🚨 CVE-2026-45896
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: intel-dg: Fix accessing regions before setting nregions
The regions array is counted by nregions, but it's set only after
accessing it:
[] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/mtd/devices/mtd_intel_dg.c:750:15
[] index 0 is out of range for type '<unknown> [*]'
Fix it by also fixing an undesired behavior: the loop silently ignores
ENOMEM and continues setting the other entries.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: intel-dg: Fix accessing regions before setting nregions
The regions array is counted by nregions, but it's set only after
accessing it:
[] UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/mtd/devices/mtd_intel_dg.c:750:15
[] index 0 is out of range for type '<unknown> [*]'
Fix it by also fixing an undesired behavior: the loop silently ignores
ENOMEM and continues setting the other entries.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-45897
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_counter: serialize reset with spinlock
Add a global static spinlock to serialize counter fetch+reset
operations, preventing concurrent dump-and-reset from underrunning
values.
The lock is taken before fetching the total so that two parallel
resets cannot both read the same counter values and then both
subtract them.
A global lock is used for simplicity since resets are infrequent.
If this becomes a bottleneck, it can be replaced with a per-net
lock later.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_counter: serialize reset with spinlock
Add a global static spinlock to serialize counter fetch+reset
operations, preventing concurrent dump-and-reset from underrunning
values.
The lock is taken before fetching the total so that two parallel
resets cannot both read the same counter values and then both
subtract them.
A global lock is used for simplicity since resets are infrequent.
If this becomes a bottleneck, it can be replaced with a per-net
lock later.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-45898
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/iwcm: Fix workqueue list corruption by removing work_list
The commit e1168f0 ("RDMA/iwcm: Simplify cm_event_handler()")
changed the work submission logic to unconditionally call
queue_work() with the expectation that queue_work() would
have no effect if work was already pending. The problem is
that a free list of struct iwcm_work is used (for which
struct work_struct is embedded), so each call to queue_work()
is basically unique and therefore does indeed queue the work.
This causes a problem in the work handler which walks the work_list
until it's empty to process entries. This means that a single
run of the work handler could process item N+1 and release it
back to the free list while the actual workqueue entry is still
queued. It could then get reused (INIT_WORK...) and lead to
list corruption in the workqueue logic.
Fix this by just removing the work_list. The workqueue already
does this for us.
This fixes the following error that was observed when stress
testing with ucmatose on an Intel E830 in iWARP mode:
[ 151.465780] list_del corruption. next->prev should be ffff9f0915c69c08, but was ffff9f0a1116be08. (next=ffff9f0a15b11c08)
[ 151.466639] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 151.466986] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:67!
[ 151.467349] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 151.467753] CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 2306 Comm: kworker/u64:18 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc4+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 151.468466] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 151.469192] Workqueue: 0x0 (iw_cm_wq)
[ 151.469478] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xf0/0x100
[ 151.469942] Code: c7 58 5f 4c b2 e8 10 50 aa ff 0f 0b 48 89 ef e8 36 57 cb ff 48 8b 55 08 48 89 e9 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 a8 5f 4c b2 e8 f0 4f aa ff <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90
[ 151.471323] RSP: 0000:ffffb15644e7bd68 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 151.471712] RAX: 000000000000006d RBX: ffff9f0915c69c08 RCX: 0000000000000027
[ 151.472243] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9f0a37d9c600
[ 151.472768] RBP: ffff9f0a15b11c08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffff7fff
[ 151.473294] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffb15644e7bba8 R12: ffff9f092339ee68
[ 151.473817] R13: ffff9f0900059c28 R14: ffff9f092339ee78 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 151.474344] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f0a847b5000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 151.474934] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 151.475362] CR2: 0000559e233a9088 CR3: 000000020296b004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 151.475895] PKRU: 55555554
[ 151.476118] Call Trace:
[ 151.476331] <TASK>
[ 151.476497] move_linked_works+0x49/0xa0
[ 151.476792] __pwq_activate_work.isra.46+0x2f/0xa0
[ 151.477151] pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x1e0/0x2f0
[ 151.477479] process_scheduled_works+0x1c8/0x410
[ 151.477823] worker_thread+0x125/0x260
[ 151.478108] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 151.478430] kthread+0xfe/0x240
[ 151.478671] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 151.478955] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 151.479240] ret_from_fork+0x208/0x270
[ 151.479523] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 151.479806] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 151.480103] </TASK>
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/iwcm: Fix workqueue list corruption by removing work_list
The commit e1168f0 ("RDMA/iwcm: Simplify cm_event_handler()")
changed the work submission logic to unconditionally call
queue_work() with the expectation that queue_work() would
have no effect if work was already pending. The problem is
that a free list of struct iwcm_work is used (for which
struct work_struct is embedded), so each call to queue_work()
is basically unique and therefore does indeed queue the work.
