🚨 CVE-2026-59874
node-tar is a tar archive manipulation library for Node.js. Prior to 7.5.18, tar.replace accepts a checksum-valid tar header with a negative base-256 encoded entry size, causing the archive scanner to make no progress while repeatedly parsing the same header. This issue is fixed in version 7.5.18.
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node-tar is a tar archive manipulation library for Node.js. Prior to 7.5.18, tar.replace accepts a checksum-valid tar header with a negative base-256 encoded entry size, causing the archive scanner to make no progress while repeatedly parsing the same header. This issue is fixed in version 7.5.18.
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GitHub
refuse to let header size be less than 0 · isaacs/node-tar@9e78bf0
fix: https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-8x88-c5mf-7j5w
🚨 CVE-2026-59875
node-tar is a tar archive manipulation library for Node.js. Prior to 7.5.17, node-tar does not strip NUL bytes from PAX path and linkpath records in src/pax.ts, allowing a crafted archive with values to reach fs.lstat or fs.open and terminate the process with an uncaught exception. This issue is fixed in version 7.5.17.
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node-tar is a tar archive manipulation library for Node.js. Prior to 7.5.17, node-tar does not strip NUL bytes from PAX path and linkpath records in src/pax.ts, allowing a crafted archive with values to reach fs.lstat or fs.open and terminate the process with an uncaught exception. This issue is fixed in version 7.5.17.
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GitHub
terminate pax strings on nul bytes · isaacs/node-tar@7a635c2
Fix: https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-gvwx-54wh-qm9j
🚨 CVE-2026-59876
protobufjs compiles protobuf definitions into JavaScript (JS) functions. From 8.2.0 until 8.6.5, the protobufjs Text Format extension parsed string-keyed map entries using ordinary property assignment, allowing a map entry with key __proto__ to change the prototype of the returned map object instead of creating an own map entry in protobufjs/ext/textformat. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.5.
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protobufjs compiles protobuf definitions into JavaScript (JS) functions. From 8.2.0 until 8.6.5, the protobufjs Text Format extension parsed string-keyed map entries using ordinary property assignment, allowing a map entry with key __proto__ to change the prototype of the returned map object instead of creating an own map entry in protobufjs/ext/textformat. This issue is fixed in version 8.6.5.
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GitHub
fix: Use own-property semantics for internal maps (#2335) · protobufjs/protobuf.js@9f97fe4
Protocol Buffers for JavaScript and TypeScript. Fast, conformant, and versatile. No protoc required. - fix: Use own-property semantics for internal maps (#2335) · protobufjs/protobuf.js@9f97fe4
🚨 CVE-2026-59877
protobufjs compiles protobuf definitions into JavaScript (JS) functions. Prior to 7.6.5 and 8.6.6, protobufjs parsed option names by advancing through schema tokens until reaching an = token without checking for end of input, so a crafted .proto schema that opens an option declaration and ends prematurely can cause parse, Root.load, or Root.loadSync to loop indefinitely. This issue is fixed in versions 7.6.5 and 8.6.6.
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protobufjs compiles protobuf definitions into JavaScript (JS) functions. Prior to 7.6.5 and 8.6.6, protobufjs parsed option names by advancing through schema tokens until reaching an = token without checking for end of input, so a crafted .proto schema that opens an option declaration and ends prematurely can cause parse, Root.load, or Root.loadSync to loop indefinitely. This issue is fixed in versions 7.6.5 and 8.6.6.
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GitHub
fix: handle EOF during options parsing (#2352) (#2356) · protobufjs/protobuf.js@10fba6d
Protocol Buffers for JavaScript and TypeScript. Fast, conformant, and versatile. No protoc required. - fix: handle EOF during options parsing (#2352) (#2356) · protobufjs/protobuf.js@10fba6d
🚨 CVE-2026-59880
Immutable.js provides many Persistent Immutable data structures. Prior to 4.3.9 and 5.1.8, Immutable.Map and Immutable.Set keep keys that share the same 32-bit hash in a HashCollisionNode collision bucket that is scanned linearly, allowing an attacker who controls keys inserted into a Map, such as through Immutable.Map(obj), Immutable.fromJS(obj), state.merge(userObject), or mergeDeep, to craft many colliding keys and degrade insertion and lookup to consume disproportionate CPU. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.9 and 5.1.8.
