🚨 CVE-2026-31703
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

writeback: Fix use after free in inode_switch_wbs_work_fn()

inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() has a loop like:

wb_get(new_wb);
while (1) {
list = llist_del_all(&new_wb->switch_wbs_ctxs);
/* Nothing to do? */
if (!list)
break;
... process the items ...
}

Now adding of items to the list looks like:

wb_queue_isw()
if (llist_add(&isw->list, &wb->switch_wbs_ctxs))
queue_work(isw_wq, &wb->switch_work);

Because inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() loops when processing isw items, it
can happen that wb->switch_work is pending while wb->switch_wbs_ctxs is
empty. This is a problem because in that case wb can get freed (no isw
items -> no wb reference) while the work is still pending causing
use-after-free issues.

We cannot just fix this by cancelling work when freeing wb because that
could still trigger problematic 0 -> 1 transitions on wb refcount due to
wb_get() in inode_switch_wbs_work_fn(). It could be all handled with
more careful code but that seems unnecessarily complex so let's avoid
that until it is proven that the looping actually brings practical
benefit. Just remove the loop from inode_switch_wbs_work_fn() instead.
That way when wb_queue_isw() queues work, we are guaranteed we have
added the first item to wb->switch_wbs_ctxs and nobody is going to
remove it (and drop the wb reference it holds) until the queued work
runs.

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🚨 CVE-2026-39805
Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows HTTP request smuggling via duplicate Content-Length headers.

'Elixir.Bandit.Headers':get_content_length/1 in lib/bandit/headers.ex uses List.keyfind/3, which returns only the first matching header. When a request contains two Content-Length headers with different values, Bandit silently accepts it, uses the first value to read the body, and dispatches the remaining bytes as a second pipelined request on the same keep-alive connection. RFC 9112 §6.3 requires recipients to treat this as an unrecoverable framing error.

When Bandit sits behind a proxy that picks the last Content-Length value and forwards the request rather than rejecting it, an unauthenticated attacker can smuggle requests past edge WAF rules, path-based ACLs, rate limiting, and audit logging.

This issue affects bandit: before 1.11.0.

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🚨 CVE-2026-43119
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: hci_sync: annotate data-races around hdev->req_status

__hci_cmd_sync_sk() sets hdev->req_status under hdev->req_lock:

hdev->req_status = HCI_REQ_PEND;

However, several other functions read or write hdev->req_status without
holding any lock:

- hci_send_cmd_sync() reads req_status in hci_cmd_work (workqueue)
- hci_cmd_sync_complete() reads/writes from HCI event completion
- hci_cmd_sync_cancel() / hci_cmd_sync_cancel_sync() read/write
- hci_abort_conn() reads in connection abort path

Since __hci_cmd_sync_sk() runs on hdev->req_workqueue while
hci_send_cmd_sync() runs on hdev->workqueue, these are different
workqueues that can execute concurrently on different CPUs. The plain
C accesses constitute a data race.

Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations on all concurrent accesses
to hdev->req_status to prevent potential compiler optimizations that
could affect correctness (e.g., load fusing in the wait_event
condition or store reordering).

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🚨 CVE-2025-71289
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fs/ntfs3: handle attr_set_size() errors when truncating files

If attr_set_size() fails while truncating down, the error is silently
ignored and the inode may be left in an inconsistent state.

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🚨 CVE-2026-43456
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bonding: fix type confusion in bond_setup_by_slave()

kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2306!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:pskb_expand_head+0xa08/0xfe0 net/core/skbuff.c:2306
RSP: 0018:ffffc90004aff760 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88807e3c8780 RCX: ffffffff89593e0e
RDX: ffff88807b7c4900 RSI: ffffffff89594747 RDI: ffff88807b7c4900
RBP: 0000000000000820 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000961a63e0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88807e3c8780
R13: 00000000961a6560 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 00000000961a63e0
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe1a0ed8df0 CR3: 000000002d816000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ipgre_header+0xdd/0x540 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:900
dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3439 [inline]
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3028 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x3ae5/0x53c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3108
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:742 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0xa54/0xc30 net/socket.c:2592
___sys_sendmsg+0x190/0x1e0 net/socket.c:2646
__sys_sendmsg+0x170/0x220 net/socket.c:2678
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x106/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe1a0e6c1a9

When a non-Ethernet device (e.g. GRE tunnel) is enslaved to a bond,
bond_setup_by_slave() directly copies the slave's header_ops to the
bond device:

bond_dev->header_ops = slave_dev->header_ops;

This causes a type confusion when dev_hard_header() is later called
on the bond device. Functions like ipgre_header(), ip6gre_header(),all use
netdev_priv(dev) to access their device-specific private data. When
called with the bond device, netdev_priv() returns the bond's private
data (struct bonding) instead of the expected type (e.g. struct
ip_tunnel), leading to garbage values being read and kernel crashes.