This causes a problem in the work handler which walks the work_list
until it's empty to process entries. This means that a single
run of the work handler could process item N+1 and release it
back to the free list while the actual workqueue entry is still
queued. It could then get reused (INIT_WORK...) and lead to
list corruption in the workqueue logic.
Fix this by just removing the work_list. The workqueue already
does this for us.
This fixes the following error that was observed when stress
testing with ucmatose on an Intel E830 in iWARP mode:
[ 151.465780] list_del corruption. next->prev should be ffff9f0915c69c08, but was ffff9f0a1116be08. (next=ffff9f0a15b11c08)
[ 151.466639] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 151.466986] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:67!
[ 151.467349] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 151.467753] CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 2306 Comm: kworker/u64:18 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc4+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 151.468466] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 151.469192] Workqueue: 0x0 (iw_cm_wq)
[ 151.469478] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xf0/0x100
[ 151.469942] Code: c7 58 5f 4c b2 e8 10 50 aa ff 0f 0b 48 89 ef e8 36 57 cb ff 48 8b 55 08 48 89 e9 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 a8 5f 4c b2 e8 f0 4f aa ff <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90
[ 151.471323] RSP: 0000:ffffb15644e7bd68 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 151.471712] RAX: 000000000000006d RBX: ffff9f0915c69c08 RCX: 0000000000000027
[ 151.472243] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9f0a37d9c600
[ 151.472768] RBP: ffff9f0a15b11c08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffff7fff
[ 151.473294] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffb15644e7bba8 R12: ffff9f092339ee68
[ 151.473817] R13: ffff9f0900059c28 R14: ffff9f092339ee78 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 151.474344] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f0a847b5000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 151.474934] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 151.475362] CR2: 0000559e233a9088 CR3: 000000020296b004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 151.475895] PKRU: 55555554
[ 151.476118] Call Trace:
[ 151.476331] <TASK>
[ 151.476497] move_linked_works+0x49/0xa0
[ 151.476792] __pwq_activate_work.isra.46+0x2f/0xa0
[ 151.477151] pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x1e0/0x2f0
[ 151.477479] process_scheduled_works+0x1c8/0x410
[ 151.477823] worker_thread+0x125/0x260
[ 151.478108] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 151.478430] kthread+0xfe/0x240
[ 151.478671] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 151.478955] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 151.479240] ret_from_fork+0x208/0x270
[ 151.479523] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 151.479806] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 151.480103] </TASK>
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46087
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/stat: fix memory leak on damon_start() failure in damon_stat_start()
Destroy the DAMON context and reset the global pointer when damon_start()
fails. Otherwise, the context allocated by damon_stat_build_ctx() is
leaked, and the stale damon_stat_context pointer will be overwritten on
the next enable attempt, making the old allocation permanently
unreachable.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/stat: fix memory leak on damon_start() failure in damon_stat_start()
Destroy the DAMON context and reset the global pointer when damon_start()
fails. Otherwise, the context allocated by damon_stat_build_ctx() is
leaked, and the stale damon_stat_context pointer will be overwritten on
the next enable attempt, making the old allocation permanently
unreachable.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46088
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: control: Validate buf_len before strnlen() in snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names()
snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names() advances pointer p through the names
buffer while decrementing buf_len. If buf_len reaches zero but items
remain, the next iteration calls strnlen(p, 0).
