🚨 CVE-2026-64508
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Support for hardening against JIT spraying

The BPF JIT allocator packs many small programs into larger executable
allocations and reuses space within those allocations as programs are
loaded and freed. When fresh code is written into space that a previous
program occupied, an indirect jump into the new program can reuse a branch
prediction left behind by the old one.

Flush the indirect branch predictors before reusing JIT memory so that
indirect jumps into a newly written program don't reuse predictions from an
old program that occupied the same space.

Introduce bpf_arch_pred_flush_enabled static key and bpf_arch_pred_flush
static call for flushing the branch predictors on JIT memory reuse.
Architectures that need a flush, can update it to a predictor flush
function. By default, its a NOP and does not emit any CALL.

Allocations larger than a pack are not covered by this flush. That is safe
because cBPF programs (the unprivileged attack surface) are bounded well
below a pack size. Issue a warning if this assumption is ever violated
while the flush is active.

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🚨 CVE-2026-64515
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: mac80211: fix MLE defragmentation

If either reconf or EPCS multi-link element (MLE) is contained in
a non-transmitted profile, the defragmentation routine is called
with a pointer to the defragmented copy, but the original elements.

This is incorrect for two reasons:
- if the original defragmentation was needed, it will not find the
correct data
- if the original frame is at a higher address, the parsing will
potentially overrun the heap data (though given the layout of
the buffers, only into the new defragmentation buffer, and then
it has to stop and fail once that's filled with copied data.

Fix it by tracking the container along with the pointer and in
doing so also unify the two almost identical defragmentation
routines.

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🚨 CVE-2026-64516
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdgpu/vce1: Fix VCE 1 firmware size and offsets

The VCPU BO contains the actual FW at an offset, but
it was not calculated into the VCPU BO size.
Subtract this from the FW size to make sure there is
no out of bounds access.

Make sure the stack and data offsets are aligned to
the 32K TLB size.

Check that the FW microcode actually fits in the
space that is reserved for it.

(cherry picked from commit c16fe59f622a080fc457a57b3e8f14c780699449)

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🚨 CVE-2026-64520
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

firmware: arm_ffa: Bound PARTITION_INFO_GET_REGS copies

The register-based PARTITION_INFO_GET path trusted the firmware-provided
indices when copying partition descriptors into the caller buffer.
Reject inconsistent counts or index progressions so the copy loop cannot
write past the allocated array.

(fixed cur_idx when exactly one descriptor in the first fragment)

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🚨 CVE-2026-64522
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5e: Fix eswitch mode block underflow on IPsec acquire SA

mlx5e_xfrm_add_state() handles acquire-flow temporary SAs by allocating
software state and skipping hardware offload setup.

That path jumps to the common success label before taking the eswitch mode
block. After tunnel-mode validation was moved earlier, the common success
label unconditionally calls mlx5_eswitch_unblock_mode(). For acquire SAs,
this decrements esw->offloads.num_block_mode without a matching increment.

Return directly after installing the acquire SA offload handle, so only the
paths that successfully called mlx5_eswitch_block_mode() call the matching
unblock.

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🚨 CVE-2026-64523
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit

handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing
req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between
handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file().
The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps
struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when
the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears
the socket down regardless of any sock_hold.

Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an
explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit().
handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the
reference on the completion-bit-winning path.

The submit error path must also release the file reference, but
after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can
discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path
cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction
-- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same
serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel()
already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit
error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown
handles final destruction.

The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change
comes in the next patch.

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🚨 CVE-2026-64524
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/hyperv: validate resolution_count and fix WIN8 fallback

A SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE with resolution_count > 64 walks past
the supported_resolution[SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT] array in the
parse loop. Bound resolution_count against the array size, folded
into the existing zero-check.

When the WIN10 resolution probe fails, the caller in
hyperv_connect_vsp() left hv->screen_*_max / preferred_* unpopulated,
which sets mode_config.max_width / max_height to 0 and makes
drm_internal_framebuffer_create() reject every userspace framebuffer
with -EINVAL. The pre-WIN10 branch had the same gap for
preferred_width / preferred_height. Use a single post-probe fallback
guarded by screen_width_max == 0 so both paths converge on the WIN8
defaults.

