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🚨 CVE-2026-41523
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). Prior to 0.22.0, an assert-based security check in vLLM's activation function loading allows any unauthenticated attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution on the server by publishing a malicious HuggingFace model, when vLLM runs in Python optimized mode (python -O or PYTHONOPTIMIZE=1). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.22.0.

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🚨 CVE-2023-54365
Traefik before 2.10.5 and 3.0.0-beta4 is affected by a denial-of-service vulnerability in HTTP/2 request handling inherited from the Go standard library's HTTP/2 implementation (CVE-2023-44487 / CVE-2023-39325, the 'Rapid Reset' technique). A remote attacker can rapidly create and cancel HTTP/2 streams to exhaust server resources and cause service unavailability.

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🚨 CVE-2026-56379
ImageMagick before 7.1.2-15 and 6.9.13-40 contains a command injection vulnerability in the SVG decoder that allows attackers to inject arbitrary MVG drawing commands. Attackers can craft malicious SVG files with injected Magick Vector Graphics commands that execute during rendering.

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🚨 CVE-2026-52845
Caddy is an extensible server platform that uses TLS by default. Prior to 2.11.4, forward_auth copy_headers deletes the exact client-supplied identity header before copying the trusted value from the auth gateway. But when the request later goes through php_fastcgi, Caddy normalizes HTTP headers into CGI variables by replacing - with _. This lets a client send an underscore alias that survives the forward_auth delete step but becomes the same PHP/FastCGI variable. Result: a remote client can inject or sometimes override identity/group headers trusted by PHP/FastCGI applications behind Caddy. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.11.4.

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🚨 CVE-2026-48020
Traefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. Prior to 2.11.48, 3.6.19, and 3.7.3, there is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's StripPrefix middleware that allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass route-level authentication and authorization. When a public router matches on a PathPrefix rule and applies the StripPrefix middleware, a request path containing .. or its percent-encoded form %2e%2e can match the public route at routing time and then, after the prefix is stripped and the path is normalized, resolve to a path served by a separate, authenticated router. As a result, an attacker can reach protected backend paths β€” such as admin or internal configuration endpoints β€” without satisfying the authentication middleware attached to the protected router. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.11.48, 3.6.19, and 3.7.3.

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🚨 CVE-2026-48491
Traefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. From 3.7.0 until 3.7.3, there is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's domain-fronting protection (SNICheck) that allows an unauthenticated client to bypass mutual TLS enforced through wildcard router TLSOptions. When a router uses a wildcard host rule such as Host(*.example.com) with stricter TLS options (for example RequireAndVerifyClientCert), SNICheck resolves the TLS options for the HTTP Host header using exact map lookups only and never applies wildcard matching. If another permissive SNI is served on the same entrypoint, an attacker can complete the TLS handshake under the permissive options and then send an HTTP Host header targeting the wildcard-protected backend, reaching it without presenting a client certificate. This affects the regular HTTPS / HTTP-2 path and does not require HTTP/3. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.3.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53622
Traefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. Prior to 3.7.3, there is a critical vulnerability in Traefik's HTTP/3 (QUIC) TLS configuration selection that allows unauthenticated clients to bypass router-specific mTLS enforcement. When HTTP/3 is enabled on an entrypoint, the TLS handshake selects the applicable TLS configuration through an exact, case-sensitive lookup on the SNI value, which fails to match wildcard host patterns (e.g., *.example.com) or case variants of the configured hostname. Because the handshake falls back to the default TLS configuration β€” which may not require client certificates β€” a client can complete the QUIC handshake without presenting a certificate, while the subsequent HTTP routing layer still dispatches the request to a backend protected by a router-specific mTLS policy. The issue affects deployments where HTTP/3 is enabled, a router uses a wildcard Host rule or case-insensitive hostname matching, a router-specific TLSOptions enforces client certificate authentication, and UDP access to the entrypoint is reachable by an attacker. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.3.

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🚨 CVE-2026-12112
A flaw was found in the foreman-mcp-server. A session management vulnerability in the MCP Server allows unauthenticated attackers to hijack active administrative sessions due to an improper cache of authenticated client connections, by trusting a non-secret session ID without re-validating authentication tokens and by logging all newly created session IDs to standard logs. This issue can result in privilege escalation and infrastructure-wide code execution.

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🚨 CVE-2026-54513
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() allowlists any array type based only on clazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permits EvilType[] even though EvilType is not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.

