🚨 CVE-2026-46145
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mana: Validate rx_hash_key_len
Sashiko points out that rx_hash_key_len comes from a uAPI structure and is
blindly passed to memcpy, allowing the userspace to trash kernel
memory. Bounds check it so the memcpy cannot overflow.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mana: Validate rx_hash_key_len
Sashiko points out that rx_hash_key_len comes from a uAPI structure and is
blindly passed to memcpy, allowing the userspace to trash kernel
memory. Bounds check it so the memcpy cannot overflow.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46152
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: drop stray 'static' from fast-RX rx_result
ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx() is documented as safe for parallel RX, but
its per-invocation rx_result is declared static. Concurrent callers then
share one instance and can overwrite each other's result between
ieee80211_rx_mesh_data() and the switch on res.
That can make a packet that was queued or consumed by
ieee80211_rx_mesh_data() fall through into ieee80211_rx_8023(), or make
a packet that should continue return as queued.
Make res an automatic variable so each invocation keeps its own result.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: drop stray 'static' from fast-RX rx_result
ieee80211_invoke_fast_rx() is documented as safe for parallel RX, but
its per-invocation rx_result is declared static. Concurrent callers then
share one instance and can overwrite each other's result between
ieee80211_rx_mesh_data() and the switch on res.
That can make a packet that was queued or consumed by
ieee80211_rx_mesh_data() fall through into ieee80211_rx_8023(), or make
a packet that should continue return as queued.
Make res an automatic variable so each invocation keeps its own result.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46166
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: use safe list iteration in radar detect work
The call to ieee80211_dfs_cac_cancel can cause the iterated chanctx to
be freed and removed from the list. Guard against this to avoid a
slab-use-after-free error.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: use safe list iteration in radar detect work
The call to ieee80211_dfs_cac_cancel can cause the iterated chanctx to
be freed and removed from the list. Guard against this to avoid a
slab-use-after-free error.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46176
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix error path fall-through in mlx5_ib_dev_res_srq_init()
mlx5_ib_dev_res_srq_init() allocates two SRQs, s0 and s1. When
ib_create_srq() fails for s1, the error branch destroys s0 but falls
through and unconditionally assigns the freed s0 and the ERR_PTR s1 to
devr->s0 and devr->s1.
This leads to several problems: the lock-free fast path checks
"if (devr->s1) return 0;" and treats the ERR_PTR as already initialised;
users in mlx5_ib_create_qp() dereference the freed SRQ or ERR_PTR via
to_msrq(devr->s0)->msrq.srqn; and mlx5_ib_dev_res_cleanup() dereferences
the ERR_PTR and double-frees s0 on teardown.
Fix by adding the same `goto unlock` in the s1 failure path.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Fix error path fall-through in mlx5_ib_dev_res_srq_init()
mlx5_ib_dev_res_srq_init() allocates two SRQs, s0 and s1. When
ib_create_srq() fails for s1, the error branch destroys s0 but falls
through and unconditionally assigns the freed s0 and the ERR_PTR s1 to
devr->s0 and devr->s1.
This leads to several problems: the lock-free fast path checks
"if (devr->s1) return 0;" and treats the ERR_PTR as already initialised;
users in mlx5_ib_create_qp() dereference the freed SRQ or ERR_PTR via
to_msrq(devr->s0)->msrq.srqn; and mlx5_ib_dev_res_cleanup() dereferences
the ERR_PTR and double-frees s0 on teardown.
Fix by adding the same `goto unlock` in the s1 failure path.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46181
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx4: Fix mis-use of RCU in mlx4_srq_event()
Sashiko points out the radix_tree itself is RCU safe, but nothing ever
frees the mlx4_srq struct with RCU, and it isn't even accessed within the
RCU critical section. It also will crash if an event is delivered before
the srq object is finished initializing.