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🚨 CVE-2026-64529
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs

The QAT driver exposes a character device (qat_adf_ctl) with IOCTLs
for device configuration, start, stop, status query and enumeration.
These IOCTLs are not part of any public uAPI header and have no known
in-tree or out-of-tree users. Device lifecycle is already managed via
sysfs.

The ioctl interface also increases the attack surface and is the
subject of a number of bug reports.

Remove the character device, the IOCTL definitions, and the related
data structures (adf_dev_status_info, adf_user_cfg_key_val,
adf_user_cfg_section, adf_user_cfg_ctl_data). Drop the now-unused
adf_cfg_user.h header and strip adf_ctl_drv.c down to the minimal
module_init/module_exit hooks for workqueue, AER, and crypto/compression
algorithm registration.

Clean up leftover dead code that was only reachable from the removed
IOCTL paths: adf_cfg_del_all(), adf_devmgr_verify_id(),
adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(), adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(),
adf_get_vf_real_id() and the unused ADF_CFG macros.

Additionally, drop the entry associated to QAT IOCTLs in
ioctl-number.rst.

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🚨 CVE-2024-14040
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: nexthop: Increase weight to u16

In CLOS networks, as link failures occur at various points in the network,
ECMP weights of the involved nodes are adjusted to compensate. With high
fan-out of the involved nodes, and overall high number of nodes,
a (non-)ECMP weight ratio that we would like to configure does not fit into
8 bits. Instead of, say, 255:254, we might like to configure something like
1000:999. For these deployments, the 8-bit weight may not be enough.

To that end, in this patch increase the next hop weight from u8 to u16.

Increasing the width of an integral type can be tricky, because while the
code still compiles, the types may not check out anymore, and numerical
errors come up. To prevent this, the conversion was done in two steps.
First the type was changed from u8 to a single-member structure, which
invalidated all uses of the field. This allowed going through them one by
one and audit for type correctness. Then the structure was replaced with a
vanilla u16 again. This should ensure that no place was missed.

The UAPI for configuring nexthop group members is that an attribute
NHA_GROUP carries an array of struct nexthop_grp entries:

struct nexthop_grp {
__u32 id; /* nexthop id - must exist */
__u8 weight; /* weight of this nexthop */
__u8 resvd1;
__u16 resvd2;
};

The field resvd1 is currently validated and required to be zero. We can
lift this requirement and carry high-order bits of the weight in the
reserved field:

struct nexthop_grp {
__u32 id; /* nexthop id - must exist */
__u8 weight; /* weight of this nexthop */
__u8 weight_high;
__u16 resvd2;
};

Keeping the fields split this way was chosen in case an existing userspace
makes assumptions about the width of the weight field, and to sidestep any
endianness issues.

The weight field is currently encoded as the weight value minus one,
because weight of 0 is invalid. This same trick is impossible for the new
weight_high field, because zero must mean actual zero. With this in place:

- Old userspace is guaranteed to carry weight_high of 0, therefore
configuring 8-bit weights as appropriate. When dumping nexthops with
16-bit weight, it would only show the lower 8 bits. But configuring such
nexthops implies existence of userspace aware of the extension in the
first place.

- New userspace talking to an old kernel will work as long as it only
attempts to configure 8-bit weights, where the high-order bits are zero.
Old kernel will bounce attempts at configuring >8-bit weights.

Renaming reserved fields as they are allocated for some purpose is commonly
done in Linux. Whoever touches a reserved field is doing so at their own
risk. nexthop_grp::resvd1 in particular is currently used by at least
strace, however they carry an own copy of UAPI headers, and the conversion
should be trivial. A helper is provided for decoding the weight out of the
two fields. Forcing a conversion seems preferable to bending backwards and
introducing anonymous unions or whatever.

