π¨ CVE-2026-54498
view_component is a framework for building reusable, testable, and encapsulated view components in Ruby on Rails. From 4.0.0 until 4.12.0, ViewComponent::Base#around_render can return HTML-unsafe strings that bypass the escaping behavior applied to normal #call return values. This creates an XSS risk when downstream applications use around_render to wrap, replace, instrument, or conditionally return content that includes user-controlled data, and ViewComponent::Collection#render_in can amplify the issue by joining per-item results and marking the entire output html_safe, converting raw unsafe output into an ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.0.
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view_component is a framework for building reusable, testable, and encapsulated view components in Ruby on Rails. From 4.0.0 until 4.12.0, ViewComponent::Base#around_render can return HTML-unsafe strings that bypass the escaping behavior applied to normal #call return values. This creates an XSS risk when downstream applications use around_render to wrap, replace, instrument, or conditionally return content that includes user-controlled data, and ViewComponent::Collection#render_in can amplify the issue by joining per-item results and marking the entire output html_safe, converting raw unsafe output into an ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer. This issue is fixed in version 4.12.0.
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GitHub
fix for around_render safety gap Β· ViewComponent/view_component@48e5fd2
A framework for building reusable, testable & encapsulated view components in Ruby on Rails. - fix for around_render safety gap Β· ViewComponent/view_component@48e5fd2
π¨ CVE-2026-54335
Feathersjs is a framework for creating web APIs and real-time applications with TypeScript or JavaScript. In 5.0.44 and earlier, the _.merge(target, source) utility exported by @feathersjs/commons recursively merges source into target by iterating Object.keys(source). When source was produced by JSON.parse and contains a __proto__, constructor, or prototype key, that key is returned as an own-enumerable property; the recursive merge then resolves target['__proto__'] to Object.prototype and writes attacker-supplied properties onto it, polluting the prototype for all plain objects in the process for the lifetime of the Node process. This issue is fixed in version 5.0.45.
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Feathersjs is a framework for creating web APIs and real-time applications with TypeScript or JavaScript. In 5.0.44 and earlier, the _.merge(target, source) utility exported by @feathersjs/commons recursively merges source into target by iterating Object.keys(source). When source was produced by JSON.parse and contains a __proto__, constructor, or prototype key, that key is returned as an own-enumerable property; the recursive merge then resolves target['__proto__'] to Object.prototype and writes attacker-supplied properties onto it, polluting the prototype for all plain objects in the process for the lifetime of the Node process. This issue is fixed in version 5.0.45.
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GitHub
fix(commons): skip prototype-polluting keys in _.merge (#3690) Β· feathersjs/feathers@28b3c03
Object.keys() returns __proto__ as an own enumerable key for
JSON-parsed sources, causing the recursive merge to write onto
Object.prototype. Skip __proto__/constructor/prototype keys.
Reported-by...
JSON-parsed sources, causing the recursive merge to write onto
Object.prototype. Skip __proto__/constructor/prototype keys.
Reported-by...
π¨ CVE-2026-56740
JLine is a Java library for handling console input. Prior to 3.30.14, 4.0.16, and 4.2.1, the JLine3 Telnet server remote-telnet module does not limit the number of environment variables a client may inject via the Telnet NEW-ENVIRON option, and TelnetIO.readNEVariables() in TelnetIO.java:1127-1180 stores each variable pair in a HashMap held by ConnectionData, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to flood unique variable pairs before the terminating IAC SE byte and exhaust JVM heap memory with an OutOfMemoryError. This issue is fixed in versions 3.30.14, 4.0.16, and 4.2.1.
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JLine is a Java library for handling console input. Prior to 3.30.14, 4.0.16, and 4.2.1, the JLine3 Telnet server remote-telnet module does not limit the number of environment variables a client may inject via the Telnet NEW-ENVIRON option, and TelnetIO.readNEVariables() in TelnetIO.java:1127-1180 stores each variable pair in a HashMap held by ConnectionData, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to flood unique variable pairs before the terminating IAC SE byte and exhaust JVM heap memory with an OutOfMemoryError. This issue is fixed in versions 3.30.14, 4.0.16, and 4.2.1.
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GitHub
fix: limit telnet NEW-ENVIRON variable count and NAWS geometry bounds Β· jline/jline3@0389f0e
JLine is a Java library for handling console input. - fix: limit telnet NEW-ENVIRON variable count and NAWS geometry bounds Β· jline/jline3@0389f0e
π¨ CVE-2026-56741
JLine is a Java library for handling console input. Prior to 3.30.14, 4.0.16, and 4.2.1, the JLine3 Telnet server remote-telnet module does not apply an upper bound to terminal dimensions received via the Telnet NAWS option, and TelnetIO.handleNAWS() in TelnetIO.java:856-879 reads client-supplied width and height as 16-bit unsigned integers and passes values such as 65535x65535 to setTerminalGeometry(), allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to repeatedly alternate values and trigger continuous expensive rendering work that causes CPU exhaustion and denial of service. This issue is fixed in versions 3.30.14, 4.0.16, and 4.2.1.
