🚨 CVE-2026-46011
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: mtk-jpeg: fix use-after-free in release path due to uncancelled work
The mtk_jpeg_release() function frees the context structure (ctx) without
first cancelling any pending or running work in ctx->jpeg_work. This
creates a race window where the workqueue callback may still be accessing
the context memory after it has been freed.
Race condition:
CPU 0 (release) CPU 1 (workqueue)
---------------- ------------------
close()
mtk_jpeg_release()
mtk_jpegenc_worker()
ctx = work->data
// accessing ctx
kfree(ctx) // freed!
access ctx // UAF!
The work is queued via queue_work() during JPEG encode/decode operations
(via mtk_jpeg_device_run). If the device is closed while work is pending
or running, the work handler will access freed memory.
Fix this by calling cancel_work_sync() BEFORE acquiring the mutex. This
ordering is critical: if cancel_work_sync() is called after mutex_lock(),
and the work handler also tries to acquire the same mutex, it would cause
a deadlock.
Note: The open error path does NOT need cancel_work_sync() because
INIT_WORK() only initializes the work structure - it does not schedule
it. Work is only scheduled later during ioctl operations.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: mtk-jpeg: fix use-after-free in release path due to uncancelled work
The mtk_jpeg_release() function frees the context structure (ctx) without
first cancelling any pending or running work in ctx->jpeg_work. This
creates a race window where the workqueue callback may still be accessing
the context memory after it has been freed.
Race condition:
CPU 0 (release) CPU 1 (workqueue)
---------------- ------------------
close()
mtk_jpeg_release()
mtk_jpegenc_worker()
ctx = work->data
// accessing ctx
kfree(ctx) // freed!
access ctx // UAF!
The work is queued via queue_work() during JPEG encode/decode operations
(via mtk_jpeg_device_run). If the device is closed while work is pending
or running, the work handler will access freed memory.
Fix this by calling cancel_work_sync() BEFORE acquiring the mutex. This
ordering is critical: if cancel_work_sync() is called after mutex_lock(),
and the work handler also tries to acquire the same mutex, it would cause
a deadlock.
Note: The open error path does NOT need cancel_work_sync() because
INIT_WORK() only initializes the work structure - it does not schedule
it. Work is only scheduled later during ioctl operations.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46012
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix memory leaks in rxkad_verify_response()
Fix rxkad_verify_response() to free the ticket and the server key under all
circumstances by initialising the ticket pointer to NULL and then making
all paths through the function after the first allocation has been done go
through a single common epilogue that just releases everything - where all
the releases skip on a NULL pointer.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix memory leaks in rxkad_verify_response()
Fix rxkad_verify_response() to free the ticket and the server key under all
circumstances by initialising the ticket pointer to NULL and then making
all paths through the function after the first allocation has been done go
through a single common epilogue that just releases everything - where all
the releases skip on a NULL pointer.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46013
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/memfd_luo: fix physical address conversion in put_folios cleanup
In memfd_luo_retrieve_folios()'s put_folios cleanup path:
1. kho_restore_folio() expects a phys_addr_t (physical address) but
receives a raw PFN (pfolio->pfn). This causes kho_restore_page() to
check the wrong physical address (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT instead of the
actual physical address).
2. This loop lacks the !pfolio->pfn check that exists in the main
retrieval loop and memfd_luo_discard_folios(), which could
incorrectly process sparse file holes where pfn=0.
Fix by converting PFN to physical address with PFN_PHYS() and adding
the !pfolio->pfn check, matching the pattern used elsewhere in this file.
This issue was identified by the AI review.
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260323110747.193569-1-duanchenghao@kylinos.cn
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/memfd_luo: fix physical address conversion in put_folios cleanup
In memfd_luo_retrieve_folios()'s put_folios cleanup path:
1. kho_restore_folio() expects a phys_addr_t (physical address) but
receives a raw PFN (pfolio->pfn). This causes kho_restore_page() to
check the wrong physical address (pfn << PAGE_SHIFT instead of the
actual physical address).
2. This loop lacks the !pfolio->pfn check that exists in the main
retrieval loop and memfd_luo_discard_folios(), which could
incorrectly process sparse file holes where pfn=0.
