🚨 CVE-2026-4602
Versions of the package jsrsasign before 11.1.1 are vulnerable to Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types due to handling negative exponents in ext/jsbn2.js. An attacker can force the computation of incorrect modular inverses and break signature verification by calling modPow with a negative exponent.
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Versions of the package jsrsasign before 11.1.1 are vulnerable to Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types due to handling negative exponents in ext/jsbn2.js. An attacker can force the computation of incorrect modular inverses and break signature verification by calling modPow with a negative exponent.
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🚨 CVE-2026-10118
A flaw was found in Poppler's Splash backend. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by crafting a malicious PDF file that, when rendered, triggers an integer overflow in the `tilingPatternFill` function. This overflow leads to an undersized heap memory allocation, allowing a subsequent out-of-bounds write. Successful exploitation could result in arbitrary code execution, information disclosure, or denial of service within the context of the application processing the PDF.
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A flaw was found in Poppler's Splash backend. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by crafting a malicious PDF file that, when rendered, triggers an integer overflow in the `tilingPatternFill` function. This overflow leads to an undersized heap memory allocation, allowing a subsequent out-of-bounds write. Successful exploitation could result in arbitrary code execution, information disclosure, or denial of service within the context of the application processing the PDF.
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🚨 CVE-2026-48509
MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, the parameterless MessagePackInputFormatter() constructor uses default serializer options, which resolve to MessagePackSerializerOptions.Standard with MessagePackSecurity.TrustedData. The formatter is designed for ASP.NET Core MVC request bodies, which commonly cross an HTTP trust boundary. This insecure default can expose applications to denial-of-service attacks that MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData is intended to mitigate, such as hash-collision attacks against dictionary-like model properties. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.
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MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, the parameterless MessagePackInputFormatter() constructor uses default serializer options, which resolve to MessagePackSerializerOptions.Standard with MessagePackSecurity.TrustedData. The formatter is designed for ASP.NET Core MVC request bodies, which commonly cross an HTTP trust boundary. This insecure default can expose applications to denial-of-service attacks that MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData is intended to mitigate, such as hash-collision attacks against dictionary-like model properties. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.
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GitHub
ASP.NET Core MessagePackInputFormatter defaults to TrustedData for HTTP request bodies
## Summary
The parameterless `MessagePackInputFormatter()` constructor uses default serializer options, which resolve to `MessagePackSerializerOptions.Standard` with `MessagePackSecurity.Trusted...
The parameterless `MessagePackInputFormatter()` constructor uses default serializer options, which resolve to `MessagePackSerializerOptions.Standard` with `MessagePackSecurity.Trusted...
🚨 CVE-2026-48510
MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, when MessagePack-CSharp decompresses Lz4Block or Lz4BlockArray payloads, it reads declared uncompressed lengths from the wire and allocates output buffers based on those lengths before validating that the compressed data is valid or that the declared expansion is reasonable. A small payload can claim a very large uncompressed length and force a large allocation before LZ4 decoding begins. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.
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MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, when MessagePack-CSharp decompresses Lz4Block or Lz4BlockArray payloads, it reads declared uncompressed lengths from the wire and allocates output buffers based on those lengths before validating that the compressed data is valid or that the declared expansion is reasonable. A small payload can claim a very large uncompressed length and force a large allocation before LZ4 decoding begins. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.
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GitHub
LZ4 decompression allocates from unbounded declared output lengths
## Summary
When MessagePack-CSharp decompresses `Lz4Block` or `Lz4BlockArray` payloads, it reads declared uncompressed lengths from the wire and allocates output buffers based on those lengths b...
When MessagePack-CSharp decompresses `Lz4Block` or `Lz4BlockArray` payloads, it reads declared uncompressed lengths from the wire and allocates output buffers based on those lengths b...
🚨 CVE-2026-48511
MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, ExpandoObjectFormatter.Deserialize populates System.Dynamic.ExpandoObject by calling IDictionary<string, object>.Add for each map entry. ExpandoObject internally maintains member names in array-like structures, so inserting many distinct keys can require repeated linear scans and array copies. For large attacker-controlled maps, this produces quadratic CPU and allocation behavior. The issue is especially surprising because ExpandoObjectResolver.Options is configured with MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData, but collision-resistant dictionary comparers cannot protect ExpandoObject insertion internals. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.