Use the spinlock since it isn't easy to make RCU work, use
refcount_inc_not_zero() to protect against partially initialized objects,
and order the refcount_set() to be after the srq is fully initialized.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx4: Fix mis-use of RCU in mlx4_srq_event()
Sashiko points out the radix_tree itself is RCU safe, but nothing ever
frees the mlx4_srq struct with RCU, and it isn't even accessed within the
RCU critical section. It also will crash if an event is delivered before
the srq object is finished initializing.
Use the spinlock since it isn't easy to make RCU work, use
refcount_inc_not_zero() to protect against partially initialized objects,
and order the refcount_set() to be after the srq is fully initialized.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46189
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Fix double free on pvrdma_alloc_ucontext() error path
Sashiko points out that pvrdma_uar_free() is already called within
pvrdma_dealloc_ucontext(), so calling it before triggers a double free.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Fix double free on pvrdma_alloc_ucontext() error path
Sashiko points out that pvrdma_uar_free() is already called within
pvrdma_dealloc_ucontext(), so calling it before triggers a double free.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46195
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: validate dacloffset before building DACL pointers
parse_sec_desc(), build_sec_desc(), and the chown path in
id_mode_to_cifs_acl() all add the server-supplied dacloffset to pntsd
before proving a DACL header fits inside the returned security
descriptor.
On 32-bit builds a malicious server can return dacloffset near
U32_MAX, wrap the derived DACL pointer below end_of_acl, and then slip
past the later pointer-based bounds checks. build_sec_desc() and
id_mode_to_cifs_acl() can then dereference DACL fields from the wrapped
pointer in the chmod/chown rewrite paths.
Validate dacloffset numerically before building any DACL pointer and
reuse the same helper at the three DACL entry points.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: validate dacloffset before building DACL pointers
parse_sec_desc(), build_sec_desc(), and the chown path in
id_mode_to_cifs_acl() all add the server-supplied dacloffset to pntsd
before proving a DACL header fits inside the returned security
descriptor.
On 32-bit builds a malicious server can return dacloffset near
U32_MAX, wrap the derived DACL pointer below end_of_acl, and then slip
past the later pointer-based bounds checks. build_sec_desc() and
id_mode_to_cifs_acl() can then dereference DACL fields from the wrapped
pointer in the chmod/chown rewrite paths.
Validate dacloffset numerically before building any DACL pointer and
reuse the same helper at the three DACL entry points.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46227
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: revalidate list cursor after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() in SCTP_SENDALL
The SCTP_SENDALL path in sctp_sendmsg() iterates ep->asocs with
list_for_each_entry_safe(), which caches the next entry in @tmp before
the loop body runs. The body calls sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(), which may
drop the socket lock inside sctp_wait_for_sndbuf().
While the lock is dropped, another thread can SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF the
association cached in @tmp, migrating it to a new endpoint via
sctp_sock_migrate() (list_del_init() + list_add_tail() to
newep->asocs), and optionally close the new socket which frees the
association via kfree_rcu(). The cached @tmp can also be freed by a
network ABORT for that association, processed in softirq while the
lock is dropped.
sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() revalidates @asoc (the current entry) on re-lock
via the "sk != asoc->base.sk" and "asoc->base.dead" checks, but nothing
revalidates @tmp. After a successful return, the iterator advances to
the stale @tmp, yielding either a use-after-free (if the peeled socket
was closed) or a list-walk onto the new endpoint's list head (type
confusion of &newep->asocs as a struct sctp_association *).
Both are reachable from CapEff=0; the type-confusion path gives
controlled indirect call via the outqueue.sched->init_sid pointer.
Fix by re-deriving @tmp from @asoc after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc()
returns. @asoc is known to still be on ep->asocs at that point: the
only callers that list_del an association from ep->asocs are
sctp_association_free() (which sets asoc->base.dead) and
sctp_assoc_migrate() (which changes asoc->base.sk), and
sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() checks both under the lock before any
successful return; a tripped check propagates as err < 0 and the loop
bails before the re-derive.