Fix by converting PFN to physical address with PFN_PHYS() and adding
the !pfolio->pfn check, matching the pattern used elsewhere in this file.
This issue was identified by the AI review.
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260323110747.193569-1-duanchenghao@kylinos.cn
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46014
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: Add missing save/restore handling of LBR MSRs
MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR and LBR MSRs are currently not enumerated by
KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST, and LBR MSRs cannot be set with KVM_SET_MSRS. So
save/restore is completely broken.
Fix it by adding the MSRs to msrs_to_save_base, and allowing writes to
LBR MSRs from userspace only (as they are read-only MSRs) if LBR
virtualization is enabled. Additionally, to correctly restore L1's LBRs
while L2 is running, make sure the LBRs are copied from the captured
VMCB01 save area in svm_copy_vmrun_state().
Note, for VMX, this also fixes a flaw where MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR isn't
reported as an MSR to save/restore.
Note #2, over-reporting MSR_IA32_LASTxxx on Intel is ok, as KVM already
handles unsupported reads and writes thanks to commit b5e2fec0ebc3 ("KVM:
Ignore DEBUGCTL MSRs with no effect") (kvm_do_msr_access() will morph the
unsupported userspace write into a nop).
[sean: guard with lbrv checks, massage changelog]
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: Add missing save/restore handling of LBR MSRs
MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR and LBR MSRs are currently not enumerated by
KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST, and LBR MSRs cannot be set with KVM_SET_MSRS. So
save/restore is completely broken.
Fix it by adding the MSRs to msrs_to_save_base, and allowing writes to
LBR MSRs from userspace only (as they are read-only MSRs) if LBR
virtualization is enabled. Additionally, to correctly restore L1's LBRs
while L2 is running, make sure the LBRs are copied from the captured
VMCB01 save area in svm_copy_vmrun_state().
Note, for VMX, this also fixes a flaw where MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR isn't
reported as an MSR to save/restore.
Note #2, over-reporting MSR_IA32_LASTxxx on Intel is ok, as KVM already
handles unsupported reads and writes thanks to commit b5e2fec0ebc3 ("KVM:
Ignore DEBUGCTL MSRs with no effect") (kvm_do_msr_access() will morph the
unsupported userspace write into a nop).
[sean: guard with lbrv checks, massage changelog]
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46015
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: call sk_data_ready() after listener migration
When inet_csk_listen_stop() migrates an established child socket from
a closing listener to another socket in the same SO_REUSEPORT group,
the target listener gets a new accept-queue entry via
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(), but that path never notifies the target
listener's waiters. A nonblocking accept() still works because it
checks the queue directly, but poll()/epoll_wait() waiters and
blocking accept() callers can also remain asleep indefinitely.
Call READ_ONCE(nsk->sk_data_ready)(nsk) after a successful migration
in inet_csk_listen_stop().
However, after inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() succeeds, the ref acquired
in reuseport_migrate_sock() is effectively transferred to
nreq->rsk_listener. Another CPU can then dequeue nreq via accept()
or listener shutdown, hit reqsk_put(), and drop that listener ref.
Since listeners are SOCK_RCU_FREE, wrap the post-queue_add()
dereferences of nsk in rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), which also
covers the existing sock_net(nsk) access in that path.
The reqsk_timer_handler() path does not need the same changes for two
reasons: half-open requests become readable only after the final ACK,
where tcp_child_process() already wakes the listener; and once nreq is
visible via inet_ehash_insert(), the success path no longer touches
nsk directly.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: call sk_data_ready() after listener migration
When inet_csk_listen_stop() migrates an established child socket from
a closing listener to another socket in the same SO_REUSEPORT group,
the target listener gets a new accept-queue entry via
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(), but that path never notifies the target
listener's waiters. A nonblocking accept() still works because it
checks the queue directly, but poll()/epoll_wait() waiters and
blocking accept() callers can also remain asleep indefinitely.
Call READ_ONCE(nsk->sk_data_ready)(nsk) after a successful migration
in inet_csk_listen_stop().
