🚨 CVE-2026-44621
With NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, applications using libunbound and configured with 'unwanted-reply-threshold', could eventually be abruptly terminated if the threshold is reached and libunbound needs to call 'libworker_alloc_cleanup' since the function is absent from the function call allow list. When an application using libunbound sets 'unwanted-reply-threshold' to any non-zero value and the iterator queries an authoritative that replies with enough wrong-transaction-ID UDP datagrams to cross the threshold, the 'libworker_alloc_cleanup' will eventually be called. Since the function is absent from the function call allow list, this leads to a fatal exit of libunbound and eventual termination of the embedding application.Unbound itself is not affected since its relevant function 'worker_alloc_cleanup' is registed in the allow list and proceeds to perform the documented cache flush.
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With NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, applications using libunbound and configured with 'unwanted-reply-threshold', could eventually be abruptly terminated if the threshold is reached and libunbound needs to call 'libworker_alloc_cleanup' since the function is absent from the function call allow list. When an application using libunbound sets 'unwanted-reply-threshold' to any non-zero value and the iterator queries an authoritative that replies with enough wrong-transaction-ID UDP datagrams to cross the threshold, the 'libworker_alloc_cleanup' will eventually be called. Since the function is absent from the function call allow list, this leads to a fatal exit of libunbound and eventual termination of the embedding application.Unbound itself is not affected since its relevant function 'worker_alloc_cleanup' is registed in the allow list and proceeds to perform the documented cache flush.
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🚨 CVE-2026-44687
In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.13.2 up to and including 1.25.1, stub or forward zones where the name is below an intermediate labed below a DNSSEC signed zone could be shadowed by the intermediate label's secure NXDOMAIN answer from the parent. This is caused by an off-by-one error in 'harden-below-nxdomain' logic; enabled by default. It effectively bypasses the configuration and the configured stub/forward zone is never contacted. 'harden-below-nxdomain' does an upward DNS cache walk together with a delegation point guard that does not allow NXDOMAIN synthesis above stub/forward zones. The guard tests the domain name but before stripping a label. This results in an iteration where the domain name equals the configured stub/forward zone apex that passes the guard, strips one more label, and probes the cache at the apex's immediate public parent. If that parent has a cached DNSSEC-secure NXDOMAIN, which it will for any private namespace nested two or more labels under a signed public name, the walk returns it and the configured stub/forward upstream is never contacted. This can only be triggered by the query for the intermediate label (between the stub/forward apex and the DNSSEC parent zone).
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In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.13.2 up to and including 1.25.1, stub or forward zones where the name is below an intermediate labed below a DNSSEC signed zone could be shadowed by the intermediate label's secure NXDOMAIN answer from the parent. This is caused by an off-by-one error in 'harden-below-nxdomain' logic; enabled by default. It effectively bypasses the configuration and the configured stub/forward zone is never contacted. 'harden-below-nxdomain' does an upward DNS cache walk together with a delegation point guard that does not allow NXDOMAIN synthesis above stub/forward zones. The guard tests the domain name but before stripping a label. This results in an iteration where the domain name equals the configured stub/forward zone apex that passes the guard, strips one more label, and probes the cache at the apex's immediate public parent. If that parent has a cached DNSSEC-secure NXDOMAIN, which it will for any private namespace nested two or more labels under a signed public name, the walk returns it and the configured stub/forward upstream is never contacted. This can only be triggered by the query for the intermediate label (between the stub/forward apex and the DNSSEC parent zone).
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🚨 CVE-2026-50251
In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, when 'unwanted-reply-threshold' is enabled (set to any value greater than zero), glue records of 0.0.0.0/::0 can short-circuit Unbound, on systems that can direct such traffic, by issuing DNS queries and receiving seemingly unwanted replies since the remote IP does not match the original source IP of 0.0.0.0/::0. This behavior keeps on looping for the glue records and pushing the counter to the configured 'unwanted-reply-threshold' that triggers a defensive cache clear. A malicious actor who controls a delegation that returns in-bailiwick glue of 0.0.0.0/::0 can drive the counter to the limit of 'unwanted-reply-threshold' to the threshold and trigger a cache clean of the message and rrset caches; at will, indefinitely, without sending a single spoofed packet. The iterator uses the 0.0.0.0/::0 glue, and a system that can route this (e.g., Linux kernel routes the datagram over loopback), Unbound's own listener answers from 127.0.0.1. Because of the mismatch of 0.0.0.0 and 127.0.0.1, in this example, Unbound accounts the reply as an unwanted (probably spoofed) answer. The counter resets to zero on every cache flush, so the attack loops forever.