The SCTP_ABORT path in sctp_sendmsg_check_sflags() returns 0 and the
loop hits 'continue' before sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() is ever called, so
the @tmp cached by list_for_each_entry_safe() still covers the
lock-held free that ba59fb027307 ("sctp: walk the list of asoc
safely") was added for.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: revalidate list cursor after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() in SCTP_SENDALL
The SCTP_SENDALL path in sctp_sendmsg() iterates ep->asocs with
list_for_each_entry_safe(), which caches the next entry in @tmp before
the loop body runs. The body calls sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(), which may
drop the socket lock inside sctp_wait_for_sndbuf().
While the lock is dropped, another thread can SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF the
association cached in @tmp, migrating it to a new endpoint via
sctp_sock_migrate() (list_del_init() + list_add_tail() to
newep->asocs), and optionally close the new socket which frees the
association via kfree_rcu(). The cached @tmp can also be freed by a
network ABORT for that association, processed in softirq while the
lock is dropped.
sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() revalidates @asoc (the current entry) on re-lock
via the "sk != asoc->base.sk" and "asoc->base.dead" checks, but nothing
revalidates @tmp. After a successful return, the iterator advances to
the stale @tmp, yielding either a use-after-free (if the peeled socket
was closed) or a list-walk onto the new endpoint's list head (type
confusion of &newep->asocs as a struct sctp_association *).
Both are reachable from CapEff=0; the type-confusion path gives
controlled indirect call via the outqueue.sched->init_sid pointer.
Fix by re-deriving @tmp from @asoc after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc()
returns. @asoc is known to still be on ep->asocs at that point: the
only callers that list_del an association from ep->asocs are
sctp_association_free() (which sets asoc->base.dead) and
sctp_assoc_migrate() (which changes asoc->base.sk), and
sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() checks both under the lock before any
successful return; a tripped check propagates as err < 0 and the loop
bails before the re-derive.
The SCTP_ABORT path in sctp_sendmsg_check_sflags() returns 0 and the
loop hits 'continue' before sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() is ever called, so
the @tmp cached by list_for_each_entry_safe() still covers the
lock-held free that ba59fb027307 ("sctp: walk the list of asoc
safely") was added for.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-48526
PyJWT is a JSON Web Token implementation in Python. Prior to 2.13.0, when the verifier is decoding JSON Web Tokens, while supporting both asymmetric and HMAC algorithms, the library does not validate use of JSON Web Keys in HMAC algorithm, allowing attacker to use the issuer public key as the secret key for HMAC algorithm. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.13.0.
🎖@cveNotify
PyJWT is a JSON Web Token implementation in Python. Prior to 2.13.0, when the verifier is decoding JSON Web Tokens, while supporting both asymmetric and HMAC algorithms, the library does not validate use of JSON Web Keys in HMAC algorithm, allowing attacker to use the issuer public key as the secret key for HMAC algorithm. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.13.0.
🎖@cveNotify
GitHub
Public-key JWK accepted as HMAC secret enables forged HS256 tokens when mixed families are allowed
> [!NOTE]
> Exploitation requires a verifier configured with both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms in `algorithms=[…]` and a raw-JSON JWK as the `key=` argument, both contrary to document...
> Exploitation requires a verifier configured with both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms in `algorithms=[…]` and a raw-JSON JWK as the `key=` argument, both contrary to document...
🚨 CVE-2026-44477
CloudNativePG is a platform designed to manage PostgreSQL databases within Kubernetes environments. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.28.3, the CloudNativePG metrics exporter opens its PostgreSQL connection as the postgres superuser via the pod-local Unix socket, then demotes the session with SET ROLE pg_monitor. SET ROLE changes only current_user; session_user remains postgres. Any SQL expression evaluated inside the scrape session can invoke RESET ROLE to recover real superuser privileges, then use COPY ... TO PROGRAM to spawn an OS-level subprocess as the postgres user inside the primary pod. The READ ONLY transaction flag does not block this; it gates writes to database state, not external processes. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.29.1 and 1.28.3.