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MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, ExpandoObjectFormatter.Deserialize populates System.Dynamic.ExpandoObject by calling IDictionary<string, object>.Add for each map entry. ExpandoObject internally maintains member names in array-like structures, so inserting many distinct keys can require repeated linear scans and array copies. For large attacker-controlled maps, this produces quadratic CPU and allocation behavior. The issue is especially surprising because ExpandoObjectResolver.Options is configured with MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData, but collision-resistant dictionary comparers cannot protect ExpandoObject insertion internals. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.
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GitHub
ExpandoObject formatter can perform quadratic insertion work on untrusted maps
## Summary
`ExpandoObjectFormatter.Deserialize` populates `System.Dynamic.ExpandoObject` by calling `IDictionary<string, object>.Add` for each map entry. `ExpandoObject` internally maintai...
`ExpandoObjectFormatter.Deserialize` populates `System.Dynamic.ExpandoObject` by calling `IDictionary<string, object>.Add` for each map entry. `ExpandoObject` internally maintai...
🚨 CVE-2026-48512
MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, MessagePack-CSharp's JSON conversion helpers contain multiple recursion paths that do not consistently enforce a depth limit. These paths are in the JSON conversion component rather than normal typed MessagePack deserialization. MessagePackSerializer.ConvertFromJson recursively processes nested JSON arrays and objects in FromJsonCore() without consulting MessagePackSecurity.MaximumObjectGraphDepth. TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken() recursively consumes comma and colon separator characters, allowing even malformed JSON with long separator runs to consume one stack frame per character. MessagePackSerializer.ConvertToJson applies depth checks to arrays and maps, but the typeless extension branch for ext-100 recursively calls ToJsonCore() without applying MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep(ref reader). Each path can allow attacker-controlled input to exhaust the process stack and trigger an uncatchable StackOverflowException instead of failing with a catchable parse or serialization exception. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.
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MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, MessagePack-CSharp's JSON conversion helpers contain multiple recursion paths that do not consistently enforce a depth limit. These paths are in the JSON conversion component rather than normal typed MessagePack deserialization. MessagePackSerializer.ConvertFromJson recursively processes nested JSON arrays and objects in FromJsonCore() without consulting MessagePackSecurity.MaximumObjectGraphDepth. TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken() recursively consumes comma and colon separator characters, allowing even malformed JSON with long separator runs to consume one stack frame per character. MessagePackSerializer.ConvertToJson applies depth checks to arrays and maps, but the typeless extension branch for ext-100 recursively calls ToJsonCore() without applying MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep(ref reader). Each path can allow attacker-controlled input to exhaust the process stack and trigger an uncatchable StackOverflowException instead of failing with a catchable parse or serialization exception. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.
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GitHub
JSON conversion APIs can recurse without consistent depth enforcement
## Summary
MessagePack-CSharp's JSON conversion helpers contain multiple recursion paths that do not consistently enforce a depth limit. These paths are in the JSON conversion component rath...
MessagePack-CSharp's JSON conversion helpers contain multiple recursion paths that do not consistently enforce a depth limit. These paths are in the JSON conversion component rath...
🚨 CVE-2026-48513
MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, runtime-generated union deserializers emitted by DynamicUnionResolver do not call MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep(ref reader) and do not decrement reader.Depth around recursive deserialization and skip paths. This means union deserialization does not consistently participate in the maximum object graph depth enforcement that protects other recursive formatter paths. For unknown union keys, the emitted deserializer calls reader.Skip() on attacker-controlled data without an enclosing depth step. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.
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MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, runtime-generated union deserializers emitted by DynamicUnionResolver do not call MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep(ref reader) and do not decrement reader.Depth around recursive deserialization and skip paths. This means union deserialization does not consistently participate in the maximum object graph depth enforcement that protects other recursive formatter paths. For unknown union keys, the emitted deserializer calls reader.Skip() on attacker-controlled data without an enclosing depth step. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.
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GitHub
DynamicUnionResolver generated deserializers miss depth enforcement
## Summary
Runtime-generated union deserializers emitted by `DynamicUnionResolver` do not call `MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep(ref reader)` and do not decrement `reader.Depth` around recursive de...
Runtime-generated union deserializers emitted by `DynamicUnionResolver` do not call `MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep(ref reader)` and do not decrement `reader.Depth` around recursive de...
🚨 CVE-2026-48514
MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, UnsafeBlitFormatterBase<T>.Deserialize reads an attacker-controlled byteLength from an extension payload and allocates an array based on that value before validating it against the extension header length or remaining payload bytes. The outer extension header is bounded by available input, but that bound is not used to constrain the inner byteLength before allocation. A very small payload can therefore request a very large T[] allocation. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.
