🚨 CVE-2026-53191
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/net: inherit IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE across bundle recv retries
When a bundle recv retries inside io_recv_finish(), the merge logic OR
the saved cflags from the previous iteration with the cflags returned by
the new iteration:
cflags = req->cqe.flags | (cflags & CQE_F_MASK);
Bits listed in CQE_F_MASK are inherited from the new iteration, and all
other bits (notably IORING_CQE_F_BUFFER and the buffer ID) come from the
saved cflags. Before this change CQE_F_MASK covered only
IORING_CQE_F_SOCK_NONEMPTY and IORING_CQE_F_MORE.
When using provided buffer rings (IOU_PBUF_RING_INC) with incremental
mode, and bundle recv, io_kbuf_inc_commit() can leave the head ring
entry partially consumed, __io_put_kbufs() then sets
IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE on the returned cflags so userspace knows the
buffer ID will be reused for subsequent completions.
Because IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE was not in CQE_F_MASK, the merge above
silently dropped it whenever the final retry iteration partially
consumed the buffer, and the subsequent req->cqe.flags = cflags &
~CQE_F_MASK save would have left a stale IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE in the
carried-over cflags had one been present. Userspace would then
wrongfully advance it ring head past an entry the kernel still uses.
Add IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE to CQE_F_MASK so it is both inherited from the
new iteration into the user-visible CQE and stripped from the saved
cflags between iterations.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/net: inherit IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE across bundle recv retries
When a bundle recv retries inside io_recv_finish(), the merge logic OR
the saved cflags from the previous iteration with the cflags returned by
the new iteration:
cflags = req->cqe.flags | (cflags & CQE_F_MASK);
Bits listed in CQE_F_MASK are inherited from the new iteration, and all
other bits (notably IORING_CQE_F_BUFFER and the buffer ID) come from the
saved cflags. Before this change CQE_F_MASK covered only
IORING_CQE_F_SOCK_NONEMPTY and IORING_CQE_F_MORE.
When using provided buffer rings (IOU_PBUF_RING_INC) with incremental
mode, and bundle recv, io_kbuf_inc_commit() can leave the head ring
entry partially consumed, __io_put_kbufs() then sets
IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE on the returned cflags so userspace knows the
buffer ID will be reused for subsequent completions.
Because IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE was not in CQE_F_MASK, the merge above
silently dropped it whenever the final retry iteration partially
consumed the buffer, and the subsequent req->cqe.flags = cflags &
~CQE_F_MASK save would have left a stale IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE in the
carried-over cflags had one been present. Userspace would then
wrongfully advance it ring head past an entry the kernel still uses.
Add IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE to CQE_F_MASK so it is both inherited from the
new iteration into the user-visible CQE and stripped from the saved
cflags between iterations.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-53192
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: timer: Fix UAF at snd_timer_user_params()
At releasing a timer object, e.g. when a userspace timer
(CONFIG_SND_UTIMER) gets closed and snd_timer_free() is called, it
tries to detach the timer instances and release the resources.
However, it's still possible that other in-flight tasks are holding
the timer instance where the to-be-deleted timer object is associated,
and this may lead to racy accesses.
Fortunately, most of ioctls dealing with the timer instance list
already have the protection with register_mutex, and this also avoids
such races. But, SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS isn't protected, hence the
concurrent ioctl may lead to use-after-free.
This patch just adds the guard with register_mutex to protect
snd_timer_user_params() for covering the code path as a quick
workaround. It's no hot-path but rather a rarely issued ioctl, so the
performance penalty doesn't matter.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: timer: Fix UAF at snd_timer_user_params()
At releasing a timer object, e.g. when a userspace timer
(CONFIG_SND_UTIMER) gets closed and snd_timer_free() is called, it
tries to detach the timer instances and release the resources.
However, it's still possible that other in-flight tasks are holding
the timer instance where the to-be-deleted timer object is associated,
and this may lead to racy accesses.
Fortunately, most of ioctls dealing with the timer instance list
already have the protection with register_mutex, and this also avoids
such races. But, SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS isn't protected, hence the
concurrent ioctl may lead to use-after-free.