🎖@cveNotify
CloudNativePG is a platform designed to manage PostgreSQL databases within Kubernetes environments. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.28.3, the CloudNativePG metrics exporter opens its PostgreSQL connection as the postgres superuser via the pod-local Unix socket, then demotes the session with SET ROLE pg_monitor. SET ROLE changes only current_user; session_user remains postgres. Any SQL expression evaluated inside the scrape session can invoke RESET ROLE to recover real superuser privileges, then use COPY ... TO PROGRAM to spawn an OS-level subprocess as the postgres user inside the primary pod. The READ ONLY transaction flag does not block this; it gates writes to database state, not external processes. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.29.1 and 1.28.3.
🎖@cveNotify
GitHub
fix: schema-qualify catalog references in monitoring queries by gbartolini · Pull Request #10576 · cloudnative-pg/cloudnative-pg
Unqualified references to pg_catalog functions and views are resolved via search_path, which can be manipulated by a database user to shadow built-in objects. Use explicit pg_catalog. qualification...
🚨 CVE-2026-45292
opentelemetry-java is the Java implementation of the OpenTelemetry API for recording telemetry, and SDK for managing telemetry recorded by the API. Prior to 1.62.0, a vulnerability affects the baggage propagation implementation in opentelemetry-api and opentelemetry-extension-trace-propagators. Parsing oversized baggage causes unbounded memory allocation and CPU consumption. Because baggage is automatically re-injected into every outgoing request, the effect can fan out to downstream services that never received the original malicious request. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.62.0.
🎖@cveNotify
opentelemetry-java is the Java implementation of the OpenTelemetry API for recording telemetry, and SDK for managing telemetry recorded by the API. Prior to 1.62.0, a vulnerability affects the baggage propagation implementation in opentelemetry-api and opentelemetry-extension-trace-propagators. Parsing oversized baggage causes unbounded memory allocation and CPU consumption. Because baggage is automatically re-injected into every outgoing request, the effect can fan out to downstream services that never received the original malicious request. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.62.0.
🎖@cveNotify
GitHub
Apply baggage limits (#8380) · open-telemetry/opentelemetry-java@03837d3
OpenTelemetry Java SDK. Contribute to open-telemetry/opentelemetry-java development by creating an account on GitHub.
🚨 CVE-2026-42999
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.2. The Keystone RBAC policy enforcer in enforce_call unconditionally merges the raw JSON request body into the policy enforcement dictionary via policy_dict.update(json_input.copy()), overwriting trusted target data that was previously set from database lookups. Because flask.request.get_json is called with force=True, this works regardless of Content-Type or HTTP method. Any authenticated user can inject arbitrary policy target attributes (e.g., user_id, project_id) into the request body to bypass RBAC checks and perform unauthorized operations on resources belonging to other users or projects. This was introduced in commit 5ea59f52 (Rocky/14.0.0).
🎖@cveNotify
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.2. The Keystone RBAC policy enforcer in enforce_call unconditionally merges the raw JSON request body into the policy enforcement dictionary via policy_dict.update(json_input.copy()), overwriting trusted target data that was previously set from database lookups. Because flask.request.get_json is called with force=True, this works regardless of Content-Type or HTTP method. Any authenticated user can inject arbitrary policy target attributes (e.g., user_id, project_id) into the request body to bypass RBAC checks and perform unauthorized operations on resources belonging to other users or projects. This was introduced in commit 5ea59f52 (Rocky/14.0.0).
🎖@cveNotify
Launchpad
Bug #2148398 “[OSSA-2026-015] RBAC Policy Target Injection via J...” : Bugs : OpenStack Identity (keystone)
In keystone/common/rbac_enforcer/enforcer.py at line 478-479, the
enforce_call method unconditionally merges the raw JSON request body
into the policy enforcement dictionary after trusted target data has
been set from the database:
json_input = flask.r…
enforce_call method unconditionally merges the raw JSON request body
into the policy enforcement dictionary after trusted target data has
been set from the database:
json_input = flask.r…
🚨 CVE-2026-43000
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.2. When combined with an application credential impersonation vulnerability, an attacker with the member role on a project can escalate to admin by chaining unrestricted application credentials with Keystone trusts. The impersonated token carries the victim's identity, which passes the trustor validation check. Keystone then validates the delegated roles against the victim's actual role assignments in the database, not the roles on the requesting token. This allows the attacker to create a trust delegating the victim's admin role to themselves. The trust persists independently, and additional trusts and application credentials can be created to maintain access. All actions are logged under the victim's identity.