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JLine is a Java library for handling console input. Prior to 3.30.14, 4.0.16, and 4.2.1, the JLine3 Telnet server remote-telnet module does not apply an upper bound to terminal dimensions received via the Telnet NAWS option, and TelnetIO.handleNAWS() in TelnetIO.java:856-879 reads client-supplied width and height as 16-bit unsigned integers and passes values such as 65535x65535 to setTerminalGeometry(), allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to repeatedly alternate values and trigger continuous expensive rendering work that causes CPU exhaustion and denial of service. This issue is fixed in versions 3.30.14, 4.0.16, and 4.2.1.
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GitHub
Merge pull request #2000 from jline/backport/jline-3.x/telnet-securit⦠· jline/jline3@3ea9cad
β¦y-fixes
fix: backport telnet DoS mitigations (GHSA-47qp, GHSA-2r2c) to 3.x
fix: backport telnet DoS mitigations (GHSA-47qp, GHSA-2r2c) to 3.x
π¨ CVE-2026-54910
FileBrowser Quantum is a free, self-hosted, web-based file manager. Prior to version 1.4.3-beta, the `subtitlesHandler` endpoint (`GET /api/media/subtitles`) accepts two user-controlled query parameters: `path` and `name`, both of which are used in filesystem operations without sanitization, creating two independent path traversal vectors. The primary vector is the `path` parameter: it is passed directly to `idx.GetRealPath()` without calling `SanitizeUserPath()`, allowing an attacker to escape the storage root and set `parentDir` to any directory on the host. No existing anchor file is required. The secondary vector is the `name` parameter: it is joined with `parentDir` via `filepath.Join(parentDir, name)` without stripping directory components, allowing traversal relative to any resolved `parentDir`. Any authenticated user (regardless of role or permissions) can exploit either vector to read any text file readable by the server process, including `/etc/passwd`, SSH keys, database credentials, and JWT signing keys. Version 1.4.3-beta patches the issue.
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FileBrowser Quantum is a free, self-hosted, web-based file manager. Prior to version 1.4.3-beta, the `subtitlesHandler` endpoint (`GET /api/media/subtitles`) accepts two user-controlled query parameters: `path` and `name`, both of which are used in filesystem operations without sanitization, creating two independent path traversal vectors. The primary vector is the `path` parameter: it is passed directly to `idx.GetRealPath()` without calling `SanitizeUserPath()`, allowing an attacker to escape the storage root and set `parentDir` to any directory on the host. No existing anchor file is required. The secondary vector is the `name` parameter: it is joined with `parentDir` via `filepath.Join(parentDir, name)` without stripping directory components, allowing traversal relative to any resolved `parentDir`. Any authenticated user (regardless of role or permissions) can exploit either vector to read any text file readable by the server process, including `/etc/passwd`, SSH keys, database credentials, and JWT signing keys. Version 1.4.3-beta patches the issue.
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GitHub
Fix security issue (#2524) Β· gtsteffaniak/filebrowser@f3f4bbe
π Web File Browser. Contribute to gtsteffaniak/filebrowser development by creating an account on GitHub.
π¨ CVE-2026-25039
Parsec is a cloud-based application for simple and cryptographically secure file sharing. The application does not sanitize the workspace name, creating a vulnerability if that workspace name is a UNC path. When creating mountpoint in the windows filesystem to mount the workspace of an organization, the application does not sanitize the workspace name. The cause issue if the workspace name evaluate to a UNC path since it's allowed for the name to containt `\` char. If the UNC path is invalid (or the targeted resource is not available) the application become unresponsive otherwise the system will interact with the mounted UNC path allowing the attacker to retrieve to [`NTLM`] hash.
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Parsec is a cloud-based application for simple and cryptographically secure file sharing. The application does not sanitize the workspace name, creating a vulnerability if that workspace name is a UNC path. When creating mountpoint in the windows filesystem to mount the workspace of an organization, the application does not sanitize the workspace name. The cause issue if the workspace name evaluate to a UNC path since it's allowed for the name to containt `\` char. If the UNC path is invalid (or the targeted resource is not available) the application become unresponsive otherwise the system will interact with the mounted UNC path allowing the attacker to retrieve to [`NTLM`] hash.
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GitHub
The application evaluate UNC path in workspace name
### Summary
The application does not sanitize the workspace name, creating a vulnerability if that workspace name is a UNC path.
### Details
When creating mountpoint in the windows filesys...
The application does not sanitize the workspace name, creating a vulnerability if that workspace name is a UNC path.
### Details
When creating mountpoint in the windows filesys...
