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🚨 CVE-2026-49269
Apple M1 GPUs retain register file data between compute shader dispatches from different processes. A sandboxed Metal attacker app can run a GPU reader shader that reads stale register values left by a separate sandboxed victim app. In the proof of concept, GPUVictim.app generates a fresh random 128-bit secret using SecRandomCopyBytes and loads it into GPU registers. GPUAttacker.app, a separate sandboxed app, recovers the exact secret from stale GPU register state. NOTE: The vendor stated that this behavior affects only legacy hardware and has already been addressed at the hardware level in current-generation Apple Silicon.

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🚨 CVE-2026-55488
motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for a piece of software called "motion," which is a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 contain an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem. The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado's built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks. As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process. Version 0.44.0 fixes the issue.

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🚨 CVE-2026-56111
Marlin Firmware through 2.1.2.7, fixed in commit 1f255d1, when built with MESH_BED_LEVELING enabled, contains an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in the M421 G-code handler that allows attackers to corrupt firmware memory by supplying out-of-range X and Y grid indices. Attackers can send a single crafted G-code command via USB serial, network interface, or malicious gcode file to write an attacker-controlled 32-bit float value past the z_values array bounds, corrupting adjacent firmware variables and causing denial of service or firmware state corruption.

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🚨 CVE-2026-56121
Feast before 0.63.0 contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability that allows unauthenticated or unauthorized attackers to achieve remote code execution by sending a crafted gRPC request to the registry server. The user_defined_function.body field of an OnDemandFeatureView spec is decoded from base64 and passed to dill.loads() before any authorization check is performed, enabling attackers to embed a malicious serialized Python object with an arbitrary __reduce__ method to execute OS commands as the feast service account.

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🚨 CVE-2026-45900
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: caam - fix netdev memory leak in dpaa2_caam_probe

When commit 0e1a4d427f58 ("crypto: caam: Unembed net_dev structure in
dpaa2") converted embedded net_device to dynamically allocated pointers,
it added cleanup in dpaa2_dpseci_disable() but missed adding cleanup in
dpaa2_dpseci_free() for error paths.

This causes memory leaks when dpaa2_dpseci_dpio_setup() fails during probe
due to DPIO devices not being ready yet. The kernel's deferred probe
mechanism handles the retry successfully, but the netdevs allocated during
the failed probe attempt are never freed, resulting in kmemleak reports
showing multiple leaked netdev-related allocations all traced back to
dpaa2_caam_probe().

Fix this by preserving the CPU mask of allocated netdevs during setup and
using it for cleanup in dpaa2_dpseci_free(). This approach ensures that
only the CPUs that actually had netdevs allocated will be cleaned up,
avoiding potential issues with CPU hotplug scenarios.

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🚨 CVE-2026-45901
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nf_tables: revert commit_mutex usage in reset path

It causes circular lock dependency between commit_mutex, nfnl_subsys_ipset
and nlk_cb_mutex when nft reset, ipset list, and iptables-nft with '-m set'
rule run at the same time.

Previous patches made it safe to run individual reset handlers concurrently
so commit_mutex is no longer required to prevent this.

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🚨 CVE-2026-45902
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

power: supply: bq256xx: Fix use-after-free in power_supply_changed()

Using the `devm_` variant for requesting IRQ _before_ the `devm_`
variant for allocating/registering the `power_supply` handle, means that
the `power_supply` handle will be deallocated/unregistered _before_ the
interrupt handler (since `devm_` naturally deallocates in reverse
allocation order). This means that during removal, there is a race
condition where an interrupt can fire just _after_ the `power_supply`
handle has been freed, *but* just _before_ the corresponding
unregistration of the IRQ handler has run.

This will lead to the IRQ handler calling `power_supply_changed()` with
a freed `power_supply` handle. Which usually crashes the system or
otherwise silently corrupts the memory...

Note that there is a similar situation which can also happen during
`probe()`; the possibility of an interrupt firing _before_ registering
the `power_supply` handle. This would then lead to the nasty situation
of using the `power_supply` handle *uninitialized* in
`power_supply_changed()`.

Fix this racy use-after-free by making sure the IRQ is requested _after_
the registration of the `power_supply` handle.

