🚨 CVE-2026-7656
The IPv6 Neighbor Discovery handlers in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c (handle_ra_input, handle_ns_input, handle_na_input) used an incorrect boolean expression that combined the RFC 4861 validity checks with the ICMPv6 code check using the wrong operator precedence: the form was '((length/hop/source/target checks) && (icmp_hdr-code != 0))'. Because every legitimate ND message carries ICMPv6 code 0, an attacker setting code == 0 (the normal value) caused the entire predicate to evaluate false, so the packet was never dropped and all of the other checks were silently skipped. The bypassed checks include the mandatory Hop Limit == 255 verification (which proves an ND packet originated on-link and was not forwarded) and, for Router Advertisements, the requirement that the source be a link-local address, as well as multicast-target sanity checks. As a result, an adjacent on-link attacker — and, because the Hop-Limit-255 guard is bypassed, potentially a remote/off-link attacker whose packets would otherwise be rejected — can have forged Router Advertisement, Neighbor Solicitation, and Neighbor Advertisement messages accepted. A forged RA lets the attacker reconfigure the victim's default router, on-link prefixes (SLAAC), MTU, reachable/retransmit timers, and (with CONFIG_NET_IPV6_RA_RDNSS) DNS servers, while forged NS/NA enable neighbor-cache poisoning, enabling man-in-the-middle, traffic redirection, and denial of service. The flaw is an input-validation/authentication weakness rather than a memory-safety issue: the underlying packet-parsing primitives (net_pkt_get_data, net_pkt_read, net_pkt_skip) are independently bounds-safe and the validated 'length' is the true buffer length, so skipping the length check causes no out-of-bounds access. The defect has existed since the logic was introduced in 2018 and shipped in all releases through v4.4.0; it is fixed by splitting the condition so any failing check drops the packet.
🎖@cveNotify
The IPv6 Neighbor Discovery handlers in subsys/net/ip/ipv6_nbr.c (handle_ra_input, handle_ns_input, handle_na_input) used an incorrect boolean expression that combined the RFC 4861 validity checks with the ICMPv6 code check using the wrong operator precedence: the form was '((length/hop/source/target checks) && (icmp_hdr-code != 0))'. Because every legitimate ND message carries ICMPv6 code 0, an attacker setting code == 0 (the normal value) caused the entire predicate to evaluate false, so the packet was never dropped and all of the other checks were silently skipped. The bypassed checks include the mandatory Hop Limit == 255 verification (which proves an ND packet originated on-link and was not forwarded) and, for Router Advertisements, the requirement that the source be a link-local address, as well as multicast-target sanity checks. As a result, an adjacent on-link attacker — and, because the Hop-Limit-255 guard is bypassed, potentially a remote/off-link attacker whose packets would otherwise be rejected — can have forged Router Advertisement, Neighbor Solicitation, and Neighbor Advertisement messages accepted. A forged RA lets the attacker reconfigure the victim's default router, on-link prefixes (SLAAC), MTU, reachable/retransmit timers, and (with CONFIG_NET_IPV6_RA_RDNSS) DNS servers, while forged NS/NA enable neighbor-cache poisoning, enabling man-in-the-middle, traffic redirection, and denial of service. The flaw is an input-validation/authentication weakness rather than a memory-safety issue: the underlying packet-parsing primitives (net_pkt_get_data, net_pkt_read, net_pkt_skip) are independently bounds-safe and the validated 'length' is the true buffer length, so skipping the length check causes no out-of-bounds access. The defect has existed since the logic was introduced in 2018 and shipped in all releases through v4.4.0; it is fixed by splitting the condition so any failing check drops the packet.
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GitHub
net: ipv6: Fix ND packets validation on input · zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr@095f064
The checks validating RA, NS and NA packets content on input were not
correct - packets should be dropped in case any of those checks failed,
however current logic was invalid, causing other checks...
correct - packets should be dropped in case any of those checks failed,
however current logic was invalid, causing other checks...