π¨ CVE-2026-46412
@beproduct/nestjs-auth is a NestJS authentication module for BeProduct IDS (Identity Server) with OpenID Connect support. Between 2026-05-11 20:19 UTC and 22:56 UTC, an attacker used a compromised npm publish token to publish 18 malicious versions of `@beproduct/nestjs-auth` (0.1.2 through 0.1.19). The postinstall payload attempted to harvest npm tokens (from `~/.npmrc`); GitHub personal access tokens, OAuth tokens (`gho_*`), and Actions OIDC tokens; AWS credentials (from environment variables and `~/.aws/credentials`); HashiCorp Vault tokens; and other secrets present in environment variables. Version `0.1.20` is a clean republish from the original `0.1.1` source tree. Anyone who installed any version in the range `>=0.1.2 <=0.1.19` should remove the package and clean the npm cache; install the clean version; rotate every credential present in the install environment, including all npm publish tokens, all GitHub PATs and OAuth tokens, AWS access keys, HashiCorp Vault tokens, and any other secret that was in env vars or config files at install time; scan affected hosts for indicators of compromise and, if any are found, treat the host as compromised and reimage; and check committed repository history for unexpected additions in `.claude/` or `.vscode/` directories. The worm is known to commit `setup.mjs` + hook configs to PR branches via automated agent runtimes.
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@beproduct/nestjs-auth is a NestJS authentication module for BeProduct IDS (Identity Server) with OpenID Connect support. Between 2026-05-11 20:19 UTC and 22:56 UTC, an attacker used a compromised npm publish token to publish 18 malicious versions of `@beproduct/nestjs-auth` (0.1.2 through 0.1.19). The postinstall payload attempted to harvest npm tokens (from `~/.npmrc`); GitHub personal access tokens, OAuth tokens (`gho_*`), and Actions OIDC tokens; AWS credentials (from environment variables and `~/.aws/credentials`); HashiCorp Vault tokens; and other secrets present in environment variables. Version `0.1.20` is a clean republish from the original `0.1.1` source tree. Anyone who installed any version in the range `>=0.1.2 <=0.1.19` should remove the package and clean the npm cache; install the clean version; rotate every credential present in the install environment, including all npm publish tokens, all GitHub PATs and OAuth tokens, AWS access keys, HashiCorp Vault tokens, and any other secret that was in env vars or config files at install time; scan affected hosts for indicators of compromise and, if any are found, treat the host as compromised and reimage; and check committed repository history for unexpected additions in `.claude/` or `.vscode/` directories. The worm is known to commit `setup.mjs` + hook configs to PR branches via automated agent runtimes.
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GitHub
Malicious code in @beproduct/nestjs-auth (0.1.2 through 0.1.19) β Mini Shai-Hulud worm
# GitHub Security Advisory draft
**Where to file:** https://github.com/BeProduct/beproduct-org-nestjs-auth/security/advisories/new
(Requires the repo to be public OR you to be a maintainer with...
**Where to file:** https://github.com/BeProduct/beproduct-org-nestjs-auth/security/advisories/new
(Requires the repo to be public OR you to be a maintainer with...
π¨ CVE-2026-46415
The Caddy Defender plugin is a middleware for Caddy that allows users to block or manipulate requests based on the client's IP address. Prior to version 0.10.1, Caddy Defender used `r.RemoteAddr` when evaluating whether a request should be blocked. `RemoteAddr` is the address of the immediate peer connected to Caddy. In deployments where Caddy is behind a trusted proxy, CDN, or load balancer, the immediate peer is usually the proxy, not the original client. Caddy resolves the original client address into its `client_ip` request variable after applying the configured `trusted_proxies` policy, but Defender did not use that value. As a result, clients from blocked IP ranges could bypass Defender when accessing Caddy through a trusted proxy whose own IP address was not blocked. This affects deployments that use Defender behind trusted proxies and expect it to enforce blocking based on the real client IP. The issue is fixed in version 0.10.1 by making Defender prefer Caddys resolved `client_ip` request variable when it is available. Defender falls back to `RemoteAddr` only when Caddy has not provided a resolved client IP. There is no complete workaround in affected Defender versions for deployments that rely on Caddy's trusted proxy client IP resolution. Until upgrading, affected users should enforce equivalent IP blocking at the trusted proxy, CDN, load balancer, firewall, or other edge layer before traffic reaches Caddy. Deployments where Caddy receives traffic directly from clients, without an intermediate trusted proxy, are not affected by this bypass.
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The Caddy Defender plugin is a middleware for Caddy that allows users to block or manipulate requests based on the client's IP address. Prior to version 0.10.1, Caddy Defender used `r.RemoteAddr` when evaluating whether a request should be blocked. `RemoteAddr` is the address of the immediate peer connected to Caddy. In deployments where Caddy is behind a trusted proxy, CDN, or load balancer, the immediate peer is usually the proxy, not the original client. Caddy resolves the original client address into its `client_ip` request variable after applying the configured `trusted_proxies` policy, but Defender did not use that value. As a result, clients from blocked IP ranges could bypass Defender when accessing Caddy through a trusted proxy whose own IP address was not blocked. This affects deployments that use Defender behind trusted proxies and expect it to enforce blocking based on the real client IP. The issue is fixed in version 0.10.1 by making Defender prefer Caddys resolved `client_ip` request variable when it is available. Defender falls back to `RemoteAddr` only when Caddy has not provided a resolved client IP. There is no complete workaround in affected Defender versions for deployments that rely on Caddy's trusted proxy client IP resolution. Until upgrading, affected users should enforce equivalent IP blocking at the trusted proxy, CDN, load balancer, firewall, or other edge layer before traffic reaches Caddy. Deployments where Caddy receives traffic directly from clients, without an intermediate trusted proxy, are not affected by this bypass.
