🚨 CVE-2026-53176
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

IB/isert: Reject login PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN

In drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c, isert_login_recv_done()
computes the login request payload length as wc->byte_len minus
ISER_HEADERS_LEN with no lower bound, and login_req_len is a signed int.
A remote iSER initiator can post a login Send work request carrying
fewer than ISER_HEADERS_LEN (76) bytes, so the subtraction underflows
and login_req_len becomes negative.

isert_rx_login_req() then reads that negative length back into a signed
int, takes size = min(rx_buflen, MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS), and because the
min() is signed it keeps the negative value; the value is then passed as
the memcpy() length and sign-extended to a multi-gigabyte size_t. The
copy into the 8192-byte login->req_buf runs far out of bounds and
faults, crashing the target node. The login phase precedes iSCSI
authentication, so no credentials are required to reach this path.

Reject any login PDU shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN before the
subtraction, mirroring the existing early return on a failed work
completion, so login_req_len can never go negative. The upper bound was
already safe: a posted login buffer cannot deliver more than
ISER_RX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, so the difference stays at or below
MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS and the existing min() clamps it; only the missing
lower bound needs to be added.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53177
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bnxt_en: Fix NULL pointer dereference

PCIe errors detected by a Root Port or Downstream Port cause error
recovery services to run on all subordinate devices regardless of
administrative state.

The .error_detected() callback, bnxt_io_error_detected(), disables
and synchronizes IRQs via bnxt_disable_int_sync(), which calls
bnxt_cp_num_to_irq_num() to map completion rings to IRQs using
bp->bnapi.

Since bp->bnapi is allocated on NIC open and freed on NIC close, PCIe
error recovery on a closed NIC can dereference a NULL pointer.

Check if bp->bnapi is NULL before disabling and synchronizing IRQs.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53178
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

staging: rtl8723bs: rtw_mlme: add bounds checks before ie_length subtraction

Add guards to ensure ie_length is large enough before subtracting
fixed IE offsets to prevent unsigned integer underflow.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53179
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

staging: rtl8723bs: fix buffer over-read in rtw_update_protection

rtw_update_protection() is called with a pointer offset into the
ies buffer but the full ie_length is passed, causing a potential
buffer over-read.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53180
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

timers/migration: Fix livelock in tmigr_handle_remote_up()

tmigr_handle_remote_cpu() skips timer_expire_remote() when cpu ==
smp_processor_id(), assuming the local softirq path already handled this
CPU's timers.

This assumption is wrong because jiffies can advance after the handling of
the CPU's global timers in run_timer_base(BASE_GLOBAL) and before
tmigr_handle_remote() evaluates the expiry times.

As a consequence a timer which expires after the CPU local timer wheel
advanced and becomes expired in the remote handling is ignored and the
callback is never invoked and removed from the timer wheel.

What's worse is that fetch_next_timer_interrupt_remote() keeps reporting it
as expired, and the event is re-queued with expires == now on each
iteration. The goto-again loop spins indefinitely.

Fix this by calling timer_expire_remote() unconditionally. That's minimal
overhead for the common case as __run_timer_base() returns immediately if
there is nothing to expire in the local wheel.

[ tglx: Amend change log and add a comment ]

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🚨 CVE-2026-53181
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vsock/vmci: fix sk_ack_backlog leak on failed handshake

When vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server() returns an error,
vmci_transport_recv_listen() calls vsock_remove_pending() but never
calls sk_acceptq_removed(). This leaves sk_ack_backlog incremented
permanently.

Repeated handshake failures (malformed packets, queue pair alloc
failure, event subscribe failure) cause sk_ack_backlog to climb
toward sk_max_ack_backlog. Once it reaches the limit the listener
permanently refuses all new connections with -ECONNREFUSED, a
silent denial of service requiring a process restart to recover.

The two existing sk_acceptq_removed() calls in af_vsock.c do not
cover this path: line 764 checks vsock_is_pending() which returns
false after vsock_remove_pending(), and line 1889 is only reached
on successful accept().

Fix by balancing sk_acceptq_added() with sk_acceptq_removed() on
the error path.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53182
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: nl80211: reject oversized EMA RNR lists

nl80211_parse_rnr_elems() stores the parsed element count in a
u8-backed cfg80211_rnr_elems::cnt field and uses that count to size
the flexible array allocation.

Reject nested NL80211_ATTR_EMA_RNR_ELEMS input once the count reaches
255, before incrementing it again. This keeps the parser aligned with
the data structure it fills and matches the existing bound check used
by nl80211_parse_mbssid_elems().