🚨 CVE-2026-8023
Zephyr's HTTP server (subsys/net/lib/http) provides a static-filesystem resource type (HTTP_RESOURCE_TYPE_STATIC_FS, available when CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM is enabled) that serves files from a configured root directory. Before this fix, both the HTTP/1 and HTTP/2 front-ends placed the raw, attacker-controlled request path into client-url_buffer (assembled in on_url() for HTTP/1 and copied verbatim from the :path pseudo-header for HTTP/2) without resolving ./.. segments. The static-FS handler then built the on-disk filename by directly concatenating the configured root with that raw URL (snprintk(fname, ..., "%s%s", static_fs_detail-fs_path, client-url_buffer) at http_server_http1.c:603 and http_server_http2.c:490) and opened it with fs_open(fname, FS_O_READ). Because the handler is reached via wildcard/leading-dir (fnmatch FNM_LEADING_DIR) or fallback resource matching, a request such as GET /<prefix/../../<file is dispatched to the handler and, after the underlying filesystem (e.g. LittleFS/FAT) resolves the .. segments, escapes the configured web root, letting an unauthenticated remote client read arbitrary readable files on the mounted volume (information disclosure). The HTTP server requires no TLS or authentication to reach this path. The fix adds http_server_remove_dot_segments(), which canonicalizes the path portion of the URL before resource lookup in both protocol handlers, neutralizing the traversal. Affects releases v4.0.0 through v4.4.0 for deployments that register a static-filesystem resource.
🎖@cveNotify
Zephyr's HTTP server (subsys/net/lib/http) provides a static-filesystem resource type (HTTP_RESOURCE_TYPE_STATIC_FS, available when CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM is enabled) that serves files from a configured root directory. Before this fix, both the HTTP/1 and HTTP/2 front-ends placed the raw, attacker-controlled request path into client-url_buffer (assembled in on_url() for HTTP/1 and copied verbatim from the :path pseudo-header for HTTP/2) without resolving ./.. segments. The static-FS handler then built the on-disk filename by directly concatenating the configured root with that raw URL (snprintk(fname, ..., "%s%s", static_fs_detail-fs_path, client-url_buffer) at http_server_http1.c:603 and http_server_http2.c:490) and opened it with fs_open(fname, FS_O_READ). Because the handler is reached via wildcard/leading-dir (fnmatch FNM_LEADING_DIR) or fallback resource matching, a request such as GET /<prefix/../../<file is dispatched to the handler and, after the underlying filesystem (e.g. LittleFS/FAT) resolves the .. segments, escapes the configured web root, letting an unauthenticated remote client read arbitrary readable files on the mounted volume (information disclosure). The HTTP server requires no TLS or authentication to reach this path. The fix adds http_server_remove_dot_segments(), which canonicalizes the path portion of the URL before resource lookup in both protocol handlers, neutralizing the traversal. Affects releases v4.0.0 through v4.4.0 for deployments that register a static-filesystem resource.
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GitHub
net: http_server: Normalize URL path before lookup · zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr@f4a423c
Add http_server_normalize_url() to resolve '.' and '..' segments in
client->url_buffer once the URL is fully assembled to avoid a remote
client to read files ...
client->url_buffer once the URL is fully assembled to avoid a remote
client to read files ...
🚨 CVE-2026-10652
Zephyr's DNS resolver (subsys/net/lib/dns) parses resource records from DNS responses in dns_unpack_answer(), which validated only the fixed RR header (type, class, TTL, rdlength) and accepted any attacker-declared rdlength, including one extending past the end of the received datagram. The TXT and SRV consumers in dns_validate_record() (resolve.c) then read up to rdlength bytes (clamped only to a record-type maximum such as DNS_MAX_TEXT_SIZE, default 64, not to the packet) from the receive buffer via memcpy without their own bounds check, and pass the result to the application's resolve callback. A malicious or spoofed DNS server, an on-path attacker forging UDP DNS replies, or (with mDNS/LLMNR enabled) any LAN node can craft a truncated TXT or SRV response that causes an out-of-bounds read of adjacent receive-pool memory; the disclosed stale bytes (residual contents of prior DNS packets / uninitialized pool memory) are returned to the application as TXT/SRV record contents, an information leak, and may in some configurations cross the allocation boundary and fault, causing a denial of service. The read is bounded (~64 bytes for TXT, ~6 for SRV) and read-only (no write). The fix rejects any record whose declared rdata extends past dns_msg->msg_size at the single chokepoint in dns_unpack_answer(). Affected: v4.3.0 and v4.4.0.
