🚨 CVE-2026-56811
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in phoenixframework phoenix (Phoenix.Socket module) allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service against any endpoint that mounts a Phoenix socket with a reachable channel transport (WebSocket or LongPoll).
This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/phoenix/socket.ex and program routine 'Elixir.Phoenix.Socket':handle_in/4.
Phoenix transports do not limit the number of channels that a single transport process may join. Every phx_join message a client sends over one connection starts a persistent channel process, and the socket process accepts an unbounded number of them. A single unauthenticated client can therefore open one WebSocket or LongPoll connection and stream a large number of phx_join messages, spawning hundreds of thousands of channel processes over that one connection and eventually reaching the BEAM maximum process limit. Once the process table is exhausted the virtual machine can no longer start new processes, denying service to legitimate traffic across the whole node. Because the amplification happens inside a single connection, network-layer connection caps and rate limiting do not mitigate it.
The fix adds a :max_channels_per_transport option (default 100) that bounds the number of channels a single transport process can join, forcing abusive clients to open many connections instead, where external load balancers and reverse proxies can throttle them.
This issue affects phoenix: from 0.11.0 before 1.5.15, 1.6.17, 1.7.24, and 1.8.9.
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Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in phoenixframework phoenix (Phoenix.Socket module) allows an unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service against any endpoint that mounts a Phoenix socket with a reachable channel transport (WebSocket or LongPoll).
This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/phoenix/socket.ex and program routine 'Elixir.Phoenix.Socket':handle_in/4.
Phoenix transports do not limit the number of channels that a single transport process may join. Every phx_join message a client sends over one connection starts a persistent channel process, and the socket process accepts an unbounded number of them. A single unauthenticated client can therefore open one WebSocket or LongPoll connection and stream a large number of phx_join messages, spawning hundreds of thousands of channel processes over that one connection and eventually reaching the BEAM maximum process limit. Once the process table is exhausted the virtual machine can no longer start new processes, denying service to legitimate traffic across the whole node. Because the amplification happens inside a single connection, network-layer connection caps and rate limiting do not mitigate it.
The fix adds a :max_channels_per_transport option (default 100) that bounds the number of channels a single transport process can join, forcing abusive clients to open many connections instead, where external load balancers and reverse proxies can throttle them.
This issue affects phoenix: from 0.11.0 before 1.5.15, 1.6.17, 1.7.24, and 1.8.9.
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Erlang Ecosystem Foundation CNA
Phoenix transports do not limit channel joins per connection, enabling process-exhaustion denial of service
This project handles the CVE Numbering Authority (CNA) for the Erlang Ecosystem Foundation (EEF).
🚨 CVE-2026-56812
Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability in phoenixframework phoenix (Presence JavaScript client) allows an attacker with ordinary channel access to cause a persistent client-side denial of service against every viewer of a presence channel topic.
This vulnerability is associated with program files assets/js/phoenix/presence.js and program routines Presence.syncState and Presence.syncDiff.
The Phoenix JavaScript presence client checks whether a presence already exists with a bare truthiness test (state[key]) instead of an own-property check. Presence keys are attacker-controlled, because applications track presences under a username or id supplied by the client. A user who joins a channel choosing a key that is an Object.prototype member name (__proto__, constructor, toString, hasOwnProperty, and similar) makes that lookup return JavaScript's built-in Object.prototype instead of undefined. Because the prototype is truthy, the code treats it as an existing presence and reads .metas.map(...) off it, which throws an uncaught TypeError.
The exception propagates out of the presence message handler, so the local state is never updated and onSync() never fires. Because the malicious key is tracked on the server, it is re-pushed on every presence update and keeps re-throwing, so presence sync stays broken for every viewer of that channel topic until the attacker leaves. Both syncState and syncDiff use the same unsafe existence-check pattern. The impact is limited to the affected topic and is a read-time confusion of the prototype object, not a mutation of Object.prototype (it is not prototype pollution).
This issue affects phoenix: from 1.2.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0 before 1.8.9.