However, after inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() succeeds, the ref acquired
in reuseport_migrate_sock() is effectively transferred to
nreq->rsk_listener. Another CPU can then dequeue nreq via accept()
or listener shutdown, hit reqsk_put(), and drop that listener ref.
Since listeners are SOCK_RCU_FREE, wrap the post-queue_add()
dereferences of nsk in rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), which also
covers the existing sock_net(nsk) access in that path.
The reqsk_timer_handler() path does not need the same changes for two
reasons: half-open requests become readable only after the final ACK,
where tcp_child_process() already wakes the listener; and once nreq is
visible via inet_ehash_insert(), the success path no longer touches
nsk directly.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46016
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
remoteproc: xlnx: Only access buffer information if IPI is buffered
In the receive callback check if message is NULL to prevent
possibility of crash by NULL pointer dereferencing.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
remoteproc: xlnx: Only access buffer information if IPI is buffered
In the receive callback check if message is NULL to prevent
possibility of crash by NULL pointer dereferencing.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46017
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: fix deferred split queue races during migration
migrate_folio_move() records the deferred split queue state from src and
replays it on dst. Replaying it after remove_migration_ptes(src, dst, 0)
makes dst visible before it is requeued, so a concurrent rmap-removal path
can mark dst partially mapped and trip the WARN in deferred_split_folio().
Move the requeue before remove_migration_ptes() so dst is back on the
deferred split queue before it becomes visible again.
Because migration still holds dst locked at that point, teach
deferred_split_scan() to requeue a folio when folio_trylock() fails.
Otherwise a fully mapped underused folio can be dequeued by the shrinker
and silently lost from split_queue.
[ziy@nvidia.com: move the comment]
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: fix deferred split queue races during migration
migrate_folio_move() records the deferred split queue state from src and
replays it on dst. Replaying it after remove_migration_ptes(src, dst, 0)
makes dst visible before it is requeued, so a concurrent rmap-removal path
can mark dst partially mapped and trip the WARN in deferred_split_folio().
Move the requeue before remove_migration_ptes() so dst is back on the
deferred split queue before it becomes visible again.
Because migration still holds dst locked at that point, teach
deferred_split_scan() to requeue a folio when folio_trylock() fails.
Otherwise a fully mapped underused folio can be dequeued by the shrinker
and silently lost from split_queue.
[ziy@nvidia.com: move the comment]
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46018
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: stop parsing UAC2 rates at MAX_NR_RATES
parse_uac2_sample_rate_range() caps the number of enumerated
rates at MAX_NR_RATES, but it only breaks out of the current
rate loop. A malformed UAC2 RANGE response with additional
triplets continues parsing the remaining triplets and repeatedly
prints "invalid uac2 rates" while probe still holds
register_mutex.
Stop the whole parse once the cap is reached and return the
number of rates collected so far.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: stop parsing UAC2 rates at MAX_NR_RATES
parse_uac2_sample_rate_range() caps the number of enumerated
rates at MAX_NR_RATES, but it only breaks out of the current
rate loop. A malformed UAC2 RANGE response with additional
triplets continues parsing the remaining triplets and repeatedly
prints "invalid uac2 rates" while probe still holds
register_mutex.
Stop the whole parse once the cap is reached and return the
number of rates collected so far.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-46019
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: atmel-aes - Fix 3-page memory leak in atmel_aes_buff_cleanup
atmel_aes_buff_init() allocates 4 pages using __get_free_pages() with
ATMEL_AES_BUFFER_ORDER, but atmel_aes_buff_cleanup() frees only the
first page using free_page(), leaking the remaining 3 pages. Use
free_pages() with ATMEL_AES_BUFFER_ORDER to fix the memory leak.