Fix this by introducing bond_header_ops with wrapper functions that
delegate to the active slave's header_ops using the slave's own
device. This ensures netdev_priv() in the slave's header functions
always receives the correct device.

The fix is placed in the bonding driver rather than individual device
drivers, as the root cause is bond blindly inheriting header_ops from
the slave without considering that these callbacks expect a specific
netdev_priv() layout.

The type confusion can be observed by adding a printk in
ipgre_header() and running the following commands:

ip link add dummy0 type dummy
ip addr add 10.0.0.1/24 dev dummy0
ip link set dummy0 up
ip link add gre1 type gre local 10.0.0.1
ip link add bond1 type bond mode active-backup
ip link set gre1 master bond1
ip link set gre1 up
ip link set bond1 up
ip addr add fe80::1/64 dev bond1

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🚨 CVE-2026-32687
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in elixir-ecto postgrex ('Elixir.Postgrex.Notifications' module) allows SQL Injection.

The channel argument passed to 'Elixir.Postgrex.Notifications':listen/3 and 'Elixir.Postgrex.Notifications':unlisten/3 is interpolated directly into LISTEN "..." / UNLISTEN "..." SQL statements without escaping the " character. An attacker who can influence the channel name can inject a " to break out of the quoted identifier and append arbitrary SQL. Because the notifications connection uses the PostgreSQL simple query protocol, multi-statement payloads are accepted, allowing DDL and DML commands to be chained (e.g. ; DROP TABLE ...; --). The same unsanitized interpolation also occurs in handle_connect/1 when replaying LISTEN commands after a reconnect.

This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/postgrex/notifications.ex and program routines 'Elixir.Postgrex.Notifications':listen/3, 'Elixir.Postgrex.Notifications':unlisten/3, 'Elixir.Postgrex.Notifications':handle_connect/1.

This issue affects postgrex: from 0.16.0 before 0.22.2.

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🚨 CVE-2026-43499
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()

remove_waiter() is used by the slowlock paths, but it is also used for
proxy-lock rollback in rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() when invoked from
futex_requeue().

In the latter case waiter::task is not current, but remove_waiter()
operates on current for the dequeue operation. That results in several
problems:

1) the rbtree dequeue happens without waiter::task::pi_lock being held

2) the waiter task's pi_blocked_on state is not cleared, which leaves a
dangling pointer primed for UAF around.

3) rt_mutex_adjust_prio_chain() operates on the wrong top priority waiter
task

Use waiter::task instead of current in all related operations in
remove_waiter() to cure those problems.

[ tglx: Fixup rt_mutex_adjust_prio_chain(), add a comment and amend the
changelog ]

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🚨 CVE-2026-47075
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences vulnerability in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting. hackney does not percent-encode carriage return (\r) or line feed (\n) characters in the URL query component before constructing the HTTP/1.1 request target. Characters outside the grammar defined in RFC 3986 Section 3.4 must be percent-encoded, but hackney_url:make_url/3 passes the query binary directly without validation or escaping. An attacker who can control all or part of a URL passed to hackney can inject raw CRLF sequences into the query string, which are then sent as HTTP line breaks in the request target. This enables injection of arbitrary HTTP headers or splitting of the HTTP request.

This issue affects hackney: from 0.13.1 before 4.0.1.

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🚨 CVE-2026-42789
Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_cert module) allows a non-CA certificate to be accepted as an intermediate issuer, enabling certificate chain forgery.

In lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert.erl, pubkey_cert:validate_extensions/7 contains two flaws that together allow a certificate with basicConstraints cA:false and no keyUsage extension to be used as an intermediate issuer in a chain passed to public_key:pkix_path_validation/3: the cA:false clause recurses into the remaining extensions without rejecting the certificate when it is in issuer position, and the keyUsage check only fires when the extension is present, so a certificate lacking keyUsage entirely bypasses the keyCertSign enforcement.

