🚨 CVE-2026-65049
Ninja Forms plugin version 3.14.8 and prior for WordPress Multisite contains an incorrect authorization vulnerability that allows a subsite Administrator to trigger network-wide deletion of all Ninja Forms data by exploiting a site-scoped capability check combined with unsafe multisite migration defaults. Attackers can send a crafted POST request to the admin-ajax.php endpoint with the nf_delete_all_data action and a per-site nonce to invoke migration routines that unconditionally iterate all blogs via switch_to_blog(), dropping all nf3_* tables and clearing options and transients across every subsite in the network without requiring super-admin or network-admin privileges.
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Ninja Forms plugin version 3.14.8 and prior for WordPress Multisite contains an incorrect authorization vulnerability that allows a subsite Administrator to trigger network-wide deletion of all Ninja Forms data by exploiting a site-scoped capability check combined with unsafe multisite migration defaults. Attackers can send a crafted POST request to the admin-ajax.php endpoint with the nf_delete_all_data action and a per-site nonce to invoke migration routines that unconditionally iterate all blogs via switch_to_blog(), dropping all nf3_* tables and clearing options and transients across every subsite in the network without requiring super-admin or network-admin privileges.
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WordPress.org
Ninja Forms – The Contact Form Builder That Grows With You
The 100% beginner friendly WordPress form builder. Drag & drop form fields to build beautiful, professional contact forms in minutes.
🚨 CVE-2026-65050
Ninja Forms WordPress plugin version 3.14.8 and prior contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the render callback of the `ninja-forms/submissions-table` Gutenberg block that allows authenticated attackers with Author-level privileges to expose stored form submissions to unauthenticated visitors by embedding the block with an arbitrary formID on a published post. Attackers can retrieve the signed bearer token injected into every page visitor's browser via `wp_localize_script` and use it against the REST API submissions endpoint to access all saved form submission field values, including sensitive personally identifiable information such as names, email addresses, and phone numbers.
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Ninja Forms WordPress plugin version 3.14.8 and prior contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the render callback of the `ninja-forms/submissions-table` Gutenberg block that allows authenticated attackers with Author-level privileges to expose stored form submissions to unauthenticated visitors by embedding the block with an arbitrary formID on a published post. Attackers can retrieve the signed bearer token injected into every page visitor's browser via `wp_localize_script` and use it against the REST API submissions endpoint to access all saved form submission field values, including sensitive personally identifiable information such as names, email addresses, and phone numbers.
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WordPress.org
Ninja Forms – The Contact Form Builder That Grows With You
The 100% beginner friendly WordPress form builder. Drag & drop form fields to build beautiful, professional contact forms in minutes.
🚨 CVE-2026-65051
Ninja Forms WordPress plugin version 3.14.8 contains a client-side enforcement of server-side security vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass all form validation by merging attacker-controlled field metadata over server-loaded form definitions before validation runs. Attackers can craft a malicious AJAX submission overriding field types, removing required flags, and disabling CAPTCHA checks through the nopriv AJAX endpoint to trigger form actions such as email notifications and database storage with unverified, attacker-controlled content.
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Ninja Forms WordPress plugin version 3.14.8 contains a client-side enforcement of server-side security vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass all form validation by merging attacker-controlled field metadata over server-loaded form definitions before validation runs. Attackers can craft a malicious AJAX submission overriding field types, removing required flags, and disabling CAPTCHA checks through the nopriv AJAX endpoint to trigger form actions such as email notifications and database storage with unverified, attacker-controlled content.
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WordPress.org
Ninja Forms – The Contact Form Builder That Grows With You
The 100% beginner friendly WordPress form builder. Drag & drop form fields to build beautiful, professional contact forms in minutes.