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Caddy Web Server
Request matchers (Caddyfile) - Caddy Documentation
Caddy is a powerful, enterprise-ready, open source web server with automatic HTTPS written in Go
π¨ CVE-2026-46428
lettre is a a mailer library for Rust. Starting in version 0.10.1 and prior to version 0.11.22, an inverted-boolean bug in lettre's `boring-tls` integration silently disables TLS hostname verification for callers using the default (strict) configuration. An on-path attacker presenting any chain-valid certificate for any domain can intercept SMTP submission, including PLAIN/LOGIN credentials and message contents, against any lettre user built with the `boring-tls` feature. Other TLS backends (`native-tls`, `rustls`) are unaffected. Version 0.11.22 patches the issue.
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lettre is a a mailer library for Rust. Starting in version 0.10.1 and prior to version 0.11.22, an inverted-boolean bug in lettre's `boring-tls` integration silently disables TLS hostname verification for callers using the default (strict) configuration. An on-path attacker presenting any chain-valid certificate for any domain can intercept SMTP submission, including PLAIN/LOGIN credentials and message contents, against any lettre user built with the `boring-tls` feature. Other TLS backends (`native-tls`, `rustls`) are unaffected. Version 0.11.22 patches the issue.
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GitHub
fix(transport-smtp): negate hostname-verify flag for boring-tls Β· lettre/lettre@f5efffc
boring's `(set_)verify_hostname(bool)` takes a *verify* flag β true
means verify, false means skip. lettre passed
`accept_invalid_hostnames` directly, inverting the semantics:
strict-defaul...
means verify, false means skip. lettre passed
`accept_invalid_hostnames` directly, inverting the semantics:
strict-defaul...
π¨ CVE-2026-46671
Rust OneNote File Parser is a parser for Microsoft OneNote files implemented in Rust. Prior to version 1.1.1, a maliciously crafted `.onetoc2` table-of-contents file can cause `Parser::parse_notebook` to open arbitrary files on the host filesystem outside the notebook's directory. The parser reads entry names listed inside the `.onetoc2` and joins them against the notebook's base directory without validating that they are relative paths confined to that directory. The parser will bail out when the target file fails to parse as a OneNote section, so direct content exfiltration through the parser's return value is not practical, though file-existence probing and denial-of-service via large or special files remain possible. Anyone using `onenote_parser` to parse .onetoc2 files received from untrusted sources is affected. Users who only ever parse their own notebooks are not at meaningful risk. The issue is fixed in onenote_parser 1.1.1. The fix rejects absolute paths, parent-directory components, and other invalid path characters in entry names, and additionally canonicalises the resolved path to confirm it stays inside the notebook's base directory. For users who cannot upgrade to 1.1.1, only call `Parser::parse_notebook` on `.onetoc2` files from trusted sources. Alternatively, use `Parser::parse_section` / `Parser::parse_section_buffer` on individual .one files, which do not perform the directory walk.
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Rust OneNote File Parser is a parser for Microsoft OneNote files implemented in Rust. Prior to version 1.1.1, a maliciously crafted `.onetoc2` table-of-contents file can cause `Parser::parse_notebook` to open arbitrary files on the host filesystem outside the notebook's directory. The parser reads entry names listed inside the `.onetoc2` and joins them against the notebook's base directory without validating that they are relative paths confined to that directory. The parser will bail out when the target file fails to parse as a OneNote section, so direct content exfiltration through the parser's return value is not practical, though file-existence probing and denial-of-service via large or special files remain possible. Anyone using `onenote_parser` to parse .onetoc2 files received from untrusted sources is affected. Users who only ever parse their own notebooks are not at meaningful risk. The issue is fixed in onenote_parser 1.1.1. The fix rejects absolute paths, parent-directory components, and other invalid path characters in entry names, and additionally canonicalises the resolved path to confirm it stays inside the notebook's base directory. For users who cannot upgrade to 1.1.1, only call `Parser::parse_notebook` on `.onetoc2` files from trusted sources. Alternatively, use `Parser::parse_section` / `Parser::parse_section_buffer` on individual .one files, which do not perform the directory walk.
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GitHub
onenote.rs/CHANGELOG.md at master Β· msiemens/onenote.rs
A Rust OneNote file parser. Contribute to msiemens/onenote.rs development by creating an account on GitHub.
π¨ CVE-2026-40187
In egroupware version 26.0 and earlier, an authenticated administrator can achieve OS-level Remote Code Execution (RCE) by uploading a malicious eTemplate XML file (`.xet`) to the VFS `/etemplates` mount. The `Widget::expand_name()` method passes template widget attribute values directly into a PHP `eval()` call with only double-quote escaping applied - **backtick characters are not escaped**. In PHP, backticks inside a double-quoted `eval()` string execute shell commands. This allows an admin-level user to escalate from web application access to arbitrary OS command execution on the server.