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🚨 CVE-2026-52923
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipc: limit next_id allocation to the valid ID range

The checkpoint/restore sysctl path can request the next SysV IPC id
through ids->next_id. ipc_idr_alloc() currently forwards that request to
idr_alloc() with an open-ended upper bound.

If the valid tail of the SysV IPC id space is full, the allocation can
spill beyond ipc_mni. The returned SysV IPC id still uses the normal
index encoding, so later lookup and removal can target the wrong slot.
This leaves the real IDR entry behind and breaks the IDR state for the
object.

The bug is in ipc_idr_alloc() in the checkpoint/restore path.

1. ids->next_id is passed to:

idr_alloc(&ids->ipcs_idr, new, ipcid_to_idx(next_id), 0, ...)

2. The zero upper bound makes the allocation effectively open-ended.
Once the valid SysV IPC tail is occupied, idr_alloc() can spill past
ipc_mni and allocate an entry beyond the valid IPC id range.

3. The new object id is still encoded with the narrower SysV IPC index
width:

new->id = (new->seq << ipcmni_seq_shift()) + idx

4. Later removal goes through ipc_rmid(), which uses:

ipcid_to_idx(ipcp->id)

That truncates the real IDR index. An object actually stored at a
high index can then be removed as if it lived at a low in-range
index.

5. For shared memory, shm_destroy() frees the current object anyway, but
the real high IDR slot is left behind as a dangling pointer.

6. A subsequent walk of /proc/sysvipc/shm reaches the stale IDR entry
and dereferences freed memory.

Prevent this by bounding the requested allocation to ipc_mni so the
checkpoint/restore path fails once the valid range is exhausted.

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🚨 CVE-2026-52924
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sctp: purge outqueue on stale COOKIE-ECHO handling

sctp_stream_update() is only invoked when the association is moved into
COOKIE_WAIT during association setup/reconfiguration. In this path, the
outbound stream scheduler state (stream->out_curr) is expected to be
clean, since no user data should have been transmitted yet unless the
state machine has already partially progressed.

However, a corner case exists in sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(): when a
Stale Cookie ERROR is received, the association is rolled back from
COOKIE_ECHOED to COOKIE_WAIT. In this scenario, user data may already
have been queued and even bundled with the COOKIE-ECHO chunk.

During the rollback, sctp_stream_update() frees the old stream table
and installs a new one, but it does not invalidate stream->out_curr.
As a result, out_curr may still point to a freed sctp_stream_out
entry from the previous stream state.

Later, SCTP scheduler dequeue paths (FCFS, RR, PRIO, etc.) rely on
stream->out_curr->ext, which can lead to use-after-free once the old
stream state has been released via sctp_stream_free().

This results in crashes such as (reported by Yuqi):

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sctp_sched_fcfs_dequeue+0x13a/0x140
Read of size 8 at addr ff1100004d4d3208 by task mini_poc/9312
CPU: 1 UID: 1001 PID: 9312 Comm: mini_poc Not tainted
7.1.0-rc1-00305-gbd3a4795d574 #5 PREEMPT(full)
sctp_sched_fcfs_dequeue+0x13a/0x140
sctp_outq_flush+0x1603/0x33e0
sctp_do_sm+0x31c9/0x5d30
sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x392/0x6f0
sctp_inq_push+0x1db/0x270
sctp_rcv+0x138d/0x3c10

Fix this by fully purging the association outqueue when handling the
Stale Cookie case. This ensures all pending transmit and retransmit
state is dropped, and any scheduler cached pointers are invalidated,
making it safe to rebuild stream state during COOKIE_WAIT restart.

Updating only stream->out_curr would be insufficient, since queued
and retransmittable data would still reference the old stream state and
trigger later use-after-free in dequeue paths.

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🚨 CVE-2026-52943
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: skbuff: fix missing zerocopy reference in pskb_carve helpers

pskb_carve_inside_header() and pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear() both copy
the old skb_shared_info header into a new buffer via memcpy(), which
includes the destructor_arg pointer (uarg) for MSG_ZEROCOPY skbs.
Neither function calls net_zcopy_get() for the new shinfo, creating an
unaccounted holder: every skb_shared_info with destructor_arg set will
call skb_zcopy_clear() once when freed, but the corresponding
net_zcopy_get() was never called for the new copy. Repeated calls
drive uarg->refcnt to zero prematurely, freeing ubuf_info_msgzc while
TX skbs still hold live destructor_arg pointers.