🚨 CVE-2026-65052
Ninja Forms WordPress plugin version 3.14.8 and prior contains an improper input validation vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary numeric values into form calculations and payment totals by submitting values that do not match any configured option in ListSelect or ListRadio fields. Attackers can tamper with form submission payloads to the ajax submit endpoint, causing the get_calc_value() method to fail open and return attacker-controlled values, enabling manipulation of payment amounts to zero or arbitrary figures and bypassing admin-configured pricing logic.
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Ninja Forms WordPress plugin version 3.14.8 and prior contains an improper input validation vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary numeric values into form calculations and payment totals by submitting values that do not match any configured option in ListSelect or ListRadio fields. Attackers can tamper with form submission payloads to the ajax submit endpoint, causing the get_calc_value() method to fail open and return attacker-controlled values, enabling manipulation of payment amounts to zero or arbitrary figures and bypassing admin-configured pricing logic.
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WordPress.org
Ninja Forms – The Contact Form Builder That Grows With You
The 100% beginner friendly WordPress form builder. Drag & drop form fields to build beautiful, professional contact forms in minutes.
🚨 CVE-2026-47390
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40 of PraisonAI, corresponding to version 1.6.40 of praisonaiagents, `spider_tools` URL validation can be bypassed using alternate loopback host encodings. The tool contains a URL validation function intended to block local or unsafe targets before fetching attacker-controlled URLs. However, the validation only blocks a small set of exact host strings such as `localhost` and `127.0.0.1`. It does not normalize hostnames, resolve DNS, parse numeric IPv4 variants, or validate the final resolved IP address before making the request. As a result, certain URLs may bypass the protection and still reach loopback services. After the weak validation passes, `scrape_page()` calls `requests.Session.get()` on the attacker-controlled URL. This allows an attacker who can influence URLs passed to `scrape_page`, `crawl`, or `extract_text` to induce SSRF requests against loopback-only services. This is a server-side request forgery protection bypass. PraisonAI version 4.6.40 and praisonaiagents version 1.6.40 contain a patch.
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PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40 of PraisonAI, corresponding to version 1.6.40 of praisonaiagents, `spider_tools` URL validation can be bypassed using alternate loopback host encodings. The tool contains a URL validation function intended to block local or unsafe targets before fetching attacker-controlled URLs. However, the validation only blocks a small set of exact host strings such as `localhost` and `127.0.0.1`. It does not normalize hostnames, resolve DNS, parse numeric IPv4 variants, or validate the final resolved IP address before making the request. As a result, certain URLs may bypass the protection and still reach loopback services. After the weak validation passes, `scrape_page()` calls `requests.Session.get()` on the attacker-controlled URL. This allows an attacker who can influence URLs passed to `scrape_page`, `crawl`, or `extract_text` to induce SSRF requests against loopback-only services. This is a server-side request forgery protection bypass. PraisonAI version 4.6.40 and praisonaiagents version 1.6.40 contain a patch.
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GitHub
Merge pull request #1684 from MervinPraison/security/batch-10-hardening · MervinPraison/PraisonAI@b0d8f77
refactor: security batch — 10 hardening fixes
🚨 CVE-2026-47391
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40, PraisonAI's first-party A2A server example exposes an unauthenticated A2A JSON-RPC endpoint and registers a `calculate(expression)` tool implemented with Python `eval()`. The example also binds to `0.0.0.0`. A remote unauthenticated attacker can send `message/send` to `/a2a`; the request reaches `agent.chat()`, and a real LLM can invoke the registered `calculate` tool. In testing with `gemini/gemini-2.5-flash-lite`, this resulted in arbitrary Python execution in the server process, confirmed by creation of a marker file from an unauthenticated HTTP request. The issue affects deployments following the official A2A example or similar unauthenticated public A2A deployments with unsafe tools. The default unauthenticated A2A surface also exposes task history and task cancellation APIs, increasing confidentiality and integrity impact. Version 4.6.40 patches the issue.