🎖@cveNotify
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: atmel-aes - Fix 3-page memory leak in atmel_aes_buff_cleanup
atmel_aes_buff_init() allocates 4 pages using __get_free_pages() with
ATMEL_AES_BUFFER_ORDER, but atmel_aes_buff_cleanup() frees only the
first page using free_page(), leaking the remaining 3 pages. Use
free_pages() with ATMEL_AES_BUFFER_ORDER to fix the memory leak.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-3840
A vulnerability in Kedro version 1.2.0 allows an attacker to exploit path traversal by providing a crafted version string. The `_get_versioned_path()` method in `kedro/io/core.py` directly interpolates user-supplied version strings into filesystem paths without sanitization. This enables an attacker to escape the intended versioned dataset directory and access files outside the expected path. The issue is also reachable through the CLI via the `--load-versions` parameter, as `_split_load_versions()` in `kedro/framework/cli/utils.py` does not validate the version string. This vulnerability can lead to unauthorized file reads, data poisoning, cross-project or cross-tenant data access, and broader downstream impacts in environments where Kedro is used with automation or orchestration layers.
🎖@cveNotify
A vulnerability in Kedro version 1.2.0 allows an attacker to exploit path traversal by providing a crafted version string. The `_get_versioned_path()` method in `kedro/io/core.py` directly interpolates user-supplied version strings into filesystem paths without sanitization. This enables an attacker to escape the intended versioned dataset directory and access files outside the expected path. The issue is also reachable through the CLI via the `--load-versions` parameter, as `_split_load_versions()` in `kedro/framework/cli/utils.py` does not validate the version string. This vulnerability can lead to unauthorized file reads, data poisoning, cross-project or cross-tenant data access, and broader downstream impacts in environments where Kedro is used with automation or orchestration layers.
🎖@cveNotify
🚨 CVE-2026-12143
form-data is a library for creating readable multipart/form-data streams. In versions through 4.0.5, the `field` argument to `FormData#append` and the `filename` option are concatenated verbatim into the `Content-Disposition` header without escaping carriage return (CR), line feed (LF), or double-quote (") characters. An application that passes attacker-controlled data as a field name or filename (for example, an API gateway that turns JSON object keys into multipart field names) allows the attacker to terminate the header line and inject additional headers, or to smuggle entire additional multipart parts, into the request the application forwards to a backend. This can let the attacker add or override form fields (e.g. set `is_admin=true`) seen by the downstream parser. This is an instance of CWE-93 (CRLF injection). The fix escapes CR, LF, and `"` as `%0D`, `%0A`, and `%22` in field names and filenames, matching the serialization browsers use per the WHATWG HTML multipart/form-data encoding algorithm. Exploitation requires the consuming application to use untrusted input as a field name or filename; applications that use only fixed/trusted field names are not affected. Fixed in 2.5.6, 3.0.5, and 4.0.6.
🎖@cveNotify
form-data is a library for creating readable multipart/form-data streams. In versions through 4.0.5, the `field` argument to `FormData#append` and the `filename` option are concatenated verbatim into the `Content-Disposition` header without escaping carriage return (CR), line feed (LF), or double-quote (") characters. An application that passes attacker-controlled data as a field name or filename (for example, an API gateway that turns JSON object keys into multipart field names) allows the attacker to terminate the header line and inject additional headers, or to smuggle entire additional multipart parts, into the request the application forwards to a backend. This can let the attacker add or override form fields (e.g. set `is_admin=true`) seen by the downstream parser. This is an instance of CWE-93 (CRLF injection). The fix escapes CR, LF, and `"` as `%0D`, `%0A`, and `%22` in field names and filenames, matching the serialization browsers use per the WHATWG HTML multipart/form-data encoding algorithm. Exploitation requires the consuming application to use untrusted input as a field name or filename; applications that use only fixed/trusted field names are not affected. Fixed in 2.5.6, 3.0.5, and 4.0.6.
🎖@cveNotify
cwe.mitre.org
CWE -
CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') (4.20)
CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') (4.20)
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) is a list of software weaknesses.
🚨 CVE-2026-28742
Naxclow devices use a uniform request-signing scheme based on a hard-coded, platform-wide salt embedded in every firmware image. Once this salt is recovered from any device, an attacker can generate valid signatures for arbitrary device or account operations due to the absence of per-device keys, server-side nonce tracking, or replay protections. Combined with the system’s use of plain HTTP for control-plane traffic, the construction enables broad request forgery and impersonation across the platform.