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🚨 CVE-2026-53183
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mptcp: allow subflow rcv wnd to shrink

In MPTCP connection, the `window` field in the TCP header refers to the
MPTCP-level rcv_nxt and it's right edge should not move backward. Such
constraint is enforced at DSS option generation time.

At the same time, the TCP stack ensures independently that the TCP-level
rcv wnd right's edge does not move backward. That in turn causes artificial
inflating of the MPTCP rcv window when the incoming data is acked at the
TCP level and is OoO in the MPTCP sequence space (or lands in the backlog).

As a consequence, the incoming traffic can exceed the receiver rcvbuf size
even when the sender is not misbehaving.

Prevent such scenario forcibly allowing the TCP subflow to shrink the
TCP-level rcv wnd regardless of the current netns setting.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53184
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

udp: clear skb->dev before running a sockmap verdict

On the UDP receive path skb->dev is repurposed as dev_scratch (the
truesize/state cache set by udp_set_dev_scratch()), through the
union { struct net_device *dev; unsigned long dev_scratch; } in sk_buff.

When a UDP socket is in a sockmap, sk_data_ready is
sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(), which calls udp_read_skb() -> recv_actor()
(sk_psock_verdict_recv) to run the attached SK_SKB verdict program in softirq.
If that program calls a socket-lookup helper (bpf_sk_lookup_tcp/udp,
bpf_skc_lookup_tcp), bpf_skc_lookup() does:

if (skb->dev)
caller_net = dev_net(skb->dev);

skb->dev still holds the dev_scratch value (a non-NULL integer), so dev_net()
dereferences it as a struct net_device * and the kernel takes a general
protection fault on a non-canonical address in softirq:

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x1010000800004a0
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1406 Comm: syz.2.19 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6 #1 PREEMPT(full)
RIP: 0010:bpf_skc_lookup net/core/filter.c:7033 [inline]
RIP: 0010:bpf_sk_lookup+0x45/0x160 net/core/filter.c:7047
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
bpf_prog_4675cb904b7071f8+0x12e/0x14e
bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu+0xc6/0x1f0
sk_psock_verdict_recv+0x1ba/0x350
udp_read_skb+0x31a/0x370
sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0x2e3/0x600
__udp_enqueue_schedule_skb+0x4c8/0x650
udpv6_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x3ec/0x740
udp6_unicast_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x140
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x61e/0x950
ip6_input_finish+0xa9/0x150
NF_HOOK+0x286/0x2f0
ip6_input+0x117/0x220
NF_HOOK+0x286/0x2f0
__netif_receive_skb+0x85/0x200
process_backlog+0x374/0x9a0
__napi_poll+0x4f/0x1c0
net_rx_action+0x3b0/0x770
handle_softirqs+0x15a/0x460
do_softirq+0x57/0x80
</IRQ>

The rmem charge that dev_scratch accounted for is released by skb_recv_udp() on
dequeue, just above, so the scratch is dead by the time recv_actor() runs. Clear
skb->dev so bpf_skc_lookup() falls back to sock_net(skb->sk), which
skb_set_owner_sk_safe() set just above.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53185
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

zram: fix use-after-free in zram_bvec_write_partial()

zram_read_page() picks the sync or async backing device read path based on
whether the parent bio is NULL. zram_bvec_write_partial() passes its
parent bio down, so for ZRAM_WB slots the read is dispatched
asynchronously and zram_read_page() returns 0 while the bio is still in
flight. The caller then runs memcpy_from_bvec(), zram_write_page() and
__free_page() on the buffer, leaving the async read to write into a freed
page.

zram_bvec_read_partial() was switched to NULL in commit 4e3c87b9421d
("zram: fix synchronous reads") for the same reason; the write_partial
counterpart was missed.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53186
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RDMA/srp: bound SRP_RSP sense copy by the received length

srp_process_rsp() copies sense data from rsp->data + resp_data_len,
where resp_data_len is the full 32-bit value supplied by the SRP target
and is never checked against the number of bytes actually received
(wc->byte_len). The copy length is bounded to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE, so
at most 96 bytes are copied, but the source offset is not bounded.

A malicious or compromised SRP target on the InfiniBand/RoCE fabric that
the initiator has logged into can return an SRP_RSP with
SRP_RSP_FLAG_SNSVALID set and a large resp_data_len. The receive buffer
is allocated at the target-chosen max_ti_iu_len, so the source of the
sense copy lands past the bytes actually received; with resp_data_len
near 0xFFFFFFFF it is gigabytes past the buffer and the read faults.