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🚨 CVE-2026-45903
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix memory access flags in helper prototypes

After commit 37cce22dbd51 ("bpf: verifier: Refactor helper access type tracking"),
the verifier started relying on the access type flags in helper
function prototypes to perform memory access optimizations.

Currently, several helper functions utilizing ARG_PTR_TO_MEM lack the
corresponding MEM_RDONLY or MEM_WRITE flags. This omission causes the
verifier to incorrectly assume that the buffer contents are unchanged
across the helper call. Consequently, the verifier may optimize away
subsequent reads based on this wrong assumption, leading to correctness
issues.

For bpf_get_stack_proto_raw_tp, the original MEM_RDONLY was incorrect
since the helper writes to the buffer. Change it to ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM
which correctly indicates write access to potentially uninitialized memory.

Similar issues were recently addressed for specific helpers in commit
ac44dcc788b9 ("bpf: Fix verifier assumptions of bpf_d_path's output buffer")
and commit 2eb7648558a7 ("bpf: Specify access type of bpf_sysctl_get_name args").

Fix these prototypes by adding the correct memory access flags.

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🚨 CVE-2026-45904
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

powerpc/eeh: fix recursive pci_lock_rescan_remove locking in EEH event handling

The recent commit 1010b4c012b0 ("powerpc/eeh: Make EEH driver device
hotplug safe") restructured the EEH driver to improve synchronization
with the PCI hotplug layer.

However, it inadvertently moved pci_lock_rescan_remove() outside its
intended scope in eeh_handle_normal_event(), leading to broken PCI
error reporting and improper EEH event triggering. Specifically,
eeh_handle_normal_event() acquired pci_lock_rescan_remove() before
calling eeh_pe_bus_get(), but eeh_pe_bus_get() itself attempts to
acquire the same lock internally, causing nested locking and disrupting
normal EEH event handling paths.

This patch adds a boolean parameter do_lock to _eeh_pe_bus_get(),
with two public wrappers:
eeh_pe_bus_get() with locking enabled.
eeh_pe_bus_get_nolock() that skips locking.

Callers that already hold pci_lock_rescan_remove() now use
eeh_pe_bus_get_nolock() to avoid recursive lock acquisition.

Additionally, pci_lock_rescan_remove() calls are restored to the correct
position—after eeh_pe_bus_get() and immediately before iterating affected
PEs and devices. This ensures EEH-triggered PCI removes occur under proper
bus rescan locking without recursive lock contention.

The eeh_pe_loc_get() function has been split into two functions:
eeh_pe_loc_get(struct eeh_pe *pe) which retrieves the loc for given PE.
eeh_pe_loc_get_bus(struct pci_bus *bus) which retrieves the location
code for given bus.

This resolves lockdep warnings such as:
<snip>
[ 84.964298] [ T928] ============================================
[ 84.964304] [ T928] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[ 84.964311] [ T928] 6.18.0-rc3 #51 Not tainted
[ 84.964315] [ T928] --------------------------------------------
[ 84.964320] [ T928] eehd/928 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 84.964324] [ T928] c000000003b29d58 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pci_lock_rescan_remove+0x28/0x40
[ 84.964342] [ T928]
but task is already holding lock:
[ 84.964347] [ T928] c000000003b29d58 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pci_lock_rescan_remove+0x28/0x40
[ 84.964357] [ T928]
other info that might help us debug this:
[ 84.964363] [ T928] Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[ 84.964367] [ T928] CPU0
[ 84.964370] [ T928] ----
[ 84.964373] [ T928] lock(pci_rescan_remove_lock);
[ 84.964378] [ T928] lock(pci_rescan_remove_lock);
[ 84.964383] [ T928]
*** DEADLOCK ***