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Immutable.js provides many Persistent Immutable data structures. Prior to 4.3.9 and 5.1.8, Immutable.Map and Immutable.Set keep keys that share the same 32-bit hash in a HashCollisionNode collision bucket that is scanned linearly, allowing an attacker who controls keys inserted into a Map, such as through Immutable.Map(obj), Immutable.fromJS(obj), state.merge(userObject), or mergeDeep, to craft many colliding keys and degrade insertion and lookup to consume disproportionate CPU. This issue is fixed in versions 4.3.9 and 5.1.8.
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GitHub
perf(Map): index large hash-collision buckets for faster lookups · immutable-js/immutable-js@3dd7e56
Backport of the hash-collision DoS fix to the 4.x line. Large
HashCollisionNode buckets now build a per-process seeded secondary index
(hashCollisionKey) instead of scanning linearly, restoring nea...
HashCollisionNode buckets now build a per-process seeded secondary index
(hashCollisionKey) instead of scanning linearly, restoring nea...
🚨 CVE-2026-9074
IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.9 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.0.3 contains an unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability in the password reset functionality.
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IBM API Connect 10.0.8.0 through 10.0.8.9 and 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.0.3 contains an unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability in the password reset functionality.
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Ibm
Security Bulletin: Multiple Vulnerabilities in IBM API Connect
Multiple vulnerabilities were addressed in IBM API Connect version v10.0.8.10
🚨 CVE-2026-46320
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tap: free page on error paths in tap_get_user_xdp()
tap_get_user_xdp() rejects a frame shorter than ETH_HLEN with -EINVAL,
and returns -ENOMEM when build_skb() fails. Both paths jump to the err
label without freeing the page that vhost_net_build_xdp() allocated for
the frame. tap_sendmsg() discards the per-buffer return value and always
returns 0, so vhost_tx_batch() takes the success path and never frees
the page; each rejected frame in a batch leaks one page-frag chunk.
Free the page on both error paths, before the skb is built. This is the
tap counterpart of the same leak in tun_xdp_one().
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tap: free page on error paths in tap_get_user_xdp()
tap_get_user_xdp() rejects a frame shorter than ETH_HLEN with -EINVAL,
and returns -ENOMEM when build_skb() fails. Both paths jump to the err
label without freeing the page that vhost_net_build_xdp() allocated for
the frame. tap_sendmsg() discards the per-buffer return value and always
returns 0, so vhost_tx_batch() takes the success path and never frees
the page; each rejected frame in a batch leaks one page-frag chunk.
Free the page on both error paths, before the skb is built. This is the
tap counterpart of the same leak in tun_xdp_one().
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🚨 CVE-2026-46321
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tun: free page on short-frame rejection in tun_xdp_one()
tun_xdp_one() returns -EINVAL on a frame shorter than ETH_HLEN without
freeing the page that vhost_net_build_xdp() allocated for it.
tun_sendmsg() discards that -EINVAL and still returns total_len, so
vhost_tx_batch() takes the success path and never frees the page; each
short frame in a batch leaks one page-frag chunk.
A local process that can open /dev/net/tun and /dev/vhost-net can hit
this path: it attaches a tun/tap device as the vhost-net backend and
feeds TX descriptors whose length minus the virtio-net header is below
ETH_HLEN. Each kick leaks the page-frag chunks for that batch, and a
tight submission loop exhausts host memory and triggers an OOM panic.
Free the page before returning -EINVAL, matching the XDP-program error
path in the same function.
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tun: free page on short-frame rejection in tun_xdp_one()
tun_xdp_one() returns -EINVAL on a frame shorter than ETH_HLEN without
freeing the page that vhost_net_build_xdp() allocated for it.
tun_sendmsg() discards that -EINVAL and still returns total_len, so
vhost_tx_batch() takes the success path and never frees the page; each
short frame in a batch leaks one page-frag chunk.
A local process that can open /dev/net/tun and /dev/vhost-net can hit
this path: it attaches a tun/tap device as the vhost-net backend and
feeds TX descriptors whose length minus the virtio-net header is below
ETH_HLEN. Each kick leaks the page-frag chunks for that batch, and a
tight submission loop exhausts host memory and triggers an OOM panic.
Free the page before returning -EINVAL, matching the XDP-program error
path in the same function.
