🚨 CVE-2026-53132
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

vsock/virtio: fix potential unbounded skb queue

virtio_transport_inc_rx_pkt() checks vvs->rx_bytes + len > vvs->buf_alloc.

virtio_transport_recv_enqueue() skips coalescing for packets
with VIRTIO_VSOCK_SEQ_EOM.

If fed with packets with len == 0 and VIRTIO_VSOCK_SEQ_EOM,
a very large number of packets can be queued
because vvs->rx_bytes stays at 0.

Fix this by estimating the skb metadata size:

(Number of skbs in the queue) * SKB_TRUESIZE(0)

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🚨 CVE-2026-53133
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

RDMA/umem: Fix truncation for block sizes >= 4G

When the iommu is used the linearization of the mapping can give a single
block that is very large split across multiple SG entries.

When __rdma_block_iter_next() reassembles the split SG entries it is
overflowing the 32 bit stack values and computed the wrong DMA addresses
for blocks after the truncation.

Use the right types to hold DMA addresses.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53134
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nft_fib: fix stale stack leak via the OIFNAME register

For NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIFNAME the destination register is declared with
len = IFNAMSIZ (four 32-bit registers), but on the lookup-fail,
RTN_LOCAL and oif-mismatch paths nft_fib{4,6}_eval() only writes one
register via "*dest = 0". The remaining three registers are left as
whatever was on the stack in nft_do_chain()'s struct nft_regs, and a
downstream expression that loads the register span can leak that
uninitialised kernel stack to userspace.

The NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT existence check has the same shape: it is only
meaningful for NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF, yet it was accepted for any result type
while the eval stores a single byte via nft_reg_store8(), leaving the rest
of the declared span stale.

Fix both:

- replace the bare "*dest = 0" in the eval with nft_fib_store_result(),
which strscpy_pad()s the whole IFNAMSIZ for OIFNAME (and is already
used on the other early-return path), and

- restrict NFTA_FIB_F_PRESENT to NFT_FIB_RESULT_OIF and declare its
destination as a single u8, so the marked span matches the one byte
the eval writes.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53135
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/display: Fix NULL deref and buffer over-read in SDP debugfs

[Why & How]
dp_sdp_message_debugfs_write() dereferences connector->base.state->crtc
without checking for NULL. A connector can be connected but not bound to
any CRTC (e.g. after hot-plug before the next atomic commit), causing a
kernel crash when writing to the sdp_message debugfs node.

The function also ignores the user-provided size argument and always
passes 36 bytes to copy_from_user(), reading past the user buffer when
size < 36.

Fix both issues by:
- Returning -ENODEV when connector->base.state or state->crtc is NULL
- Clamping write_size to min(size, sizeof(data))

(cherry picked from commit 6ab4c36a522842ff70474a1c0af2e40e50fc8300)

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🚨 CVE-2026-53136
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/display: Clamp VBIOS HDMI retimer register count to array size

[Why & How]
The VBIOS integrated info tables (v1_11 and v2_1) contain HdmiRegNum and
Hdmi6GRegNum fields that are used as loop bounds when copying retimer I2C
register settings into fixed-size arrays (dp*_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[9]
and dp*_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[3]). These u8 fields are not validated
before use, so a malformed VBIOS can specify values up to 255, causing an
out-of-bounds heap write during driver probe.

Clamp each register count to the destination array size using min_t()
before the copy loops, in both get_integrated_info_v11() and
get_integrated_info_v2_1().

(cherry picked from commit 5a7f0ef90195940c54b0f5bb85b87da55f038c69)

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🚨 CVE-2026-53137
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/display: Clamp HDMI HDCP2 rx_id_list read to buffer size

[Why & How]
During HDCP 2.x repeater authentication over HDMI, the driver reads the
sink's RxStatus register and extracts a 10-bit message size field (max
value 1023). This value is used as the read length for the ReceiverID
list without being clamped to the size of the destination buffer
rx_id_list[177]. A malicious HDMI repeater could advertise a message
size larger than the buffer, causing an out-of-bounds write during the
I2C read.

Clamp the read length in mod_hdcp_read_rx_id_list() to the size of the
rx_id_list buffer, matching the approach already used in the DP branch.

(cherry picked from commit 229212219e4247d9486f8ba41ef087358490be09)

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🚨 CVE-2026-53138
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/display: Bound VBIOS record-chain walk loops

[Why & How]
All record-chain walk loops in bios_parser.c and bios_parser2.c use
for(;;) and only terminate on a 0xFF record_type sentinel or zero
record_size. A malformed VBIOS image missing the terminator record
causes unbounded iteration at probe time, potentially hundreds of
thousands of iterations with record_size=1. In the final iterations
near the BIOS image boundary, struct casts beyond the 2-byte header
validated by GET_IMAGE can also read out of bounds.

Cap all 14 record-chain walk loops to BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD (256)
iterations. The atombios.h defines up to 22 distinct record types
and atomfirmware.h has 13. Assuming an average of less than 10
records per type (which is reasonable since most are connector-
based) 256 is a generous upper bound.