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Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability in phoenixframework phoenix (Presence JavaScript client) allows an attacker with ordinary channel access to cause a persistent client-side denial of service against every viewer of a presence channel topic.
This vulnerability is associated with program files assets/js/phoenix/presence.js and program routines Presence.syncState and Presence.syncDiff.
The Phoenix JavaScript presence client checks whether a presence already exists with a bare truthiness test (state[key]) instead of an own-property check. Presence keys are attacker-controlled, because applications track presences under a username or id supplied by the client. A user who joins a channel choosing a key that is an Object.prototype member name (__proto__, constructor, toString, hasOwnProperty, and similar) makes that lookup return JavaScript's built-in Object.prototype instead of undefined. Because the prototype is truthy, the code treats it as an existing presence and reads .metas.map(...) off it, which throws an uncaught TypeError.
The exception propagates out of the presence message handler, so the local state is never updated and onSync() never fires. Because the malicious key is tracked on the server, it is re-pushed on every presence update and keeps re-throwing, so presence sync stays broken for every viewer of that channel topic until the attacker leaves. Both syncState and syncDiff use the same unsafe existence-check pattern. The impact is limited to the affected topic and is a read-time confusion of the prototype object, not a mutation of Object.prototype (it is not prototype pollution).
This issue affects phoenix: from 1.2.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0 before 1.8.9.
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Erlang Ecosystem Foundation CNA
Phoenix JavaScript presence client crashes on presence keys colliding with Object.prototype members in Presence.syncState/syncDiff
This project handles the CVE Numbering Authority (CNA) for the Erlang Ecosystem Foundation (EEF).
🚨 CVE-2026-46331
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fix pedit partial COW leading to page cache corruption
tcf_pedit_act() computes the COW range for skb_ensure_writable()
once before the key loop using tcfp_off_max_hint, but the hint does
not account for the runtime header offset added by typed keys. This
can leave part of the write region un-COW'd.
Fix by moving skb_ensure_writable() inside the per-key loop where
the actual write offset is known, and add overflow checking on the
offset arithmetic. For negative offsets (e.g. Ethernet header edits
at ingress), use skb_cow() to COW the headroom instead. Guard
offset_valid() against INT_MIN, where negation is undefined.
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fix pedit partial COW leading to page cache corruption
tcf_pedit_act() computes the COW range for skb_ensure_writable()
once before the key loop using tcfp_off_max_hint, but the hint does
not account for the runtime header offset added by typed keys. This
can leave part of the write region un-COW'd.
Fix by moving skb_ensure_writable() inside the per-key loop where
the actual write offset is known, and add overflow checking on the
offset arithmetic. For negative offsets (e.g. Ethernet header edits
at ingress), use skb_cow() to COW the headroom instead. Guard
offset_valid() against INT_MIN, where negation is undefined.
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🚨 CVE-2026-53137
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Clamp HDMI HDCP2 rx_id_list read to buffer size
[Why & How]
During HDCP 2.x repeater authentication over HDMI, the driver reads the
sink's RxStatus register and extracts a 10-bit message size field (max
value 1023). This value is used as the read length for the ReceiverID
list without being clamped to the size of the destination buffer
rx_id_list[177]. A malicious HDMI repeater could advertise a message
size larger than the buffer, causing an out-of-bounds write during the
I2C read.
Clamp the read length in mod_hdcp_read_rx_id_list() to the size of the
rx_id_list buffer, matching the approach already used in the DP branch.
(cherry picked from commit 229212219e4247d9486f8ba41ef087358490be09)
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Clamp HDMI HDCP2 rx_id_list read to buffer size
[Why & How]
During HDCP 2.x repeater authentication over HDMI, the driver reads the
sink's RxStatus register and extracts a 10-bit message size field (max
value 1023). This value is used as the read length for the ReceiverID
list without being clamped to the size of the destination buffer
rx_id_list[177]. A malicious HDMI repeater could advertise a message
size larger than the buffer, causing an out-of-bounds write during the
I2C read.
Clamp the read length in mod_hdcp_read_rx_id_list() to the size of the
rx_id_list buffer, matching the approach already used in the DP branch.