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In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, when 'unwanted-reply-threshold' is enabled (set to any value greater than zero), glue records of 0.0.0.0/::0 can short-circuit Unbound, on systems that can direct such traffic, by issuing DNS queries and receiving seemingly unwanted replies since the remote IP does not match the original source IP of 0.0.0.0/::0. This behavior keeps on looping for the glue records and pushing the counter to the configured 'unwanted-reply-threshold' that triggers a defensive cache clear. A malicious actor who controls a delegation that returns in-bailiwick glue of 0.0.0.0/::0 can drive the counter to the limit of 'unwanted-reply-threshold' to the threshold and trigger a cache clean of the message and rrset caches; at will, indefinitely, without sending a single spoofed packet. The iterator uses the 0.0.0.0/::0 glue, and a system that can route this (e.g., Linux kernel routes the datagram over loopback), Unbound's own listener answers from 127.0.0.1. Because of the mismatch of 0.0.0.0 and 127.0.0.1, in this example, Unbound accounts the reply as an unwanted (probably spoofed) answer. The counter resets to zero on every cache flush, so the attack loops forever.
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🚨 CVE-2026-50252
In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.4.22 up to and including 1.25.1, UDP source port is randomized and intended to serve as a secret value that increases the entropy of DNS transactions. When resolver load balancing policies depend on the source port while their outcome is revealed this secrecy is undermined. The vulnerability arises when the load balancing policy is consistent with respect to the incoming source UDP port and IP address while heavily depending on the incoming source UDP port as a randomization source. When the SO_REUSEPORT configuration option is enabled ('so-reuseport: yes') in Unbound (by default), it meets these conditions, making it vulnerable for DNS cache poisoning attacks. Upon startup, Unbound randomly partitions the available UDP source port space into disjoint subsets of (almost) equal size, assigning each subset to a specific worker thread. When an incoming DNS query is received, the kernel’s SO_REUSEPORT load balancing mechanism deterministically assigns the query to a socket associated with a particular thread. All outgoing DNS queries generated during the resolution of that request use source ports selected exclusively from the port subset assigned to the corresponding thread. Since these port subsets are disjoint across threads, the source port observed in a resolver’s outgoing query to an authoritative name server serves as a reliable indicator of the worker thread that processed the original client query. A malicious actor can acquire the mapping between incoming UDP source ports (for a given fixed source IP address) and Unbound worker threads and leverage it to conduct DNS cache poisoning attacks by effectively lowering the random port population per thread.
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In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.4.22 up to and including 1.25.1, UDP source port is randomized and intended to serve as a secret value that increases the entropy of DNS transactions. When resolver load balancing policies depend on the source port while their outcome is revealed this secrecy is undermined. The vulnerability arises when the load balancing policy is consistent with respect to the incoming source UDP port and IP address while heavily depending on the incoming source UDP port as a randomization source. When the SO_REUSEPORT configuration option is enabled ('so-reuseport: yes') in Unbound (by default), it meets these conditions, making it vulnerable for DNS cache poisoning attacks. Upon startup, Unbound randomly partitions the available UDP source port space into disjoint subsets of (almost) equal size, assigning each subset to a specific worker thread. When an incoming DNS query is received, the kernel’s SO_REUSEPORT load balancing mechanism deterministically assigns the query to a socket associated with a particular thread. All outgoing DNS queries generated during the resolution of that request use source ports selected exclusively from the port subset assigned to the corresponding thread. Since these port subsets are disjoint across threads, the source port observed in a resolver’s outgoing query to an authoritative name server serves as a reliable indicator of the worker thread that processed the original client query. A malicious actor can acquire the mapping between incoming UDP source ports (for a given fixed source IP address) and Unbound worker threads and leverage it to conduct DNS cache poisoning attacks by effectively lowering the random port population per thread.