Any party holding an end-entity certificate with basicConstraints cA:false and no keyUsage extension, issued by any CA in the victim's trust store, can use that certificate's private key to sign forged leaf certificates for arbitrary identities. public_key:pkix_path_validation/3 accepts the resulting chain, and by extension every TLS or mTLS endpoint built on the OTP ssl application that relies on the default verifier is affected, including server identity verification on the client side and client certificate verification on mTLS servers.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 29.0.1, OTP 28.5.0.1, OTP 27.3.4.12 and OTP 26.2.5.21, corresponding to public_key from 0.22 before 1.21.1, 1.20.3.1, 1.17.1.3 and 1.15.1.7.

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🚨 CVE-2026-42791
Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_ocsp module) allows forged OCSP responses signed with an expired responder certificate to be accepted as valid.

OCSP response verification in pubkey_ocsp:verify_response/5 and pubkey_ocsp:is_authorized_responder/3 in lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ocsp.erl does not check the validity period (notBefore/notAfter) of the OCSP responder certificate. An attacker who has obtained the private key of an expired CA-designated OCSP responder certificate can forge OCSP responses that Erlang/OTP accepts as valid.

This affects TLS clients using OCSP stapling via the ssl application: a malicious or compromised server can present a revoked TLS certificate together with a forged OCSP response signed by an expired responder key, and the client will accept the revoked certificate as valid. It also affects applications calling public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 directly, where the impact depends on the use case — server-side client certificate validation using this API may allow authentication bypass with a revoked client certificate.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 27.0 before OTP 29.0.1, OTP 28.5.0.1 and OTP 27.3.4.12, corresponding to public_key from 1.16 before 1.21.1, 1.20.3.1 and 1.17.1.3.

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🚨 CVE-2026-45944
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommu/vt-d: Clear Present bit before tearing down context entry

When tearing down a context entry, the current implementation zeros the
entire 128-bit entry using multiple 64-bit writes. This creates a window
where the hardware can fetch a "torn" entry — where some fields are
already zeroed while the 'Present' bit is still set — leading to
unpredictable behavior or spurious faults.

While x86 provides strong write ordering, the compiler may reorder writes
to the two 64-bit halves of the context entry. Even without compiler
reordering, the hardware fetch is not guaranteed to be atomic with
respect to multiple CPU writes.

Align with the "Guidance to Software for Invalidations" in the VT-d spec
(Section 6.5.3.3) by implementing the recommended ownership handshake:

1. Clear only the 'Present' (P) bit of the context entry first to
signal the transition of ownership from hardware to software.
2. Use dma_wmb() to ensure the cleared bit is visible to the IOMMU.
3. Perform the required cache and context-cache invalidation to ensure
hardware no longer has cached references to the entry.
4. Fully zero out the entry only after the invalidation is complete.

Also, add a dma_wmb() to context_set_present() to ensure the entry
is fully initialized before the 'Present' bit becomes visible.

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🚨 CVE-2026-42790
Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_cert and public_key modules) allows a DNS nameConstraints bypass via subject CommonName fallback in TLS hostname verification.

Two flaws combine to allow a subordinate CA whose DNS nameConstraints are restricted (e.g. permitted;DNS:allowed.example.com) to issue a leaf certificate that an OTP TLS client accepts as a valid identity for an out-of-scope hostname (e.g. victim.example.com):

First, pubkey_cert:validate_names/6 in lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert.erl only checks SAN DNS entries against nameConstraints. Per RFC 5280, a permitted DNS subtree only restricts certificates that contain a DNS-typed name. A leaf with no subjectAltName therefore trivially satisfies any permitted;DNS:... constraint regardless of its subject commonName.

Second, public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/3 in lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl falls back to the subject commonName when no subjectAltName is present, extracting id-at-commonName attributes as presented IDs and matching them against the reference hostname. The strict pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(https) matcher does not suppress this fallback.

The result is that path validation accepts a CN-only leaf under a DNS-constrained intermediate (no SAN means the nameConstraints are not triggered), and hostname verification then accepts it via the CN fallback. The bypass is reachable from stock ssl:connect with verify_peer, a trusted CA, SNI, and the canonical strict https hostname matcher.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 19.3 before OTP 29.0.1, OTP 28.5.0.1, OTP 27.3.4.12 and OTP 26.2.5.21, corresponding to public_key from 1.4 before 1.21.1, 1.20.3.1, 1.17.1.3 and 1.15.1.7.