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PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40, PraisonAI's first-party A2A server example exposes an unauthenticated A2A JSON-RPC endpoint and registers a `calculate(expression)` tool implemented with Python `eval()`. The example also binds to `0.0.0.0`. A remote unauthenticated attacker can send `message/send` to `/a2a`; the request reaches `agent.chat()`, and a real LLM can invoke the registered `calculate` tool. In testing with `gemini/gemini-2.5-flash-lite`, this resulted in arbitrary Python execution in the server process, confirmed by creation of a marker file from an unauthenticated HTTP request. The issue affects deployments following the official A2A example or similar unauthenticated public A2A deployments with unsafe tools. The default unauthenticated A2A surface also exposes task history and task cancellation APIs, increasing confidentiality and integrity impact. Version 4.6.40 patches the issue.
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GitHub
fix: harden JWT secret handling and replace eval() in examples (#1793) · MervinPraison/PraisonAI@e0fb8e7
Addresses remaining attack surface from security advisories:
GHSA-3qg8-5g3r-79v5 (JWT signing key - CRITICAL):
auth_service.py: PLATFORM_ENV no longer defaults to 'dev' when unse...
GHSA-3qg8-5g3r-79v5 (JWT signing key - CRITICAL):
auth_service.py: PLATFORM_ENV no longer defaults to 'dev' when unse...
🚨 CVE-2026-47392
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40 of PraisonAI, corresponding to version 1.6.40 of praisonaiagents, `execute_code()` in `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` (v1.6.37, subprocess sandbox mode) can be fully bypassed using `print.__self__` to retrieve the real Python `builtins` module, from which `__import__` can be extracted via `vars()` and runtime string construction. This achieves arbitrary OS command execution on the host, completely defeating the sandbox. This is a novel bypass that survives all patches for CVE-2026-39888 (frame traversal), CVE-2026-34938 (str subclass), and CVE-2026-40158 (`type.__getattribute__` trampoline). PraisonAI version 4.6.40 and praisonaiagents version 1.6.40 contain an updated fix.
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PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40 of PraisonAI, corresponding to version 1.6.40 of praisonaiagents, `execute_code()` in `praisonaiagents/tools/python_tools.py` (v1.6.37, subprocess sandbox mode) can be fully bypassed using `print.__self__` to retrieve the real Python `builtins` module, from which `__import__` can be extracted via `vars()` and runtime string construction. This achieves arbitrary OS command execution on the host, completely defeating the sandbox. This is a novel bypass that survives all patches for CVE-2026-39888 (frame traversal), CVE-2026-34938 (str subclass), and CVE-2026-40158 (`type.__getattribute__` trampoline). PraisonAI version 4.6.40 and praisonaiagents version 1.6.40 contain an updated fix.
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GitHub
Merge pull request #1684 from MervinPraison/security/batch-10-hardening · MervinPraison/PraisonAI@b0d8f77
refactor: security batch — 10 hardening fixes
🚨 CVE-2026-47393
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. CVE-2026-44338 (GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj) documents that PraisonAI ships a code-generator (`praisonai.deploy.api.generate_api_server_code`) that emits a Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. Users who follow the documented quickstart (`praisonai deploy --type api`) get a server that binds to `0.0.0.0` per the recommended sample YAML, exposes `/chat` and `/agents` endpoints, runs `praisonai.run()` on user-supplied JSON input — LLM orchestration with the API key materials present in the process environment, and does not require any authentication. Versions prior to 4.6.40 still ship the generator with `auth_enabled` defaulting to `False`. The fix shape is opt-in via `APIConfig(auth_enabled=True, auth_token=...)`. Version 4.6.40 fixes the issue.
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PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. CVE-2026-44338 (GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj) documents that PraisonAI ships a code-generator (`praisonai.deploy.api.generate_api_server_code`) that emits a Flask API server with authentication disabled by default. Users who follow the documented quickstart (`praisonai deploy --type api`) get a server that binds to `0.0.0.0` per the recommended sample YAML, exposes `/chat` and `/agents` endpoints, runs `praisonai.run()` on user-supplied JSON input — LLM orchestration with the API key materials present in the process environment, and does not require any authentication. Versions prior to 4.6.40 still ship the generator with `auth_enabled` defaulting to `False`. The fix shape is opt-in via `APIConfig(auth_enabled=True, auth_token=...)`. Version 4.6.40 fixes the issue.