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🚨 CVE-2026-52863
In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.25.0 up to and including 1.25.1, a fix that makes the 'respip' and 'dns64' modules work together, creates a shallow copy of the view name in effect that could lead to memory corruption if the owner of the original view name is jostled out when Unbound is under pressure. Unbound needs to be configured with one of 'respip'/'rpz' modules, together with a module that can attach subqueries (respip CNAME redirection, dns64, subnetcache) and a configured 'access-control-view' while Unbound is under pressure so that joslte logic kicks in and starts dropping slow queries. The subquery is getting a shallow copy of the view name and if the super query which owns the view name is jostled out, memory corruption can occur. Likelihood of a crash is low, since it relies heavily on the underlying memory allocator and the memory layout. Debug memory builds (e.g., ASAN) that catch the free terminate the server.
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In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.25.0 up to and including 1.25.1, a fix that makes the 'respip' and 'dns64' modules work together, creates a shallow copy of the view name in effect that could lead to memory corruption if the owner of the original view name is jostled out when Unbound is under pressure. Unbound needs to be configured with one of 'respip'/'rpz' modules, together with a module that can attach subqueries (respip CNAME redirection, dns64, subnetcache) and a configured 'access-control-view' while Unbound is under pressure so that joslte logic kicks in and starts dropping slow queries. The subquery is getting a shallow copy of the view name and if the super query which owns the view name is jostled out, memory corruption can occur. Likelihood of a crash is low, since it relies heavily on the underlying memory allocator and the memory layout. Debug memory builds (e.g., ASAN) that catch the free terminate the server.
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🚨 CVE-2026-54478
In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.18.0 up to and including 1.25.1, when Unbound listens on a 'proxy-protocol-port' interface with 'answer-cookie: yes', the RFC 9018 server-cookie SipHash is computed over the proxy's wire address instead of the PROXYv2-declared client. One server cookie obtained through a given proxy node therefore validates for every PROXYv2-declared source behind that node. On a UDP+proxy-protocol front, an off-path attacker can harvest one cookie with a single legitimate query, then replay it under any spoofed source and pass DNS Cookie checks that were deployed to defeat this in the first place.
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In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.18.0 up to and including 1.25.1, when Unbound listens on a 'proxy-protocol-port' interface with 'answer-cookie: yes', the RFC 9018 server-cookie SipHash is computed over the proxy's wire address instead of the PROXYv2-declared client. One server cookie obtained through a given proxy node therefore validates for every PROXYv2-declared source behind that node. On a UDP+proxy-protocol front, an off-path attacker can harvest one cookie with a single legitimate query, then replay it under any spoofed source and pass DNS Cookie checks that were deployed to defeat this in the first place.
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🚨 CVE-2026-55708
In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.6.0 up to and including 1.25.1, the 'view_local_data' and 'view_local_datas' commands of 'unbound-control' create a bare local zones tree for an already configured named view when the view is configured with no local data to begin with. However, the creation through the control interface omits adding the default-protected zones (e.g., RFC 1918 reverse, AS112 zones, .onion, .localhost). Once the local zone tree exists without the defaults, every query for a default-protected name from a client mapped to that view escapes to the public DNS via the iterator instead of being answered locally, bypassing local policy expectations.
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In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.6.0 up to and including 1.25.1, the 'view_local_data' and 'view_local_datas' commands of 'unbound-control' create a bare local zones tree for an already configured named view when the view is configured with no local data to begin with. However, the creation through the control interface omits adding the default-protected zones (e.g., RFC 1918 reverse, AS112 zones, .onion, .localhost). Once the local zone tree exists without the defaults, every query for a default-protected name from a client mapped to that view escapes to the public DNS via the iterator instead of being answered locally, bypassing local policy expectations.