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MessagePack for C# is a MessagePack serializer for C#. Prior to 2.5.301 and 3.1.7, UnsafeBlitFormatterBase<T>.Deserialize reads an attacker-controlled byteLength from an extension payload and allocates an array based on that value before validating it against the extension header length or remaining payload bytes. The outer extension header is bounded by available input, but that bound is not used to constrain the inner byteLength before allocation. A very small payload can therefore request a very large T[] allocation. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.5.301 and 3.1.7.
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GitHub
Unity unsafe blit formatter allocates from unbounded byte length
## Summary
`UnsafeBlitFormatterBase<T>.Deserialize` reads an attacker-controlled `byteLength` from an extension payload and allocates an array based on that value before validating it agai...
`UnsafeBlitFormatterBase<T>.Deserialize` reads an attacker-controlled `byteLength` from an extension payload and allocates an array based on that value before validating it agai...
🚨 CVE-2026-54325
Pi is a minimal terminal coding harness. Pi before 0.79.0 loaded project-local configuration and resources from a repository's .pi directory without first asking the user to trust that repository. This included project-local extensions, which are executable TypeScript or JavaScript modules loaded into the Pi process. An attacker who controls a repository could place Pi-specific project resources in that repository. If a user then started Pi from that working tree, the project-local extension code could run with the same privileges as the local Pi process without the user having a convenient way to make a trust decision. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.79.0.
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Pi is a minimal terminal coding harness. Pi before 0.79.0 loaded project-local configuration and resources from a repository's .pi directory without first asking the user to trust that repository. This included project-local extensions, which are executable TypeScript or JavaScript modules loaded into the Pi process. An attacker who controls a repository could place Pi-specific project resources in that repository. If a user then started Pi from that working tree, the project-local extension code could run with the same privileges as the local Pi process without the user having a convenient way to make a trust decision. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.79.0.
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GitHub
fix(coding-agent): persist implicit project trust on reload · earendil-works/pi@38f18be
AI agent toolkit: unified LLM API, agent loop, TUI, coding agent CLI - fix(coding-agent): persist implicit project trust on reload · earendil-works/pi@38f18be
🚨 CVE-2026-54326
Pi is a minimal terminal coding harness. From 0.74.0 until 0.78.1, Pi HTML exports render session Markdown into a static HTML file. It did not consistently reject unsafe Markdown link and image URL schemes. In versions with scheme filtering, C0 control characters in the URL scheme could bypass the check because browsers normalize those characters before navigation. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.78.1.
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Pi is a minimal terminal coding harness. From 0.74.0 until 0.78.1, Pi HTML exports render session Markdown into a static HTML file. It did not consistently reject unsafe Markdown link and image URL schemes. In versions with scheme filtering, C0 control characters in the URL scheme could bypass the check because browsers normalize those characters before navigation. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.78.1.
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GitHub
Fix HTML export URL sanitization · earendil-works/pi@6cb23f9
AI agent toolkit: unified LLM API, agent loop, TUI, coding agent CLI - Fix HTML export URL sanitization · earendil-works/pi@6cb23f9
🚨 CVE-2026-54327
Pi is a minimal terminal coding harness. From 0.74.0 until 0.78.1, Pi stored API keys and OAuth credentials in auth.json. A race condition in the file write path could briefly create or rewrite this file with permissions derived from the process umask before tightening the file to owner-only permissions. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.78.1.
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Pi is a minimal terminal coding harness. From 0.74.0 until 0.78.1, Pi stored API keys and OAuth credentials in auth.json. A race condition in the file write path could briefly create or rewrite this file with permissions derived from the process umask before tightening the file to owner-only permissions. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.78.1.
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GitHub
fix(coding-agent): set auth file mode on creation · earendil-works/pi@135fb54
AI agent toolkit: unified LLM API, agent loop, TUI, coding agent CLI - fix(coding-agent): set auth file mode on creation · earendil-works/pi@135fb54
🚨 CVE-2026-54328
Pi is a minimal terminal coding harness. From 0.74.0 until 0.78.1, Pi versions with temporary npm or git extension package installs used predictable paths under the operating system temporary directory. On Linux-based multi-user systems, a local attacker who can write to the shared temporary directory could prepare the expected package location before another user runs pi with a temporary extension package source. Pi could then load attacker-controlled extension code in the victim user's process. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.78.1.
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Pi is a minimal terminal coding harness. From 0.74.0 until 0.78.1, Pi versions with temporary npm or git extension package installs used predictable paths under the operating system temporary directory. On Linux-based multi-user systems, a local attacker who can write to the shared temporary directory could prepare the expected package location before another user runs pi with a temporary extension package source. Pi could then load attacker-controlled extension code in the victim user's process. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.78.1.