🎖@cveNotify
An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.2. When combined with an application credential impersonation vulnerability, an attacker with the member role on a project can escalate to admin by chaining unrestricted application credentials with Keystone trusts. The impersonated token carries the victim's identity, which passes the trustor validation check. Keystone then validates the delegated roles against the victim's actual role assignments in the database, not the roles on the requesting token. This allows the attacker to create a trust delegating the victim's admin role to themselves. The trust persists independently, and additional trusts and application credentials can be created to maintain access. All actions are logged under the victim's identity.
🎖@cveNotify
Launchpad
Bug #2148477 “[OSSA-2026-015] Impersonation via application cred...” : Bugs : OpenStack Identity (keystone)
An attacker who holds a valid application credential on a project can obtain tokens attributed to other users on the same project. The POST /v3/auth/tokens endpoint does not verify that the user specified in the authentication payload matches the owner of…
🚨 CVE-2026-42965
A flaw was found in the OpenShift Router. A user with EndpointSlice write access can exploit this vulnerability by creating a Service backed by an FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) EndpointSlice that resolves to a cloud metadata endpoint. This allows the router to proxy requests to the cloud metadata endpoint, leading to the disclosure of instance credentials and other sensitive metadata. This bypasses previous security measures for validating IP addresses.
🎖@cveNotify
A flaw was found in the OpenShift Router. A user with EndpointSlice write access can exploit this vulnerability by creating a Service backed by an FQDN (Fully Qualified Domain Name) EndpointSlice that resolves to a cloud metadata endpoint. This allows the router to proxy requests to the cloud metadata endpoint, leading to the disclosure of instance credentials and other sensitive metadata. This bypasses previous security measures for validating IP addresses.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46579
A flaw was found in the OpenShift Router. When a Route has `insecureEdgeTerminationPolicy` set to Allow, the HTTP frontend does not remove `X-SSL-Client-*` headers from incoming requests. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to send plain HTTP requests with crafted `X-SSL-Client-*` headers. As a result, backends relying on these headers for mutual TLS (Transport Layer Security) authentication can be bypassed, enabling the attacker to impersonate client certificate identities.
🎖@cveNotify
A flaw was found in the OpenShift Router. When a Route has `insecureEdgeTerminationPolicy` set to Allow, the HTTP frontend does not remove `X-SSL-Client-*` headers from incoming requests. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to send plain HTTP requests with crafted `X-SSL-Client-*` headers. As a result, backends relying on these headers for mutual TLS (Transport Layer Security) authentication can be bypassed, enabling the attacker to impersonate client certificate identities.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-44420
FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to 3.26.0, a malicious RDP client can trigger a heap-buffer-overflow write in FreeRDP's server-side clipboard (cliprdr) channel by sending a CB_CLIP_CAPS PDU with a too-small capabilitySetLength. This can crash the server process (remote DoS) and may be exploitable for code execution because it corrupts heap memory. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.26.0.
🎖@cveNotify
FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to 3.26.0, a malicious RDP client can trigger a heap-buffer-overflow write in FreeRDP's server-side clipboard (cliprdr) channel by sending a CB_CLIP_CAPS PDU with a too-small capabilitySetLength. This can crash the server process (remote DoS) and may be exploitable for code execution because it corrupts heap memory. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.26.0.
🎖@cveNotify
GitHub
FreeRDP cliprdr server heap-buffer-overflow via undersized capabilitySetLength in CB_CLIP_CAPS
### Summary
A malicious RDP client can trigger a heap-buffer-overflow write in FreeRDP's server-side clipboard (cliprdr) channel by sending a CB_CLIP_CAPS PDU with a too-small `capabilitySetLe...
A malicious RDP client can trigger a heap-buffer-overflow write in FreeRDP's server-side clipboard (cliprdr) channel by sending a CB_CLIP_CAPS PDU with a too-small `capabilitySetLe...