This patch just adds the guard with register_mutex to protect
snd_timer_user_params() for covering the code path as a quick
workaround. It's no hot-path but rather a rarely issued ioctl, so the
performance penalty doesn't matter.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-53193
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: timer: Forcibly close timer instances at closing
When snd_timer object is freed via snd_timer_free() and still pending
snd_timer_instance objects are assigned to the timer object, it tries
to unlink all instances and just set NULL to each ti->timer, then
releases the resources immediately. The problem is, however, when
there are slave timer instances that are associated with a master
instance linked to this timer: namely, those slave instances still
point to the freed timer object although the master instance is
unlinked, which may lead to user-after-free. The bug can be easily
triggered particularly when a new userspace-driven timers
(CONFIG_SND_UTIMER) is involved, since it can create and delete the
timer object via a simple file open/close, while the other
applications may keep accessing to that timer.
This patch is an attempt to paper over the problem above: now instead
of just unlinking, call snd_timer_close[_locked]() forcibly for each
pending timer instance, so that all assigned slave timer instances are
properly detached, too. Since snd_timer_close() might be called later
by the driver that created that instance, the check of
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD is added at the beginning, too.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: timer: Forcibly close timer instances at closing
When snd_timer object is freed via snd_timer_free() and still pending
snd_timer_instance objects are assigned to the timer object, it tries
to unlink all instances and just set NULL to each ti->timer, then
releases the resources immediately. The problem is, however, when
there are slave timer instances that are associated with a master
instance linked to this timer: namely, those slave instances still
point to the freed timer object although the master instance is
unlinked, which may lead to user-after-free. The bug can be easily
triggered particularly when a new userspace-driven timers
(CONFIG_SND_UTIMER) is involved, since it can create and delete the
timer object via a simple file open/close, while the other
applications may keep accessing to that timer.
This patch is an attempt to paper over the problem above: now instead
of just unlinking, call snd_timer_close[_locked]() forcibly for each
pending timer instance, so that all assigned slave timer instances are
properly detached, too. Since snd_timer_close() might be called later
by the driver that created that instance, the check of
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD is added at the beginning, too.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-53194
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix bulk-out buffer overflow
klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer() is called by the generic write path
with the bulk-out buffer and its size (bulk_out_size, 64 bytes). It
stores a two-byte length header at the start of the buffer and copies
the payload from the write fifo starting at buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, but
passes the full buffer size as the number of bytes to copy:
count = kfifo_out_locked(&port->write_fifo, buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN,
size, &port->lock);
When the fifo holds at least size bytes, size bytes are copied starting
two bytes into the size-byte buffer, writing KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes past its
end. Copy at most size - KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes instead, leaving room for
the header as safe_serial already does.
Writing bulk_out_size or more bytes to the tty triggers a slab
out-of-bounds write, observed with KASAN by emulating the device with
dummy_hcd and raw-gadget:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kfifo_copy_out+0x83/0xc0
Write of size 64 at addr ffff888112c62202 by task python3
kfifo_copy_out
klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer [kl5kusb105]
usb_serial_generic_write_start [usbserial]
Allocated by task 139:
usb_serial_probe [usbserial]
The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of allocated 64-byte region
The out-of-bounds write no longer occurs with this change applied.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix bulk-out buffer overflow
klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer() is called by the generic write path
with the bulk-out buffer and its size (bulk_out_size, 64 bytes). It
stores a two-byte length header at the start of the buffer and copies
the payload from the write fifo starting at buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, but
passes the full buffer size as the number of bytes to copy:
count = kfifo_out_locked(&port->write_fifo, buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN,
size, &port->lock);
When the fifo holds at least size bytes, size bytes are copied starting
two bytes into the size-byte buffer, writing KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes past its
end. Copy at most size - KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes instead, leaving room for
the header as safe_serial already does.
Writing bulk_out_size or more bytes to the tty triggers a slab
out-of-bounds write, observed with KASAN by emulating the device with
dummy_hcd and raw-gadget:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kfifo_copy_out+0x83/0xc0
Write of size 64 at addr ffff888112c62202 by task python3
kfifo_copy_out
klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer [kl5kusb105]
usb_serial_generic_write_start [usbserial]
Allocated by task 139:
usb_serial_probe [usbserial]
The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of allocated 64-byte region
The out-of-bounds write no longer occurs with this change applied.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-53195
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in build_i2c_fw_hdr()
build_i2c_fw_hdr() allocates a fixed-size buffer of
(16*1024 - 512) + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec) bytes, then
copies le16_to_cpu(img_header->Length) bytes into it without
validating that Length fits within the available space after the
firmware record header.
img_header->Length is a __le16 from the firmware file and can be
up to 65535. check_fw_sanity() validates the total firmware size
but not img_header->Length specifically.