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🚨 CVE-2026-55717
In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.10.0 up to and including 1.25.1, when 'serve-expired: yes' is set together with a 'response-ip: <net> redirect' /'response-ip-data: <net> CNAME <target>' rule (or the RPZ 'rpz-cname-override' equivalent), a remote client who controls any delegated domain can crash the daemon. The serve-expired-client-timeout callback runs a two-pass loop to chase the respip-generated CNAME alias; on the second pass it resets 'alias_rrset' but not 'partial_rep'. Later, this inconsistency leads to a NULL pointer dereference and an eventual crash. A malicious actor can exploit the vulnerability by controlling any zone that replies with an A/AAAA record that falls inside the configured response-ip/rpz subnet. By delaying the answer when the previous record has expired, the vulnerable path of 'serve-expired-client-timeout' is taken leading to denial of service via the server crash.
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In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.10.0 up to and including 1.25.1, when 'serve-expired: yes' is set together with a 'response-ip: <net> redirect' /'response-ip-data: <net> CNAME <target>' rule (or the RPZ 'rpz-cname-override' equivalent), a remote client who controls any delegated domain can crash the daemon. The serve-expired-client-timeout callback runs a two-pass loop to chase the respip-generated CNAME alias; on the second pass it resets 'alias_rrset' but not 'partial_rep'. Later, this inconsistency leads to a NULL pointer dereference and an eventual crash. A malicious actor can exploit the vulnerability by controlling any zone that replies with an A/AAAA record that falls inside the configured response-ip/rpz subnet. By delaying the answer when the previous record has expired, the vulnerable path of 'serve-expired-client-timeout' is taken leading to denial of service via the server crash.
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🚨 CVE-2026-55973
In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.23.0 up to and including 1.25.1, when 'dns-error-reporting: yes' is set, the EDNS Report-Channel option (code 18) from the last upstream response is read and uses the option's length as the length of the agent domain. When a domain name check is performed on the agent domain, the returned lenght is not used and if the agent domain is followed by garbage, those bytes are moved onto the tail of the synthetic '_er.' report query name. That query name is later used in the iterator via a subquery to send out the DNS Error Report and when Unbound tries to walk that query name during 'find_closest_of_type()', it strips labels using the query name length rather than stopping at the embedded root, walks one byte past it, and feeds the first garbage byte to 'dname_query_hash()' as a label length writing over the stack variable 'labuf'. One ordinary upstream response from a delegated zone the attacker controls is sufficient to terminate the daemon.
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In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.23.0 up to and including 1.25.1, when 'dns-error-reporting: yes' is set, the EDNS Report-Channel option (code 18) from the last upstream response is read and uses the option's length as the length of the agent domain. When a domain name check is performed on the agent domain, the returned lenght is not used and if the agent domain is followed by garbage, those bytes are moved onto the tail of the synthetic '_er.' report query name. That query name is later used in the iterator via a subquery to send out the DNS Error Report and when Unbound tries to walk that query name during 'find_closest_of_type()', it strips labels using the query name length rather than stopping at the embedded root, walks one byte past it, and feeds the first garbage byte to 'dname_query_hash()' as a label length writing over the stack variable 'labuf'. One ordinary upstream response from a delegated zone the attacker controls is sufficient to terminate the daemon.
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🚨 CVE-2026-55990
In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.7.0 up to and including 1.25.1, when the 'dnscrypt:' clause lists more 'dnscrypt-provider-cert:' files than there are matching 'dnscrypt-secret-key:' files, Unbound fills only the matched prefix and leaves the tail slots at the '0xdb' fill that libsodium's allocator writes into every allocation. Unbound would then iterate over the number of cert files, not the actual slots, so it walks into a slot with garbage data filled with '0xdb' bytes. Any unauthenticated client that sends one UDP datagram of ≥ 68 bytes whose first 8 bytes are '0xdb' to 'dnscrypt-port' will use that garbage entry which leads to a garbage dereference killing the server. This is a silent faulty configuration that goes unnoticed until triggered with the right client query. Unbound needs to be compiled with DNSCrypt support ('--enable-dnscrypt').