🎖@cveNotify
Naxclow devices use a uniform request-signing scheme based on a hard-coded, platform-wide salt embedded in every firmware image. Once this salt is recovered from any device, an attacker can generate valid signatures for arbitrary device or account operations due to the absence of per-device keys, server-side nonce tracking, or replay protections. Combined with the system’s use of plain HTTP for control-plane traffic, the construction enables broad request forgery and impersonation across the platform.
🎖@cveNotify
GitHub
CSAF/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-162-02.json at develop · cisagov/CSAF
CISA CSAF Security Advisories. Contribute to cisagov/CSAF development by creating an account on GitHub.
🚨 CVE-2026-42932
Naxclow device identifiers use fixed manufacturing prefixes combined with sequential counters, producing a fully predictable and enumerable identifier space. Because the platform also exposes an endpoint that reveals the current identifier high-water mark, the active fleet can be enumerated.
🎖@cveNotify
Naxclow device identifiers use fixed manufacturing prefixes combined with sequential counters, producing a fully predictable and enumerable identifier space. Because the platform also exposes an endpoint that reveals the current identifier high-water mark, the active fleet can be enumerated.
🎖@cveNotify
GitHub
CSAF/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-162-02.json at develop · cisagov/CSAF
CISA CSAF Security Advisories. Contribute to cisagov/CSAF development by creating an account on GitHub.
🚨 CVE-2026-42947
A flaw in Naxclow's platform’s onboarding workflow allows an attacker to replay a confirm-then-bind sequence to silently reassign a device to an arbitrary account. Because the affected endpoints validate request signatures but do not confirm legitimate ownership, an attacker with any account can take over a device without user interaction while the device remains online and unaware.
🎖@cveNotify
A flaw in Naxclow's platform’s onboarding workflow allows an attacker to replay a confirm-then-bind sequence to silently reassign a device to an arbitrary account. Because the affected endpoints validate request signatures but do not confirm legitimate ownership, an attacker with any account can take over a device without user interaction while the device remains online and unaware.
🎖@cveNotify
GitHub
CSAF/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-162-02.json at develop · cisagov/CSAF
CISA CSAF Security Advisories. Contribute to cisagov/CSAF development by creating an account on GitHub.
🚨 CVE-2026-50099
During WiFi association, Naxclow device firmware prints the host network’s SSID, PSK, and negotiated WPA keys in cleartext to an exposed UART console on production hardware. The UART pads are labeled, run with default serial settings, and drop to an interactive RT-Thread shell that permits arbitrary memory reads, enabling full firmware extraction. An attacker with brief physical access, common for outdoor-mounted devices, can therefore recover WiFi credentials and bootstrap firmware-side attacks.
🎖@cveNotify
During WiFi association, Naxclow device firmware prints the host network’s SSID, PSK, and negotiated WPA keys in cleartext to an exposed UART console on production hardware. The UART pads are labeled, run with default serial settings, and drop to an interactive RT-Thread shell that permits arbitrary memory reads, enabling full firmware extraction. An attacker with brief physical access, common for outdoor-mounted devices, can therefore recover WiFi credentials and bootstrap firmware-side attacks.
🎖@cveNotify
GitHub
CSAF/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-162-02.json at develop · cisagov/CSAF
CISA CSAF Security Advisories. Contribute to cisagov/CSAF development by creating an account on GitHub.
🚨 CVE-2026-50101
Naxclow devices use a server-side, per-device relay credential that never rotates and is re-issued to the device on each boot. Because this credential remains valid indefinitely and cannot be reset or revoked by the legitimate owner, any party that obtains it through any exposure path can maintain persistent access to the device’s relay channel. This enables long-term impersonation or interception, even after factory resets or re-onboarding.
🎖@cveNotify
Naxclow devices use a server-side, per-device relay credential that never rotates and is re-issued to the device on each boot. Because this credential remains valid indefinitely and cannot be reset or revoked by the legitimate owner, any party that obtains it through any exposure path can maintain persistent access to the device’s relay channel. This enables long-term impersonation or interception, even after factory resets or re-onboarding.
🎖@cveNotify
GitHub
CSAF/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-162-02.json at develop · cisagov/CSAF
CISA CSAF Security Advisories. Contribute to cisagov/CSAF development by creating an account on GitHub.