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🚨 CVE-2026-53251
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: Fix not releasing hdev reference on iso_conn_big_sync
hci_get_route() returns a reference-counted hci_dev pointer via
hci_dev_hold(). The function exits normally or with an error without ever
releasing it.
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: ISO: Fix not releasing hdev reference on iso_conn_big_sync
hci_get_route() returns a reference-counted hci_dev pointer via
hci_dev_hold(). The function exits normally or with an error without ever
releasing it.
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🚨 CVE-2026-53252
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: fix memory leak in error path of hci_alloc_dev()
Early failures in Bluetooth HCI UART configuration leak SRCU percpu
memory.
When device initialization fails before hci_register_dev() completes,
the HCI_UNREGISTER flag is never set. As a result, when the device
reference count reaches zero, bt_host_release() evaluates this flag as
false and falls back to a direct kfree(hdev).
Because hci_release_dev() is bypassed, the SRCU struct initialized
early in hci_alloc_dev() is never cleaned up, resulting in a leak of
percpu memory.
Fix the leak by explicitly calling cleanup_srcu_struct() in the
fallback (unregistered) branch of bt_host_release() before freeing
the device.
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: fix memory leak in error path of hci_alloc_dev()
Early failures in Bluetooth HCI UART configuration leak SRCU percpu
memory.
When device initialization fails before hci_register_dev() completes,
the HCI_UNREGISTER flag is never set. As a result, when the device
reference count reaches zero, bt_host_release() evaluates this flag as
false and falls back to a direct kfree(hdev).
Because hci_release_dev() is bypassed, the SRCU struct initialized
early in hci_alloc_dev() is never cleaned up, resulting in a leak of
percpu memory.
Fix the leak by explicitly calling cleanup_srcu_struct() in the
fallback (unregistered) branch of bt_host_release() before freeing
the device.
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🚨 CVE-2026-53253
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: bnep: reject short frames before parsing
A BNEP peer can send a short BNEP SDU. bnep_rx_frame() reads the
packet type byte immediately and, for control packets, reads the control
opcode and setup UUID-size byte before proving that those bytes are
present. bnep_rx_control() also dereferences the control opcode without
rejecting an empty control payload.
Use skb_pull_data() for the fixed fields in bnep_rx_frame() so a NULL
return gates each dereference. Split the control handler so the frame
path can pass an opcode that has already been pulled, and keep the
byte-buffer wrapper for extension control payloads.
For BNEP_SETUP_CONN_REQ, name the UUID-size byte before pulling the
setup payload. struct bnep_setup_conn_req carries destination and source
service UUIDs after that byte, each uuid_size bytes, so the parser now
documents that tuple explicitly instead of leaving the pull length as an
opaque multiplication.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in bnep_rx_frame.isra.0+0x130c/0x1790
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c0f7908 which belongs
to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 1-byte
region [ffff88800c0f7908, ffff88800c0f7909)
Read of size 1
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0xb3/0x140 (?:?)
print_address_description+0x57/0x3a0 (?:?)
bnep_rx_frame+0x130c/0x1790 (net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c:306)
print_report+0xb9/0x2b0 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x1ba/0x3a0 (?:?)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
kasan_addr_to_slab+0x21/0x60 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?)
process_one_work+0xfce/0x17e0 (kernel/workqueue.c:3200)
worker_thread+0x65c/0xe40 (?:?)
__kthread_parkme+0x184/0x230 (?:?)
kthread+0x35e/0x470 (?:?)
_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?)
ret_from_fork+0x586/0x870 (?:?)
__switch_to+0x74f/0xdc0 (?:?)
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 (?:?)
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: bnep: reject short frames before parsing
A BNEP peer can send a short BNEP SDU. bnep_rx_frame() reads the
packet type byte immediately and, for control packets, reads the control
opcode and setup UUID-size byte before proving that those bytes are
present. bnep_rx_control() also dereferences the control opcode without
rejecting an empty control payload.
Use skb_pull_data() for the fixed fields in bnep_rx_frame() so a NULL
return gates each dereference. Split the control handler so the frame
path can pass an opcode that has already been pulled, and keep the
byte-buffer wrapper for extension control payloads.