While strnlen(p, 0) returns 0 and would hit the existing name_len == 0
error path, CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE's fortified strnlen() first checks
maxlen against __builtin_dynamic_object_size(). When Clang loses track
of p's object size inside the loop, this triggers a BRK exception panic
before the return value is examined.
Add a buf_len == 0 guard at the loop entry to prevent calling fortified
strnlen() on an exhausted buffer.
Found by kernel fuzz testing through Xiaomi Smartphone.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: control: Validate buf_len before strnlen() in snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names()
snd_ctl_elem_init_enum_names() advances pointer p through the names
buffer while decrementing buf_len. If buf_len reaches zero but items
remain, the next iteration calls strnlen(p, 0).
While strnlen(p, 0) returns 0 and would hit the existing name_len == 0
error path, CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE's fortified strnlen() first checks
maxlen against __builtin_dynamic_object_size(). When Clang loses track
of p's object size inside the loop, this triggers a BRK exception panic
before the return value is examined.
Add a buf_len == 0 guard at the loop entry to prevent calling fortified
strnlen() on an exhausted buffer.
Found by kernel fuzz testing through Xiaomi Smartphone.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46089
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
zram: do not forget to endio for partial discard requests
As reported by Qu Wenruo and Avinesh Kumar, the following
getconf PAGESIZE
65536
blkdiscard -p 4k /dev/zram0
takes literally forever to complete. zram doesn't support partial
discards and just returns immediately w/o doing any discard work in such
cases. The problem is that we forget to endio on our way out, so
blkdiscard sleeps forever in submit_bio_wait(). Fix this by jumping to
end_bio label, which does bio_endio().
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
zram: do not forget to endio for partial discard requests
As reported by Qu Wenruo and Avinesh Kumar, the following
getconf PAGESIZE
65536
blkdiscard -p 4k /dev/zram0
takes literally forever to complete. zram doesn't support partial
discards and just returns immediately w/o doing any discard work in such
cases. The problem is that we forget to endio on our way out, so
blkdiscard sleeps forever in submit_bio_wait(). Fix this by jumping to
end_bio label, which does bio_endio().
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46090
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: aloop: Fix peer runtime UAF during format-change stop
loopback_check_format() may stop the capture side when playback starts
with parameters that no longer match a running capture stream. Commit
826af7fa62e3 ("ALSA: aloop: Fix racy access at PCM trigger") moved
the peer lookup under cable->lock, but the actual snd_pcm_stop() still
runs after dropping that lock.
A concurrent close can clear the capture entry from cable->streams[] and
detach or free its runtime while the playback trigger path still holds a
stale peer substream pointer.
Keep a per-cable count of in-flight peer stops before dropping
cable->lock, and make free_cable() wait for those stops before
detaching the runtime. This preserves the existing behavior while
making the peer runtime lifetime explicit.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: aloop: Fix peer runtime UAF during format-change stop
loopback_check_format() may stop the capture side when playback starts
with parameters that no longer match a running capture stream. Commit
826af7fa62e3 ("ALSA: aloop: Fix racy access at PCM trigger") moved
the peer lookup under cable->lock, but the actual snd_pcm_stop() still
runs after dropping that lock.
A concurrent close can clear the capture entry from cable->streams[] and
detach or free its runtime while the playback trigger path still holds a
stale peer substream pointer.
Keep a per-cable count of in-flight peer stops before dropping
cable->lock, and make free_cable() wait for those stops before
detaching the runtime. This preserves the existing behavior while
making the peer runtime lifetime explicit.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46091
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rc: igorplugusb: heed coherency rules
In a control request, the USB request structure
can be subject to DMA on some HCs. Hence it must obey
the rules for DMA coherency. Allocate it separately.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rc: igorplugusb: heed coherency rules
In a control request, the USB request structure
can be subject to DMA on some HCs. Hence it must obey
the rules for DMA coherency. Allocate it separately.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46092
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw88: check for PCI upstream bridge existence
pci_upstream_bridge() returns NULL if the device is on a root bus. If
8821CE is installed in the system with such a PCI topology, the probing
routine will crash. This has probably been unnoticed as 8821CE is mostly
supplied in laptops where there is a PCI-to-PCI bridge located upstream
from the device. However the card might be installed on a system with
different configuration.
