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🚨 CVE-2026-53137
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/display: Clamp HDMI HDCP2 rx_id_list read to buffer size

[Why & How]
During HDCP 2.x repeater authentication over HDMI, the driver reads the
sink's RxStatus register and extracts a 10-bit message size field (max
value 1023). This value is used as the read length for the ReceiverID
list without being clamped to the size of the destination buffer
rx_id_list[177]. A malicious HDMI repeater could advertise a message
size larger than the buffer, causing an out-of-bounds write during the
I2C read.

Clamp the read length in mod_hdcp_read_rx_id_list() to the size of the
rx_id_list buffer, matching the approach already used in the DP branch.

(cherry picked from commit 229212219e4247d9486f8ba41ef087358490be09)

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🚨 CVE-2026-53138
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/display: Bound VBIOS record-chain walk loops

[Why & How]
All record-chain walk loops in bios_parser.c and bios_parser2.c use
for(;;) and only terminate on a 0xFF record_type sentinel or zero
record_size. A malformed VBIOS image missing the terminator record
causes unbounded iteration at probe time, potentially hundreds of
thousands of iterations with record_size=1. In the final iterations
near the BIOS image boundary, struct casts beyond the 2-byte header
validated by GET_IMAGE can also read out of bounds.

Cap all 14 record-chain walk loops to BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD (256)
iterations. The atombios.h defines up to 22 distinct record types
and atomfirmware.h has 13. Assuming an average of less than 10
records per type (which is reasonable since most are connector-
based) 256 is a generous upper bound.

(cherry picked from commit 95700a3d660287ed657d6892f7be9ffc0e294a93)

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🚨 CVE-2026-53141
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/v3d: Fix global performance monitor reference counting

In the SET_GLOBAL ioctl, v3d_perfmon_find() bumps the reference count on
the perfmon it returns, but v3d_perfmon_set_global_ioctl() and
v3d_perfmon_delete() fail to release that reference on several paths:

1. v3d_perfmon_set_global_ioctl() leaks the reference on its error
paths.

2. CLEAR_GLOBAL leaks both the find reference and the reference
previously stashed in v3d->global_perfmon by the SET_GLOBAL ioctl
that configured it.

3. Destroying a perfmon that is the current global perfmon leaks the
reference stashed by the SET_GLOBAL ioctl.

Release each of these references explicitly.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53142
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/xe/display: fix oops in suspend/shutdown without display

The xe driver keeps track of whether to probe display, and whether
display hardware is there, using xe->info.probe_display. It gets set to
false if there's no display after intel_display_device_probe(). However,
the display may also be disabled via fuses, detected at a later time in
intel_display_device_info_runtime_init().

In this case, the xe driver does for_each_intel_crtc() on uninitialized
mode config in xe_display_flush_cleanup_work(), leading to a NULL
pointer dereference, and generally calls display code with display info
cleared.

Check for intel_display_device_present() after
intel_display_device_info_runtime_init(), and reset
xe->info.probe_display as necessary. Also do unset_display_features()
for completeness, although display runtime init has already done
that. This will need to be unified across all cases later.

Move intel_display_device_info_runtime_init() call slightly earlier,
similar to i915, to avoid a bunch of unnecessary setup for no display
cases.

Note #1: The xe driver has no business doing low level display plumbing
like for_each_intel_crtc() to begin with. It all needs to happen in
display code.

Note #2: The actual bug is present already in commit 44e694958b95
("drm/xe/display: Implement display support"), but the oops was likely
introduced later at commit ddf6492e0e50 ("drm/xe/display: Make display
suspend/resume work on discrete").

(cherry picked from commit 7c3eb9f47533220888a67266448185fd0775d4da)

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🚨 CVE-2026-53144
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdkfd: fix NULL dereference in get_queue_ids()

When usr_queue_id_array is NULL and num_queues is non-zero,
get_queue_ids() returns NULL. The callers check only IS_ERR() on the
return value; since IS_ERR(NULL) == false the check passes, and
suspend_queues() calls q_array_invalidate() which immediately
dereferences NULL while iterating num_queues times.

Userspace can trigger this via kfd_ioctl_set_debug_trap() by supplying
num_queues > 0 with a zero queue_array_ptr, causing a kernel panic.

A NULL usr_queue_id_array with num_queues == 0 is a legitimate no-op
(q_array_invalidate never executes, and resume_queues already guards
all queue_ids dereferences behind a NULL check). Return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL)
only when num_queues is non-zero and the pointer is absent; both callers
already propagate IS_ERR() returns correctly to userspace.