[ 84.964388] [ T928] May be due to missing lock nesting notation

[ 84.964393] [ T928] 1 lock held by eehd/928:
[ 84.964397] [ T928] #0: c000000003b29d58 (pci_rescan_remove_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: pci_lock_rescan_remove+0x28/0x40
[ 84.964408] [ T928]
stack backtrace:
[ 84.964414] [ T928] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 928 Comm: eehd Not tainted 6.18.0-rc3 #51 VOLUNTARY
[ 84.964417] [ T928] Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX POWER10 (architected) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NH1060_022) hv:phyp pSeries
[ 84.964419] [ T928] Call Trace:
[ 84.964420] [ T928] [c0000011a7157990] [c000000001705de4] dump_stack_lvl+0xc8/0x130 (unreliable)
[ 84.964424] [ T928] [c0000011a71579d0] [c0000000002f66e0] print_deadlock_bug+0x430/0x440
[ 84.964428] [ T928] [c0000011a7157a70] [c0000000002fd0c0] __lock_acquire+0x1530/0x2d80
[ 84.964431] [ T928] [c0000011a7157ba0] [c0000000002fea54] lock_acquire+0x144/0x410
[ 84.964433] [ T928] [c0000011a7157cb0] [c0000011a7157cb0] __mutex_lock+0xf4/0x1050
[ 84.964436] [ T928] [c0000011a7157e00] [c000000000de21d8] pci_lock_rescan_remove+0x28/0x40
[ 84.964439] [ T928] [c0000011a7157e20] [c00000000004ed98] eeh_pe_bus_get+0x48/0xc0
[ 84.964442] [ T928] [c0000011a7157e50] [c00000
---truncated---

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🚨 CVE-2026-45905
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfrm: fix ip_rt_bug race in icmp_route_lookup reverse path

icmp_route_lookup() performs multiple route lookups to find a suitable
route for sending ICMP error messages, with special handling for XFRM
(IPsec) policies.

The lookup sequence is:
1. First, lookup output route for ICMP reply (dst = original src)
2. Pass through xfrm_lookup() for policy check
3. If blocked (-EPERM) or dst is not local, enter "reverse path"
4. In reverse path, call xfrm_decode_session_reverse() to get fl4_dec
which reverses the original packet's flow (saddr<->daddr swapped)
5. If fl4_dec.saddr is local (we are the original destination), use
__ip_route_output_key() for output route lookup
6. If fl4_dec.saddr is NOT local (we are a forwarding node), use
ip_route_input() to simulate the reverse packet's input path
7. Finally, pass rt2 through xfrm_lookup() with XFRM_LOOKUP_ICMP flag

The bug occurs in step 6: ip_route_input() is called with fl4_dec.daddr
(original packet's source) as destination. If this address becomes local
between the initial check and ip_route_input() call (e.g., due to
concurrent "ip addr add"), ip_route_input() returns a LOCAL route with
dst.output set to ip_rt_bug.

This route is then used for ICMP output, causing dst_output() to call
ip_rt_bug(), triggering a WARN_ON:

------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: net/ipv4/route.c:1275 at ip_rt_bug+0x21/0x30, CPU#1
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ip_push_pending_frames+0x202/0x240
icmp_push_reply+0x30d/0x430
__icmp_send+0x1149/0x24f0
ip_options_compile+0xa2/0xd0
ip_rcv_finish_core+0x829/0x1950
ip_rcv+0x2d7/0x420
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x185/0x1f0
netif_receive_skb+0x90/0x450
tun_get_user+0x3413/0x3fb0
tun_chr_write_iter+0xe4/0x220
...

Fix this by checking rt2->rt_type after ip_route_input(). If it's
RTN_LOCAL, the route cannot be used for output, so treat it as an error.

The reproducer requires kernel modification to widen the race window,
making it unsuitable as a selftest. It is available at:

https://gist.github.com/mrpre/eae853b72ac6a750f5d45d64ddac1e81

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🚨 CVE-2026-45906
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

power: supply: pf1550: Fix use-after-free in power_supply_changed()

Using the `devm_` variant for requesting IRQ _before_ the `devm_`
variant for allocating/registering the `power_supply` handle, means that
the `power_supply` handle will be deallocated/unregistered _before_ the
interrupt handler (since `devm_` naturally deallocates in reverse
allocation order). This means that during removal, there is a race
condition where an interrupt can fire just _after_ the `power_supply`
handle has been freed, *but* just _before_ the corresponding
unregistration of the IRQ handler has run.

This will lead to the IRQ handler calling `power_supply_changed()` with
a freed `power_supply` handle. Which usually crashes the system or
otherwise silently corrupts the memory...

Note that there is a similar situation which can also happen during
`probe()`; the possibility of an interrupt firing _before_ registering
the `power_supply` handle. This would then lead to the nasty situation
of using the `power_supply` handle *uninitialized* in
`power_supply_changed()`.

Fix this racy use-after-free by making sure the IRQ is requested _after_
the registration of the `power_supply` handle.

🎖@cveNotify