KASAN reports use-after-free on a freed ubuf_info_msgzc:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in skb_release_data+0x77b/0x810
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801574d3e8 by task poc/220

Call Trace:
skb_release_data+0x77b/0x810
kfree_skb_list_reason+0x13e/0x610
skb_release_data+0x4cd/0x810
sk_skb_reason_drop+0xf3/0x340
skb_queue_purge_reason+0x282/0x440
rds_tcp_inc_free+0x1e/0x30
rds_recvmsg+0x354/0x1780
__sys_recvmsg+0xdf/0x180

Allocated by task 219:
msg_zerocopy_realloc+0x157/0x7b0
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2892/0x3ba0

Freed by task 219:
ip_recv_error+0x74a/0xb10
tcp_recvmsg+0x475/0x530

The skb consuming the late access still referenced the same uarg via
shinfo->destructor_arg copied by pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear() without
a refcount bump. This has been verified to be reliably exploitable: a
working proof-of-concept achieves full root privilege escalation from
an unprivileged local user on a default kernel configuration.

The fix follows the pattern of pskb_expand_head() which has the same
memcpy/cloned structure. For pskb_carve_inside_header(), net_zcopy_get()
is placed after skb_orphan_frags() succeeds, so the orphan error path
needs no cleanup. For pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear(), net_zcopy_get() is
placed after all failure points and just before skb_release_data(), so
no error path needs cleanup at all -- matching pskb_expand_head() more
closely and avoiding the need for a balancing net_zcopy_put().

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🚨 CVE-2026-57281
Jenkins Script Security Plugin 1402.v94c9ce464861 and earlier does not reject Groovy AST transformation annotations carrying an extensions member, allowing attackers able to run sandboxed Groovy scripts to execute code outside the sandbox if a suitable script is present on the classpath of the component that evaluates the script.

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🚨 CVE-2026-56121
Feast before 0.63.0 contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that allows unauthenticated or unauthorized attackers to achieve remote code execution by sending a crafted gRPC request to the registry server. The user_defined_function.body field of an OnDemandFeatureView spec is decoded from base64 and passed to dill.loads() before any authorization check is performed, enabling attackers to embed a malicious serialized Python object with an arbitrary __reduce__ method to execute OS commands as the feast service account.

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🚨 CVE-2026-52950
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/xe/dma-buf: fix UAF with retry loop

Retry doesn't work here, since bo will be freed on error, leading to
UAF. However, now that we do the alloc & init before the attach, we can
now combine this as one unit and have the init do the alloc for us. This
should make the retry safe.

Reported by Sashiko.

v2: Fix up the error unwind (CI)

(cherry picked from commit 479669418253e0f27f8cf5db01a731352ea592e7)

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🚨 CVE-2026-52951
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/xe/dma-buf: handle empty bo and UAF races

There look to be some nasty races here when triggering the
invalidate_mappings hook:

1) We do xe_bo_alloc() followed by the attach, before the actual full bo
init step in xe_dma_buf_init_obj(). However the bo is visible on the
attachments list after the attach. This is bad since exporter driver,
say amdgpu, can at any time call back into our invalidate_mappings hook,
with an empty/bogus bo, leading to potential bugs/crashes.

2) Similar to 1) but here we get a UAF, when the invalidate_mappings
hook is triggered. For example, we get as far as xe_bo_init_locked()
but this fails in some way. But here the bo will be freed on error, but
we still have it attached from dma-buf pov, so if the
invalidate_mappings is now triggered then the bo we access is gone and
we trigger UAF and more bugs/crashes.

To fix this, move the attach step until after we actually have a fully
set up buffer object. Note that the bo is not published to userspace
until later, so not sure what the comment "Don't publish the bo
until we have a valid attachment", is referring to.

We have at least two different customers reporting hitting a NULL ptr
deref in evict_flags when importing something from amdgpu, followed by
triggering the evict flow. Hit rate is also pretty low, which would
hint at some kind of race, so something like 1) or 2) might explain
this.

v2:
- Shuffle the order of the ops slightly (no functional change)
- Improve the comment to better explain the ordering (Matt B)

(cherry picked from commit af1f2ad0c59fe4e2f924c526f66e968289d77971)

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