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🚨 CVE-2026-46116
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfrm: defensively unhash xfrm_state lists in __xfrm_state_delete

KASAN reproduces a slab-use-after-free in __xfrm_state_delete()'s
hlist_del_rcu calls under syzkaller load on linux-6.12.y stable
(reproduced on 6.12.47, also reachable via the same code path on
torvalds/master and on the ipsec tree). Nine unique signatures cluster
in the xfrm_state lifecycle, the load-bearing one being:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __hlist_del include/linux/list.h:990 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hlist_del_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:516 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __xfrm_state_delete net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881198bcb70 by task kworker/u8:9/435

Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
Call Trace:
__hlist_del / hlist_del_rcu
__xfrm_state_delete
xfrm_state_delete
xfrm_state_flush
xfrm_state_fini
ops_exit_list
cleanup_net

The other observed signatures hit the same slab object from
__xfrm_state_lookup, xfrm_alloc_spi, __xfrm_state_insert and an OOB
write variant of __xfrm_state_delete, all on the byseq/byspi
hash chains.

__xfrm_state_delete() guards its byseq and byspi unhashes with
value-based predicates:

if (x->km.seq)
hlist_del_rcu(&x->byseq);
if (x->id.spi)
hlist_del_rcu(&x->byspi);

while everywhere else in the file (e.g. state_cache, state_cache_input)
the safer hlist_unhashed() check is used. xfrm_alloc_spi() sets
x->id.spi = newspi inside xfrm_state_lock and then immediately inserts
into byspi, but a path that observes x->id.spi != 0 outside of
xfrm_state_lock can still skip-or-hit the byspi unhash inconsistently
with whether x is actually on the list. The same holds for x->km.seq
versus byseq, and the bydst/bysrc unhashes have no predicate at all,
so a second __xfrm_state_delete() on the same object writes through
LIST_POISON pprev.

The defensive change here:

- Use hlist_del_init_rcu() instead of hlist_del_rcu() on bydst,
bysrc, byseq and byspi so a second deletion is a no-op rather
than a write through LIST_POISON pprev. The byseq/byspi nodes
are already initialised in xfrm_state_alloc().
- Test hlist_unhashed() rather than the value predicate for
byseq/byspi, so the unhash decision tracks list state rather than
mutable scalar fields.

Empirical verification: applied this patch on top of v6.12.47, rebuilt,
and re-ran the same syzkaller harness for 1h16m on a previously-crashy
configuration that produced ~100 hits each of slab-use-after-free
Read in xfrm_alloc_spi / Read in __xfrm_state_lookup / Write in
__xfrm_state_delete. After the patch, 7.1M execs across 32 VMs at
~1550 exec/sec produced zero xfrm_state UAF/OOB hits. /proc/slabinfo
confirms the xfrm_state slab is actively allocated and freed during
the run (~143 KiB resident), so the fuzzer is still exercising those
code paths -- they just no longer crash.

Reproduction:

- Linux 6.12.47 x86_64 + KASAN_GENERIC + KASAN_INLINE + KCOV
- syzkaller @ 746545b8b1e4c3a128db8652b340d3df90ce61db
- 32 QEMU/KVM VMs x 2 vCPU on AWS c5.metal bare metal
- 9 unique signatures collected in ~9h, all within xfrm_state
lifecycle

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🚨 CVE-2026-46135
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nvmet-tcp: fix race between ICReq handling and queue teardown

nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq() updates queue->state after sending an
Initialization Connection Response (ICResp), but it does so without
serializing against target-side queue teardown.

If an NVMe/TCP host sends an Initialization Connection Request
(ICReq) and immediately closes the connection, target-side teardown
may start in softirq context before io_work drains the already
buffered ICReq. In that case, nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue()
sets queue->state to NVMET_TCP_Q_DISCONNECTING and drops the queue
reference under state_lock.

If io_work later processes that ICReq, nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq() can
still overwrite the state back to NVMET_TCP_Q_LIVE. That defeats the
DISCONNECTING-state guard in nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() and
allows a later socket state change to re-enter teardown and issue a
second kref_put() on an already released queue.