For BNEP_SETUP_CONN_REQ, name the UUID-size byte before pulling the
setup payload. struct bnep_setup_conn_req carries destination and source
service UUIDs after that byte, each uuid_size bytes, so the parser now
documents that tuple explicitly instead of leaving the pull length as an
opaque multiplication.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in bnep_rx_frame.isra.0+0x130c/0x1790
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800c0f7908 which belongs
to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 1-byte
region [ffff88800c0f7908, ffff88800c0f7909)
Read of size 1
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0xb3/0x140 (?:?)
print_address_description+0x57/0x3a0 (?:?)
bnep_rx_frame+0x130c/0x1790 (net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c:306)
print_report+0xb9/0x2b0 (?:?)
__virt_addr_valid+0x1ba/0x3a0 (?:?)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
kasan_addr_to_slab+0x21/0x60 (?:?)
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?)
process_one_work+0xfce/0x17e0 (kernel/workqueue.c:3200)
worker_thread+0x65c/0xe40 (?:?)
__kthread_parkme+0x184/0x230 (?:?)
kthread+0x35e/0x470 (?:?)
_raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?)
ret_from_fork+0x586/0x870 (?:?)
__switch_to+0x74f/0xdc0 (?:?)
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 (?:?)
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-53254
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: validate skb length in MCC handlers
The RFCOMM MCC handlers cast skb->data to protocol-specific structs
without validating skb->len first. A malicious remote device can send
truncated MCC frames and trigger out-of-bounds reads in these handlers.
Fix this by using skb_pull_data() to validate and access the required
data before dereferencing it.
rfcomm_recv_rpn() requires special handling since ETSI TS 07.10 allows
1-byte RPN requests. Handle this by validating only the DLCI byte first,
and validating the full struct only when len > 1.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: validate skb length in MCC handlers
The RFCOMM MCC handlers cast skb->data to protocol-specific structs
without validating skb->len first. A malicious remote device can send
truncated MCC frames and trigger out-of-bounds reads in these handlers.
Fix this by using skb_pull_data() to validate and access the required
data before dereferencing it.
rfcomm_recv_rpn() requires special handling since ETSI TS 07.10 allows
1-byte RPN requests. Handle this by validating only the DLCI byte first,
and validating the full struct only when len > 1.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-53255
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: validate advertising TLV before type checks
tlv_data_is_valid() reads each advertising data field length from
data[i], then inspects data[i + 1] for managed EIR types before
checking that the current field still fits inside the supplied buffer.
A malformed field whose length byte is the last byte of the buffer can
therefore make the parser read one byte past the advertising data.
KASAN reported the following when a malformed MGMT_OP_ADD_ADVERTISING
request reached that path:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in tlv_data_is_valid()
Read of size 1
Call trace:
tlv_data_is_valid()
add_advertising()
hci_mgmt_cmd()
hci_sock_sendmsg()
Move the existing element-length check before any type-octet inspection
so each non-empty element is proven to contain its type byte before the
parser looks at data[i + 1].
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: validate advertising TLV before type checks
tlv_data_is_valid() reads each advertising data field length from
data[i], then inspects data[i + 1] for managed EIR types before
checking that the current field still fits inside the supplied buffer.
A malformed field whose length byte is the last byte of the buffer can
therefore make the parser read one byte past the advertising data.
KASAN reported the following when a malformed MGMT_OP_ADD_ADVERTISING
request reached that path:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in tlv_data_is_valid()
Read of size 1
Call trace:
tlv_data_is_valid()
add_advertising()
hci_mgmt_cmd()
hci_sock_sendmsg()
Move the existing element-length check before any type-octet inspection
so each non-empty element is proven to contain its type byte before the
parser looks at data[i + 1].
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-53256
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: hold listener socket in rfcomm_connect_ind()
rfcomm_get_sock_by_channel() scans rfcomm_sk_list under the list lock,
but returns the selected listener after dropping that lock without
taking a reference. rfcomm_connect_ind() then locks the listener,
queues a child socket on it, and may notify it after unlocking it.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the
order within that path:
rfcomm_connect_ind(): listener close:
1. Find parent in 1. close() enters
rfcomm_get_sock_by_channel() rfcomm_sock_release().
2. Drop rfcomm_sk_list.lock 2. rfcomm_sock_shutdown()
without pinning parent. closes the listener.
3. Call lock_sock(parent) and 3. rfcomm_sock_kill()
bt_accept_enqueue(parent, unlinks and puts parent.
sk, true).