Check if the bridge does exist for the specific workaround to be applied.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace static
analysis tool.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw88: check for PCI upstream bridge existence
pci_upstream_bridge() returns NULL if the device is on a root bus. If
8821CE is installed in the system with such a PCI topology, the probing
routine will crash. This has probably been unnoticed as 8821CE is mostly
supplied in laptops where there is a PCI-to-PCI bridge located upstream
from the device. However the card might be installed on a system with
different configuration.
Check if the bridge does exist for the specific workaround to be applied.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace static
analysis tool.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46093
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/vmalloc: take vmap_purge_lock in shrinker
decay_va_pool_node() can be invoked concurrently from two paths:
__purge_vmap_area_lazy() when pools are being purged, and the shrinker via
vmap_node_shrink_scan().
However, decay_va_pool_node() is not safe to run concurrently, and the
shrinker path currently lacks serialization, leading to races and possible
leaks.
Protect decay_va_pool_node() by taking vmap_purge_lock in the shrinker
path to ensure serialization with purge users.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/vmalloc: take vmap_purge_lock in shrinker
decay_va_pool_node() can be invoked concurrently from two paths:
__purge_vmap_area_lazy() when pools are being purged, and the shrinker via
vmap_node_shrink_scan().
However, decay_va_pool_node() is not safe to run concurrently, and the
shrinker path currently lacks serialization, leading to races and possible
leaks.
Protect decay_va_pool_node() by taking vmap_purge_lock in the shrinker
path to ensure serialization with purge users.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46094
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix bounds check in check_xattrs() to prevent out-of-bounds access
The bounds check for the next xattr entry in check_xattrs() uses
(void *)next >= end, which allows next to point within sizeof(u32)
bytes of end. On the next loop iteration, IS_LAST_ENTRY() reads 4
bytes via *(__u32 *)(entry), which can overrun the valid xattr region.
For example, if next lands at end - 1, the check passes since
next < end, but IS_LAST_ENTRY() reads 4 bytes starting at end - 1,
accessing 3 bytes beyond the valid region.
Fix this by changing the check to (void *)next + sizeof(u32) > end,
ensuring there is always enough space for the IS_LAST_ENTRY() read
on the subsequent iteration.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix bounds check in check_xattrs() to prevent out-of-bounds access
The bounds check for the next xattr entry in check_xattrs() uses
(void *)next >= end, which allows next to point within sizeof(u32)
bytes of end. On the next loop iteration, IS_LAST_ENTRY() reads 4
bytes via *(__u32 *)(entry), which can overrun the valid xattr region.
For example, if next lands at end - 1, the check passes since
next < end, but IS_LAST_ENTRY() reads 4 bytes starting at end - 1,
accessing 3 bytes beyond the valid region.
Fix this by changing the check to (void *)next + sizeof(u32) > end,
ensuring there is always enough space for the IS_LAST_ENTRY() read
on the subsequent iteration.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46095
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/md-llbitmap: raise barrier before state machine transition
Move the barrier raise operation before calling llbitmap_state_machine()
in both llbitmap_start_write() and llbitmap_start_discard(). This
ensures the barrier is in place before any state transitions occur,
preventing potential race conditions where the state machine could
complete before the barrier is properly raised.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/md-llbitmap: raise barrier before state machine transition
Move the barrier raise operation before calling llbitmap_state_machine()
in both llbitmap_start_write() and llbitmap_start_discard(). This
ensures the barrier is in place before any state transitions occur,
preventing potential race conditions where the state machine could
complete before the barrier is properly raised.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46096
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm2-sessions: Fix missing tpm_buf_destroy() in tpm2_read_public()
tpm2_read_public() calls tpm_buf_init() but fails to call
tpm_buf_destroy() on two exit paths, leaking a page allocation:
1. When name_size() returns an error (unrecognized hash algorithm),
the function returns directly without destroying the buffer.
2. On the success path, the buffer is never destroyed before
returning.