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GitHub
Merge pull request #1685 from MervinPraison/security/batch-11-hardening · MervinPraison/PraisonAI@ef79b7a
refactor: security batch 2 — platform IDOR and deploy hardening
🚨 CVE-2026-47394
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40, the fix for GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw / CVE-2026-44336 is incomplete. The original advisory description named four vulnerable handlers in `mcp_server/adapters/cli_tools.py`. Commit `68cc9427` ("fix(security): harden MCP rules path handling…") added a `_resolve_rule_path()` helper and applied it to `rules.create`, `rules.show`, and `rules.delete`. `workflow.show` was left unchanged. Two adjacent handlers in the same file have the same pattern, `workflow.validate` and `deploy.validate`. Neither was mentioned in the original advisory. Both remained unchanged. The original advisory also identified the dispatcher (`server.py:281-298`) as a root cause. It accepts unvalidated `**kwargs` from `params["arguments"]` with no enforcement against the tool's declared `input_schema`. That code is unchanged prior to version 4.6.40. A single unauthenticated MCP `tools/call` to `praisonai.workflow.show` returns the contents of any file the host user can read: `/etc/passwd`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.aws/credentials`, or any project `.env`. Version 4.6.40 contains an updated fix.
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PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40, the fix for GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw / CVE-2026-44336 is incomplete. The original advisory description named four vulnerable handlers in `mcp_server/adapters/cli_tools.py`. Commit `68cc9427` ("fix(security): harden MCP rules path handling…") added a `_resolve_rule_path()` helper and applied it to `rules.create`, `rules.show`, and `rules.delete`. `workflow.show` was left unchanged. Two adjacent handlers in the same file have the same pattern, `workflow.validate` and `deploy.validate`. Neither was mentioned in the original advisory. Both remained unchanged. The original advisory also identified the dispatcher (`server.py:281-298`) as a root cause. It accepts unvalidated `**kwargs` from `params["arguments"]` with no enforcement against the tool's declared `input_schema`. That code is unchanged prior to version 4.6.40. A single unauthenticated MCP `tools/call` to `praisonai.workflow.show` returns the contents of any file the host user can read: `/etc/passwd`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.aws/credentials`, or any project `.env`. Version 4.6.40 contains an updated fix.
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GitHub
Merge pull request #1684 from MervinPraison/security/batch-10-hardening · MervinPraison/PraisonAI@b0d8f77
refactor: security batch — 10 hardening fixes
🚨 CVE-2026-47395
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40 of PraisonAI, corresponding to version 1.6.40 of praisonaiagents, PraisonAI's direct-prompt CLI automatically expands `@url:` mentions in raw prompt text before agent execution begins. If a prompt contains `@url:<http-or-https-url>`, the CLI calls `MentionsParser.process(...)`. The `@url:` handler then performs a direct `urllib.request.urlopen()` request to the attacker-controlled URL and returns the response body. That response body is prepended to the final model prompt context. There is no loopback/private-address restriction, no metadata-service restriction, and no approval gate before the fetch. As a result, attacker-influenced prompt text can cause the operator's machine to fetch localhost-only HTTP resources and inject the response into model context. PraisonAI version 4.6.40 and praisonaiagents version 1.6.40 contain a fix.
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PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40 of PraisonAI, corresponding to version 1.6.40 of praisonaiagents, PraisonAI's direct-prompt CLI automatically expands `@url:` mentions in raw prompt text before agent execution begins. If a prompt contains `@url:<http-or-https-url>`, the CLI calls `MentionsParser.process(...)`. The `@url:` handler then performs a direct `urllib.request.urlopen()` request to the attacker-controlled URL and returns the response body. That response body is prepended to the final model prompt context. There is no loopback/private-address restriction, no metadata-service restriction, and no approval gate before the fetch. As a result, attacker-influenced prompt text can cause the operator's machine to fetch localhost-only HTTP resources and inject the response into model context. PraisonAI version 4.6.40 and praisonaiagents version 1.6.40 contain a fix.