4. Read parent flags and may 4. parent can be freed.
call sk_state_change().
If close wins the race, parent can be freed before
rfcomm_connect_ind() reaches lock_sock(), bt_accept_enqueue(), or the
deferred-setup callback.
Take a reference on the listener before leaving rfcomm_sk_list.lock.
After lock_sock() succeeds, recheck that it is still in BT_LISTEN
before queueing a child, cache the deferred-setup bit while the parent
is locked, and drop the reference after the last parent use.
KASAN reported a slab-use-after-free in lock_sock_nested() from
rfcomm_connect_ind(), with the freeing stack going through
rfcomm_sock_kill() and rfcomm_sock_release().
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: hold listener socket in rfcomm_connect_ind()
rfcomm_get_sock_by_channel() scans rfcomm_sk_list under the list lock,
but returns the selected listener after dropping that lock without
taking a reference. rfcomm_connect_ind() then locks the listener,
queues a child socket on it, and may notify it after unlocking it.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the
order within that path:
rfcomm_connect_ind(): listener close:
1. Find parent in 1. close() enters
rfcomm_get_sock_by_channel() rfcomm_sock_release().
2. Drop rfcomm_sk_list.lock 2. rfcomm_sock_shutdown()
without pinning parent. closes the listener.
3. Call lock_sock(parent) and 3. rfcomm_sock_kill()
bt_accept_enqueue(parent, unlinks and puts parent.
sk, true).
4. Read parent flags and may 4. parent can be freed.
call sk_state_change().
If close wins the race, parent can be freed before
rfcomm_connect_ind() reaches lock_sock(), bt_accept_enqueue(), or the
deferred-setup callback.
Take a reference on the listener before leaving rfcomm_sk_list.lock.
After lock_sock() succeeds, recheck that it is still in BT_LISTEN
before queueing a child, cache the deferred-setup bit while the parent
is locked, and drop the reference after the last parent use.
KASAN reported a slab-use-after-free in lock_sock_nested() from
rfcomm_connect_ind(), with the freeing stack going through
rfcomm_sock_kill() and rfcomm_sock_release().
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-53257
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: enforce HE/EHT cap/oper consistency
Xiang Mei reports that mac80211 could crash if eht_cap is set
but eht_oper isn't. Rather than fixing that for the individual
user(s), enforce that both HE/EHT have consistent elements.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: enforce HE/EHT cap/oper consistency
Xiang Mei reports that mac80211 could crash if eht_cap is set
but eht_oper isn't. Rather than fixing that for the individual
user(s), enforce that both HE/EHT have consistent elements.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-53258
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: fix leak if split 6 GHz scanning fails
rdev->int_scan_req is leaked if cfg80211_scan() fails. Note that it's
supposed to be released at ___cfg80211_scan_done() but this doesn't happen
as rdev->scan_req is NULL at that point, too, leading to the early return
from the freeing function.
unreferenced object 0xffff8881161d0800 (size 512):
comm "wpa_supplicant", pid 379, jiffies 4294749765
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 81 13 16 81 88 ff ff ................
backtrace (crc c867fdb6):
kmemleak_alloc+0x89/0x90
__kmalloc_noprof+0x2fd/0x410
cfg80211_scan+0x133/0x730
nl80211_trigger_scan+0xc69/0x1cc0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x204/0x2f0
genl_rcv_msg+0x431/0x6b0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x143/0x3f0
genl_rcv+0x27/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x4f6/0x820
netlink_sendmsg+0x797/0xce0
__sock_sendmsg+0xc4/0x160
____sys_sendmsg+0x5e4/0x890
___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x180
__sys_sendmsg+0x136/0x1e0
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x76/0xc0
x64_sys_call+0x13f0/0x17d0
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: fix leak if split 6 GHz scanning fails
rdev->int_scan_req is leaked if cfg80211_scan() fails. Note that it's
supposed to be released at ___cfg80211_scan_done() but this doesn't happen
as rdev->scan_req is NULL at that point, too, leading to the early return
from the freeing function.
unreferenced object 0xffff8881161d0800 (size 512):
comm "wpa_supplicant", pid 379, jiffies 4294749765
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f0 81 13 16 81 88 ff ff ................
