokens, and forge password reset tokens, achieving full account takeover. The repository also ships with DEBUG=True as the default, causing error pages to leak database credentials, email credentials, OAuth data, and internal file paths.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71240
DjangoCRM's toggle_default_sorting view is the only route in common/urls.py that is not wrapped in login_required or staff_member_required, and it redirects to a caller-supplied next_url GET parameter after only checking secure_url(next_url), which merely verifies the target host matches the current site's domain (blocking only cross-domain redirects) while allowing any same-site path with no authentication required to reach the view. This enables unauthenticated phishing redirects and referrer-based token leakage via redirect chains.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71241
Book-Management-System's Flask API endpoints /student, /record, /books, /find_stu_book, and /find_not_return_book are missing the @login_required decorator that protects sibling routes (/search_student, /storage) in the same file. This allows any unauthenticated remote user to retrieve student PII (name, gender, card validity, debt status) and full book-borrowing history by supplying a card_id. Because card_id values are sequential integers, the entire student database can be enumerated without authentication.

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