The ICResp send failure path has the same problem. If teardown has
already moved the queue to DISCONNECTING, a send error can still
overwrite the state with NVMET_TCP_Q_FAILED, again reopening the
window for a second teardown path to drop the queue reference.

Fix this by serializing both post-send state transitions with
state_lock and bailing out if teardown has already started.

Use -ESHUTDOWN as an internal sentinel for that bail-out path rather
than propagating it as a transport error like -ECONNRESET. Keep
nvmet_tcp_socket_error() setting rcv_state to NVMET_TCP_RECV_ERR before
honoring that sentinel so receive-side parsing stays quiesced until the
existing release path completes.

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🚨 CVE-2026-46242
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF

ep_remove() (via ep_remove_file()) cleared file->f_ep under
file->f_lock but then kept using @file inside the critical section
(is_file_epoll(), hlist_del_rcu() through the head, spin_unlock).
A concurrent __fput() taking the eventpoll_release() fastpath in
that window observed the transient NULL, skipped
eventpoll_release_file() and ran to f_op->release / file_free().

For the epoll-watches-epoll case, f_op->release is
ep_eventpoll_release() -> ep_clear_and_put() -> ep_free(), which
kfree()s the watched struct eventpoll. Its embedded ->refs
hlist_head is exactly where epi->fllink.pprev points, so the
subsequent hlist_del_rcu()'s "*pprev = next" scribbles into freed
kmalloc-192 memory.

In addition, struct file is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so the slot
backing @file could be recycled by alloc_empty_file() --
reinitializing f_lock and f_ep -- while ep_remove() is still
nominally inside that lock. The upshot is an attacker-controllable
kmem_cache_free() against the wrong slab cache.

Pin @file via epi_fget() at the top of ep_remove() and gate the
critical section on the pin succeeding. With the pin held @file
cannot reach refcount zero, which holds __fput() off and
transitively keeps the watched struct eventpoll alive across the
hlist_del_rcu() and the f_lock use, closing both UAFs.

If the pin fails @file has already reached refcount zero and its
__fput() is in flight. Because we bailed before clearing f_ep,
that path takes the eventpoll_release() slow path into
eventpoll_release_file() and blocks on ep->mtx until the waiter
side's ep_clear_and_put() drops it. The bailed epi's share of
ep->refcount stays intact, so the trailing ep_refcount_dec_and_test()
in ep_clear_and_put() cannot free the eventpoll out from under
eventpoll_release_file(); the orphaned epi is then cleaned up
there.

A successful pin also proves we are not racing
eventpoll_release_file() on this epi, so drop the now-redundant
re-check of epi->dying under f_lock. The cheap lockless
READ_ONCE(epi->dying) fast-path bailout stays.

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🚨 CVE-2026-11332
A flaw was found in ansible-core. The ansible-galaxy role install command processes dependency specifications from a role's meta/requirements.yml file. Due to improper neutralization of argument delimiters, a malicious role author can inject arbitrary git configuration flags through the src field. This allows arbitrary code execution on the machine of a user who installs the role via ansible-galaxy role install.

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🚨 CVE-2026-48855
Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Erlang OTP ssh (ssh_sftpd module) allows File Discovery.

The SSH_FXP_READLINK handler in ssh_sftpd sends the raw result of file:read_link/2 to the client without calling chroot_filename/2 to strip the backend root prefix. An authenticated SFTP client can create a symlink inside the chroot pointing to /; ssh_sftpd resolves the target to the absolute backend root and stores it on disk. Reading the symlink back via SSH_FXP_READLINK returns that absolute path, for example /data/sftp, instead of the chrooted value /.

The information disclosed is the absolute filesystem path of the SFTP root directory and of any symlink targets within it. No file contents, credentials, or access to paths outside the root directory are obtainable through this issue alone.

This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/ssh/src/ssh_sftpd.erl.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 29.0.2, OTP 28.5.0.2 and OTP 27.3.4.13, corresponding to ssh from 3.0.1 before 6.0.1, 5.5.2.1 and 5.2.11.8.

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🚨 CVE-2026-48856
Sensitive Data Exposure vulnerability in Erlang OTP inets (httpc_response module) allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data.

The httpc client forwards the Authorization and Proxy-Authorization request headers to redirect targets without checking whether the redirect crosses an origin boundary. httpc_response:redirect/2 constructs the redirected request by updating only the host field of the header record; all other fields (including authorization and proxy_authorization) are copied verbatim. The redirect target host is never compared against the original host.

autoredirect defaults to true, so this affects all httpc callers that do not explicitly disable automatic redirects.