All other error paths in the function correctly call
tpm_buf_destroy() before returning.
Fix both by adding the missing tpm_buf_destroy() calls.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm2-sessions: Fix missing tpm_buf_destroy() in tpm2_read_public()
tpm2_read_public() calls tpm_buf_init() but fails to call
tpm_buf_destroy() on two exit paths, leaking a page allocation:
1. When name_size() returns an error (unrecognized hash algorithm),
the function returns directly without destroying the buffer.
2. On the success path, the buffer is never destroyed before
returning.
All other error paths in the function correctly call
tpm_buf_destroy() before returning.
Fix both by adding the missing tpm_buf_destroy() calls.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46097
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: edt-ft5x06 - fix use-after-free in debugfs teardown
The commit 68743c500c6e ("Input: edt-ft5x06 - use per-client debugfs
directory") removed the manual debugfs teardown, relying on the I2C core
to handle it. However, this creates a window where debugfs files are
still accessible after edt_ft5x06_ts_teardown_debugfs() frees
tsdata->raw_buffer.
To prevent a use-after-free, protect the freeing of raw_buffer with the
device mutex and set raw_buffer to NULL. The debugfs read function
already checks if raw_buffer is NULL under the same mutex, so this
safely avoids the use-after-free.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: edt-ft5x06 - fix use-after-free in debugfs teardown
The commit 68743c500c6e ("Input: edt-ft5x06 - use per-client debugfs
directory") removed the manual debugfs teardown, relying on the I2C core
to handle it. However, this creates a window where debugfs files are
still accessible after edt_ft5x06_ts_teardown_debugfs() frees
tsdata->raw_buffer.
To prevent a use-after-free, protect the freeing of raw_buffer with the
device mutex and set raw_buffer to NULL. The debugfs read function
already checks if raw_buffer is NULL under the same mutex, so this
safely avoids the use-after-free.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46098
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: caif: clear client service pointer on teardown
`caif_connect()` can tear down an existing client after remote shutdown by
calling `caif_disconnect_client()` followed by `caif_free_client()`.
`caif_free_client()` releases the service layer referenced by
`adap_layer->dn`, but leaves that pointer stale.
When the socket is later destroyed, `caif_sock_destructor()` calls
`caif_free_client()` again and dereferences the freed service pointer.
Clear the client/service links before releasing the service object so
repeated teardown becomes harmless.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: caif: clear client service pointer on teardown
`caif_connect()` can tear down an existing client after remote shutdown by
calling `caif_disconnect_client()` followed by `caif_free_client()`.
`caif_free_client()` releases the service layer referenced by
`adap_layer->dn`, but leaves that pointer stale.
When the socket is later destroyed, `caif_sock_destructor()` calls
`caif_free_client()` again and dereferences the freed service pointer.
Clear the client/service links before releasing the service object so
repeated teardown becomes harmless.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46099
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: fix NOREF dst use in seg6 and rpl lwtunnels
seg6_input_core() and rpl_input() call ip6_route_input() which sets a
NOREF dst on the skb, then pass it to dst_cache_set_ip6() invoking
dst_hold() unconditionally.
On PREEMPT_RT, ksoftirqd is preemptible and a higher-priority task can
release the underlying pcpu_rt between the lookup and the caching
through a concurrent FIB lookup on a shared nexthop.