Fix by rejecting images where img_header->Length exceeds the
available destination space.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in build_i2c_fw_hdr()
build_i2c_fw_hdr() allocates a fixed-size buffer of
(16*1024 - 512) + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec) bytes, then
copies le16_to_cpu(img_header->Length) bytes into it without
validating that Length fits within the available space after the
firmware record header.
img_header->Length is a __le16 from the firmware file and can be
up to 65535. check_fw_sanity() validates the total firmware size
but not img_header->Length specifically.
Fix by rejecting images where img_header->Length exceeds the
available destination space.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-53196
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in get_manuf_info()
get_manuf_info() reads le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size) bytes from the
device I2C EEPROM into a buffer allocated with kmalloc_obj(), which
is sizeof(struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor) = 10 bytes.
The Size field comes from the device and is only validated (in
check_i2c_image()) to make sure the descriptor fits within
TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE (16384 bytes), not against the destination buffer size.
A malicious USB device can therefore set Size to any value up to 16377,
causing a heap overflow of up to 16367 bytes when plugged into a host
running this driver.
valid_csum() is called after read_rom() and also iterates
buffer[0..Size-1], compounding the out-of-bounds access.
Fix by rejecting descriptors with unexpected length before calling
read_rom().
[ johan: amend commit message; also check for short descriptors ]
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in get_manuf_info()
get_manuf_info() reads le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size) bytes from the
device I2C EEPROM into a buffer allocated with kmalloc_obj(), which
is sizeof(struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor) = 10 bytes.
The Size field comes from the device and is only validated (in
check_i2c_image()) to make sure the descriptor fits within
TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE (16384 bytes), not against the destination buffer size.
A malicious USB device can therefore set Size to any value up to 16377,
causing a heap overflow of up to 16367 bytes when plugged into a host
running this driver.
valid_csum() is called after read_rom() and also iterates
buffer[0..Size-1], compounding the out-of-bounds access.
Fix by rejecting descriptors with unexpected length before calling
read_rom().
[ johan: amend commit message; also check for short descriptors ]
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-53197
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: iptfs: fix ABBA deadlock in iptfs_destroy_state()
iptfs_destroy_state() calls hrtimer_cancel() while holding a spinlock
that the timer callback also acquires, leading to an ABBA deadlock on
SMP systems.
For the output timer (iptfs_timer):
- iptfs_destroy_state() holds x->lock, calls hrtimer_cancel()
- iptfs_delay_timer() callback takes x->lock
For the drop timer (drop_timer):
- iptfs_destroy_state() holds drop_lock, calls hrtimer_cancel()
- iptfs_drop_timer() callback takes drop_lock
Both timers use HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT, so their callbacks run in softirq
context. When hrtimer_cancel() is called for a soft timer that is
currently executing on another CPU, hrtimer_cancel_wait_running() spins
on softirq_expiry_lock -- the same lock held by the softirq running the
callback. If the callback is blocked waiting for the spinlock held by
the caller of hrtimer_cancel(), a circular dependency forms:
CPU 0: holds lock_A -> waits for softirq_expiry_lock
CPU 1: holds softirq_expiry_lock -> waits for lock_A
Fix by calling hrtimer_cancel() before acquiring the respective locks.
hrtimer_cancel() is safe to call without holding any lock and will wait
for any in-progress callback to complete. For the output timer, the
lock is still acquired afterwards to drain the packet queue. For the
drop timer, the lock/unlock pair is removed entirely since it only
existed to serialize with the timer callback, which hrtimer_cancel()
already guarantees.
Found by source code audit.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: iptfs: fix ABBA deadlock in iptfs_destroy_state()
iptfs_destroy_state() calls hrtimer_cancel() while holding a spinlock
that the timer callback also acquires, leading to an ABBA deadlock on
SMP systems.