Copy the sense data only if it has not been truncated, that is, only if
the response header, the response data, and the sense region fit within
the bytes actually received; otherwise drop the sense and log. The
in-tree iSER and NVMe-RDMA receive paths already bound their parse by
wc->byte_len; this brings ib_srp into line with them.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53188
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RDMA/core: Validate the passed in fops for ib_get_ucaps()

Sashiko pointed out it is not safe to rely only on the devt because
char/block alias so if the user finds a block device with the same dev_t
it can masquerade as a ucap cdev fd.

Test the f_ops to only accept authentic cdevs.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53189
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/huge_memory: update file PMD counter before folio_put()

__split_huge_pmd_locked() updates the file/shmem RSS counter after
dropping the PMD mapping's folio reference. If folio_put() drops the last
reference, mm_counter_file() can later read freed folio state via
folio_test_swapbacked().

Move the counter update before folio_put().

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🚨 CVE-2026-53190
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/virtio: fix dma_fence refcount leak on error in virtio_gpu_dma_fence_wait()

dma_fence_unwrap_for_each() internally calls dma_fence_unwrap_first()
which does cursor->chain = dma_fence_get(head), taking an extra
reference. On normal loop completion, dma_fence_unwrap_next()
releases this via dma_fence_chain_walk() -> dma_fence_put().

When virtio_gpu_do_fence_wait() fails and the function returns early
from inside the loop, the cursor->chain reference is never released.
This is the only caller in the entire kernel that does an early return
inside dma_fence_unwrap_for_each.

Add dma_fence_put(itr.chain) before the early return.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53191
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/net: inherit IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE across bundle recv retries

When a bundle recv retries inside io_recv_finish(), the merge logic OR
the saved cflags from the previous iteration with the cflags returned by
the new iteration:
cflags = req->cqe.flags | (cflags & CQE_F_MASK);

Bits listed in CQE_F_MASK are inherited from the new iteration, and all
other bits (notably IORING_CQE_F_BUFFER and the buffer ID) come from the
saved cflags. Before this change CQE_F_MASK covered only
IORING_CQE_F_SOCK_NONEMPTY and IORING_CQE_F_MORE.

When using provided buffer rings (IOU_PBUF_RING_INC) with incremental
mode, and bundle recv, io_kbuf_inc_commit() can leave the head ring
entry partially consumed, __io_put_kbufs() then sets
IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE on the returned cflags so userspace knows the
buffer ID will be reused for subsequent completions.

Because IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE was not in CQE_F_MASK, the merge above
silently dropped it whenever the final retry iteration partially
consumed the buffer, and the subsequent req->cqe.flags = cflags &
~CQE_F_MASK save would have left a stale IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE in the
carried-over cflags had one been present. Userspace would then
wrongfully advance it ring head past an entry the kernel still uses.

Add IORING_CQE_F_BUF_MORE to CQE_F_MASK so it is both inherited from the
new iteration into the user-visible CQE and stripped from the saved
cflags between iterations.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53192
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: timer: Fix UAF at snd_timer_user_params()

At releasing a timer object, e.g. when a userspace timer
(CONFIG_SND_UTIMER) gets closed and snd_timer_free() is called, it
tries to detach the timer instances and release the resources.
However, it's still possible that other in-flight tasks are holding
the timer instance where the to-be-deleted timer object is associated,
and this may lead to racy accesses.

Fortunately, most of ioctls dealing with the timer instance list
already have the protection with register_mutex, and this also avoids
such races. But, SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS isn't protected, hence the
concurrent ioctl may lead to use-after-free.

This patch just adds the guard with register_mutex to protect
snd_timer_user_params() for covering the code path as a quick
workaround. It's no hot-path but rather a rarely issued ioctl, so the
performance penalty doesn't matter.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53193
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: timer: Forcibly close timer instances at closing

When snd_timer object is freed via snd_timer_free() and still pending
snd_timer_instance objects are assigned to the timer object, it tries
to unlink all instances and just set NULL to each ti->timer, then
releases the resources immediately. The problem is, however, when
there are slave timer instances that are associated with a master
instance linked to this timer: namely, those slave instances still
point to the freed timer object although the master instance is
unlinked, which may lead to user-after-free. The bug can be easily
triggered particularly when a new userspace-driven timers
(CONFIG_SND_UTIMER) is involved, since it can create and delete the
timer object via a simple file open/close, while the other
applications may keep accessing to that timer.

