🚨 CVE-2026-6627
The WPFormify – Stripe Payments with Form and Checkout plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification and deletion of Stripe payment credentials in all versions up to, and including, 1.1.1. This is due to missing capability checks and nonce verification on the `wpf_stripe_callback_success()` and `wpf_stripe_disconnect()` functions, both hooked to `admin_init`. The `admin_init` hook fires on `admin-post.php` which is accessible without authentication. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite the site's Stripe API credentials with attacker-controlled values (redirecting payments to the attacker's Stripe account) or disconnect the Stripe integration entirely by deleting the stored credentials.

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🚨 CVE-2026-6639
The AI Chatbot & Workflow Automation by AIWU plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.6. This is due to the `getCurrentTaskResults()` method in `modules/workspace/controller.php` being accessible without authentication or authorization checks. The method is not included in the workspace controller's `getNoncedMethods()` array, the base `getPermissions()` returns an empty array, and all AJAX actions are registered with `wp_ajax_nopriv_` hooks (`classes/frame.php:282`). When tasks are created via features like the Bulk Post Generator, the task parameters — including the OpenAI API key in plaintext, AI prompts, keywords, and full AI model configuration — are stored in the database and returned in the JSON response. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to enumerate sequential task IDs and retrieve sensitive configuration data including API keys.

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🚨 CVE-2026-6972
The SKT Skill Bar plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the `chart_size` attribute of the `skillwrapper` shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 2.6. This is due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on the `chart_size` attribute, which is concatenated directly into an inline `<style>` block. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.

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🚨 CVE-2026-70376
Pluck CMS's admin panel relies solely on a Referer-header comparison (requestedByTheSameDomain() in data/inc/functions.admin.php, gating every admin.php action) for CSRF protection, with no per-request anti-CSRF token anywhere in the admin area. When a request carries no Referer/Host information, the function's elseif branch returns true, treating the request as same-origin. Because a cross-site attacker page can suppress the Referer header (e.g. via <meta name=referrer content=no-referrer>), it can force an authenticated administrator's browser to submit forged admin actions with no valid Referer, including creating pages with raw HTML (stored XSS via the rendered page) and installing PHP modules/themes (remote code execution).

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🚨 CVE-2026-70377
imagecli's `scale <ratio>` pipeline operation (Scale::apply() in src/image_ops.rs) computes output width/height as (dimension as f32 * ratio) as u32 with no upper-bound validation on the CLI-supplied ratio, which is parsed via nom::number::complete::float with no range check. A large ratio (e.g. 100000) causes an attempted allocation of hundreds of terabytes, aborting the process. Any application embedding imagecli as a library and accepting user-controlled pipeline strings is remotely crashable with a single request.