🚨 CVE-2026-44421
FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to 3.26.0, a malicious RDP server can trigger a heap-buffer-overflow write in the FreeRDP client by sending crafted RDPGFX PDUs. The bug is in gdi_CacheToSurface: it validates a destination rectangle that is clamped to UINT16_MAX, but then performs the copy using the original cacheEntry->width/height. This can cause a large out-of-bounds heap write and may lead to client crashes or code execution. This bug is reachable from a malicious RDP server, but only when the client has RDPGFX enabled. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.26.0.
🎖@cveNotify
FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to 3.26.0, a malicious RDP server can trigger a heap-buffer-overflow write in the FreeRDP client by sending crafted RDPGFX PDUs. The bug is in gdi_CacheToSurface: it validates a destination rectangle that is clamped to UINT16_MAX, but then performs the copy using the original cacheEntry->width/height. This can cause a large out-of-bounds heap write and may lead to client crashes or code execution. This bug is reachable from a malicious RDP server, but only when the client has RDPGFX enabled. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.26.0.
🎖@cveNotify
GitHub
FreeRDP RDPGFX CacheToSurface heap-buffer-overflow via clamped-rectangle validation bypass
### Summary
A malicious RDP server can trigger a heap-buffer-overflow write in the FreeRDP client by sending crafted RDPGFX PDUs. The bug is in `gdi_CacheToSurface`: it validates a destination rec...
A malicious RDP server can trigger a heap-buffer-overflow write in the FreeRDP client by sending crafted RDPGFX PDUs. The bug is in `gdi_CacheToSurface`: it validates a destination rec...
🚨 CVE-2026-45700
FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to 3.26.0, FreeRDP's planar bitmap decoder has an out-of-bounds heap write when decoding RLE planar data. In libfreerdp/codec/planar.c, freerdp_bitmap_decompress_planar() validates the X destination coordinate nXDst against the caller-provided destination stride (nDstStep) even when it is writing into the internal temp buffer pTempData. An attacker can bypass the check with a large nDstStep and a large nXDst, causing planar_decompress_plane_rle() to write past the end of pTempData. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.26.0.
🎖@cveNotify
FreeRDP is a free implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol. Prior to 3.26.0, FreeRDP's planar bitmap decoder has an out-of-bounds heap write when decoding RLE planar data. In libfreerdp/codec/planar.c, freerdp_bitmap_decompress_planar() validates the X destination coordinate nXDst against the caller-provided destination stride (nDstStep) even when it is writing into the internal temp buffer pTempData. An attacker can bypass the check with a large nDstStep and a large nXDst, causing planar_decompress_plane_rle() to write past the end of pTempData. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.26.0.
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GitHub
Heap-buffer-overflow write in planar bitmap decoder
### Affected
* 3rd party implementations that use their own decoding system and utilize the `FreeRDP` planar decoder
* No FreeRDP server or client is affected by this.
### Summary
FreeRDP...
* 3rd party implementations that use their own decoding system and utilize the `FreeRDP` planar decoder
* No FreeRDP server or client is affected by this.
### Summary
FreeRDP...
🚨 CVE-2026-46384
iskorotkov/avro is a fast Go Avro codec. Prior to 2.33.0, several Avro decoder paths read attacker-controlled 64-bit values from the wire format and either narrowed them to platform-sized int before bounds-checking, or summed them with overflow-prone signed-int arithmetic. On 32-bit targets (GOARCH=386, arm, mips, wasm, etc.), the truncation paths can silently bypass byte-slice limits, select the wrong union branch, or hit the OCF negative-make panic via wrap. Three sub-issues are not 32-bit-specific: cumulative-size arithmetic overflow in arrayDecoder.Decode / mapDecoder.Decode / mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode (wraps at math.MaxInt64 on amd64 / arm64 and bypasses MaxSliceAllocSize / MaxMapAllocSize), math.MinInt negation in block-header handling, and make([]byte, size) with a negative size in OCF block reads — all three panic or bypass caps on any platform, giving an attacker a denial-of-service primitive there. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.33.0.