For the output timer (iptfs_timer):
- iptfs_destroy_state() holds x->lock, calls hrtimer_cancel()
- iptfs_delay_timer() callback takes x->lock
For the drop timer (drop_timer):
- iptfs_destroy_state() holds drop_lock, calls hrtimer_cancel()
- iptfs_drop_timer() callback takes drop_lock
Both timers use HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT, so their callbacks run in softirq
context. When hrtimer_cancel() is called for a soft timer that is
currently executing on another CPU, hrtimer_cancel_wait_running() spins
on softirq_expiry_lock -- the same lock held by the softirq running the
callback. If the callback is blocked waiting for the spinlock held by
the caller of hrtimer_cancel(), a circular dependency forms:
CPU 0: holds lock_A -> waits for softirq_expiry_lock
CPU 1: holds softirq_expiry_lock -> waits for lock_A
Fix by calling hrtimer_cancel() before acquiring the respective locks.
hrtimer_cancel() is safe to call without holding any lock and will wait
for any in-progress callback to complete. For the output timer, the
lock is still acquired afterwards to drain the packet queue. For the
drop timer, the lock/unlock pair is removed entirely since it only
existed to serialize with the timer callback, which hrtimer_cancel()
already guarantees.
Found by source code audit.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-53198
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on double SMB2_CANCEL
A deferred byte-range lock (an SMB2_LOCK that blocks) registers an async work on
conn->async_requests via setup_async_work(), with cancel_fn =
smb2_remove_blocked_lock and cancel_argv[0] pointing at the struct file_lock.
When the request is cancelled, the worker frees the file_lock with
locks_free_lock() and takes the cancelled early-exit, which "goto out"s and never
reaches release_async_work() -- the only site that unlinks the work from
conn->async_requests and clears cancel_fn/cancel_argv. The work therefore stays
matchable on async_requests with a live cancel_fn pointing at the freed file_lock,
until connection teardown finally runs release_async_work().
smb2_cancel() fires cancel_fn unconditionally with no state guard, so a second
SMB2_CANCEL for the same AsyncId, arriving in that window, re-runs
smb2_remove_blocked_lock() on the freed file_lock -- a slab use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __locks_delete_block
__locks_delete_block
locks_delete_block
ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_unblock
smb2_remove_blocked_lock
smb2_cancel <- 2nd SMB2_CANCEL fires cancel_fn
handle_ksmbd_work
Allocated by ...: locks_alloc_lock <- smb2_lock
Freed by ...: locks_free_lock <- smb2_lock (cancelled branch)
... cache file_lock_cache of size 192
Reproduced on mainline with KASAN by an authenticated SMB client.
Skip a work whose state is already KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED so its cancel callback
cannot be fired a second time.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on double SMB2_CANCEL
A deferred byte-range lock (an SMB2_LOCK that blocks) registers an async work on
conn->async_requests via setup_async_work(), with cancel_fn =
smb2_remove_blocked_lock and cancel_argv[0] pointing at the struct file_lock.
When the request is cancelled, the worker frees the file_lock with
locks_free_lock() and takes the cancelled early-exit, which "goto out"s and never
reaches release_async_work() -- the only site that unlinks the work from
conn->async_requests and clears cancel_fn/cancel_argv. The work therefore stays
matchable on async_requests with a live cancel_fn pointing at the freed file_lock,
until connection teardown finally runs release_async_work().
smb2_cancel() fires cancel_fn unconditionally with no state guard, so a second
SMB2_CANCEL for the same AsyncId, arriving in that window, re-runs
smb2_remove_blocked_lock() on the freed file_lock -- a slab use-after-free:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __locks_delete_block
__locks_delete_block
locks_delete_block
ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_unblock
smb2_remove_blocked_lock
smb2_cancel <- 2nd SMB2_CANCEL fires cancel_fn
handle_ksmbd_work
Allocated by ...: locks_alloc_lock <- smb2_lock
Freed by ...: locks_free_lock <- smb2_lock (cancelled branch)
... cache file_lock_cache of size 192
Reproduced on mainline with KASAN by an authenticated SMB client.
Skip a work whose state is already KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED so its cancel callback
cannot be fired a second time.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-53199
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hv_netvsc: use kmap_local_page in netvsc_copy_to_send_buf
netvsc_copy_to_send_buf() copies page buffer entries into the VMBus
send buffer using phys_to_virt() on the entry PFN. Entries for the
RNDIS header and the skb linear data come from kmalloc'd memory and
are always in the kernel direct map, but entries for skb fragments
reference page cache or user pages, which on 32-bit x86 with
CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y can live above the LOWMEM boundary. For such a page
phys_to_virt() returns an address outside the direct map and the
subsequent memcpy() faults on the transmit softirq path, which is
fatal.