🎖@cveNotify
Zephyr's DNS resolver (subsys/net/lib/dns) parses resource records from DNS responses in dns_unpack_answer(), which validated only the fixed RR header (type, class, TTL, rdlength) and accepted any attacker-declared rdlength, including one extending past the end of the received datagram. The TXT and SRV consumers in dns_validate_record() (resolve.c) then read up to rdlength bytes (clamped only to a record-type maximum such as DNS_MAX_TEXT_SIZE, default 64, not to the packet) from the receive buffer via memcpy without their own bounds check, and pass the result to the application's resolve callback. A malicious or spoofed DNS server, an on-path attacker forging UDP DNS replies, or (with mDNS/LLMNR enabled) any LAN node can craft a truncated TXT or SRV response that causes an out-of-bounds read of adjacent receive-pool memory; the disclosed stale bytes (residual contents of prior DNS packets / uninitialized pool memory) are returned to the application as TXT/SRV record contents, an information leak, and may in some configurations cross the allocation boundary and fault, causing a denial of service. The read is bounded (~64 bytes for TXT, ~6 for SRV) and read-only (no write). The fix rejects any record whose declared rdata extends past dns_msg->msg_size at the single chokepoint in dns_unpack_answer(). Affected: v4.3.0 and v4.4.0.
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GitHub
net: dns: validate rdata length in dns_unpack_answer · zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr@58b46c8
dns_unpack_answer() validated only the fixed RR header size and
accepted any rdlength, even one extending past the end of the packet.
TXT and SRV consumers in resolve.c then read up to rdlength byt...
accepted any rdlength, even one extending past the end of the packet.
TXT and SRV consumers in resolve.c then read up to rdlength byt...
🚨 CVE-2026-10653
The Zephyr net_buf library (lib/net_buf/buf.c) manipulated both of its reference counts -- the per-header buf->ref and the per-data-block ref_count at the start of each variable/heap data allocation -- with plain non-atomic C operators (buf->ref++, if (--buf->ref > 0), if (--(*ref_count))). The API is documented as self-synchronizing: callers may share one buffer across threads (e.g. via k_fifo) and each holder independently calls net_buf_unref() with no surrounding lock. Under true concurrency (SMP, or single-core preemption between the non-atomic load and store while another context unrefs the same buffer), two holders can both observe the same prior reference value and both conclude they are the last reference. For heap/variable-data pools (mem_pool_data_unref/heap_data_unref, used by zbus message subscribers, the IP stack RX/TX buffers when CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE=n, capture, wireguard, ISO-TP and usbip) this produces a double k_heap_free()/k_free() of the same block -- heap-metadata corruption and a use-after-free on the heap-hardening poison pattern. For the per-header refcount the buffer is returned to the pool free LIFO twice for any pool type (including fixed-data pools used by Bluetooth and networking), corrupting the free list so a later allocation hands the same buffer to two owners. The fix converts both refcounts to atomic_inc/atomic_dec (overlaying buf->ref in an atomic_t-sized union and changing the data-block refcount from uint8_t to atomic_t). Impact is gated on genuine concurrency and on an application architecture that shares one buffer among multiple independent unref'ers; the trigger is a refcount/timing race rather than packet content, so an external attacker has at most weak indirect influence over the race window. Affects all Zephyr releases through v4.4.0.