An attacker who controls a server that the victim contacts via httpc can issue a cross-origin 3xx redirect to a server they also control. The Authorization header (including Basic credentials derived from URL userinfo via httpc_request:handle_user_info/2) is forwarded to the redirect target, allowing credential theft. The same applies to the Proxy-Authorization header.

This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/inets/src/http_client/httpc_response.erl.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 29.0.2, OTP 28.5.0.2 and OTP 27.3.4.13, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.7.1, 9.6.2.2 and 9.3.2.6.

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🚨 CVE-2026-48858
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Erlang/OTP ftp (ftp_internal module) allows FTP bounce attacks and SSRF via an unvalidated PASV response IP address.

The ftp_internal:handle_ctrl_result/2 PASV handler (mode=passive, ipfamily=inet, ftp_extension=false) extracts the IP address from the server's 227 response and passes it directly to gen_tcp:connect/4 without validating it against the control connection peer address. The adjacent EPSV handlers correctly call peername(CSock) to derive the IP from the control connection, but the PASV handler does not. A malicious or compromised FTP server can redirect the client's data connection to an arbitrary internal host and port. On read operations (ftp:ls/1,2, ftp:nlist/1,2, ftp:recv/2,3), data from the redirected target is returned to the caller. On write operations (ftp:send/2,3, ftp:append/2,3), file content is sent to the redirected target. This enables SSRF against internal hosts, cloud metadata endpoints, and FTP bounce attacks against third-party hosts.

The vulnerable path is the default configuration (mode=passive, ipfamily=inet, ftp_extension=false). RFC 2577 section 3 explicitly recommends validating the PASV response IP against the control connection peer.

The ftp application is deprecated and scheduled for removal in OTP-30.

This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/inets/src/ftp/ftp_internal.erl (inets 5.10.4 through 6.5, OTP 17.4 through 20.3) and lib/ftp/src/ftp_internal.erl (ftp 1.0 and later, OTP 21.0 and later).

This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.4 before OTP 29.0.2, OTP 28.5.0.2 and OTP 27.3.4.13, corresponding to inets from 5.10.4 before 7.0 and ftp from 1.0 before 1.2.6, 1.2.4.1 and 1.2.3.1.

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🚨 CVE-2026-48859
Observable Timing Discrepancy vulnerability in Erlang/OTP ssh (ssh_auth, ssh_options modules) allows unauthenticated remote username enumeration via timing side-channel in password authentication.

When the SSH daemon is configured with the user_passwords or password option, ssh_auth:check_password/3 performs a PBKDF2-SHA256 computation with 600,000 iterations (~300ms) for valid usernames, but returns immediately (~0ms) for invalid usernames via the ssh_options:get_password_option/2 path. This timing difference is detectable in a single authentication attempt and allows an unauthenticated attacker to distinguish valid from invalid usernames.

The user_passwords and password options are documented as intended for test purposes; the recommended alternative is pwdfun, which is not affected by this vulnerability.

This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/ssh/src/ssh_auth.erl and lib/ssh/src/ssh_options.erl.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.2, corresponding to ssh from 6.0 before 6.0.1.

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🚨 CVE-2026-48860
Reliance on IP Address for Authentication vulnerability in Erlang/OTP ssl (inet_tls_dist module) allows unauthenticated bypass of the distribution-over-TLS LAN allowlist.

The inet_tls_dist:check_ip/1 function, which enforces a LAN allowlist for Erlang distribution over TLS, calls inet:sockname/1 instead of inet:peername/1 to obtain the peer's IP address. Because inet:sockname/1 returns the local socket address, both the local IP and the supposed peer IP resolve to the same value, causing the subnet mask comparison to always succeed regardless of the actual remote address. Any holder of a CA-signed TLS certificate can therefore bypass the LAN restriction and gain full Erlang distribution access to the node, including rpc:call/4 and code:load_binary/3.

This vulnerability is associated with program file lib/ssl/src/inet_tls_dist.erl.

This issue affects OTP from OTP 26.0 before OTP 29.0.2, OTP 28.5.0.2 and OTP 27.3.4.13, corresponding to ssl from 11.0 before 11.7.2, 11.6.0.2 and 11.2.12.9.

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