backtrace (crc c867fdb6):
kmemleak_alloc+0x89/0x90
__kmalloc_noprof+0x2fd/0x410
cfg80211_scan+0x133/0x730
nl80211_trigger_scan+0xc69/0x1cc0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x204/0x2f0
genl_rcv_msg+0x431/0x6b0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x143/0x3f0
genl_rcv+0x27/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x4f6/0x820
netlink_sendmsg+0x797/0xce0
__sock_sendmsg+0xc4/0x160
____sys_sendmsg+0x5e4/0x890
___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x180
__sys_sendmsg+0x136/0x1e0
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x76/0xc0
x64_sys_call+0x13f0/0x17d0
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-53259
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: anycast: insert aca into global hash under idev->lock
syzbot reported a splat [1]: a slab-use-after-free in
ipv6_chk_acast_addr(), which walks the global inet6_acaddr_lst[] hash
under RCU and dereferences a struct ifacaddr6 that has already been
freed while still linked in the hash, so a later reader walks into a
dangling node.
In __ipv6_dev_ac_inc() the aca is allocated with refcount 1, then
aca_get() bumps it to 2 to keep it alive across the unlocked region.
It is published to idev->ac_list under idev->lock, but
ipv6_add_acaddr_hash() runs after write_unlock_bh(). A concurrent
teardown (ipv6_ac_destroy_dev() from addrconf_ifdown(), under RTNL)
can slip into that window:
CPU0 __ipv6_dev_ac_inc CPU1 ipv6_ac_destroy_dev (RTNL)
------------------------------ ------------------------------------
aca_alloc() refcnt 1
aca_get() refcnt 2
write_lock_bh(idev->lock)
add aca to ac_list
write_unlock_bh(idev->lock)
write_lock_bh(idev->lock)
pull aca off ac_list
write_unlock_bh(idev->lock)
ipv6_del_acaddr_hash(aca)
hlist_del_init_rcu() is a no-op,
aca is not in the hash yet
aca_put() refcnt 2->1
ipv6_add_acaddr_hash(aca)
aca now inserted into the hash
aca_put() refcnt 1->0
call_rcu(aca_free_rcu) -> kfree(aca)
The hash removal becomes a no-op because the insertion has not
happened yet, so once CPU0 inserts and drops the last reference, the
aca is freed while still linked in inet6_acaddr_lst[], and readers
dereference freed memory after the slab slot is reused.
This window opened once RTNL stopped serializing the join path against
device teardown. Move ipv6_add_acaddr_hash() inside the idev->lock
section so the ac_list and hash insertions are atomic with respect to
teardown: a racing remover now either misses the aca entirely or finds
it in both lists.
acaddr_hash_lock is now nested under idev->lock, which is acquired in
softirq context, so switch all acaddr_hash_lock sites to spin_lock_bh()
to avoid the irq lock inversion reported in [2].
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a01df04303c131efbf3a
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6a194ef7.ba3b1513.1890b4.0000.GAE@google.com/
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: anycast: insert aca into global hash under idev->lock
syzbot reported a splat [1]: a slab-use-after-free in
ipv6_chk_acast_addr(), which walks the global inet6_acaddr_lst[] hash
under RCU and dereferences a struct ifacaddr6 that has already been
freed while still linked in the hash, so a later reader walks into a
dangling node.
In __ipv6_dev_ac_inc() the aca is allocated with refcount 1, then
aca_get() bumps it to 2 to keep it alive across the unlocked region.
It is published to idev->ac_list under idev->lock, but
ipv6_add_acaddr_hash() runs after write_unlock_bh(). A concurrent
teardown (ipv6_ac_destroy_dev() from addrconf_ifdown(), under RTNL)
can slip into that window:
CPU0 __ipv6_dev_ac_inc CPU1 ipv6_ac_destroy_dev (RTNL)
------------------------------ ------------------------------------
aca_alloc() refcnt 1
aca_get() refcnt 2
write_lock_bh(idev->lock)
add aca to ac_list
write_unlock_bh(idev->lock)
write_lock_bh(idev->lock)
pull aca off ac_list
write_unlock_bh(idev->lock)
ipv6_del_acaddr_hash(aca)
hlist_del_init_rcu() is a no-op,
aca is not in the hash yet
aca_put() refcnt 2->1
ipv6_add_acaddr_hash(aca)
aca now inserted into the hash
aca_put() refcnt 1->0
call_rcu(aca_free_rcu) -> kfree(aca)
The hash removal becomes a no-op because the insertion has not
happened yet, so once CPU0 inserts and drops the last reference, the
aca is freed while still linked in inet6_acaddr_lst[], and readers
dereference freed memory after the slab slot is reused.