(cherry picked from commit 95700a3d660287ed657d6892f7be9ffc0e294a93)

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🚨 CVE-2026-53139
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/v3d: Skip CSD when it has zeroed workgroups

A compute shader dispatch encodes its workgroup counts in the CFG0..CFG2
registers. Kicking off a dispatch with a zero count in any of the three
dimensions is invalid. First, the hardware will process 0 as 65536,
while the user-space driver exposes a maximum of 65535. Over that, a
submission with a zeroed workgroup dimension should be a no-op.

These zeroed counts can reach the dispatch path through an indirect CSD
job, whose workgroup counts are only known once the indirect buffer is
read and may legitimately be zero, but such scenario should only result in
a no-op.

Overwrite the indirect CSD job workgroup counts with the indirect BO
ones, even if they are zeroed, and don't submit the job to the hardware
when any of the workgroup counts is zero, so the job completes immediately
instead of running the shader.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53140
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/v3d: Fix vaddr leak when indirect CSD has zeroed workgroups

v3d_rewrite_csd_job_wg_counts_from_indirect() maps both the indirect
buffer and the workgroup buffer and is expected to release them before
returning. When any of the workgroup counts read from the buffer is zero,
the function bailed out early and skipped the cleanup, leaking the vaddr
mappings of both BOs.

Jump to the cleanup path instead of returning directly, so the mappings
are always dropped.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53141
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/v3d: Fix global performance monitor reference counting

In the SET_GLOBAL ioctl, v3d_perfmon_find() bumps the reference count on
the perfmon it returns, but v3d_perfmon_set_global_ioctl() and
v3d_perfmon_delete() fail to release that reference on several paths:

1. v3d_perfmon_set_global_ioctl() leaks the reference on its error
paths.

2. CLEAR_GLOBAL leaks both the find reference and the reference
previously stashed in v3d->global_perfmon by the SET_GLOBAL ioctl
that configured it.

3. Destroying a perfmon that is the current global perfmon leaks the
reference stashed by the SET_GLOBAL ioctl.

Release each of these references explicitly.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53142
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/xe/display: fix oops in suspend/shutdown without display

The xe driver keeps track of whether to probe display, and whether
display hardware is there, using xe->info.probe_display. It gets set to
false if there's no display after intel_display_device_probe(). However,
the display may also be disabled via fuses, detected at a later time in
intel_display_device_info_runtime_init().

In this case, the xe driver does for_each_intel_crtc() on uninitialized
mode config in xe_display_flush_cleanup_work(), leading to a NULL
pointer dereference, and generally calls display code with display info
cleared.

Check for intel_display_device_present() after
intel_display_device_info_runtime_init(), and reset
xe->info.probe_display as necessary. Also do unset_display_features()
for completeness, although display runtime init has already done
that. This will need to be unified across all cases later.

Move intel_display_device_info_runtime_init() call slightly earlier,
similar to i915, to avoid a bunch of unnecessary setup for no display
cases.

Note #1: The xe driver has no business doing low level display plumbing
like for_each_intel_crtc() to begin with. It all needs to happen in
display code.

Note #2: The actual bug is present already in commit 44e694958b95
("drm/xe/display: Implement display support"), but the oops was likely
introduced later at commit ddf6492e0e50 ("drm/xe/display: Make display
suspend/resume work on discrete").

(cherry picked from commit 7c3eb9f47533220888a67266448185fd0775d4da)

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🚨 CVE-2026-53143
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdkfd: Fix buffer overflow in SDMA queue checkpoint/restore on GFX11

The v11 MQD manager incorrectly assigned the CP-compute variants of
checkpoint_mqd/restore_mqd for KFD_MQD_TYPE_SDMA queues. These functions
use sizeof(struct v11_compute_mqd) (2048 bytes) instead of sizeof(struct
v11_sdma_mqd) (512 bytes), causing a 1536-byte overflow.

During CRIU checkpoint of an SDMA queue on Navi3x:
- checkpoint_mqd() reads 2048 bytes from a 512-byte SDMA MQD buffer,
leaking 1536 bytes of adjacent GTT memory to userspace

During CRIU restore:
- restore_mqd() writes 2048 bytes into a 512-byte SDMA MQD buffer,
corrupting 1536 bytes of adjacent GTT memory (often the ring buffer
or neighboring MQDs)

This is a copy-paste regression unique to v11. All other ASIC backends
(cik, vi, v9, v10, v12) correctly use the SDMA-specific variants.

Add checkpoint_mqd_sdma() and restore_mqd_sdma() functions that properly
handle the smaller v11_sdma_mqd structure, matching the pattern used in
other MQD managers.

(cherry picked from commit 6fa41db7ffdec97d62433adf03b7b9b759af8c2c)

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🚨 CVE-2026-53144
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amdkfd: fix NULL dereference in get_queue_ids()

When usr_queue_id_array is NULL and num_queues is non-zero,
get_queue_ids() returns NULL. The callers check only IS_ERR() on the
return value; since IS_ERR(NULL) == false the check passes, and
suspend_queues() calls q_array_invalidate() which immediately
dereferences NULL while iterating num_queues times.