🎖@cveNotify
The Zephyr net_buf library (lib/net_buf/buf.c) manipulated both of its reference counts -- the per-header buf->ref and the per-data-block ref_count at the start of each variable/heap data allocation -- with plain non-atomic C operators (buf->ref++, if (--buf->ref > 0), if (--(*ref_count))). The API is documented as self-synchronizing: callers may share one buffer across threads (e.g. via k_fifo) and each holder independently calls net_buf_unref() with no surrounding lock. Under true concurrency (SMP, or single-core preemption between the non-atomic load and store while another context unrefs the same buffer), two holders can both observe the same prior reference value and both conclude they are the last reference. For heap/variable-data pools (mem_pool_data_unref/heap_data_unref, used by zbus message subscribers, the IP stack RX/TX buffers when CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE=n, capture, wireguard, ISO-TP and usbip) this produces a double k_heap_free()/k_free() of the same block -- heap-metadata corruption and a use-after-free on the heap-hardening poison pattern. For the per-header refcount the buffer is returned to the pool free LIFO twice for any pool type (including fixed-data pools used by Bluetooth and networking), corrupting the free list so a later allocation hands the same buffer to two owners. The fix converts both refcounts to atomic_inc/atomic_dec (overlaying buf->ref in an atomic_t-sized union and changing the data-block refcount from uint8_t to atomic_t). Impact is gated on genuine concurrency and on an application architecture that shares one buffer among multiple independent unref'ers; the trigger is a refcount/timing race rather than packet content, so an external attacker has at most weak indirect influence over the race window. Affects all Zephyr releases through v4.4.0.
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GitHub
net_buf: make reference counts atomic · zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr@9bb2878
The two reference counts in the net_buf library -- the per-header
`buf->ref` and the per-data-block `*ref_count` byte at the start of
each variable-data allocation -- were manipulated with p...
`buf->ref` and the per-data-block `*ref_count` byte at the start of
each variable-data allocation -- were manipulated with p...
🚨 CVE-2026-10654
A race condition in the Zephyr Bluetooth Classic RFCOMM host stack (subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/rfcomm.c) mishandles a simultaneous bidirectional session disconnect. When the local device has initiated a session teardown (state BT_RFCOMM_STATE_DISCONNECTING, DISC sent, RTX timer armed) and the connected peer concurrently sends its own DISC frame for dlci 0, rfcomm_handle_disc() invokes rfcomm_session_disconnected(), which unconditionally forced the session to BT_RFCOMM_STATE_DISCONNECTED without ever calling bt_l2cap_chan_disconnect().
Because the recovery timer was also cancelled and a later UA is ignored in the DISCONNECTED state, the session becomes permanently wedged: the underlying L2CAP channel is never released and the session slot in the fixed bt_rfcomm_pool[CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN] array is never reclaimed (its conn pointer stays set).
Subsequent bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() calls on that connection fail with -EINVAL due to the invalid session state, so RFCOMM service is denied for that peer, and repeated occurrences can exhaust the session pool. The DISC frame is peer-controlled over the air, but exploitation requires the peer's DISC to collide with a local-initiated disconnect (a high-complexity timing race). Impact is availability/resource-leak only; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity consequence. The defect shipped in released versions (present in v4.4.0 and earlier).
The fix only transitions to DISCONNECTED when the session is not already in DISCONNECTING, preserving the proper L2CAP teardown path.
🎖@cveNotify
A race condition in the Zephyr Bluetooth Classic RFCOMM host stack (subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/rfcomm.c) mishandles a simultaneous bidirectional session disconnect. When the local device has initiated a session teardown (state BT_RFCOMM_STATE_DISCONNECTING, DISC sent, RTX timer armed) and the connected peer concurrently sends its own DISC frame for dlci 0, rfcomm_handle_disc() invokes rfcomm_session_disconnected(), which unconditionally forced the session to BT_RFCOMM_STATE_DISCONNECTED without ever calling bt_l2cap_chan_disconnect().
Because the recovery timer was also cancelled and a later UA is ignored in the DISCONNECTED state, the session becomes permanently wedged: the underlying L2CAP channel is never released and the session slot in the fixed bt_rfcomm_pool[CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN] array is never reclaimed (its conn pointer stays set).
Subsequent bt_rfcomm_dlc_connect() calls on that connection fail with -EINVAL due to the invalid session state, so RFCOMM service is denied for that peer, and repeated occurrences can exhaust the session pool. The DISC frame is peer-controlled over the air, but exploitation requires the peer's DISC to collide with a local-initiated disconnect (a high-complexity timing race). Impact is availability/resource-leak only; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality, or integrity consequence. The defect shipped in released versions (present in v4.4.0 and earlier).