This window opened once RTNL stopped serializing the join path against
device teardown. Move ipv6_add_acaddr_hash() inside the idev->lock
section so the ac_list and hash insertions are atomic with respect to
teardown: a racing remover now either misses the aca entirely or finds
it in both lists.
acaddr_hash_lock is now nested under idev->lock, which is acquired in
softirq context, so switch all acaddr_hash_lock sites to spin_lock_bh()
to avoid the irq lock inversion reported in [2].
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a01df04303c131efbf3a
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6a194ef7.ba3b1513.1890b4.0000.GAE@google.com/
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🚨 CVE-2026-56401
Wazuh wazuh-modulesd before 5.0.0-beta3 contains a null pointer dereference vulnerability in inventory_sync FlatBuffer DataValue handling. An enrolled agent can send a verifier-valid DataValue message omitting the optional id field, causing wazuh-modulesd to crash when dereferencing data->id()->string_view() without null validation, resulting in denial of service.
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Wazuh wazuh-modulesd before 5.0.0-beta3 contains a null pointer dereference vulnerability in inventory_sync FlatBuffer DataValue handling. An enrolled agent can send a verifier-valid DataValue message omitting the optional id field, causing wazuh-modulesd to crash when dereferencing data->id()->string_view() without null validation, resulting in denial of service.
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GitHub
Merge pull request #36244 from wazuh/fix/wazuh-deps · wazuh/wazuh@3adf4f8
Only download external deps when required
🚨 CVE-2022-35493
A Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in json search parse and the json response in wrteam.in, eShop - Multipurpose Ecommerce Store Website version 3.0.4 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the get_products?search parameter.
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A Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in json search parse and the json response in wrteam.in, eShop - Multipurpose Ecommerce Store Website version 3.0.4 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the get_products?search parameter.
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GitHub
Exploit-eShop-Multipurpose-Ecommerce-Store-Website-3.0.4-Cross-Site-Scripting-XSS/README.md at main · Keyvanhardani/Exploit-eShop…
Contribute to Keyvanhardani/Exploit-eShop-Multipurpose-Ecommerce-Store-Website-3.0.4-Cross-Site-Scripting-XSS development by creating an account on GitHub.
🚨 CVE-2025-67288
An arbitrary file upload vulnerability in Umbraco CMS v16.3.3 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code by uploading a crafted PDF file. NOTE: this is disputed by the Supplier because the responsibility for file validation (as shown in the documentation) belongs to the system administrator who is implementing Umbraco CMS in their environment, not to Umbraco CMS itself. The Supplier also states that PDF JavaScript runs in a completely isolated sandbox, not the browser's DOM context, which means that privilege boundaries would not be crossed, a related issue to CVE-2023-49279.
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An arbitrary file upload vulnerability in Umbraco CMS v16.3.3 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code by uploading a crafted PDF file. NOTE: this is disputed by the Supplier because the responsibility for file validation (as shown in the documentation) belongs to the system administrator who is implementing Umbraco CMS in their environment, not to Umbraco CMS itself. The Supplier also states that PDF JavaScript runs in a completely isolated sandbox, not the browser's DOM context, which means that privilege boundaries would not be crossed, a related issue to CVE-2023-49279.
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🚨 CVE-2026-50256
A stack-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland. A mismatch between the X server and the libXfont2 library's maximum font name length can cause a stack buffer overflow during font alias resolution. The server allocates a 256 byte stack buffer but libXfont2's alias target name length is 1024 bytes. A font alias name between 257 and 1023 bytes causes the X server to copy that name into the undersized stack buffer without further checks. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root.
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A stack-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the X.Org X server and Xwayland. A mismatch between the X server and the libXfont2 library's maximum font name length can cause a stack buffer overflow during font alias resolution. The server allocates a 256 byte stack buffer but libXfont2's alias target name length is 1024 bytes. A font alias name between 257 and 1023 bytes causes the X server to copy that name into the undersized stack buffer without further checks. This may be used to crash the server, or for privilege escalation if the X server runs as root.
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