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GitHub
Merge pull request #1684 from MervinPraison/security/batch-10-hardening · MervinPraison/PraisonAI@b0d8f77
refactor: security batch — 10 hardening fixes
🚨 CVE-2026-47396
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40, PraisonAI's call server exposes a network-facing agent control API without authentication when `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` is not configured. The affected component is the `praisonai.api.agent_invoke` router as mounted by `praisonai.api.call`. The authentication helper `verify_token()` fails open when `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` is unset. Since every sensitive agent-control endpoint depends on this helper, starting the call server without a token allows any reachable client to list agents, inspect agent metadata and instructions, invoke agents, and unregister agents. This is security-relevant because the bundled call server includes the vulnerable router and binds to `0.0.0.0`. As a result, operators who launch the call server without explicitly setting `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` may unintentionally expose an unauthenticated remote agent control plane. Version 4.6.40 fixes the issue.
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PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40, PraisonAI's call server exposes a network-facing agent control API without authentication when `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` is not configured. The affected component is the `praisonai.api.agent_invoke` router as mounted by `praisonai.api.call`. The authentication helper `verify_token()` fails open when `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` is unset. Since every sensitive agent-control endpoint depends on this helper, starting the call server without a token allows any reachable client to list agents, inspect agent metadata and instructions, invoke agents, and unregister agents. This is security-relevant because the bundled call server includes the vulnerable router and binds to `0.0.0.0`. As a result, operators who launch the call server without explicitly setting `CALL_SERVER_TOKEN` may unintentionally expose an unauthenticated remote agent control plane. Version 4.6.40 fixes the issue.
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GitHub
Merge pull request #1685 from MervinPraison/security/batch-11-hardening · MervinPraison/PraisonAI@ef79b7a
refactor: security batch 2 — platform IDOR and deploy hardening
🚨 CVE-2026-47397
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40, hidden metadata in a webpage causes PraisonAI agents to write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary paths. `write_file` skips path validation when `workspace=None` (always `None` in production). Version 4.6.40 fixes the issue.
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PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 4.6.40, hidden metadata in a webpage causes PraisonAI agents to write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary paths. `write_file` skips path validation when `workspace=None` (always `None` in production). Version 4.6.40 fixes the issue.
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GitHub
Merge pull request #1684 from MervinPraison/security/batch-10-hardening · MervinPraison/PraisonAI@b0d8f77
refactor: security batch — 10 hardening fixes
🚨 CVE-2026-47399
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 0.1.4, the workspace-scoped REST routes contain a systemic object-level authorization flaw that allows an authenticated user from one workspace to access, modify, and delete objects belonging to another workspace by supplying the victim object's global UUID. The affected pattern appears in workspace-scoped routes such as agents, projects, issues, and comments. The route layer verifies that the caller is a member of the `workspace_id` provided in the URL, but the service layer later resolves the target object by global object ID only. It does not verify that the resolved object actually belongs to the workspace in the URL. As a result, a valid member of `workspace_attacker` can call a route under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_attacker}/...` while supplying an object UUID from `workspace_victim`. The server authorizes the request based on membership in `workspace_attacker`, then fetches or mutates the victim object by global UUID. This breaks the platform's workspace isolation boundary. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
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PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 0.1.4, the workspace-scoped REST routes contain a systemic object-level authorization flaw that allows an authenticated user from one workspace to access, modify, and delete objects belonging to another workspace by supplying the victim object's global UUID. The affected pattern appears in workspace-scoped routes such as agents, projects, issues, and comments. The route layer verifies that the caller is a member of the `workspace_id` provided in the URL, but the service layer later resolves the target object by global object ID only. It does not verify that the resolved object actually belongs to the workspace in the URL. As a result, a valid member of `workspace_attacker` can call a route under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_attacker}/...` while supplying an object UUID from `workspace_victim`. The server authorizes the request based on membership in `workspace_attacker`, then fetches or mutates the victim object by global UUID. This breaks the platform's workspace isolation boundary. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