The fix only transitions to DISCONNECTED when the session is not already in DISCONNECTING, preserving the proper L2CAP teardown path.
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GitHub
bluetooth: classic: rfcomm: fix race condition in session disconnect · zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr@c67b59f
Fix a race condition in RFCOMM session disconnection when both local
and peer devices initiate disconnection simultaneously.
Add state check in `rfcomm_session_disconnected()` to only transition
t...
and peer devices initiate disconnection simultaneously.
Add state check in `rfcomm_session_disconnected()` to only transition
t...
🚨 CVE-2026-10655
The asynchronous SNTP client in Zephyr (subsys/net/lib/sntp/sntp.c, sntp_close_async) closed the UDP socket file descriptor directly from the calling thread immediately after detaching it from the network socket service, without synchronizing with the socket-service poll thread.
The socket service thread polls each socket via zvfs_poll, which (in zsock_poll_prepare_ctx) registers a k_poll_event pointing into the socket's net_context (&ctx->recv_q) and then blocks in k_poll without holding a reference or lock. net_context objects are allocated from a fixed pool (contexts[CONFIG_NET_MAX_CONTEXTS]) and reused after close.
When sntp_close_async is invoked from a different thread than the poll thread (in the in-tree consumer subsys/net/lib/config/init_clock_sntp.c, the SNTP timeout handler runs on the system workqueue while the socket service thread is blocked in poll on the same fd), the close frees and may reuse the net_context while the poll thread still has a poller node linked into the freed object, resulting in a use-after-free / object confusion of kernel poll structures.
The SNTP timeout path is the normal no-response failure mode, so a network peer or off-path attacker who drops or delays the SNTP/NTP response can drive the racing close repeatedly (and periodically with NET_CONFIG_SNTP_INIT_RESYNC). The most likely consequence is a crash of the networking thread (denial of service), with potential memory corruption when the freed context slot is reallocated.
The fix defers the close to the socket service thread itself via net_socket_service_close (NET_SOCKET_SERVICE_CLOSE_SOCKETS), so the same thread that polls performs the close, eliminating the race. Affected releases: v4.2.0 through v4.4.0.
🎖@cveNotify
The asynchronous SNTP client in Zephyr (subsys/net/lib/sntp/sntp.c, sntp_close_async) closed the UDP socket file descriptor directly from the calling thread immediately after detaching it from the network socket service, without synchronizing with the socket-service poll thread.
The socket service thread polls each socket via zvfs_poll, which (in zsock_poll_prepare_ctx) registers a k_poll_event pointing into the socket's net_context (&ctx->recv_q) and then blocks in k_poll without holding a reference or lock. net_context objects are allocated from a fixed pool (contexts[CONFIG_NET_MAX_CONTEXTS]) and reused after close.
When sntp_close_async is invoked from a different thread than the poll thread (in the in-tree consumer subsys/net/lib/config/init_clock_sntp.c, the SNTP timeout handler runs on the system workqueue while the socket service thread is blocked in poll on the same fd), the close frees and may reuse the net_context while the poll thread still has a poller node linked into the freed object, resulting in a use-after-free / object confusion of kernel poll structures.
The SNTP timeout path is the normal no-response failure mode, so a network peer or off-path attacker who drops or delays the SNTP/NTP response can drive the racing close repeatedly (and periodically with NET_CONFIG_SNTP_INIT_RESYNC). The most likely consequence is a crash of the networking thread (denial of service), with potential memory corruption when the freed context slot is reallocated.
The fix defers the close to the socket service thread itself via net_socket_service_close (NET_SOCKET_SERVICE_CLOSE_SOCKETS), so the same thread that polls performs the close, eliminating the race. Affected releases: v4.2.0 through v4.4.0.
🎖@cveNotify
GitHub
net: sntp: fix close-while-polling in `sntp_close_async` · zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr@ef47bdf
Fix `sntp_close_async` closing the socket while the socket service is
still polling it by deferring the close operation to the socket service.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Yates <jordan@embeint.com>
still polling it by deferring the close operation to the socket service.