Simplified race sequence:
ksoftirqd/X higher-prio task (same CPU X)
----------- --------------------------------
seg6_input_core(,skb)/rpl_input(skb)
dst_cache_get()
-> miss
ip6_route_input(skb)
-> ip6_pol_route(,skb,flags)
[RT6_LOOKUP_F_DST_NOREF in flags]
-> FIB lookup resolves fib6_nh
[nhid=N route]
-> rt6_make_pcpu_route()
[creates pcpu_rt, refcount=1]
pcpu_rt->sernum = fib6_sernum
[fib6_sernum=W]
-> cmpxchg(fib6_nh.rt6i_pcpu,
NULL, pcpu_rt)
[slot was empty, store succeeds]
-> skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst)
[dst is pcpu_rt, refcount still 1]
rt_genid_bump_ipv6()
-> bumps fib6_sernum
[fib6_sernum from W to Z]
ip6_route_output()
-> ip6_pol_route()
-> FIB lookup resolves fib6_nh
[nhid=N]
-> rt6_get_pcpu_route()
pcpu_rt->sernum != fib6_sernum
[W <> Z, stale]
-> prev = xchg(rt6i_pcpu, NULL)
-> dst_release(prev)
[prev is pcpu_rt,
refcount 1->0, dead]
dst = skb_dst(skb)
[dst is the dead pcpu_rt]
dst_cache_set_ip6(dst)
-> dst_hold() on dead dst
-> WARN / use-after-free
For the race to occur, ksoftirqd must be preemptible (PREEMPT_RT without
PREEMPT_RT_NEEDS_BH_LOCK) and a concurrent task must be able to release
the pcpu_rt. Shared nexthop objects provide such a path, as two routes
pointing to the same nhid share the same fib6_nh and its rt6i_pcpu
entry.
Fix seg6_input_core() and rpl_input() by calling skb_dst_force() after
ip6_route_input() to force the NOREF dst into a refcounted one before
caching.
The output path is not affected as ip6_route_output() already returns a
refcounted dst.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: fix NOREF dst use in seg6 and rpl lwtunnels
seg6_input_core() and rpl_input() call ip6_route_input() which sets a
NOREF dst on the skb, then pass it to dst_cache_set_ip6() invoking
dst_hold() unconditionally.
On PREEMPT_RT, ksoftirqd is preemptible and a higher-priority task can
release the underlying pcpu_rt between the lookup and the caching
through a concurrent FIB lookup on a shared nexthop.
Simplified race sequence:
ksoftirqd/X higher-prio task (same CPU X)
----------- --------------------------------
seg6_input_core(,skb)/rpl_input(skb)
dst_cache_get()
-> miss
ip6_route_input(skb)
-> ip6_pol_route(,skb,flags)
[RT6_LOOKUP_F_DST_NOREF in flags]
-> FIB lookup resolves fib6_nh
[nhid=N route]
-> rt6_make_pcpu_route()
[creates pcpu_rt, refcount=1]
pcpu_rt->sernum = fib6_sernum
[fib6_sernum=W]
-> cmpxchg(fib6_nh.rt6i_pcpu,
NULL, pcpu_rt)
[slot was empty, store succeeds]
-> skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst)
[dst is pcpu_rt, refcount still 1]
rt_genid_bump_ipv6()
-> bumps fib6_sernum
[fib6_sernum from W to Z]
ip6_route_output()
-> ip6_pol_route()
-> FIB lookup resolves fib6_nh
[nhid=N]
-> rt6_get_pcpu_route()
pcpu_rt->sernum != fib6_sernum
[W <> Z, stale]
-> prev = xchg(rt6i_pcpu, NULL)
-> dst_release(prev)
[prev is pcpu_rt,
refcount 1->0, dead]
dst = skb_dst(skb)
[dst is the dead pcpu_rt]
dst_cache_set_ip6(dst)
-> dst_hold() on dead dst
-> WARN / use-after-free
For the race to occur, ksoftirqd must be preemptible (PREEMPT_RT without
PREEMPT_RT_NEEDS_BH_LOCK) and a concurrent task must be able to release
the pcpu_rt. Shared nexthop objects provide such a path, as two routes
pointing to the same nhid share the same fib6_nh and its rt6i_pcpu
entry.
Fix seg6_input_core() and rpl_input() by calling skb_dst_force() after
ip6_route_input() to force the NOREF dst into a refcounted one before
caching.
The output path is not affected as ip6_route_output() already returns a
refcounted dst.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46100
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: afs: revert mmap_prepare() change
Partially reverts commit 9d5403b1036c ("fs: convert most other
generic_file_*mmap() users to .mmap_prepare()").
This is because the .mmap invocation establishes a refcount, but
.mmap_prepare is called at a point where a merge or an allocation failure
might happen after the call, which would leak the refcount increment.