Userspace can trigger this via kfd_ioctl_set_debug_trap() by supplying
num_queues > 0 with a zero queue_array_ptr, causing a kernel panic.

A NULL usr_queue_id_array with num_queues == 0 is a legitimate no-op
(q_array_invalidate never executes, and resume_queues already guards
all queue_ids dereferences behind a NULL check). Return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL)
only when num_queues is non-zero and the pointer is absent; both callers
already propagate IS_ERR() returns correctly to userspace.

(cherry picked from commit f165a82cdf503884bb1797771c61b2fcc72113d4)

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🚨 CVE-2026-53146
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

thunderbolt: Limit XDomain response copy to actual frame size

tb_xdomain_copy() copies req->response_size bytes from the received
packet buffer regardless of the actual frame size. When a short
response arrives, this reads past the valid frame data in the DMA
pool buffer into stale contents from previous transactions.

Use the minimum of frame size and expected response size for the
copy length.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53147
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

thunderbolt: Validate XDomain request packet size before type cast

tb_xdp_handle_request() casts the received packet buffer to
protocol-specific structs without verifying that the allocation
is large enough for the target type. A peer can send a minimal
XDomain packet that passes the generic header length check but is
shorter than the struct accessed after the cast, causing out-of-
bounds reads from the kmemdup allocation.

Plumb the packet length through xdomain_request_work and validate
it against the expected struct size before each cast.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53148
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

thunderbolt: Clamp XDomain response data copy to allocation size

tb_xdp_properties_request() derives the per-packet copy length from
the response header without checking that it fits in the previously
allocated data buffer. A malicious peer can set its length field
larger than the declared data_length, causing memcpy to write past
the kcalloc allocation.

Clamp the per-packet copy length so that the cumulative offset
never exceeds data_len.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53149
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

thunderbolt: Bound root directory content to block size

__tb_property_parse_dir() does not check that content_offset +
content_len fits within block_len for the root directory case.
When rootdir->length equals or exceeds block_len - 2, the entry
loop reads past the allocated property block.

Add a bounds check after computing content_offset and content_len
to reject directories whose content extends past the block.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53150
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

thunderbolt: Reject zero-length property entries in validator

tb_property_entry_valid() accepts entries with length == 0 for
DIRECTORY, DATA, and TEXT types. A zero-length TEXT entry passes
validation but causes an underflow in the null-termination logic:

property->value.text[property->length * 4 - 1] = '\0';

When property->length is 0 this writes to offset -1 relative to
the allocation.

Reject zero-length entries early in the validator since they have no
valid representation in the XDomain property protocol.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53151
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

rxrpc: Fix the ACK parser to extract the SACK table for parsing

Fix modification of the received skbuff in rxrpc_input_soft_acks() and a
potential incorrect access of the buffer in a fragmented UDP packet (the
packet would probably have to be deliberately pre-generated as fragmented)
when AF_RXRPC tries to extract the contents of the SACK table by copying
out the contents of the SACK table into a buffer before attempting to parse

AF_RXRPC assumes that it can just call skb_condense() and then validly
access the SACK table from skb->data and that it will be a flat buffer -
but skb_condense() can silently fail to do anything under some
circumstances.

Note that whilst rxrpc_input_soft_acks() should be able to parse extended
ACKs, the rest of AF_RXRPC doesn't currently support that.

Further, there's then no need to call skb_condense() in rxrpc_input_ack(),
so don't.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53152
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mmc: dw_mmc-rockchip: Add missing private data for very old controllers

The really old controllers (rk2928, rk3066, rk3188) do not support UHS
speeds at all, and thus never handled phase data.

For that reason it never had a parse_dt callback and no driver private
data at all.

Commit ff6f0286c896 ("mmc: dw_mmc-rockchip: Add memory clock auto-gating
support") makes the private data sort of mandatory, because the init
function checks whether phases are configured internally or through the
clock controller.

This results in the old SoCs then experiencing NULL-pointer dereferences
when they try to access that private-data struct.

While we could have if (priv) conditionals in all places, it's way less
cluttery to just give the old types their private-data struct.

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🚨 CVE-2026-53153
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/list_lru: drain before clearing xarray entry on reparent

memcg_reparent_list_lrus() clears the dying memcg's xarray entry with
xas_store(&xas, NULL) before reparenting its per-node lists into the
parent. This opens a window where a concurrent list_lru_del() arriving
for the dying memcg sees xa_load() == NULL, walks to the parent in
lock_list_lru_of_memcg(), takes the parent's per-node lock, and calls
list_del_init() on an item still physically linked on the dying memcg's
list.

If another in-flight thread holds the dying memcg's per-node lock at the
same moment (another list_lru_del, or a list_lru_walk_one running an
isolate callback), both threads modify ->next/->prev pointers on the same
physical list under different locks. Adjacent items can corrupt each
other's links.

Fix it by reversing the order: reparent each per-node list and mark the
child's list lru dead and then clear the xarray entry. Any concurrent
list_lru op that finds the still-set xarray entry either takes the dying
memcg's per-node lock (synchronizing with the drain) or sees LONG_MIN and
walks to the parent, where the items now live.

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