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In egroupware version 26.0 and earlier, an authenticated administrator can achieve OS-level Remote Code Execution (RCE) by uploading a malicious eTemplate XML file (`.xet`) to the VFS `/etemplates` mount. The `Widget::expand_name()` method passes template widget attribute values directly into a PHP `eval()` call with only double-quote escaping applied - **backtick characters are not escaped**. In PHP, backticks inside a double-quoted `eval()` string execute shell commands. This allows an admin-level user to escalate from web application access to arbitrary OS command execution on the server.
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GitHub
Authenticated RCE via Malicious eTemplate Upload in EGroupware
## Summary
An authenticated administrator can achieve OS-level Remote Code Execution (RCE) by uploading a malicious eTemplate XML file (`.xet`) to the VFS `/etemplates` mount.
The `Widget::ex...
An authenticated administrator can achieve OS-level Remote Code Execution (RCE) by uploading a malicious eTemplate XML file (`.xet`) to the VFS `/etemplates` mount.
The `Widget::ex...
π¨ CVE-2026-42210
Webmin is a web-based system administration tool for Unix-like servers. Prior to version 2.640, for Webmin accounts that require a second authentication factor (typically TOTP), an attacker with knowledge of the username and password can bypass the 2FA requirement by using Basic authentication. Webmin is a web-based system administration tool for Unix-like servers. As a workaround, apply the patch from commit da18a16c84ae5c0b78cad79609cb0efb174000ec manually.
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Webmin is a web-based system administration tool for Unix-like servers. Prior to version 2.640, for Webmin accounts that require a second authentication factor (typically TOTP), an attacker with knowledge of the username and password can bypass the 2FA requirement by using Basic authentication. Webmin is a web-based system administration tool for Unix-like servers. As a workaround, apply the patch from commit da18a16c84ae5c0b78cad79609cb0efb174000ec manually.
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GitHub
Fix to require 2FA for RPC basic auth Β· webmin/webmin@da18a16
+ improve remote auth errors
π¨ CVE-2026-46555
WhatsApp MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for WhatsApp, enabling Claude to read and send WhatsApp messages. Prior to version 0.2.1, the `whatsapp-bridge` HTTP API listens on `127.0.0.1:8080` without authentication and without Host header validation, and the `/api/send` endpoint accepts an absolute `media_path` parameter without confining it to a safe directory. Combined, these issues allow any local process running as the same user as the bridge to send WhatsApp messages from the paired account without authorization; the same caller to read arbitrary files readable by the user (e.g. SSH private keys, browser session data, source code, dotfiles) and exfiltrate them as WhatsApp document attachments; and/or a remote attacker to trigger the same operations via DNS rebinding from a webpage the user visits, since no Host header validation is performed. In MCP environments, "local caller" extends beyond processes the user explicitly launched β sibling MCP servers, IDE extensions, and tool-triggered flows running in the user's session can act as the effective caller. This issue is fixed in whatsapp-mcp v0.2.1 and corresponding Docker images / release artifacts. Users should upgrade immediately. The fix introduces bearer token authentication on the bridge HTTP API (configured via environment variable, required on all requests, validated with constant-time comparison); host header allow-list validation to prevent DNS rebinding; and confinement of `media_path` to a configured directory, with rejection of absolute paths outside the root and path traversal sequences. This is a breaking change for clients of the bridge API. For users who cannot immediately upgrade: Stop the bridge, or block loopback access to port 8080, when the bridge is not actively in use; avoid running the bridge alongside untrusted MCP servers, browser extensions, or other untrusted local processes; avoid browsing untrusted sites while the bridge is running (DNS rebinding mitigation); and/or run the bridge under a dedicated user account or in a sandbox/container with no access to sensitive files.
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WhatsApp MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for WhatsApp, enabling Claude to read and send WhatsApp messages. Prior to version 0.2.1, the `whatsapp-bridge` HTTP API listens on `127.0.0.1:8080` without authentication and without Host header validation, and the `/api/send` endpoint accepts an absolute `media_path` parameter without confining it to a safe directory. Combined, these issues allow any local process running as the same user as the bridge to send WhatsApp messages from the paired account without authorization; the same caller to read arbitrary files readable by the user (e.g. SSH private keys, browser session data, source code, dotfiles) and exfiltrate them as WhatsApp document attachments; and/or a remote attacker to trigger the same operations via DNS rebinding from a webpage the user visits, since no Host header validation is performed. In MCP environments, "local caller" extends beyond processes the user explicitly launched β sibling MCP servers, IDE extensions, and tool-triggered flows running in the user's session can act as the effective caller. This issue is fixed in whatsapp-mcp v0.2.1 and corresponding Docker images / release artifacts. Users should upgrade immediately. The fix introduces bearer token authentication on the bridge HTTP API (configured via environment variable, required on all requests, validated with constant-time comparison); host header allow-list validation to prevent DNS rebinding; and confinement of `media_path` to a configured directory, with rejection of absolute paths outside the root and path traversal sequences. This is a breaking change for clients of the bridge API. For users who cannot immediately upgrade: Stop the bridge, or block loopback access to port 8080, when the bridge is not actively in use; avoid running the bridge alongside untrusted MCP servers, browser extensions, or other untrusted local processes; avoid browsing untrusted sites while the bridge is running (DNS rebinding mitigation); and/or run the bridge under a dedicated user account or in a sandbox/container with no access to sensitive files.