Signed-off-by: Jordan Yates <jordan@embeint.com>
🚨 CVE-2026-9263
The Zephyr Bluetooth controller ISO Adaptation Layer (subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/isoal.c) fails to validate the length field of a framed ISO PDU start segment. Per the Bluetooth specification a start segment (sc=0) always carries a 3-byte time_offset, so its segment-header len must be at least PDU_ISO_SEG_TIMEOFFSET_SIZE (3). isoal_check_seg_header() accepted start segments with len < 3 as valid, and isoal_rx_framed_consume() then computed length = seg_hdr->len - 3 in a uint8_t, underflowing to 253-255 when len is 0-2. That oversized length is passed to isoal_rx_append_to_sdu(), whose copy is clamped only against the destination SDU buffer size, not the source PDU length, so up to ~255 bytes of controller memory beyond the received PDU are copied (via sink_sdu_write_hci()/net_buf_add_mem) into an HCI ISO data packet and delivered to the host. The PDU and its segment headers are entirely attacker-controlled and arrive over the air, reachable through both the CIS and BIS-sync HCI data paths (hci_driver.c) and the vendor data path (ull_iso.c), so a remote CIS peer or a broadcaster the device is synced to can trigger an out-of-bounds read causing information disclosure to the host and potential denial of service (faults or malformed oversized HCI ISO packets). The flaw affects all Zephyr releases since framed ISO reception was introduced in v3.0.0. The fix rejects sc=0 segments with len < 3 in isoal_check_seg_header() and adds a guard before the subtraction in isoal_rx_framed_consume().
🎖@cveNotify
The Zephyr Bluetooth controller ISO Adaptation Layer (subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/isoal.c) fails to validate the length field of a framed ISO PDU start segment. Per the Bluetooth specification a start segment (sc=0) always carries a 3-byte time_offset, so its segment-header len must be at least PDU_ISO_SEG_TIMEOFFSET_SIZE (3). isoal_check_seg_header() accepted start segments with len < 3 as valid, and isoal_rx_framed_consume() then computed length = seg_hdr->len - 3 in a uint8_t, underflowing to 253-255 when len is 0-2. That oversized length is passed to isoal_rx_append_to_sdu(), whose copy is clamped only against the destination SDU buffer size, not the source PDU length, so up to ~255 bytes of controller memory beyond the received PDU are copied (via sink_sdu_write_hci()/net_buf_add_mem) into an HCI ISO data packet and delivered to the host. The PDU and its segment headers are entirely attacker-controlled and arrive over the air, reachable through both the CIS and BIS-sync HCI data paths (hci_driver.c) and the vendor data path (ull_iso.c), so a remote CIS peer or a broadcaster the device is synced to can trigger an out-of-bounds read causing information disclosure to the host and potential denial of service (faults or malformed oversized HCI ISO packets). The flaw affects all Zephyr releases since framed ISO reception was introduced in v3.0.0. The fix rejects sc=0 segments with len < 3 in isoal_check_seg_header() and adds a guard before the subtraction in isoal_rx_framed_consume().
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GitHub
Bluetooth: Controller: Fix OOB read in ISOAL · zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr@28080d8
When sc=0, a framed ISO PDU segment header includes a 3-byte time_offset
field, so seg_hdr->len must be at least PDU_ISO_SEG_TIMEOFFSET_SIZE.
isoal_check_seg_header() accepted segments with ...
field, so seg_hdr->len must be at least PDU_ISO_SEG_TIMEOFFSET_SIZE.
isoal_check_seg_header() accepted segments with ...
🚨 CVE-2026-14074
Side-channel information leakage in WebAuthentication in Google Chrome on iOS prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)
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Side-channel information leakage in WebAuthentication in Google Chrome on iOS prior to 150.0.7871.47 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)
🎖@cveNotify
Chrome Releases
Stable Channel Update for Desktop
The Chrome team is delighted to announce the promotion of Chrome 150 to the stable channel for Windows, Mac and Linux. This will roll out ov...