Map the pages with kmap_local_page() instead, handling two properties
of the page buffer entries:
- pb[i].pfn is a Hyper-V PFN at HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE (4K) granularity,
not a native PFN. Reconstruct the physical address first and derive
the native page from it, so the mapping stays correct where
PAGE_SIZE > HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE (e.g. arm64 with 64K pages).
- Since commit 41a6328b2c55 ("hv_netvsc: Preserve contiguous PFN
grouping in the page buffer array"), an entry describes a full
physically contiguous fragment and pb[i].len can exceed PAGE_SIZE,
while kmap_local_page() maps a single page. Copy page by page,
splitting at native page boundaries.
The copy path only handles packets smaller than the send section size
(6144 bytes by default); larger packets take the cp_partial path where
only the RNDIS header is copied. So entries here are bounded by the
section size and a copy is split at most once on 4K-page systems. On
!CONFIG_HIGHMEM configs kmap_local_page() folds to page_address() and
no mapping work is added.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hv_netvsc: use kmap_local_page in netvsc_copy_to_send_buf
netvsc_copy_to_send_buf() copies page buffer entries into the VMBus
send buffer using phys_to_virt() on the entry PFN. Entries for the
RNDIS header and the skb linear data come from kmalloc'd memory and
are always in the kernel direct map, but entries for skb fragments
reference page cache or user pages, which on 32-bit x86 with
CONFIG_HIGHMEM=y can live above the LOWMEM boundary. For such a page
phys_to_virt() returns an address outside the direct map and the
subsequent memcpy() faults on the transmit softirq path, which is
fatal.
Map the pages with kmap_local_page() instead, handling two properties
of the page buffer entries:
- pb[i].pfn is a Hyper-V PFN at HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE (4K) granularity,
not a native PFN. Reconstruct the physical address first and derive
the native page from it, so the mapping stays correct where
PAGE_SIZE > HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE (e.g. arm64 with 64K pages).
- Since commit 41a6328b2c55 ("hv_netvsc: Preserve contiguous PFN
grouping in the page buffer array"), an entry describes a full
physically contiguous fragment and pb[i].len can exceed PAGE_SIZE,
while kmap_local_page() maps a single page. Copy page by page,
splitting at native page boundaries.
The copy path only handles packets smaller than the send section size
(6144 bytes by default); larger packets take the cp_partial path where
only the RNDIS header is copied. So entries here are bounded by the
section size and a copy is split at most once on 4K-page systems. On
!CONFIG_HIGHMEM configs kmap_local_page() folds to page_address() and
no mapping work is added.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-53200
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: nv: Fix handling of XN[0] when !FEAT_XNX
XN has already been extracted from its bitfield position so using
FIELD_PREP() on the mask that clears XN[0] is completely broken, having
the effect of unconditionally granting execute permissions...
Fix the obvious mistake by manipulating the right bit.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: nv: Fix handling of XN[0] when !FEAT_XNX
XN has already been extracted from its bitfield position so using
FIELD_PREP() on the mask that clears XN[0] is completely broken, having
the effect of unconditionally granting execute permissions...
Fix the obvious mistake by manipulating the right bit.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-53201
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "drm/xe: Skip exec queue schedule toggle if queue is idle during suspend"
This reverts commit 8533051ce92015e9cc6f75e0d52119b9d91610b6.
The idle-skip optimization bypasses GuC suspend, so the GPU may not
perform the context switch that flushes TLB entries for invalidated
userptr VMAs. In LR/preempt-fence VM mode, this can lead to missed TLB
invalidation and page faults during userptr invalidation tests.
Restore unconditional schedule toggling on suspend so the context-switch
TLB flush is always performed.
This optimization will be reintroduced with a fix that does not skip
suspend in LR/preempt-fence VM mode.
(cherry picked from commit 6a1e7934d9a6cf46aecae00a99c2603d1295e170)
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "drm/xe: Skip exec queue schedule toggle if queue is idle during suspend"
This reverts commit 8533051ce92015e9cc6f75e0d52119b9d91610b6.
The idle-skip optimization bypasses GuC suspend, so the GPU may not
perform the context switch that flushes TLB entries for invalidated
userptr VMAs. In LR/preempt-fence VM mode, this can lead to missed TLB
invalidation and page faults during userptr invalidation tests.