Functionality is being added to permit the use of .mmap_prepare in this
case, but in the interim, we need to fix this.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: afs: revert mmap_prepare() change
Partially reverts commit 9d5403b1036c ("fs: convert most other
generic_file_*mmap() users to .mmap_prepare()").
This is because the .mmap invocation establishes a refcount, but
.mmap_prepare is called at a point where a merge or an allocation failure
might happen after the call, which would leak the refcount increment.
Functionality is being added to permit the use of .mmap_prepare in this
case, but in the interim, we need to fix this.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46101
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: reject zero shift in nft_bitwise
Reject zero shift operands for nft_bitwise left and right shift
expressions during initialization.
The carry propagation logic computes the carry from the adjacent 32-bit
word using BITS_PER_TYPE(u32) - shift. A zero shift operand turns this
into a 32-bit shift, which is undefined behaviour.
Reject zero shift operands in the control plane, alongside the existing
check for values greater than or equal to 32, so malformed rules never
reach the packet path.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: reject zero shift in nft_bitwise
Reject zero shift operands for nft_bitwise left and right shift
expressions during initialization.
The carry propagation logic computes the carry from the adjacent 32-bit
word using BITS_PER_TYPE(u32) - shift. A zero shift operand turns this
into a 32-bit shift, which is undefined behaviour.
Reject zero shift operands in the control plane, alongside the existing
check for values greater than or equal to 32, so malformed rules never
reach the packet path.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46102
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: strparser: fix skb_head leak in strp_abort_strp()
When the stream parser is aborted, for example after a message assembly timeout,
it can still hold a reference to a partially assembled message in
strp->skb_head.
That skb is not released in strp_abort_strp(), which leaks the partially
assembled message and can be triggered repeatedly to exhaust memory.
Fix this by freeing strp->skb_head and resetting the parser state in the
abort path. Leave strp_stop() unchanged so final cleanup still happens in
strp_done() after the work and timer have been synchronized.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: strparser: fix skb_head leak in strp_abort_strp()
When the stream parser is aborted, for example after a message assembly timeout,
it can still hold a reference to a partially assembled message in
strp->skb_head.
That skb is not released in strp_abort_strp(), which leaks the partially
assembled message and can be triggered repeatedly to exhaust memory.
Fix this by freeing strp->skb_head and resetting the parser state in the
abort path. Leave strp_stop() unchanged so final cleanup still happens in
strp_done() after the work and timer have been synchronized.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46103
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: ucan: fix devres lifetime
USB drivers bind to USB interfaces and any device managed resources
should have their lifetime tied to the interface rather than parent USB
device. This avoids issues like memory leaks when drivers are unbound
without their devices being physically disconnected (e.g. on probe
deferral or configuration changes).
Fix the control message buffer lifetime so that it is released on driver
unbind.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: ucan: fix devres lifetime
USB drivers bind to USB interfaces and any device managed resources
should have their lifetime tied to the interface rather than parent USB
device. This avoids issues like memory leaks when drivers are unbound
without their devices being physically disconnected (e.g. on probe
deferral or configuration changes).
Fix the control message buffer lifetime so that it is released on driver
unbind.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46104
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: use sk blob accessor in socket permission helpers
SELinux socket state lives in the composite LSM socket blob.
sock_has_perm() and nlmsg_sock_has_extended_perms() currently
dereference sk->sk_security directly, which assumes the SELinux socket
blob is at offset zero.
In stacked configurations that assumption does not hold. If another LSM
allocates socket blob storage before SELinux, these helpers may read the
wrong blob and feed invalid SID and class values into AVC checks.
Use selinux_sock() instead of accessing sk->sk_security directly.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: use sk blob accessor in socket permission helpers
SELinux socket state lives in the composite LSM socket blob.
sock_has_perm() and nlmsg_sock_has_extended_perms() currently
dereference sk->sk_security directly, which assumes the SELinux socket
blob is at offset zero.
In stacked configurations that assumption does not hold. If another LSM
allocates socket blob storage before SELinux, these helpers may read the
wrong blob and feed invalid SID and class values into AVC checks.
Use selinux_sock() instead of accessing sk->sk_security directly.
🎖@cveNotify