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GitHub
Merge pull request #1686 from MervinPraison/security/batch-12-remaining · MervinPraison/PraisonAI@24385d6
refactor: security batch 3 — platform service scoping (do not auto-merge)
🚨 CVE-2026-47405
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have a broken workspace authorization check that allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to escalate their own role to `owner`. The issue is caused by privileged workspace-management routes using the shared dependency `require_workspace_member(...)` without requiring `admin` or `owner`. The dependency defaults to `min_role="member"`, so routes that should be administrative are accessible to ordinary workspace members. As a result, a normal workspace member can promote their own account from `member` to `owner`; add arbitrary users as `owner` or `admin`; change other members' roles; remove legitimate owners or members; take over workspace membership completely; and/or perform destructive workspace operations after escalation. This is a broken access control / vertical privilege escalation vulnerability. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
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PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have a broken workspace authorization check that allows any authenticated low-privilege workspace member to escalate their own role to `owner`. The issue is caused by privileged workspace-management routes using the shared dependency `require_workspace_member(...)` without requiring `admin` or `owner`. The dependency defaults to `min_role="member"`, so routes that should be administrative are accessible to ordinary workspace members. As a result, a normal workspace member can promote their own account from `member` to `owner`; add arbitrary users as `owner` or `admin`; change other members' roles; remove legitimate owners or members; take over workspace membership completely; and/or perform destructive workspace operations after escalation. This is a broken access control / vertical privilege escalation vulnerability. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
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GitHub
Merge pull request #1686 from MervinPraison/security/batch-12-remaining · MervinPraison/PraisonAI@24385d6
refactor: security batch 3 — platform service scoping (do not auto-merge)
🚨 CVE-2026-47406
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The dependency endpoints (`POST/GET /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/dependencies` and `DELETE .../dependencies/{dep_id}`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then dispatch to `DependencyService` calls that take URL/body-supplied issue and dependency IDs without verifying any of them belong to the membership-checked workspace. Most damaging: `create_dependency` accepts `body.depends_on_issue_id` from the request body — that ID is checked against nothing — letting an attacker create a "blocks" or "related" link between any two issues anywhere in the database. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
🎖@cveNotify
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The dependency endpoints (`POST/GET /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/dependencies` and `DELETE .../dependencies/{dep_id}`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then dispatch to `DependencyService` calls that take URL/body-supplied issue and dependency IDs without verifying any of them belong to the membership-checked workspace. Most damaging: `create_dependency` accepts `body.depends_on_issue_id` from the request body — that ID is checked against nothing — letting an attacker create a "blocks" or "related" link between any two issues anywhere in the database. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
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GitHub
Merge pull request #1685 from MervinPraison/security/batch-11-hardening · MervinPraison/PraisonAI@ef79b7a
refactor: security batch 2 — platform IDOR and deploy hardening
🚨 CVE-2026-47407
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 0.1.4, the Platform server exposes resources under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...` and protects them with a `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspace_id in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (`agent_id`, `issue_id`, `project_id`, `label_id`, `comment_id`, `dependency_id`) by primary key alone. The resource's own `workspace_id` is never compared to the URL's `workspace_id`. A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace's resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete. There is a second bug in the member-management routes (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`). Each one inherits the default `min_role="member"` from `require_workspace_member`. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove other members, and delete the workspace. The role hierarchy exists in the schema but is not enforced. Registration is open at `/api/v1/auth/register` with no email verification. The default server bind is `0.0.0.0:8000` (`python -m praisonai_platform`). One curl from any unauthenticated network position is enough to bootstrap into the system. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