🚨 CVE-2026-50108
The Naxclow platform API that returns device relay registration details exposes a persistent credential without verifying that the requester is the legitimate device or owner. An actor able to present a platform-valid request signature can retrieve credentials for arbitrary devices and register on the relay as that device, enabling interception and disruption of its communications.
🎖@cveNotify
The Naxclow platform API that returns device relay registration details exposes a persistent credential without verifying that the requester is the legitimate device or owner. An actor able to present a platform-valid request signature can retrieve credentials for arbitrary devices and register on the relay as that device, enabling interception and disruption of its communications.
🎖@cveNotify
GitHub
CSAF/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-162-02.json at develop · cisagov/CSAF
CISA CSAF Security Advisories. Contribute to cisagov/CSAF development by creating an account on GitHub.
🚨 CVE-2026-50244
The Naxclow platform exposes a registration endpoint that accepts signed requests containing a batch prefix and an arbitrary caller-supplied account identifier, without validating any ownership relationship. Each call mints a new sequential device identifier and returns the current high-water counter value for the batch, allowing callers to measure and enumerate the active device space. The endpoint’s behavior enables precise fleet enumeration.
🎖@cveNotify
The Naxclow platform exposes a registration endpoint that accepts signed requests containing a batch prefix and an arbitrary caller-supplied account identifier, without validating any ownership relationship. Each call mints a new sequential device identifier and returns the current high-water counter value for the batch, allowing callers to measure and enumerate the active device space. The endpoint’s behavior enables precise fleet enumeration.
🎖@cveNotify
GitHub
CSAF/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-162-02.json at develop · cisagov/CSAF
CISA CSAF Security Advisories. Contribute to cisagov/CSAF development by creating an account on GitHub.
🚨 CVE-2026-42604
Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. The `POST /openid/config` endpoint in Actual Budget's sync-server versions <= 26.4.0 exposes the full OpenID Connect configuration—including the OAuth2 `client_secret`—to any caller who knows the bootstrap password. The endpoint also lacks authentication and rate limiting, making the bootstrap password brute-forceable. Version 26.5.0 fixes the issue.
🎖@cveNotify
Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. The `POST /openid/config` endpoint in Actual Budget's sync-server versions <= 26.4.0 exposes the full OpenID Connect configuration—including the OAuth2 `client_secret`—to any caller who knows the bootstrap password. The endpoint also lacks authentication and rate limiting, making the bootstrap password brute-forceable. Version 26.5.0 fixes the issue.
🎖@cveNotify
actualbudget.org
Release 26.5.0 | Actual Budget
New release of Actual.
🚨 CVE-2026-42890
Actual is an open-source personal finance application. In the macOS desktop application version 25.x (built on Electron 39.2.7), the ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE fuse is not disabled, allowing an attacker who can place a file on disk or control command-line arguments to invoke the signed Actual.app binary with the ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1 environment variable set. This converts the application into a Node.js REPL capable of executing arbitrary code that inherits the application's entitlements and code signature, bypassing macOS Gatekeeper review. Version 26.5.0 patches the issue.
🎖@cveNotify
Actual is an open-source personal finance application. In the macOS desktop application version 25.x (built on Electron 39.2.7), the ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE fuse is not disabled, allowing an attacker who can place a file on disk or control command-line arguments to invoke the signed Actual.app binary with the ELECTRON_RUN_AS_NODE=1 environment variable set. This converts the application into a Node.js REPL capable of executing arbitrary code that inherits the application's entitlements and code signature, bypassing macOS Gatekeeper review. Version 26.5.0 patches the issue.
🎖@cveNotify
actualbudget.org
Release 26.5.0 | Actual Budget
New release of Actual.
🚨 CVE-2026-43872
Actual is an open-source personal finance application. Prior to version 26.5.0, several endpoints are affected by a path traversal vulnerability. Version 26.5.0 fixes the issue.
🎖@cveNotify
Actual is an open-source personal finance application. Prior to version 26.5.0, several endpoints are affected by a path traversal vulnerability. Version 26.5.0 fixes the issue.
🎖@cveNotify
actualbudget.org
Release 26.5.0 | Actual Budget
New release of Actual.