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GitHub
fix(coding-agent): harden git package install paths · earendil-works/pi@a98e087
AI agent toolkit: unified LLM API, agent loop, TUI, coding agent CLI - fix(coding-agent): harden git package install paths · earendil-works/pi@a98e087
🚨 CVE-2026-50193
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.13.0 until 2.14.0, a potential Denial-of-Service exists when attacker sends deeply nested JSON if (and only if) the service reads deeply nested (1000s of levels) JSON as JsonNode (ObjectMapper.readTree()) and writes out same (or modifided) node using JsonNode.toString(). This can consume significant amount of resources with concurrent relatively small requests (1000 nested arrays is 2kB). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.14.0.
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jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.13.0 until 2.14.0, a potential Denial-of-Service exists when attacker sends deeply nested JSON if (and only if) the service reads deeply nested (1000s of levels) JSON as JsonNode (ObjectMapper.readTree()) and writes out same (or modifided) node using JsonNode.toString(). This can consume significant amount of resources with concurrent relatively small requests (1000 nested arrays is 2kB). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.14.0.
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GitHub
Fix #3447 · FasterXML/jackson-databind@a1fa4ae
General data-binding package for Jackson: works on streaming API (core) implementation(s) - Fix #3447 · FasterXML/jackson-databind@a1fa4ae
🚨 CVE-2026-54512
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV. If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization. An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.
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jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV. If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization. An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList<com.evil.Gadget> when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.
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GitHub
`PolymorphicTypeValidator` needs to validate generic type parameters … · FasterXML/jackson-databind@434d6c5
…too (#5988)
🚨 CVE-2026-54513
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() allowlists any array type based only on clazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permits EvilType[] even though EvilType is not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.
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jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() allowlists any array type based only on clazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permits EvilType[] even though EvilType is not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.
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GitHub
Backport fix for #5981 in 2.18 branch (#5984) · FasterXML/jackson-databind@01d1692
General data-binding package for Jackson: works on streaming API (core) implementation(s) - Backport fix for #5981 in 2.18 branch (#5984) · FasterXML/jackson-databind@01d1692
🚨 CVE-2026-54514
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.0.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, JDKFromStringDeserializer constructed InetSocketAddress with new InetSocketAddress(host, port), which performs eager DNS name resolution for hostname inputs at deserialization time. An application that binds untrusted JSON into a type containing an InetSocketAddress field issues an attacker-chosen DNS query during readValue, before any application-level validation or connect logic. The fix uses InetSocketAddress.createUnresolved(host, port), deferring DNS to an explicit connect. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.
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jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.0.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, JDKFromStringDeserializer constructed InetSocketAddress with new InetSocketAddress(host, port), which performs eager DNS name resolution for hostname inputs at deserialization time. An application that binds untrusted JSON into a type containing an InetSocketAddress field issues an attacker-chosen DNS query during readValue, before any application-level validation or connect logic. The fix uses InetSocketAddress.createUnresolved(host, port), deferring DNS to an explicit connect. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.
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GitHub
Improve `InetSocketAddress` deserialization (#5951) · FasterXML/jackson-databind@1f5a103
General data-binding package for Jackson: works on streaming API (core) implementation(s) - Improve `InetSocketAddress` deserialization (#5951) · FasterXML/jackson-databind@1f5a103
🚨 CVE-2026-54516
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.21.0 until 2.21.4 and 3.1.4, POJOPropertiesCollector._renameProperties() allows a property with @JsonProperty("renamed") on the getter and @JsonIgnore on the setter to be renamed rather than dropped. With MapperFeature.INFER_PROPERTY_MUTATORS enabled (default), the private backing field is retained; during deserialization BeanDeserializerFactory.addBeanProps() sees hasField()==true, builds a FieldProperty, and makes the backing field writable. An attacker supplying the renamed JSON key writes the backing field directly, bypassing the @JsonIgnore on the setter. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.4.
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jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.21.0 until 2.21.4 and 3.1.4, POJOPropertiesCollector._renameProperties() allows a property with @JsonProperty("renamed") on the getter and @JsonIgnore on the setter to be renamed rather than dropped. With MapperFeature.INFER_PROPERTY_MUTATORS enabled (default), the private backing field is retained; during deserialization BeanDeserializerFactory.addBeanProps() sees hasField()==true, builds a FieldProperty, and makes the backing field writable. An attacker supplying the renamed JSON key writes the backing field directly, bypassing the @JsonIgnore on the setter. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.4.