(cherry picked from commit 229212219e4247d9486f8ba41ef087358490be09)
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🚨 CVE-2026-53138
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Bound VBIOS record-chain walk loops
[Why & How]
All record-chain walk loops in bios_parser.c and bios_parser2.c use
for(;;) and only terminate on a 0xFF record_type sentinel or zero
record_size. A malformed VBIOS image missing the terminator record
causes unbounded iteration at probe time, potentially hundreds of
thousands of iterations with record_size=1. In the final iterations
near the BIOS image boundary, struct casts beyond the 2-byte header
validated by GET_IMAGE can also read out of bounds.
Cap all 14 record-chain walk loops to BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD (256)
iterations. The atombios.h defines up to 22 distinct record types
and atomfirmware.h has 13. Assuming an average of less than 10
records per type (which is reasonable since most are connector-
based) 256 is a generous upper bound.
(cherry picked from commit 95700a3d660287ed657d6892f7be9ffc0e294a93)
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Bound VBIOS record-chain walk loops
[Why & How]
All record-chain walk loops in bios_parser.c and bios_parser2.c use
for(;;) and only terminate on a 0xFF record_type sentinel or zero
record_size. A malformed VBIOS image missing the terminator record
causes unbounded iteration at probe time, potentially hundreds of
thousands of iterations with record_size=1. In the final iterations
near the BIOS image boundary, struct casts beyond the 2-byte header
validated by GET_IMAGE can also read out of bounds.
Cap all 14 record-chain walk loops to BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD (256)
iterations. The atombios.h defines up to 22 distinct record types
and atomfirmware.h has 13. Assuming an average of less than 10
records per type (which is reasonable since most are connector-
based) 256 is a generous upper bound.
(cherry picked from commit 95700a3d660287ed657d6892f7be9ffc0e294a93)
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🚨 CVE-2026-53141
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/v3d: Fix global performance monitor reference counting
In the SET_GLOBAL ioctl, v3d_perfmon_find() bumps the reference count on
the perfmon it returns, but v3d_perfmon_set_global_ioctl() and
v3d_perfmon_delete() fail to release that reference on several paths:
1. v3d_perfmon_set_global_ioctl() leaks the reference on its error
paths.
2. CLEAR_GLOBAL leaks both the find reference and the reference
previously stashed in v3d->global_perfmon by the SET_GLOBAL ioctl
that configured it.
3. Destroying a perfmon that is the current global perfmon leaks the
reference stashed by the SET_GLOBAL ioctl.
Release each of these references explicitly.
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/v3d: Fix global performance monitor reference counting
In the SET_GLOBAL ioctl, v3d_perfmon_find() bumps the reference count on
the perfmon it returns, but v3d_perfmon_set_global_ioctl() and
v3d_perfmon_delete() fail to release that reference on several paths:
1. v3d_perfmon_set_global_ioctl() leaks the reference on its error
paths.
2. CLEAR_GLOBAL leaks both the find reference and the reference
previously stashed in v3d->global_perfmon by the SET_GLOBAL ioctl
that configured it.
3. Destroying a perfmon that is the current global perfmon leaks the
reference stashed by the SET_GLOBAL ioctl.
Release each of these references explicitly.
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🚨 CVE-2026-53142
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/display: fix oops in suspend/shutdown without display
The xe driver keeps track of whether to probe display, and whether
display hardware is there, using xe->info.probe_display. It gets set to
false if there's no display after intel_display_device_probe(). However,
the display may also be disabled via fuses, detected at a later time in
intel_display_device_info_runtime_init().
In this case, the xe driver does for_each_intel_crtc() on uninitialized
mode config in xe_display_flush_cleanup_work(), leading to a NULL
pointer dereference, and generally calls display code with display info
cleared.
Check for intel_display_device_present() after
intel_display_device_info_runtime_init(), and reset
xe->info.probe_display as necessary. Also do unset_display_features()
for completeness, although display runtime init has already done
that. This will need to be unified across all cases later.