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GitHub
whatsapp-mcp/SECURITY.md at main Β· verygoodplugins/whatsapp-mcp
WhatsApp MCP server - Connect Claude to WhatsApp for reading and sending messages - verygoodplugins/whatsapp-mcp
π¨ CVE-2026-46715
Flask-Security-Too allows users to add security features to their Flask applicationa. Version 5.8.0's OAuth reauthentication flow can mark a session as fresh after verifying an OAuth account that belongs to a different user. If an attacker can operate an already-authenticated but stale victim session, they can complete OAuth verification using their own OAuth identity. The victim session is then treated as recently reauthenticated, allowing freshness-protected account actions to proceed. Version 5.8.1 contains a fix for this issue.
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Flask-Security-Too allows users to add security features to their Flask applicationa. Version 5.8.0's OAuth reauthentication flow can mark a session as fresh after verifying an OAuth account that belongs to a different user. If an attacker can operate an already-authenticated but stale victim session, they can complete OAuth verification using their own OAuth identity. The victim session is then treated as recently reauthenticated, allowing freshness-protected account actions to proceed. Version 5.8.1 contains a fix for this issue.
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GitHub
Fix GHSA-97r5-pg8x-p63p - possible to 'verify' an account using a dif⦠· pallets-eco/flask-security@8e69f3a
β¦ferent users oauth credentials. (#1216) (#1224)
The fix is simply to verify that the email address from the oauth response matches the current user.
2 other hardening improvements:
1) make sure...
The fix is simply to verify that the email address from the oauth response matches the current user.
2 other hardening improvements:
1) make sure...
π¨ CVE-2026-64650
The `@ai-sdk/harness-opencode` tool is an HarnessV1 adapter backed by @openai/codex-sdk, which drives the codex command line interface. Prior to version 1.0.29, the tool relay authorizes requests from any process whose command line contains an allowed helper script path (the Codex CLI shim). This allows untrusted code executing in the sandbox to invoke arbitrary host-exposed tools, including secret lookups, deployment operations, and cloud API calls without a corresponding model-authorized tool-call event. Exploitation requires a Linux environment (the vulnerable fallback checks `process.platform === 'linux'` and reads `/proc`); an active harness session with one or more host-provided tools; and untrusted code executing in the sandbox (e.g. a malicious dependency, build script, or lifecycle hook) The fix in version 1.0.29 removes the process-path authorization fallback entirely. Relay requests are now only accepted after exact, short-lived, one-time authorization matching the tool name and input from a bridge-observed model event. Some workarounds are available. Do not run the Codex harness on untrusted repositories or with untrusted dependencies, and/or limit host-exposed tools to non-sensitive operations when working with untrusted code.
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The `@ai-sdk/harness-opencode` tool is an HarnessV1 adapter backed by @openai/codex-sdk, which drives the codex command line interface. Prior to version 1.0.29, the tool relay authorizes requests from any process whose command line contains an allowed helper script path (the Codex CLI shim). This allows untrusted code executing in the sandbox to invoke arbitrary host-exposed tools, including secret lookups, deployment operations, and cloud API calls without a corresponding model-authorized tool-call event. Exploitation requires a Linux environment (the vulnerable fallback checks `process.platform === 'linux'` and reads `/proc`); an active harness session with one or more host-provided tools; and untrusted code executing in the sandbox (e.g. a malicious dependency, build script, or lifecycle hook) The fix in version 1.0.29 removes the process-path authorization fallback entirely. Relay requests are now only accepted after exact, short-lived, one-time authorization matching the tool name and input from a bridge-observed model event. Some workarounds are available. Do not run the Codex harness on untrusted repositories or with untrusted dependencies, and/or limit host-exposed tools to non-sensitive operations when working with untrusted code.
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GitHub
fix(harness): improve CLI relay tool invocation logic by felixarntz Β· Pull Request #17105 Β· vercel/ai
Summary
Improves CLI relay tool invocation logic for the relevant harnesses (Codex and OpenCode).
Checklist
All commits are signed (PRs with unsigned commits cannot be merged)
Tests have been ad...
Improves CLI relay tool invocation logic for the relevant harnesses (Codex and OpenCode).
Checklist
All commits are signed (PRs with unsigned commits cannot be merged)
Tests have been ad...
π¨ CVE-2026-64651
The `@ai-sdk/harness-opencode` tool connects HarnessAgent to OpenCode through a sandboxed bridge. Prior to version 1.0.28, the tool relay authorizes requests from any process whose command line contains an allowed helper script path (`host-tool-mcp.mjs`). This allows untrusted code executing in the sandbox to invoke arbitrary host-exposed tools including secret lookups, deployment operations, and cloud API calls without a corresponding model-authorized tool-call event. Exploitation requires a Linux environment (the vulnerable fallback checks `process.platform === 'linux'` and reads `/proc`); an active harness session with one or more host-provided tools; and untrusted code executing in the sandbox (e.g. a malicious dependency, build script, or lifecycle hook) The fix in version 1.0.28 removes the process-path authorization fallback entirely. Relay requests are now only accepted after exact, short-lived, one-time authorization matching the tool name and input from a bridge-observed model event. Some workarounds are available. Do not run the OpenCode harness on untrusted repositories or with untrusted dependencies, and/or limit host-exposed tools to non-sensitive operations when working with untrusted code.