🚨 CVE-2026-54406
A malicious actor with access to the network and high privileges could exploit a Path Traversal vulnerability found in self-hosted instances of UniFi Network Application to escalate write permission on the host device.
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A malicious actor with access to the network and high privileges could exploit a Path Traversal vulnerability found in self-hosted instances of UniFi Network Application to escalate write permission on the host device.
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🚨 CVE-2026-54407
A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit an Improper Access Control vulnerability found in UniFi Protect Application to bypass authentication in certain UniFi Protect Application API endpoints.
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A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit an Improper Access Control vulnerability found in UniFi Protect Application to bypass authentication in certain UniFi Protect Application API endpoints.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-55114
A malicious actor with access to the network and low privileges could exploit an Improper Access Control vulnerability found in UniFi Network Application to escalate privileges within the UniFi Network Application.
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A malicious actor with access to the network and low privileges could exploit an Improper Access Control vulnerability found in UniFi Network Application to escalate privileges within the UniFi Network Application.
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🚨 CVE-2026-55118
A malicious actor with access to the network,low privileges and under certain conditions could exploit an Improper Access Control vulnerability found in UniFi Network Application to escalate privileges within the UniFi Network Application.
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A malicious actor with access to the network,low privileges and under certain conditions could exploit an Improper Access Control vulnerability found in UniFi Network Application to escalate privileges within the UniFi Network Application.
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🚨 CVE-2026-56841
A malicious actor with access to the network and low privileges could exploit an authenticated SQL Injection vulnerability found in UniFi Protect Application to escalate privileges on the host device.
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A malicious actor with access to the network and low privileges could exploit an authenticated SQL Injection vulnerability found in UniFi Protect Application to escalate privileges on the host device.
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🚨 CVE-2026-13743
CubeSpace CW0057 Reaction Wheel firmware versions prior to 5.0.20 are vulnerable to an Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability. This could allow an attacker with physical access to the product to upload arbitrary malicious firmware to the device without authentication.
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CubeSpace CW0057 Reaction Wheel firmware versions prior to 5.0.20 are vulnerable to an Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability. This could allow an attacker with physical access to the product to upload arbitrary malicious firmware to the device without authentication.
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🚨 CVE-2026-52187
Buffer Overflow vulnerability in UTT nv518G nv518GV3v3.2.7-210919-161313 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the gohead/sub_483ba0 component
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Buffer Overflow vulnerability in UTT nv518G nv518GV3v3.2.7-210919-161313 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the gohead/sub_483ba0 component
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GitHub
CVEreport/518G/FUN_00483ba0/README.md at main · akuma-QAQ/CVEreport
Contribute to akuma-QAQ/CVEreport development by creating an account on GitHub.
🚨 CVE-2026-38968
ntopng through 6.6 is vulnerable to Predictable Session Identifier which can lead to Session Hijacking. HTTP session identifiers in src/HTTPserver.cpp use weak time-seeded pseudo-randomness during session creation. As a result, fresh authenticated logins can receive deterministic or colliding session cookies under attacker-controlled timing.
🎖@cveNotify
ntopng through 6.6 is vulnerable to Predictable Session Identifier which can lead to Session Hijacking. HTTP session identifiers in src/HTTPserver.cpp use weak time-seeded pseudo-randomness during session creation. As a result, fresh authenticated logins can receive deterministic or colliding session cookies under attacker-controlled timing.
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GitHub
Further improvement to https://github.com/ntop/ntopng/commit/179a346c… · ntop/ntopng@14e2249
…eb6239fd36128ccca3efa8f9ea61eeb5
🚨 CVE-2026-38969
ruby webrick through v1.9.2 WEBrick reparses trailer Content-Length into canonical request state, enabling request smuggling.
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ruby webrick through v1.9.2 WEBrick reparses trailer Content-Length into canonical request state, enabling request smuggling.
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GitHub
[BUG] WEBrick reparses trailer Content-Length into canonical request state, enabling request metadata confusion / request smuggling…
Summary The latest ruby/webrick still accepts a Content-Length value from chunked request trailers and exposes it as canonical request metadata to the application. A crafted chunked request whose r...