Restore unconditional schedule toggling on suspend so the context-switch
TLB flush is always performed.
This optimization will be reintroduced with a fix that does not skip
suspend in LR/preempt-fence VM mode.
(cherry picked from commit 6a1e7934d9a6cf46aecae00a99c2603d1295e170)
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-44935
Missing validation of "valuesFrom" references in Helm Deployer of SUSE Rancher Fleet 0.15 before 0.15.2, 0.14 before 0.14.6, 0.13 before 0.13.11 and 0.12 before 0.12.15 could be used by owners of one tenant to access fleet credentials of other tenants.
🎖@cveNotify
Missing validation of "valuesFrom" references in Helm Deployer of SUSE Rancher Fleet 0.15 before 0.15.2, 0.14 before 0.14.6, 0.13 before 0.13.11 and 0.12 before 0.12.15 could be used by owners of one tenant to access fleet credentials of other tenants.
🎖@cveNotify
GitHub
Cross namespace secret disclosure via unvalidated `valuesFrom` references in Helm Deployer
### Impact
A vulnerability in Fleet for Rancher Manager affects multi-tenancy environments where different tenants share the same downstream clusters (e.g., different privileged or untrusted teams...
A vulnerability in Fleet for Rancher Manager affects multi-tenancy environments where different tenants share the same downstream clusters (e.g., different privileged or untrusted teams...
🚨 CVE-2026-32285
The Delete function fails to properly validate offsets when processing malformed JSON input. This can lead to a negative slice index and a runtime panic, allowing a denial of service attack.
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The Delete function fails to properly validate offsets when processing malformed JSON input. This can lead to a negative slice index and a runtime panic, allowing a denial of service attack.
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GitHub
Panic in Delete() via slice bounds out of range [-1:] on malformed input (v1.1.1) · Issue #275 · buger/jsonparser
Summary github.com/buger/jsonparser v1.1.1 panics with a negative slice index in the Delete() function when given malformed JSON input. This is a denial-of-service vulnerability - any service that ...
🚨 CVE-2026-34986
Go JOSE provides an implementation of the Javascript Object Signing and Encryption set of standards in Go, including support for JSON Web Encryption (JWE), JSON Web Signature (JWS), and JSON Web Token (JWT) standards. Prior to 4.1.4 and 3.0.5, decrypting a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) object will panic if the alg field indicates a key wrapping algorithm (one ending in KW, with the exception of A128GCMKW, A192GCMKW, and A256GCMKW) and the encrypted_key field is empty. The panic happens when cipher.KeyUnwrap() in key_wrap.go attempts to allocate a slice with a zero or negative length based on the length of the encrypted_key. This code path is reachable from ParseEncrypted() / ParseEncryptedJSON() / ParseEncryptedCompact() followed by Decrypt() on the resulting object. Note that the parse functions take a list of accepted key algorithms. If the accepted key algorithms do not include any key wrapping algorithms, parsing will fail and the application will be unaffected. This panic is also reachable by calling cipher.KeyUnwrap() directly with any ciphertext parameter less than 16 bytes long, but calling this function directly is less common. Panics can lead to denial of service. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.1.4 and 3.0.5.
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Go JOSE provides an implementation of the Javascript Object Signing and Encryption set of standards in Go, including support for JSON Web Encryption (JWE), JSON Web Signature (JWS), and JSON Web Token (JWT) standards. Prior to 4.1.4 and 3.0.5, decrypting a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) object will panic if the alg field indicates a key wrapping algorithm (one ending in KW, with the exception of A128GCMKW, A192GCMKW, and A256GCMKW) and the encrypted_key field is empty. The panic happens when cipher.KeyUnwrap() in key_wrap.go attempts to allocate a slice with a zero or negative length based on the length of the encrypted_key. This code path is reachable from ParseEncrypted() / ParseEncryptedJSON() / ParseEncryptedCompact() followed by Decrypt() on the resulting object. Note that the parse functions take a list of accepted key algorithms. If the accepted key algorithms do not include any key wrapping algorithms, parsing will fail and the application will be unaffected. This panic is also reachable by calling cipher.KeyUnwrap() directly with any ciphertext parameter less than 16 bytes long, but calling this function directly is less common. Panics can lead to denial of service. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.1.4 and 3.0.5.