🎖@cveNotify
iskorotkov/avro is a fast Go Avro codec. Prior to 2.33.0, several Avro decoder paths read attacker-controlled 64-bit values from the wire format and either narrowed them to platform-sized int before bounds-checking, or summed them with overflow-prone signed-int arithmetic. On 32-bit targets (GOARCH=386, arm, mips, wasm, etc.), the truncation paths can silently bypass byte-slice limits, select the wrong union branch, or hit the OCF negative-make panic via wrap. Three sub-issues are not 32-bit-specific: cumulative-size arithmetic overflow in arrayDecoder.Decode / mapDecoder.Decode / mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode (wraps at math.MaxInt64 on amd64 / arm64 and bypasses MaxSliceAllocSize / MaxMapAllocSize), math.MinInt negation in block-header handling, and make([]byte, size) with a negative size in OCF block reads — all three panic or bypass caps on any platform, giving an attacker a denial-of-service primitive there. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.33.0.
🎖@cveNotify
GitHub
Integer Overflow in Avro Decoder
# Integer Overflow in Avro Decoder
## Summary
Several Avro decoder paths read attacker-controlled 64-bit values from the wire format and either narrowed them to platform-sized `int` before bo...
## Summary
Several Avro decoder paths read attacker-controlled 64-bit values from the wire format and either narrowed them to platform-sized `int` before bo...
🚨 CVE-2026-46385
iskorotkov/avro is a fast Go Avro codec. Prior to 2.33.0, the Avro array and map decoders looped over an attacker-controlled block-count value without checking the underlying reader's error state inside the loop body. Reader.ReadBlockHeader returns the count as a Go int, which is 64-bit on amd64 / arm64 targets — so a producer can declare a block of up to math.MaxInt64 (~9.2 × 10¹⁸) elements followed by EOF (or any truncated payload), and the decoder will attempt that many no-op iterations before propagating the error. The realistic ceiling is "indefinite until the worker is killed externally" — a single hostile payload pins a CPU core until the process is OOM-killed, deadline-cancelled, or terminated. Remote, unauthenticated denial-of-service. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.33.0.
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iskorotkov/avro is a fast Go Avro codec. Prior to 2.33.0, the Avro array and map decoders looped over an attacker-controlled block-count value without checking the underlying reader's error state inside the loop body. Reader.ReadBlockHeader returns the count as a Go int, which is 64-bit on amd64 / arm64 targets — so a producer can declare a block of up to math.MaxInt64 (~9.2 × 10¹⁸) elements followed by EOF (or any truncated payload), and the decoder will attempt that many no-op iterations before propagating the error. The realistic ceiling is "indefinite until the worker is killed externally" — a single hostile payload pins a CPU core until the process is OOM-killed, deadline-cancelled, or terminated. Remote, unauthenticated denial-of-service. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.33.0.
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GitHub
CPU Exhaustion in Avro Decoder via Unbounded Block-Count Iteration
# CPU Exhaustion in Avro Decoder via Unbounded Block-Count Iteration
## Summary
The Avro array and map decoders looped over an attacker-controlled block-count value without checking the under...
## Summary
The Avro array and map decoders looped over an attacker-controlled block-count value without checking the under...
🚨 CVE-2026-10118
A flaw was found in Poppler's Splash backend. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by crafting a malicious PDF file that, when rendered, triggers an integer overflow in the `tilingPatternFill` function. This overflow leads to an undersized heap memory allocation, allowing a subsequent out-of-bounds write. Successful exploitation could result in arbitrary code execution, information disclosure, or denial of service within the context of the application processing the PDF.
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A flaw was found in Poppler's Splash backend. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by crafting a malicious PDF file that, when rendered, triggers an integer overflow in the `tilingPatternFill` function. This overflow leads to an undersized heap memory allocation, allowing a subsequent out-of-bounds write. Successful exploitation could result in arbitrary code execution, information disclosure, or denial of service within the context of the application processing the PDF.
🎖@cveNotify