π@cveNotify
The `@ai-sdk/harness-opencode` tool connects HarnessAgent to OpenCode through a sandboxed bridge. Prior to version 1.0.28, the tool relay authorizes requests from any process whose command line contains an allowed helper script path (`host-tool-mcp.mjs`). This allows untrusted code executing in the sandbox to invoke arbitrary host-exposed tools including secret lookups, deployment operations, and cloud API calls without a corresponding model-authorized tool-call event. Exploitation requires a Linux environment (the vulnerable fallback checks `process.platform === 'linux'` and reads `/proc`); an active harness session with one or more host-provided tools; and untrusted code executing in the sandbox (e.g. a malicious dependency, build script, or lifecycle hook) The fix in version 1.0.28 removes the process-path authorization fallback entirely. Relay requests are now only accepted after exact, short-lived, one-time authorization matching the tool name and input from a bridge-observed model event. Some workarounds are available. Do not run the OpenCode harness on untrusted repositories or with untrusted dependencies, and/or limit host-exposed tools to non-sensitive operations when working with untrusted code.
π@cveNotify
GitHub
fix(harness): improve CLI relay tool invocation logic by felixarntz Β· Pull Request #17105 Β· vercel/ai
Summary
Improves CLI relay tool invocation logic for the relevant harnesses (Codex and OpenCode).
Checklist
All commits are signed (PRs with unsigned commits cannot be merged)
Tests have been ad...
Improves CLI relay tool invocation logic for the relevant harnesses (Codex and OpenCode).
Checklist
All commits are signed (PRs with unsigned commits cannot be merged)
Tests have been ad...
π¨ CVE-2026-47128
nono is software that allows users to run AI agents in a zero-latency sandbox. Prior to version 0.55.0, the nono Landlock/seccomp policies allow access to local Unix domain sockets (concrete and abstract). This allows an easy sandbox escape by talking to the per-user systemd dbus socket. Version 0.55.0 patches the issue.
π@cveNotify
nono is software that allows users to run AI agents in a zero-latency sandbox. Prior to version 0.55.0, the nono Landlock/seccomp policies allow access to local Unix domain sockets (concrete and abstract). This allows an easy sandbox escape by talking to the per-user systemd dbus socket. Version 0.55.0 patches the issue.
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GitHub
nono: Sandbox escape on Linux via D-Bus: `systemd-run --user`
### Summary
The nono Landlock/seccomp policies allow access to local Unix domain sockets (concrete and abstract).
This allows an easy sandbox escape by talking to the per-user systemd dbus sock...
The nono Landlock/seccomp policies allow access to local Unix domain sockets (concrete and abstract).
This allows an easy sandbox escape by talking to the per-user systemd dbus sock...
π¨ CVE-2026-47133
ClearanceKit intercepts file-system access events on macOS and enforces per-process access policies. Prior to version 5.0.10, each table in the on-disk SQLite policy store (`/Library/Application Support/clearancekit/store.db`) is verified using an ECDSA signature stored in the `data_signatures` table. The signed payload contains only the canonical row content, with no version counter or freshness binding. An attacker who can write `store.db` and the matching `data_signatures` row β feasible during the opfilter-update window when the Endpoint Security filter is offline, or via offline-boot / decrypted-backup scenarios β can substitute a previously-captured legitimately-signed snapshot. opfilter accepts the older snapshot as fully valid on next boot because the existing signatures still verify. Version 5.0.10 patches the issue.
π@cveNotify
ClearanceKit intercepts file-system access events on macOS and enforces per-process access policies. Prior to version 5.0.10, each table in the on-disk SQLite policy store (`/Library/Application Support/clearancekit/store.db`) is verified using an ECDSA signature stored in the `data_signatures` table. The signed payload contains only the canonical row content, with no version counter or freshness binding. An attacker who can write `store.db` and the matching `data_signatures` row β feasible during the opfilter-update window when the Endpoint Security filter is offline, or via offline-boot / decrypted-backup scenarios β can substitute a previously-captured legitimately-signed snapshot. opfilter accepts the older snapshot as fully valid on next boot because the existing signatures still verify. Version 5.0.10 patches the issue.
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GitHub
Signed policy tables lack monotonic counter, allowing replay of older legitimately-signed snapshots
### Summary
Each table in the on-disk SQLite policy store (`/Library/Application Support/clearancekit/store.db`) is verified using an ECDSA signature stored in the `data_signatures` table. The s...
Each table in the on-disk SQLite policy store (`/Library/Application Support/clearancekit/store.db`) is verified using an ECDSA signature stored in the `data_signatures` table. The s...