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GitHub
Panic in JWE decryption
### Impact
Decrypting a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) object will panic if the `alg` field indicates a key wrapping algorithm ([one ending in `KW`](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4#p...
Decrypting a JSON Web Encryption (JWE) object will panic if the `alg` field indicates a key wrapping algorithm ([one ending in `KW`](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4#p...
🚨 CVE-2026-34078
Flatpak is a Linux application sandboxing and distribution framework. Prior to 1.16.4, the Flatpak portal accepts paths in the sandbox-expose options which can be app-controlled symlinks pointing at arbitrary paths. Flatpak run mounts the resolved host path in the sandbox. This gives apps access to all host files and can be used as a primitive to gain code execution in the host context. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.16.4.
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Flatpak is a Linux application sandboxing and distribution framework. Prior to 1.16.4, the Flatpak portal accepts paths in the sandbox-expose options which can be app-controlled symlinks pointing at arbitrary paths. Flatpak run mounts the resolved host path in the sandbox. This gives apps access to all host files and can be used as a primitive to gain code execution in the host context. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.16.4.
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GitHub
CVE-2026-34078: Complete sandbox escape leading to host file access and code execution in the host context
### Impact
Every Flatpak app is able to read and write arbitrary files on the host and execute code in the host context.
### Description
The Flatpak portal accepts paths in the `sandbox-expose...
Every Flatpak app is able to read and write arbitrary files on the host and execute code in the host context.
### Description
The Flatpak portal accepts paths in the `sandbox-expose...
🚨 CVE-2026-32280
During chain building, the amount of work that is done is not correctly limited when a large number of intermediate certificates are passed in VerifyOptions.Intermediates, which can lead to a denial of service. This affects both direct users of crypto/x509 and users of crypto/tls.
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During chain building, the amount of work that is done is not correctly limited when a large number of intermediate certificates are passed in VerifyOptions.Intermediates, which can lead to a denial of service. This affects both direct users of crypto/x509 and users of crypto/tls.
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🚨 CVE-2026-32283
If one side of the TLS connection sends multiple key update messages post-handshake in a single record, the connection can deadlock, causing uncontrolled consumption of resources. This can lead to a denial of service. This only affects TLS 1.3.
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If one side of the TLS connection sends multiple key update messages post-handshake in a single record, the connection can deadlock, causing uncontrolled consumption of resources. This can lead to a denial of service. This only affects TLS 1.3.
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🚨 CVE-2026-33810
When verifying a certificate chain containing excluded DNS constraints, these constraints are not correctly applied to wildcard DNS SANs which use a different case than the constraint. This only affects validation of otherwise trusted certificate chains, issued by a root CA in the VerifyOptions.Roots CertPool, or in the system certificate pool.
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When verifying a certificate chain containing excluded DNS constraints, these constraints are not correctly applied to wildcard DNS SANs which use a different case than the constraint. This only affects validation of otherwise trusted certificate chains, issued by a root CA in the VerifyOptions.Roots CertPool, or in the system certificate pool.
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🚨 CVE-2026-34486
Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data vulnerability in Apache Tomcat due to the fix for CVE-2026-29146 allowing the bypass of the EncryptInterceptor.
This issue affects Apache Tomcat: 11.0.20, 10.1.53, 9.0.116.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 11.0.21, 10.1.54 or 9.0.117, which fix the issue.
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Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data vulnerability in Apache Tomcat due to the fix for CVE-2026-29146 allowing the bypass of the EncryptInterceptor.
This issue affects Apache Tomcat: 11.0.20, 10.1.53, 9.0.116.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 11.0.21, 10.1.54 or 9.0.117, which fix the issue.
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🚨 CVE-2026-31419
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bonding: fix use-after-free in bond_xmit_broadcast()
bond_xmit_broadcast() reuses the original skb for the last slave
(determined by bond_is_last_slave()) and clones it for others.
Concurrent slave enslave/release can mutate the slave list during
RCU-protected iteration, changing which slave is "last" mid-loop.
This causes the original skb to be double-consumed (double-freed).
Replace the racy bond_is_last_slave() check with a simple index
comparison (i + 1 == slaves_count) against the pre-snapshot slave
count taken via READ_ONCE() before the loop. This preserves the
zero-copy optimization for the last slave while making the "last"
determination stable against concurrent list mutations.