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🚨 CVE-2026-70378
imagecli's `carve <ratio>` pipeline operation (Carve::apply() in src/image_ops.rs) only asserts `ratio <= 1.0`, never validating that the ratio is positive. A negative ratio (e.g. -5) causes the computed target width to saturate to 0 via Rust's defined float-to-uint cast, which is then passed to imageproc::seam_carving::shrink_width — a function that panics when given a width below 2, crashing the process. This shares the same missing-input-validation root cause as the sibling `scale` finding in the same file but is an independently fixable, distinct code path.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71202
The raster Rust crate's crop() function (src/editor.rs) clamps the crop width/height against source dimensions but only clamps the offset_x/offset_y parameters against 0, never against the source width/height. When an offset exceeds the corresponding source dimension, `width2 - offset_x` (or the height equivalent) underflows to a negative i32, which release builds do not trap; the negative value is then cast to usize inside Image::blank()'s Vec::with_capacity() call, triggering a capacity-overflow panic and crashing the process on a single crafted crop request.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71203
changedetection.io's REST API resources are protected by an @auth.check_token decorator validating the caller's x-api-key header, except the Spec resource registered at /api/v1/full-spec (changedetectionio/api/Spec.py), whose get() method carries neither @auth.check_token nor @validate_openapi_request. An unauthenticated client can retrieve the full merged OpenAPI schema (all endpoint paths, parameters, and registered processor plugins) even when API access control is enabled and every sibling /api/v1/* route correctly requires the key.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71205
changedetection.io's /login route checks the submitted password against a single PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 hash with no per-IP or per-session rate limiting, failed-attempt counter, or lockout (no rate-limiting library is present in requirements.txt). Because the entire application is protected by one shared password with no per-user accounts, a successful brute-force guess grants full administrative access, including the ability to view/regenerate the API token.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71206
Shiori's CheckToken function (internal/domains/auth.go) validates only the JWT's HMAC signature and returns the embedded claims.Account object unmodified, never re-fetching the account from the database. No session store or token-revocation mechanism exists in the codebase. Deleting an account or demoting it from owner to a regular role has no effect on tokens already issued to that account — a deleted or demoted owner's token continues authenticating with its original owner-level privileges until natural expiry, which can be up to 30 days with 'remember me' enabled.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71207
The Stock-Inventory-Management-System application's login.php assigns raw $_POST username/password values to $_SESSION and builds its authentication query by directly concatenating those session values into a SQL statement with no parameterization or escaping. An unauthenticated remote attacker can submit a payload such as ' OR '1'='1 in the login form to bypass authentication entirely. The same script additionally contains hardcoded administrative credentials (admin/neola) in a post-login conditional check, providing a second, independent full-authentication-bypass path.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71208
KubeSphere's cluster-controller reconciliation (pkg/utils/clusterclient/clusterclient.go, addCluster) processes every Cluster custom resource's connection configuration and immediately calls Discovery().ServerVersion() against the CRD-specified Kubernetes API endpoint, which is parsed only for URL syntax (url.Parse) with no allow/deny-list for loopback, RFC1918 private ranges, link-local, or cloud-metadata addresses (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A user able to create or update a Cluster CRD can force the controller-manager and apiserver pods to issue outbound requests to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71209
audiobookshelf's authentication-exemption check (server/routers/Auth.js) matches unauthenticated-allowed GET routes against req.path via a regex requiring a literal /items/:id/cover or /authors/:id/image shape, where req.path retains %2F sequences URL-encoded. Express's router decodes the :id route parameter before handler code runs, so a %2F-encoded '../' sequence in :id (e.g. ..%2f..%2f..%2ftmp%2fpwned) passes the literal-path auth-exemption check while resolving to a real path-traversal payload once decoded. CacheManager.handleCoverCache then joins this decoded value into a cache file path and streams the result before any database-backed ownership check. This bypasses the fix applied for CVE-2025-25205 (which anchored the exemption regex and switched it to req.path) and results in unauthenticated arbitrary file read of any file matching the pattern *_<width>[x<height>].<ext> that the service account can read.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71210
Mealie's AsyncSafeTransport SSRF guard (mealie/pkgs/safehttp/transport.py) resolves a target hostname once, checks the resolved IP against private-range rules, but then issues the actual outbound HTTP request using the original hostname, which the underlying async transport re-resolves independently. Because the validated IP is never pinned to the actual connection, a DNS-rebinding attacker (returning a public IP to the validation lookup and a private/metadata IP to the real connection) defeats the guard. This is reachable by any authenticated user via /api/recipes/create/url, /api/recipes/test-scrape-url, and /api/recipes/{slug}/image, and the scraper reflects fetched content back to the requester, allowing an authenticated user to read internal HTTP services and cloud-metadata endpoints.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71211
MLflow's AI Gateway accepts an auth_config.api_base value when creating a gateway secret (mlflow/server/handlers.py, _create_gateway_secret) with no validation of scheme, host, or IP range; the value is stored verbatim. The gateway proxy endpoint (mlflow/server/gateway_api.py, raw_proxy) subsequently issues an HTTP request to that stored api_base plus a caller-supplied path and returns the full response body. MLflow's existing SSRF guard, _validate_webhook_url (which blocks non-global and metadata IPs), is never invoked anywhere in this gateway secret/proxy code path. The CreateGatewaySecret action additionally has no entry in the permission-validator map, so it requires only basic authentication rather than any specific scope, meaning any authenticated user — including read-only accounts — can create a secret pointing at an internal address and reach it via the proxy endpoint, potentially exposing cloud-instance IAM credentials via metadata services. This is related to CVE-2026-4035, which addresses a distinct mechanism in the same gateway-secret feature (server-side $ENV_VAR resolution inside the api_key field leaking credentials to the configured upstream); the finding here is an independent missing-validation gap in the api_base destination itself, unaffected by that fix.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71212
xidown (a yt-dlp/ffmpeg GUI wrapper) builds its yt-dlp command-line invocation (xidown/core/scanner.py and downloader.py) by appending the user-provided or scanned URL as a bare trailing positional argument, with no '--' end-of-options marker and no scheme validation anywhere in the codebase. Because yt-dlp parses any argument beginning with '-' as a CLI option rather than link text, a crafted 'URL' value such as -U (yt-dlp's self-update flag) or --exec=... is parsed as a real yt-dlp option instead of a URL, altering the tool's control flow before its own URL validation runs. Full code execution via --exec was not demonstrated in the single-URL flow tested, but the underlying argument-injection primitive is confirmed and unmitigated across all call sites.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71213
Typemill's login endpoint (POST /tm/login, ControllerWebAuth::login()) performs no rate-limiting, failed-attempt counting, or account lockout when captcha is disabled, which is the default configuration. An unauthenticated attacker can send unlimited password-guessing requests against any account, including administrators, with no throttling. The only attempt-counting/lockout logic present in the same file protects an optional secondary email-authcode step and does not apply to the primary password check.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71214
The Aerie/PlanDev sequencing-server's authorization middleware (sequencing-server/src/app.ts) derives the caller's Hasura session role via getHasuraSession(), which prefers a session_variables object taken directly from the client-supplied JSON request body over the Authorization header's JWT claims, with no verification that the request actually originated from Hasura. By setting {"session_variables":{"x-hasura-role":"aerie_admin"}} in the body of a request to POST /command-expansion/put-expansion with no Authorization header, an unauthenticated attacker satisfies the role check and can insert arbitrary expansion rules into sequencing.expansion_rule, which govern how spacecraft activities are translated into commands. Separately, POST /put-dictionary is explicitly listed in the ENDPOINTS_WHITELIST and is exempt from any authentication, allowing unauthenticated writes of command dictionaries.

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🚨 CVE-2026-71215
art-template's sub-template resolution logic (src/compile/adapter/resolve-filename.js), used by both the include() and extend() template directives, resolves the target file path via path.resolve(root, filename) with no check afterward that the result remains inside root. Because path.resolve() discards root entirely when filename is an absolute path, and does not block '../' traversal sequences, and the resolved path is passed directly to fs.readFileSync() in loader.js with its contents compiled and rendered, an application that lets a sub-template name be influenced by external input (e.g. a query parameter passed into {{include page}}) allows an attacker to read arbitrary files on disk that the Node process can access.

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🚨 CVE-2026-7105
The Xpro Addons plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized creation of data due to a missing capability check on the `get_menu_content_editor()` function in all versions up to, and including, 1.5.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to create arbitrary published posts of the `xpro_content` custom post type with attacker-controlled titles. The created posts are publicly queryable on the front-end, enabling content injection, SEO spam, and database pollution.

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🚨 CVE-2026-7441
The Simple Yearly Archive plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the `posttype` attribute of the `SimpleYearlyArchive` shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 2.2.4 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.

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