Move intel_display_device_info_runtime_init() call slightly earlier,
similar to i915, to avoid a bunch of unnecessary setup for no display
cases.
Note #1: The xe driver has no business doing low level display plumbing
like for_each_intel_crtc() to begin with. It all needs to happen in
display code.
Note #2: The actual bug is present already in commit 44e694958b95
("drm/xe/display: Implement display support"), but the oops was likely
introduced later at commit ddf6492e0e50 ("drm/xe/display: Make display
suspend/resume work on discrete").
(cherry picked from commit 7c3eb9f47533220888a67266448185fd0775d4da)
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/display: fix oops in suspend/shutdown without display
The xe driver keeps track of whether to probe display, and whether
display hardware is there, using xe->info.probe_display. It gets set to
false if there's no display after intel_display_device_probe(). However,
the display may also be disabled via fuses, detected at a later time in
intel_display_device_info_runtime_init().
In this case, the xe driver does for_each_intel_crtc() on uninitialized
mode config in xe_display_flush_cleanup_work(), leading to a NULL
pointer dereference, and generally calls display code with display info
cleared.
Check for intel_display_device_present() after
intel_display_device_info_runtime_init(), and reset
xe->info.probe_display as necessary. Also do unset_display_features()
for completeness, although display runtime init has already done
that. This will need to be unified across all cases later.
Move intel_display_device_info_runtime_init() call slightly earlier,
similar to i915, to avoid a bunch of unnecessary setup for no display
cases.
Note #1: The xe driver has no business doing low level display plumbing
like for_each_intel_crtc() to begin with. It all needs to happen in
display code.
Note #2: The actual bug is present already in commit 44e694958b95
("drm/xe/display: Implement display support"), but the oops was likely
introduced later at commit ddf6492e0e50 ("drm/xe/display: Make display
suspend/resume work on discrete").
(cherry picked from commit 7c3eb9f47533220888a67266448185fd0775d4da)
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🚨 CVE-2026-53144
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: fix NULL dereference in get_queue_ids()
When usr_queue_id_array is NULL and num_queues is non-zero,
get_queue_ids() returns NULL. The callers check only IS_ERR() on the
return value; since IS_ERR(NULL) == false the check passes, and
suspend_queues() calls q_array_invalidate() which immediately
dereferences NULL while iterating num_queues times.
Userspace can trigger this via kfd_ioctl_set_debug_trap() by supplying
num_queues > 0 with a zero queue_array_ptr, causing a kernel panic.
A NULL usr_queue_id_array with num_queues == 0 is a legitimate no-op
(q_array_invalidate never executes, and resume_queues already guards
all queue_ids dereferences behind a NULL check). Return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL)
only when num_queues is non-zero and the pointer is absent; both callers
already propagate IS_ERR() returns correctly to userspace.
(cherry picked from commit f165a82cdf503884bb1797771c61b2fcc72113d4)
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: fix NULL dereference in get_queue_ids()
When usr_queue_id_array is NULL and num_queues is non-zero,
get_queue_ids() returns NULL. The callers check only IS_ERR() on the
return value; since IS_ERR(NULL) == false the check passes, and
suspend_queues() calls q_array_invalidate() which immediately
dereferences NULL while iterating num_queues times.
Userspace can trigger this via kfd_ioctl_set_debug_trap() by supplying
num_queues > 0 with a zero queue_array_ptr, causing a kernel panic.
A NULL usr_queue_id_array with num_queues == 0 is a legitimate no-op
(q_array_invalidate never executes, and resume_queues already guards
all queue_ids dereferences behind a NULL check). Return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL)
only when num_queues is non-zero and the pointer is absent; both callers
already propagate IS_ERR() returns correctly to userspace.
(cherry picked from commit f165a82cdf503884bb1797771c61b2fcc72113d4)
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🚨 CVE-2026-54408
A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit an Improper Access Control vulnerability found in UniFi Protect Application to bypass authentication for data streaming.
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A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit an Improper Access Control vulnerability found in UniFi Protect Application to bypass authentication for data streaming.