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PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Prior to version 0.1.4, the Platform server exposes resources under `/api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...` and protects them with a `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` FastAPI dependency. The dependency only checks that the caller is a member of the workspace_id in the URL prefix. The route handlers then look up the inner resource (`agent_id`, `issue_id`, `project_id`, `label_id`, `comment_id`, `dependency_id`) by primary key alone. The resource's own `workspace_id` is never compared to the URL's `workspace_id`. A user can therefore put their own workspace in the URL prefix and any other workspace's resource ID in the path. The auth check passes, since they really are a member of the prefix workspace. The service then returns the cross-tenant resource for read, update, or delete. There is a second bug in the member-management routes (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`). Each one inherits the default `min_role="member"` from `require_workspace_member`. Any basic member can therefore promote themselves to admin or owner, demote or remove other members, and delete the workspace. The role hierarchy exists in the schema but is not enforced. Registration is open at `/api/v1/auth/register` with no email verification. The default server bind is `0.0.0.0:8000` (`python -m praisonai_platform`). One curl from any unauthenticated network position is enough to bootstrap into the system. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
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GitHub
Merge pull request #1686 from MervinPraison/security/batch-12-remaining · MervinPraison/PraisonAI@24385d6
refactor: security batch 3 — platform service scoping (do not auto-merge)
🚨 CVE-2026-47408
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The `GET /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/activity` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` and dispatches to `ActivityService.list_for_issue(issue_id)`, which executes `SELECT * FROM activity WHERE issue_id = :issue_id` with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace can read the full activity log of any issue across the entire multi-tenant deployment. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
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PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The `GET /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/activity` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` and dispatches to `ActivityService.list_for_issue(issue_id)`, which executes `SELECT * FROM activity WHERE issue_id = :issue_id` with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace can read the full activity log of any issue across the entire multi-tenant deployment. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
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GitHub
Merge pull request #1685 from MervinPraison/security/batch-11-hardening · MervinPraison/PraisonAI@ef79b7a
refactor: security batch 2 — platform IDOR and deploy hardening
🚨 CVE-2026-47409
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no "cannot remove last owner" guard. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
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PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling owner lockout. The `DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role="member"`). Any member can remove any other member, including the workspace owner, using a single DELETE. There is no caller-role check, no target-role check, no "cannot remove last owner" guard. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
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GitHub
Merge pull request #1686 from MervinPraison/security/batch-12-remaining · MervinPraison/PraisonAI@24385d6
refactor: security batch 3 — platform service scoping (do not auto-merge)
🚨 CVE-2026-47410
PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an insecure default cryptographic key. The JWT signing secret defaults to the hardcoded literal `"dev-secret-change-me"` when `PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET` is unset. A safety check exists but only fires when `PLATFORM_ENV != "dev"`; the default value of `PLATFORM_ENV` is `"dev"`, so the check is silently bypassed in any deployment that does not explicitly opt out. The attacker reads the literal from this public source file, mints a JWT with arbitrary `sub` and `email` claims, and authenticates as any existing user (including workspace owners and admins). PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
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PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an insecure default cryptographic key. The JWT signing secret defaults to the hardcoded literal `"dev-secret-change-me"` when `PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET` is unset. A safety check exists but only fires when `PLATFORM_ENV != "dev"`; the default value of `PLATFORM_ENV` is `"dev"`, so the check is silently bypassed in any deployment that does not explicitly opt out. The attacker reads the literal from this public source file, mints a JWT with arbitrary `sub` and `email` claims, and authenticates as any existing user (including workspace owners and admins). PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.
🎖@cveNotify
GitHub
Merge pull request #1685 from MervinPraison/security/batch-11-hardening · MervinPraison/PraisonAI@ef79b7a
refactor: security batch 2 — platform IDOR and deploy hardening
🚨 CVE-2026-21575
This High severity RCE (Remote Code Execution) vulnerability was introduced in version 3.4.11 of Sourcetree for Mac and Sourcetree for Windows.