π¨ CVE-2026-47134
ClearanceKit intercepts file-system access events on macOS and enforces per-process access policies. The ECDSA private key used to sign the on-disk policy database (`/Library/Application Support/clearancekit/store.db`) is stored in the macOS System Keychain. The key was created via the two-step pattern `SecKeyCreateRandomKey` (in-memory) followed by `SecItemAdd(kSecValueRef:, kSecAttrAccess:)` (persist). Prior to version 5.0.10, for `kSecClassKey` items in the legacy System Keychain, `kSecAttrAccess` passed to `SecItemAdd` is silently ignored β the persisted key inherits no ACL restriction. The same access builder applied to `kSecClassGenericPassword` items correctly binds the ACL, making this bug specific to the EC key. The result is that any process running as root can use the key to produce valid signatures over arbitrary policy content. Version 5.0.10 fixes the issue. No known workarounds are available. Disabling the system extension and manually removing the System Keychain item labelled `clearancekit policy signing key` would prevent the forged-signature path but also disables policy enforcement.
π@cveNotify
ClearanceKit intercepts file-system access events on macOS and enforces per-process access policies. The ECDSA private key used to sign the on-disk policy database (`/Library/Application Support/clearancekit/store.db`) is stored in the macOS System Keychain. The key was created via the two-step pattern `SecKeyCreateRandomKey` (in-memory) followed by `SecItemAdd(kSecValueRef:, kSecAttrAccess:)` (persist). Prior to version 5.0.10, for `kSecClassKey` items in the legacy System Keychain, `kSecAttrAccess` passed to `SecItemAdd` is silently ignored β the persisted key inherits no ACL restriction. The same access builder applied to `kSecClassGenericPassword` items correctly binds the ACL, making this bug specific to the EC key. The result is that any process running as root can use the key to produce valid signatures over arbitrary policy content. Version 5.0.10 fixes the issue. No known workarounds are available. Disabling the system extension and manually removing the System Keychain item labelled `clearancekit policy signing key` would prevent the forged-signature path but also disables policy enforcement.
π@cveNotify
GitHub
Policy signing key in System Keychain has permissive ACL allowing any local-root process to forge signed policy
### Summary
The ECDSA private key used to sign the on-disk policy database (`/Library/Application Support/clearancekit/store.db`) is stored in the macOS System Keychain. The key was created via ...
The ECDSA private key used to sign the on-disk policy database (`/Library/Application Support/clearancekit/store.db`) is stored in the macOS System Keychain. The key was created via ...
π¨ CVE-2026-46681
@nevware21/ts-utils is a comprehensive TypeScript/JavaScript utility library. Prior to version 0.14.0, the _copyProps function in lib/src/object/copy.ts uses for...in to iterate over source object properties without an Object.hasOwnProperty check, and does not filter dangerous keys (__proto__, constructor, prototype). This allows an attacker to pollute the prototype chain of all objects in the application. Version 0.14.0 patches the issue.
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@nevware21/ts-utils is a comprehensive TypeScript/JavaScript utility library. Prior to version 0.14.0, the _copyProps function in lib/src/object/copy.ts uses for...in to iterate over source object properties without an Object.hasOwnProperty check, and does not filter dangerous keys (__proto__, constructor, prototype). This allows an attacker to pollute the prototype chain of all objects in the application. Version 0.14.0 patches the issue.
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GitHub
Add new object utility helpers and harden defaults against prototype β¦ Β· nevware21/ts-utils@5e887f4
β¦pollution (#564)
- add new object helpers: objPick, objOmit, objPickBy, objOmitBy,
objMapValues, objMergeIf, objDefaults, and objDiff
- export the new helpers from the public index
- add common t...
- add new object helpers: objPick, objOmit, objPickBy, objOmitBy,
objMapValues, objMergeIf, objDefaults, and objDiff
- export the new helpers from the public index
- add common t...
π¨ CVE-2026-47425
Rattler is a library that provides common functionality used within the conda ecosystem. Prior to version 0.43.2, `EntryPoint::FromStr` in `rattler_conda_types` performs only `.trim()` on the `command` field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious `noarch:python` package can ship an `info/link.json` with an entry-point name containing `..`, `/`, `\`, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as `bin/pip`) with mode `0o775` on Unix and a copied launcher `.exe` on Windows. This affects the default install path of `pixi install`, `mamba install` via py-rattler, `rattler-build`, and any other consumer of the `rattler` install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved. Version 0.43.2 contains a fix for the issue.
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Rattler is a library that provides common functionality used within the conda ecosystem. Prior to version 0.43.2, `EntryPoint::FromStr` in `rattler_conda_types` performs only `.trim()` on the `command` field before the linker joins it onto the install prefix and writes an executable Python script. A malicious `noarch:python` package can ship an `info/link.json` with an entry-point name containing `..`, `/`, `\`, or an absolute path; the resulting file is written outside the prefix (or clobbers an existing in-prefix entry-point such as `bin/pip`) with mode `0o775` on Unix and a copied launcher `.exe` on Windows. This affects the default install path of `pixi install`, `mamba install` via py-rattler, `rattler-build`, and any other consumer of the `rattler` install crate; no flag or post-link-script opt-in is involved. Version 0.43.2 contains a fix for the issue.
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GitHub
fix: reject path traversal in python entrypoints (#2445) Β· conda/rattler@4f06eca
Rust crates to work with the Conda ecosystem. Contribute to conda/rattler development by creating an account on GitHub.