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🚨 CVE-2026-54409
A malicious actor with access to the network and under certain conditions could exploit an Improper Initialization vulnerability found in UniFi Protect Application to bypass authentication in UniFi Protect Cameras.
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A malicious actor with access to the network and under certain conditions could exploit an Improper Initialization vulnerability found in UniFi Protect Application to bypass authentication in UniFi Protect Cameras.
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🚨 CVE-2026-55115
A malicious actor with access to the network and low privileges could exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in UniFi Protect Application to escalate privileges on the host device.
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A malicious actor with access to the network and low privileges could exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in UniFi Protect Application to escalate privileges on the host device.
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🚨 CVE-2026-9272
In Progress Flowmon ADS versions prior to 12.5.6 and 13.0.5, a vulnerability exists whereby an adversary who is authenticated as a low-privileged user in the Anomaly Detection System (ADS) may send specially crafted requests that could result in unauthorized access to application data and its modification.
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In Progress Flowmon ADS versions prior to 12.5.6 and 13.0.5, a vulnerability exists whereby an adversary who is authenticated as a low-privileged user in the Anomaly Detection System (ADS) may send specially crafted requests that could result in unauthorized access to application data and its modification.
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Progress
Product Alert Bulletin – July 2026 – CVE-2026-9272 - Progress Community
In Progress Flowmon ADS versions prior to 12.5.6 and 13.0.5, a vulnerability exists whereby an adversary who is authenticated as a low-privileged user in the Anomaly Detection System (ADS) may send specially crafted requests that could result in unauthorized…
🚨 CVE-2026-21368
Memory Corruption when parsing jpeg commands due to unaccounted extra writes to the buffer during validation checks.
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Memory Corruption when parsing jpeg commands due to unaccounted extra writes to the buffer during validation checks.
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🚨 CVE-2026-21369
Memory Corruption when handling flash commands due to outdated LED count values being used after userspace modification.
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Memory Corruption when handling flash commands due to outdated LED count values being used after userspace modification.
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🚨 CVE-2026-21370
Memory Corruption when validating input batch size and buffer plane count exceeds maximum allowed values.
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Memory Corruption when validating input batch size and buffer plane count exceeds maximum allowed values.
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🚨 CVE-2026-21379
Memory Corruption when allocating memory with sizes that exceed the maximum allowed value.
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Memory Corruption when allocating memory with sizes that exceed the maximum allowed value.
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🚨 CVE-2026-21383
Cryptographic Issue when using a static initialization vector for AES-GCM key wrapping, which requires a unique value for each call to ensure security.
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Cryptographic Issue when using a static initialization vector for AES-GCM key wrapping, which requires a unique value for each call to ensure security.
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🚨 CVE-2026-21384
Memory Corruption when updating prepared commands with invalid port indices based on user space input exceeds supported read client limits.
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Memory Corruption when updating prepared commands with invalid port indices based on user space input exceeds supported read client limits.
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🚨 CVE-2026-25268
Memory Corruption when processing invalid HT40 channel layouts during dynamic channel switching operations.
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Memory Corruption when processing invalid HT40 channel layouts during dynamic channel switching operations.
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🚨 CVE-2026-25271
Memory Corruption when processing asynchronous input parameters due to improper handling of modified values between check and use.
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Memory Corruption when processing asynchronous input parameters due to improper handling of modified values between check and use.
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🚨 CVE-2026-53133
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/umem: Fix truncation for block sizes >= 4G
When the iommu is used the linearization of the mapping can give a single
block that is very large split across multiple SG entries.
When __rdma_block_iter_next() reassembles the split SG entries it is
overflowing the 32 bit stack values and computed the wrong DMA addresses
for blocks after the truncation.
Use the right types to hold DMA addresses.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/umem: Fix truncation for block sizes >= 4G
When the iommu is used the linearization of the mapping can give a single
block that is very large split across multiple SG entries.
When __rdma_block_iter_next() reassembles the split SG entries it is
overflowing the 32 bit stack values and computed the wrong DMA addresses
for blocks after the truncation.
Use the right types to hold DMA addresses.
🎖@cveNotify