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In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.7.0 up to and including 1.25.1, when the 'dnscrypt:' clause lists more 'dnscrypt-provider-cert:' files than there are matching 'dnscrypt-secret-key:' files, Unbound fills only the matched prefix and leaves the tail slots at the '0xdb' fill that libsodium's allocator writes into every allocation. Unbound would then iterate over the number of cert files, not the actual slots, so it walks into a slot with garbage data filled with '0xdb' bytes. Any unauthenticated client that sends one UDP datagram of ≥ 68 bytes whose first 8 bytes are '0xdb' to 'dnscrypt-port' will use that garbage entry which leads to a garbage dereference killing the server. This is a silent faulty configuration that goes unnoticed until triggered with the right client query. Unbound needs to be compiled with DNSCrypt support ('--enable-dnscrypt').
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🚨 CVE-2026-56416
In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, when the validator builds the canonical RDATA form for an RRSIG-covered PX/RP/MINFO/SOA RRset, it computes the address of the second embedded domain name as 'datstart + dname_valid(datstart, ...)' and passes it straight to 'query_dname_tolower()' without checking that a second name is actually present in the RDATA. The wire-format parser accepts multi-dname RRs whose RDATA ends after the first name, so an attacker who runs a DNSSEC-signed authoritative server can deliver a record with an absent second domain name (e.g. SOA record) and cause 'query_dname_tolower()' to walk label-by-label through stale bytes in the per-worker 'env->scratch_buffer', past the end of that heap allocation if 'msg-buffer-size' has been lowered from the default. This leads to heap buffer overflow and on a release build the outcome relies heavily on the contents of the buffer tail and the adjacent heap chunk.
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In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, when the validator builds the canonical RDATA form for an RRSIG-covered PX/RP/MINFO/SOA RRset, it computes the address of the second embedded domain name as 'datstart + dname_valid(datstart, ...)' and passes it straight to 'query_dname_tolower()' without checking that a second name is actually present in the RDATA. The wire-format parser accepts multi-dname RRs whose RDATA ends after the first name, so an attacker who runs a DNSSEC-signed authoritative server can deliver a record with an absent second domain name (e.g. SOA record) and cause 'query_dname_tolower()' to walk label-by-label through stale bytes in the per-worker 'env->scratch_buffer', past the end of that heap allocation if 'msg-buffer-size' has been lowered from the default. This leads to heap buffer overflow and on a release build the outcome relies heavily on the contents of the buffer tail and the adjacent heap chunk.
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🚨 CVE-2026-10723
BIND may accept incorrect child-zone NSEC3 records as valid, which could allow an attacker to forge authenticated NXDOMAIN responses.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.18.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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BIND may accept incorrect child-zone NSEC3 records as valid, which could allow an attacker to forge authenticated NXDOMAIN responses.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.18.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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🚨 CVE-2026-10822
If BIND encounters a particular invalid data structure in a DNS record, it will accept the invalid data, and may subsequently abort and exit.
BIND will first need to store a DNS record for a key (KEY, DNSKEY, etc.). That key must specify a PRIVATEDNS algorithm (253), and in the algorithm identifier, improperly give a length longer than the actual identifier data. The invalid identifier will be stored. If BIND later needs to render that record to text, it will use the invalid length during processing, leading to a consistency check failing.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.18.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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If BIND encounters a particular invalid data structure in a DNS record, it will accept the invalid data, and may subsequently abort and exit.