This patch is an attempt to paper over the problem above: now instead
of just unlinking, call snd_timer_close[_locked]() forcibly for each
pending timer instance, so that all assigned slave timer instances are
properly detached, too. Since snd_timer_close() might be called later
by the driver that created that instance, the check of
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD is added at the beginning, too.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53194
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

USB: serial: kl5kusb105: fix bulk-out buffer overflow

klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer() is called by the generic write path
with the bulk-out buffer and its size (bulk_out_size, 64 bytes). It
stores a two-byte length header at the start of the buffer and copies
the payload from the write fifo starting at buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN, but
passes the full buffer size as the number of bytes to copy:

count = kfifo_out_locked(&port->write_fifo, buf + KLSI_HDR_LEN,
size, &port->lock);

When the fifo holds at least size bytes, size bytes are copied starting
two bytes into the size-byte buffer, writing KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes past its
end. Copy at most size - KLSI_HDR_LEN bytes instead, leaving room for
the header as safe_serial already does.

Writing bulk_out_size or more bytes to the tty triggers a slab
out-of-bounds write, observed with KASAN by emulating the device with
dummy_hcd and raw-gadget:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kfifo_copy_out+0x83/0xc0
Write of size 64 at addr ffff888112c62202 by task python3
kfifo_copy_out
klsi_105_prepare_write_buffer [kl5kusb105]
usb_serial_generic_write_start [usbserial]
Allocated by task 139:
usb_serial_probe [usbserial]
The buggy address is located 2 bytes inside of allocated 64-byte region

The out-of-bounds write no longer occurs with this change applied.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53195
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in build_i2c_fw_hdr()

build_i2c_fw_hdr() allocates a fixed-size buffer of
(16*1024 - 512) + sizeof(struct ti_i2c_firmware_rec) bytes, then
copies le16_to_cpu(img_header->Length) bytes into it without
validating that Length fits within the available space after the
firmware record header.

img_header->Length is a __le16 from the firmware file and can be
up to 65535. check_fw_sanity() validates the total firmware size
but not img_header->Length specifically.

Fix by rejecting images where img_header->Length exceeds the
available destination space.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53196
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

USB: serial: io_ti: fix heap overflow in get_manuf_info()

get_manuf_info() reads le16_to_cpu(rom_desc->Size) bytes from the
device I2C EEPROM into a buffer allocated with kmalloc_obj(), which
is sizeof(struct edge_ti_manuf_descriptor) = 10 bytes.

The Size field comes from the device and is only validated (in
check_i2c_image()) to make sure the descriptor fits within
TI_MAX_I2C_SIZE (16384 bytes), not against the destination buffer size.
A malicious USB device can therefore set Size to any value up to 16377,
causing a heap overflow of up to 16367 bytes when plugged into a host
running this driver.

valid_csum() is called after read_rom() and also iterates
buffer[0..Size-1], compounding the out-of-bounds access.

Fix by rejecting descriptors with unexpected length before calling
read_rom().

[ johan: amend commit message; also check for short descriptors ]

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🚨 CVE-2026-53197
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfrm: iptfs: fix ABBA deadlock in iptfs_destroy_state()

iptfs_destroy_state() calls hrtimer_cancel() while holding a spinlock
that the timer callback also acquires, leading to an ABBA deadlock on
SMP systems.

For the output timer (iptfs_timer):
- iptfs_destroy_state() holds x->lock, calls hrtimer_cancel()
- iptfs_delay_timer() callback takes x->lock

For the drop timer (drop_timer):
- iptfs_destroy_state() holds drop_lock, calls hrtimer_cancel()
- iptfs_drop_timer() callback takes drop_lock

Both timers use HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT, so their callbacks run in softirq
context. When hrtimer_cancel() is called for a soft timer that is
currently executing on another CPU, hrtimer_cancel_wait_running() spins
on softirq_expiry_lock -- the same lock held by the softirq running the
callback. If the callback is blocked waiting for the spinlock held by
the caller of hrtimer_cancel(), a circular dependency forms:

CPU 0: holds lock_A -> waits for softirq_expiry_lock
CPU 1: holds softirq_expiry_lock -> waits for lock_A

Fix by calling hrtimer_cancel() before acquiring the respective locks.
hrtimer_cancel() is safe to call without holding any lock and will wait
for any in-progress callback to complete. For the output timer, the
lock is still acquired afterwards to drain the packet queue. For the
drop timer, the lock/unlock pair is removed entirely since it only
existed to serialize with the timer callback, which hrtimer_cancel()
already guarantees.

Found by source code audit.

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