The UAF can trigger the following crash:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in skb_clone
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888100ef8d40 by task exploit/147
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 147 Comm: exploit Not tainted 7.0.0-rc3+ #4 PREEMPTLAZY
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:597)
skb_clone (include/linux/skbuff.h:1724 include/linux/skbuff.h:1792 include/linux/skbuff.h:3396 net/core/skbuff.c:2108)
bond_xmit_broadcast (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5334)
bond_start_xmit (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5567 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5593)
dev_hard_start_xmit (include/linux/netdevice.h:5325 include/linux/netdevice.h:5334 net/core/dev.c:3871 net/core/dev.c:3887)
__dev_queue_xmit (include/linux/netdevice.h:3601 net/core/dev.c:4838)
ip6_finish_output2 (include/net/neighbour.h:540 include/net/neighbour.h:554 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:136)
ip6_finish_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:208 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:219)
ip6_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:250)
ip6_send_skb (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1985)
udp_v6_send_skb (net/ipv6/udp.c:1442)
udpv6_sendmsg (net/ipv6/udp.c:1733)
__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:730 net/socket.c:742 net/socket.c:2206)
__x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
</TASK>
Allocated by task 147:
Freed by task 147:
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888100ef8c80
which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224
The buggy address is located 192 bytes inside of
freed 224-byte region [ffff888100ef8c80, ffff888100ef8d60)
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888100ef8c00: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888100ef8c80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff888100ef8d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888100ef8d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888100ef8e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bonding: fix use-after-free in bond_xmit_broadcast()
bond_xmit_broadcast() reuses the original skb for the last slave
(determined by bond_is_last_slave()) and clones it for others.
Concurrent slave enslave/release can mutate the slave list during
RCU-protected iteration, changing which slave is "last" mid-loop.
This causes the original skb to be double-consumed (double-freed).
Replace the racy bond_is_last_slave() check with a simple index
comparison (i + 1 == slaves_count) against the pre-snapshot slave
count taken via READ_ONCE() before the loop. This preserves the
zero-copy optimization for the last slave while making the "last"
determination stable against concurrent list mutations.
The UAF can trigger the following crash:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in skb_clone
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888100ef8d40 by task exploit/147
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 147 Comm: exploit Not tainted 7.0.0-rc3+ #4 PREEMPTLAZY
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:597)
skb_clone (include/linux/skbuff.h:1724 include/linux/skbuff.h:1792 include/linux/skbuff.h:3396 net/core/skbuff.c:2108)
bond_xmit_broadcast (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5334)
bond_start_xmit (drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5567 drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c:5593)
dev_hard_start_xmit (include/linux/netdevice.h:5325 include/linux/netdevice.h:5334 net/core/dev.c:3871 net/core/dev.c:3887)
__dev_queue_xmit (include/linux/netdevice.h:3601 net/core/dev.c:4838)
ip6_finish_output2 (include/net/neighbour.h:540 include/net/neighbour.h:554 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:136)
ip6_finish_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:208 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:219)
ip6_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:250)
ip6_send_skb (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1985)
udp_v6_send_skb (net/ipv6/udp.c:1442)
udpv6_sendmsg (net/ipv6/udp.c:1733)
__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:730 net/socket.c:742 net/socket.c:2206)
__x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
</TASK>
Allocated by task 147:
Freed by task 147:
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888100ef8c80
which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224
The buggy address is located 192 bytes inside of
freed 224-byte region [ffff888100ef8c80, ffff888100ef8d60)
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888100ef8c00: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888100ef8c80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff888100ef8d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888100ef8d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff888100ef8e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
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🚨 CVE-2026-4786
Mitgation of CVE-2026-4519 was incomplete. If the URL contained "%action" the mitigation could be bypassed for certain browser types the "webbrowser.open()" API could have commands injected into the underlying shell. See CVE-2026-4519 for details.
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Mitgation of CVE-2026-4519 was incomplete. If the URL contained "%action" the mitigation could be bypassed for certain browser types the "webbrowser.open()" API could have commands injected into the underlying shell. See CVE-2026-4519 for details.
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GitHub
[3.14] gh-148169: Fix webbrowser `%action` substitution bypass of das… · python/cpython@28b4ad3
…h-prefix check (GH-148170) (#148516)
Co-authored-by: Stan Ulbrych <stan@python.org>
Co-authored-by: Stan Ulbrych <stan@python.org>