BIND will first need to store a DNS record for a key (KEY, DNSKEY, etc.). That key must specify a PRIVATEDNS algorithm (253), and in the algorithm identifier, improperly give a length longer than the actual identifier data. The invalid identifier will be stored. If BIND later needs to render that record to text, it will use the invalid length during processing, leading to a consistency check failing.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.18.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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🚨 CVE-2026-11331
An attacker who knows (or guesses) that a resolver uses RPZ with wildcard CNAME policies can craft query names long enough to trigger a NAMETOOLONG error condition during RPZ processing. This is not handled correctly and may lead to defeating the RPZ rule. It also may lead to an unexpected exit of the BIND 9 software.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.16.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.16.8-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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An attacker who knows (or guesses) that a resolver uses RPZ with wildcard CNAME policies can craft query names long enough to trigger a NAMETOOLONG error condition during RPZ processing. This is not handled correctly and may lead to defeating the RPZ rule. It also may lead to an unexpected exit of the BIND 9 software.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.16.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.16.8-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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🚨 CVE-2026-11605
The issue is a resource exhaustion vulnerability associated with DNSSEC validation. BIND always validates all RRSIG records in an answer, even if they are not strictly needed. A query to an authoritative server/zone which returns many valid but superfluous RRSIG records causes the validator to waste disproportionate CPU time.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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The issue is a resource exhaustion vulnerability associated with DNSSEC validation. BIND always validates all RRSIG records in an answer, even if they are not strictly needed. A query to an authoritative server/zone which returns many valid but superfluous RRSIG records causes the validator to waste disproportionate CPU time.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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🚨 CVE-2026-11622
A DNSSEC validating resolver that is under a random subdomain attack against a DNSSEC-signed zone can suffer from runaway memory usage. The attacker needs to be able to send queries faster than the resolver can perform validation. The increased memory usage can be orders of magnitude beyond the limit configured in the `max-cache-size` parameter.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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A DNSSEC validating resolver that is under a random subdomain attack against a DNSSEC-signed zone can suffer from runaway memory usage. The attacker needs to be able to send queries faster than the resolver can perform validation. The increased memory usage can be orders of magnitude beyond the limit configured in the `max-cache-size` parameter.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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🚨 CVE-2026-11721
It is possible for an attacker's zone to respond to a query with an RRSIG that has a smaller number of labels than the zone in which the RRSIG is contained. This causes `named` to produce a wildcard name for a zone that is shorter than the attacker's zone, which can result in cache poisoning. For this attack to have any effect, the resolver under attack must have set `synth-from-dnssec yes;` (which is the default).
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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It is possible for an attacker's zone to respond to a query with an RRSIG that has a smaller number of labels than the zone in which the RRSIG is contained. This causes `named` to produce a wildcard name for a zone that is shorter than the attacker's zone, which can result in cache poisoning. For this attack to have any effect, the resolver under attack must have set `synth-from-dnssec yes;` (which is the default).
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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🚨 CVE-2026-12617
The issue is unexpected program termination based on ordering and/or specific content in responses to queries for CNAME or DNAME, and A records. Specifically, if a client queries for a DNAME and A record below the DNAME to the resolver, and the authoritative server responds positively to the A query but delays the DNAME response and later responds negatively, `named` may quit unexpectedly. Or, if a client queries for a CNAME and A record for the same name to the resolver, and the authoritative server responds positively to the A query but delays the CNAME response and later responds with a self-referential CNAME, the same failure may occur.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.18.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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The issue is unexpected program termination based on ordering and/or specific content in responses to queries for CNAME or DNAME, and A records. Specifically, if a client queries for a DNAME and A record below the DNAME to the resolver, and the authoritative server responds positively to the A query but delays the DNAME response and later responds negatively, `named` may quit unexpectedly. Or, if a client queries for a CNAME and A record for the same name to the resolver, and the authoritative server responds positively to the A query but delays the CNAME response and later responds with a self-referential CNAME, the same failure may occur.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.18.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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🚨 CVE-2026-13204
If a provably insecure domain is covered by both an NSEC and NSEC3 record at the parent, and there exist an RRSIG for only one of these types, then BIND may exit unexpectedly with an assertion while validating this proof.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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If a provably insecure domain is covered by both an NSEC and NSEC3 record at the parent, and there exist an RRSIG for only one of these types, then BIND may exit unexpectedly with an assertion while validating this proof.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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🚨 CVE-2026-13321
The BIND resolver accepts validly-signed NSEC records where the "Next Domain Name" field points outside the signer's zone.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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The BIND resolver accepts validly-signed NSEC records where the "Next Domain Name" field points outside the signer's zone.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.18.50, 9.20.0 through 9.20.24, 9.21.0 through 9.21.23, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.18.50-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.24-S1.
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🚨 CVE-2026-14985
The Analog Way Picturall Quad Compact Mark II version 3.5.8, contains a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the core firmware. This is due to improper privilege delegation and insufficient input validation in a maintenance script.
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The Analog Way Picturall Quad Compact Mark II version 3.5.8, contains a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the core firmware. This is due to improper privilege delegation and insufficient input validation in a maintenance script.
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kb.cert.org
CERT/CC Vulnerability Note VU#360868
Analog Way Picturall Quad Compact Mark II contains a local privilege escalation vulnerability