🚨 CVE-2026-38970
pdfcpu through v0.11.1 contains an uncontrolled-recursion denial-of-service issue in pkg/pdfcpu/model/parse.go. The parser descends recursively through nested PDF objects, including arrays, via ParseObjectContext() and parseArray() without enforcing a maximum nesting depth.
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pdfcpu through v0.11.1 contains an uncontrolled-recursion denial-of-service issue in pkg/pdfcpu/model/parse.go. The parser descends recursively through nested PDF objects, including arrays, via ParseObjectContext() and parseArray() without enforcing a maximum nesting depth.
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GitHub
GitHub - pdfcpu/pdfcpu: PDF tooling for Go and the command line.
PDF tooling for Go and the command line. Contribute to pdfcpu/pdfcpu development by creating an account on GitHub.
🚨 CVE-2026-38971
ardupilot through Plane-4.6.3 was found to contain an out-of-bounds read issue in libraries/GCS_MAVLink/GCS_serial_control.cpp in GCS_MAVLINK::handle_serial_control().
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ardupilot through Plane-4.6.3 was found to contain an out-of-bounds read issue in libraries/GCS_MAVLink/GCS_serial_control.cpp in GCS_MAVLINK::handle_serial_control().
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GitHub
GitHub - ArduPilot/ardupilot: ArduPlane, ArduCopter, ArduRover, ArduSub source
ArduPlane, ArduCopter, ArduRover, ArduSub source. Contribute to ArduPilot/ardupilot development by creating an account on GitHub.
🚨 CVE-2026-52830
fast-mcp-telegram is a Telegram MCP Server. Prior to 0.19.1, fast-mcp-telegram validates HTTP Bearer tokens by joining the raw token string into a session-file path. The verifier rejects the exact reserved token telegram, but it does not reject path separators or normalize the path before checking whether the session file exists. A remote HTTP client can therefore authenticate as the default legacy session with a token such as ../fast-mcp-telegram/telegram when the documented default session file ~/.config/fast-mcp-telegram/telegram.session exists. This bypasses the reserved session name control that is intended to prevent HTTP multi-user sessions from colliding with the default stdio or legacy account. With account-prefixed MCP tools enabled, the attacker still sees and calls the prefixed tools for the default account, so the prefix middleware does not stop the session selection bypass. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.19.1.
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fast-mcp-telegram is a Telegram MCP Server. Prior to 0.19.1, fast-mcp-telegram validates HTTP Bearer tokens by joining the raw token string into a session-file path. The verifier rejects the exact reserved token telegram, but it does not reject path separators or normalize the path before checking whether the session file exists. A remote HTTP client can therefore authenticate as the default legacy session with a token such as ../fast-mcp-telegram/telegram when the documented default session file ~/.config/fast-mcp-telegram/telegram.session exists. This bypasses the reserved session name control that is intended to prevent HTTP multi-user sessions from colliding with the default stdio or legacy account. With account-prefixed MCP tools enabled, the attacker still sees and calls the prefixed tools for the default account, so the prefix middleware does not stop the session selection bypass. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.19.1.
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GitHub
CVE-2026-52830 - GitHub Advisory Database
fast-mcp-telegram: Bearer token path traversal bypasses reserved Telegram session protection
🚨 CVE-2026-13768
Gardyn devices expose a privileged iothubowner key. Access to this key will allow a malicious user to invoke an IoTHub Registry Manager function which returns connection information for all Gardyn Home Kit and Studio devices. Access to this key also allows a malicious user to execute arbitrary commands on a specific connected device and may allow the malicious user to pivot to other devices on the user's network.
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Gardyn devices expose a privileged iothubowner key. Access to this key will allow a malicious user to invoke an IoTHub Registry Manager function which returns connection information for all Gardyn Home Kit and Studio devices. Access to this key also allows a malicious user to execute arbitrary commands on a specific connected device and may allow the malicious user to pivot to other devices on the user's network.
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GitHub
CSAF/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-183-03.json at develop · cisagov/CSAF
CISA CSAF Security Advisories. Contribute to cisagov/CSAF development by creating an account on GitHub.