This RCE (Remote Code Execution) vulnerability, with a CVSS Score of 7.1, allows an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code which has high impact to confidentiality, high impact to integrity, high impact to availability, and requires user interaction.
Atlassian recommends that Sourcetree for Mac and Sourcetree for Windows customers upgrade to latest version, if you are unable to do so, upgrade your instance to one of the specified supported fixed versions:
* Sourcetree for Mac and Sourcetree for Windows 3.4: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 3.4.13
See the release notes (https://www.sourcetreeapp.com/download-archives). You can download the latest version of Sourcetree for Mac and Sourcetree for Windows from the download center (https://www.sourcetreeapp.com/download-archives).
This vulnerability was reported via our Bug Bounty program.
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This High severity RCE (Remote Code Execution) vulnerability was introduced in version 3.4.11 of Sourcetree for Mac and Sourcetree for Windows.
This RCE (Remote Code Execution) vulnerability, with a CVSS Score of 7.1, allows an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code which has high impact to confidentiality, high impact to integrity, high impact to availability, and requires user interaction.
Atlassian recommends that Sourcetree for Mac and Sourcetree for Windows customers upgrade to latest version, if you are unable to do so, upgrade your instance to one of the specified supported fixed versions:
* Sourcetree for Mac and Sourcetree for Windows 3.4: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 3.4.13
See the release notes (https://www.sourcetreeapp.com/download-archives). You can download the latest version of Sourcetree for Mac and Sourcetree for Windows from the download center (https://www.sourcetreeapp.com/download-archives).
This vulnerability was reported via our Bug Bounty program.
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Atlassian
Sourcetreeapp/download-archives
🚨 CVE-2026-21577
This High severity DoS (Denial of Service) vulnerability was introduced in versions 9.0.1, 9.1.0, 9.2.0, 9.3.1, 9.4.0, 9.5.1, 10.0.2, 10.1.0 and 10.2.0 of Confluence Data Center.
This DoS (Denial of Service) vulnerability, with a CVSS Score of 7.1, allows an authenticated attacker to cause a resource to be unavailable for its intended users by temporarily or indefinitely disrupting services of a host connected to a network.
Atlassian recommends that Confluence Data Center customers upgrade to latest version, if you are unable to do so, upgrade your instance to one of the specified supported fixed versions:
Confluence Data Center 9.2: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 9.2.17
Confluence Data Center 10.2: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 10.2.7
See the release notes ([https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-release-notes-327.html]). You can download the latest version of Confluence Data Center from the download center ([https://www.atlassian.com/software/confluence/download-archives]).
This vulnerability was reported via our Penetration Testing program.
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This High severity DoS (Denial of Service) vulnerability was introduced in versions 9.0.1, 9.1.0, 9.2.0, 9.3.1, 9.4.0, 9.5.1, 10.0.2, 10.1.0 and 10.2.0 of Confluence Data Center.
This DoS (Denial of Service) vulnerability, with a CVSS Score of 7.1, allows an authenticated attacker to cause a resource to be unavailable for its intended users by temporarily or indefinitely disrupting services of a host connected to a network.
Atlassian recommends that Confluence Data Center customers upgrade to latest version, if you are unable to do so, upgrade your instance to one of the specified supported fixed versions:
Confluence Data Center 9.2: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 9.2.17
Confluence Data Center 10.2: Upgrade to a release greater than or equal to 10.2.7
See the release notes ([https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-release-notes-327.html]). You can download the latest version of Confluence Data Center from the download center ([https://www.atlassian.com/software/confluence/download-archives]).
This vulnerability was reported via our Penetration Testing program.
🎖@cveNotify
Atlassian
Confluence Server Download Archives | Atlassian
Previous versions of Confluence Server are available for download. Some older versions may no longer be supported by Atlassian.