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GitHub
Backport #5967: "Renamed `@JsonIgnore`d setters can deserialize via p… · FasterXML/jackson-databind@c3d56dd
…rivate fields" (#5968)
🚨 CVE-2026-54517
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.21.0 until 2.21.4 and 3.1.4, in BeanDeserializer._deserializeUsingPropertyBased, the active-view (@JsonView) filter was applied only to creator properties; the regular property-buffering branch performed no prop.visibleInView(activeView) check. A change making SetterlessProperty.isMerging() return true routed setterless Collection/Map properties through this unguarded path, so a setterless collection annotated with a restricted @JsonView is populated from attacker JSON even when the active view excludes it. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.21.4 and 3.1.4.
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jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.21.0 until 2.21.4 and 3.1.4, in BeanDeserializer._deserializeUsingPropertyBased, the active-view (@JsonView) filter was applied only to creator properties; the regular property-buffering branch performed no prop.visibleInView(activeView) check. A change making SetterlessProperty.isMerging() return true routed setterless Collection/Map properties through this unguarded path, so a setterless collection annotated with a restricted @JsonView is populated from attacker JSON even when the active view excludes it. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.21.4 and 3.1.4.
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GitHub
`@JsonView` by-passed for some "setterless" creator properties (#5969) · FasterXML/jackson-databind@5bf23ed
General data-binding package for Jackson: works on streaming API (core) implementation(s) - `@JsonView` by-passed for some "setterless" creator properties (#5969) · FasterXML/jackson-databind@5bf23ed
🚨 CVE-2026-9073
A flaw was found in foreman-mcp-server. This component utilizes two distinct logging mechanisms that can expose sensitive session and authentication data. One mechanism logs session identifiers, which are treated as authentication credentials, at an informational level. The other, when debug logging is enabled, incompletely sanitizes HTTP request headers, leading to the cleartext logging of sensitive information such as authorization tokens and API keys. This vulnerability can result in a confidentiality breach, as sensitive authentication data is persisted in plain text within container logs, increasing the risk if logs are forwarded to a centralized platform.
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A flaw was found in foreman-mcp-server. This component utilizes two distinct logging mechanisms that can expose sensitive session and authentication data. One mechanism logs session identifiers, which are treated as authentication credentials, at an informational level. The other, when debug logging is enabled, incompletely sanitizes HTTP request headers, leading to the cleartext logging of sensitive information such as authorization tokens and API keys. This vulnerability can result in a confidentiality breach, as sensitive authentication data is persisted in plain text within container logs, increasing the risk if logs are forwarded to a centralized platform.
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🚨 CVE-2026-54518
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.21.0 until 2.21.4 and 3.1.4, UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrappedCreatorProperties() replays buffered JSON into creator parameters but never consults prop.visibleInView(activeView). The normal property-based creator path gates creator properties on the active view, but this unwrapped-creator replay path bypasses that check, so a constructor parameter annotated with both @JsonView(AdminView.class) and @JsonUnwrapped is populated from attacker JSON even when a more restrictive view is active. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.21.4 and 3.1.4.
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jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.21.0 until 2.21.4 and 3.1.4, UnwrappedPropertyHandler.processUnwrappedCreatorProperties() replays buffered JSON into creator parameters but never consults prop.visibleInView(activeView). The normal property-based creator path gates creator properties on the active view, but this unwrapped-creator replay path bypasses that check, so a constructor parameter annotated with both @JsonView(AdminView.class) and @JsonUnwrapped is populated from attacker JSON even when a more restrictive view is active. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.21.4 and 3.1.4.
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GitHub
Backport #5971: `@JsonView` by-passed for unwrapped creator parameter… · FasterXML/jackson-databind@721fa07
…s (#5973)
🚨 CVE-2026-5818
Incorrect check of function return value in Caliptra Core Runtime Firmware (ActivateFirmwareCmd::activate_fw modules) allows bypass of Caliptra Core's verification of the MCU FW during a hitless update.
This issue affects Core Runtime Firmware: from 2.0.0 through 2.0.1, 2.1.0.
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Incorrect check of function return value in Caliptra Core Runtime Firmware (ActivateFirmwareCmd::activate_fw modules) allows bypass of Caliptra Core's verification of the MCU FW during a hitless update.
This issue affects Core Runtime Firmware: from 2.0.0 through 2.0.1, 2.1.0.
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GitHub
MCU Firmware Update Authentication Bypass on Caliptra Core
The firmware authorization check performed by Caliptra Core during MCU hitless update in activate_firmware is silently discarded. MCU is intended to independently validate this firmware update prio...