(cherry picked from commit f165a82cdf503884bb1797771c61b2fcc72113d4)

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🚨 CVE-2026-54408
A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit an Improper Access Control vulnerability found in UniFi Protect Application to bypass authentication for data streaming.

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🚨 CVE-2026-54409
A malicious actor with access to the network and under certain conditions could exploit an Improper Initialization vulnerability found in UniFi Protect Application to bypass authentication in UniFi Protect Cameras.

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🚨 CVE-2026-55115
A malicious actor with access to the network and low privileges could exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in UniFi Protect Application to escalate privileges on the host device.

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🚨 CVE-2026-9272
In Progress Flowmon ADS versions prior to 12.5.6 and 13.0.5, a vulnerability exists whereby an adversary who is authenticated as a low-privileged user in the Anomaly Detection System (ADS) may send specially crafted requests that could result in unauthorized access to application data and its modification.

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🚨 CVE-2026-21368
Memory Corruption when parsing jpeg commands due to unaccounted extra writes to the buffer during validation checks.

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🚨 CVE-2026-21369
Memory Corruption when handling flash commands due to outdated LED count values being used after userspace modification.

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🚨 CVE-2026-21370
Memory Corruption when validating input batch size and buffer plane count exceeds maximum allowed values.

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🚨 CVE-2026-21379
Memory Corruption when allocating memory with sizes that exceed the maximum allowed value.

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🚨 CVE-2026-21383
Cryptographic Issue when using a static initialization vector for AES-GCM key wrapping, which requires a unique value for each call to ensure security.

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🚨 CVE-2026-21384
Memory Corruption when updating prepared commands with invalid port indices based on user space input exceeds supported read client limits.

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🚨 CVE-2026-25268
Memory Corruption when processing invalid HT40 channel layouts during dynamic channel switching operations.

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🚨 CVE-2026-25271
Memory Corruption when processing asynchronous input parameters due to improper handling of modified values between check and use.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53133
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RDMA/umem: Fix truncation for block sizes >= 4G

When the iommu is used the linearization of the mapping can give a single
block that is very large split across multiple SG entries.

When __rdma_block_iter_next() reassembles the split SG entries it is
overflowing the 32 bit stack values and computed the wrong DMA addresses
for blocks after the truncation.

Use the right types to hold DMA addresses.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53134
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nft_fib: fix stale stack leak via the OIFNAME register

For NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIFNAME the destination register is declared with
len = IFNAMSIZ (four 32-bit registers), but on the lookup-fail,
RTN_LOCAL and oif-mismatch paths nft_fib{4,6}_eval() only writes one
register via "*dest = 0". The remaining three registers are left as
whatever was on the stack in nft_do_chain()'s struct nft_regs, and a
downstream expression that loads the register span can leak that
uninitialised kernel stack to userspace.

The NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT existence check has the same shape: it is only
meaningful for NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF, yet it was accepted for any result type
while the eval stores a single byte via nft_reg_store8(), leaving the rest
of the declared span stale.

Fix both:

- replace the bare "*dest = 0" in the eval with nft_fib_store_result(),
which strscpy_pad()s the whole IFNAMSIZ for OIFNAME (and is already
used on the other early-return path), and

- restrict NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT to NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF and declare its
destination as a single u8, so the marked span matches the one byte
the eval writes.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53135
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/display: Fix NULL deref and buffer over-read in SDP debugfs

[Why & How]
dp_sdp_message_debugfs_write() dereferences connector->base.state->crtc
without checking for NULL. A connector can be connected but not bound to
any CRTC (e.g. after hot-plug before the next atomic commit), causing a
kernel crash when writing to the sdp_message debugfs node.

The function also ignores the user-provided size argument and always
passes 36 bytes to copy_from_user(), reading past the user buffer when
size < 36.

Fix both issues by:
- Returning -ENODEV when connector->base.state or state->crtc is NULL
- Clamping write_size to min(size, sizeof(data))

(cherry picked from commit 6ab4c36a522842ff70474a1c0af2e40e50fc8300)

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🚨 CVE-2026-53136
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/display: Clamp VBIOS HDMI retimer register count to array size

[Why & How]
The VBIOS integrated info tables (v1_11 and v2_1) contain HdmiRegNum and
Hdmi6GRegNum fields that are used as loop bounds when copying retimer I2C
register settings into fixed-size arrays (dp*_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[9]
and dp*_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[3]). These u8 fields are not validated
before use, so a malformed VBIOS can specify values up to 255, causing an
out-of-bounds heap write during driver probe.

Clamp each register count to the destination array size using min_t()
before the copy loops, in both get_integrated_info_v11() and
get_integrated_info_v2_1().

(cherry picked from commit 5a7f0ef90195940c54b0f5bb85b87da55f038c69)

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