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🚨 CVE-2026-64530
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: cls_api: Handle TC_ACT_CONSUMED in tcf_qevent_handle

tcf_classify() can return TC_ACT_CONSUMED while the skb is held by the
defragmentation engine (e.g. act_ct on out-of-order fragments). When
that happens the skb is no longer owned by the caller and must not be
touched again.

tcf_qevent_handle() did not handle TC_ACT_CONSUMED: it fell through the
switch and returned the skb to the caller as if classification had
passed. The only qdisc that wires up qevents today is RED, via three call sites
(qe_mark on RED_PROB_MARK/HARD_MARK, qe_early_drop on congestion_drop)
red_enqueue() was continuing to operate on an skb it no longer owns in this
case -- enqueueing it, dropping it, or updating statistics. Resulting in a UAF.

tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1: red ... qevent early_drop block 10
tc filter add block 10 ... action ct

(with ct defrag enabled and traffic that produces out-of-order
fragments, e.g. a fragmented UDP stream)

Handle TC_ACT_CONSUMED in tcf_qevent_handle() the same way the ingress
and egress fast paths do: treat it as stolen and return NULL without
touching the skb. Unlike the TC_ACT_STOLEN case, the skb must not be
dropped/freed here, as it is no longer owned by us.

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🚨 CVE-2026-50256
A stack-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland. A mismatch between the X server and the libXfont2 library's maximum font name length can cause a stack buffer overflow during font alias resolution. The server allocates a 256 byte stack buffer but libXfont2's alias target name length is 1024 bytes. A font alias name between 257 and 1023 bytes causes the X server to copy that name into the undersized stack buffer without further checks. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root.

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🚨 CVE-2026-50257
A use-after-free flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland in miSyncDestroyFence(). A client that sets up multiple fence triggers can trigger a use-after-free function pointer call. An attacker would connect to the X server to set up a fence and await that fence, then a second X connection destroys the fence, causing the use-after-free. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root.

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🚨 CVE-2026-50258
A stack-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland. The X server has multiple stack buffers sized XkbMaxShiftLevel * XkbNumKbdGroups but CheckKeyTypes() does not verify or clamp non-canonical key types to XkbMaxShiftLevel. A client can change key types to excessive shift levels and trigger stack overflows. This is caused by an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-26597. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root.

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🚨 CVE-2026-50259
A stack-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland. _XkbSetMapChecks() declares a fixed-size stack buffer mapWidths[256] indexed by key type index. The helper function CheckKeyTypes() writes to this buffer at a client-controlled offset, allowing a stack buffer overflow. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root.

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🚨 CVE-2026-50260
A use-after-free flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland in FreeCounter(). A client that sets up multiple SyncCounters and awaits on those triggers can trigger a use-after-free when destroying those counters via a second client connection. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root.

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🚨 CVE-2026-50261
A use-after-free flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland in SyncChangeCounter(). A client that sets up multiple SyncCounters can trigger a use-after-free when destroying those counters via a second client connection while changing those counters. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root.

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🚨 CVE-2026-50262
An out-of-bounds read flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland in __glXDisp_ChangeDrawableAttributes(). A wrong size validation check can read a client-controlled number of bytes, exceeding the request buffer, leading to information disclosure. A write path also exists but requires byte-swapped clients which is disabled by default.

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🚨 CVE-2026-50263
A use-after-free flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland in CreateSaverWindow(). A client can trigger a use-after-free read after changing window attributes and forcing the screen saver, leading to information disclosure.

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🚨 CVE-2026-50264
An out-of-bounds write flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland in DRIGetBuffers/DRIGetBuffersWithFormat. A client that requests multiple DRI2BufferBackLeft attachments and one DRI2BufferFrontLeft can trigger an out-of-bounds heap write. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root.

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🚨 CVE-2025-15662
The Printcart Web to Print Product Designer for WooCommerce WordPress plugin before 2.5.3 does not restrict a user-supplied URL before fetching it server-side and does not enforce a valid authorization check, allowing unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary local files (including configuration files containing database credentials and secret keys) and to make server-side requests to internal resources.

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🚨 CVE-2026-10082
The Advanced Ads WordPress plugin before 2.0.23 does not sanitize and escape a shortcode parameter before outputting it in the page, allowing users with the Contributor role and above to inject arbitrary web scripts that execute when the affected content is viewed, including by higher-privileged users.

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