Noma Labs found a prompt injection flaw (GitLost) in GitHub Agentic Workflows: posting a crafted issue in a public org repo causes the AI agent to exfiltrate private repository contents as a public comment, bypassing guardrails via the keyword "Additionally.".
https://noma.security/blog/gitlost-how-we-tricked-githubs-ai-agent-into-leaking-private-repos
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GhostApproval is a symlink-following vulnerability affecting 6 AI coding assistants (Amazon Q, Claude Code, Augment, Cursor, Google Antigravity, Windsurf). Malicious repos trick agents into writing outside the workspace sandbox, enabling RCE. Critically, agents internally recognize the dangerous target but confirmation prompts hide it from users, nullifying Human-in-the-Loop protections.
https://www.wiz.io/blog/ghostapproval-a-trust-boundary-gap-in-ai-coding-assistants
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Datadog Security Research has tracked multiple coordinated campaigns enumerating GitHub organizations, repositories, and users through the public GitHub API, abusing leaked access tokens, and cloning private repositories.
https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/coordinated-github-api-enumeration
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Sysdig TRT observed an attacker use one leaked service principal (with RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory) to self-grant Global Administrator, then elevateAccess to root RBAC Owner, harvest storage/Event Hub/Key Vault keys, and plant backdoors on 26 app registrations.
https://www.sysdig.com/blog/no-single-pane-of-glass-anatomy-of-an-azure-permission-takeover
#azure
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🔶 Introducing OAuth Support for AWS MCP Server
AWS MCP Server now supports OAuth-based sign-in using existing AWS credentials (IAM, IAM Identity Center, federated). Includes dynamic client registration, headless token API, new IAM condition keys, token introspection/revocation, and CloudTrail logging for OAuth events.
https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/introducing-oauth-support-for-aws-mcp-server
#aws
AWS MCP Server now supports OAuth-based sign-in using existing AWS credentials (IAM, IAM Identity Center, federated). Includes dynamic client registration, headless token API, new IAM condition keys, token introspection/revocation, and CloudTrail logging for OAuth events.
https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/introducing-oauth-support-for-aws-mcp-server
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🔶 Authenticate legitimate AI agent traffic with AWS WAF Bot Control
AWS WAF Bot Control now supports Web Bot Authentication (WBA), using ed25519 cryptographic signatures (RFC 9421) to verify AI agent identities. It introduces new WAF labels (verified, invalid, expired, unknown_bot) enabling granular allow/block rules, replacing unreliable IP-based bot filtering.
https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/authenticate-legitimate-ai-agent-traffic-with-aws-waf-bot-control
#aws
AWS WAF Bot Control now supports Web Bot Authentication (WBA), using ed25519 cryptographic signatures (RFC 9421) to verify AI agent identities. It introduces new WAF labels (verified, invalid, expired, unknown_bot) enabling granular allow/block rules, replacing unreliable IP-based bot filtering.
https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/authenticate-legitimate-ai-agent-traffic-with-aws-waf-bot-control
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🔶 OIDC tokens can now restrict which AWS roles they assume
AWS STS now supports a new OIDC claim that restricts which role ARNs a token can assume. Enforced before trust policy evaluation. The boolean condition key sts:RoleAuthorizedByIdp enables mandatory enforcement via trust policies or RCPs.
https://awsteele.com/blog/2026/07/13/oidc-tokens-can-restrict-which-aws-roles-they-assume.html
#aws
AWS STS now supports a new OIDC claim that restricts which role ARNs a token can assume. Enforced before trust policy evaluation. The boolean condition key sts:RoleAuthorizedByIdp enables mandatory enforcement via trust policies or RCPs.
https://awsteele.com/blog/2026/07/13/oidc-tokens-can-restrict-which-aws-roles-they-assume.html
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🔶🔷🔴 The Two Mitigations for the Service-Account Confused Deputy in the Cloud
Two mitigations exist for cloud service-account confused deputy attacks: for customer-managed identities, an attachment gate (GCP actAs, AWS iam:PassRole, Azure assign/action) controls bind-time authorization; for provider-managed identities, the CSP enforces internal checks, with AWS uniquely exposing this via Forward Access Sessions and condition keys.
https://kattraxler.cloud/the-two-mitigations-for-the-service-account-confused-deputy-in-the-cloud
#aws #azure #gcp
Two mitigations exist for cloud service-account confused deputy attacks: for customer-managed identities, an attachment gate (GCP actAs, AWS iam:PassRole, Azure assign/action) controls bind-time authorization; for provider-managed identities, the CSP enforces internal checks, with AWS uniquely exposing this via Forward Access Sessions and condition keys.
https://kattraxler.cloud/the-two-mitigations-for-the-service-account-confused-deputy-in-the-cloud
#aws #azure #gcp
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🔶 Introducing Claude apps gateway for AWS
Amazon announced the Claude apps gateway for AWS, a self-hosted control plane that gives organizations a single point of control over access, cost, and policy for Claude Code and Claude Desktop.
https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/machine-learning/introducing-claude-apps-gateway-for-aws
#aws
Amazon announced the Claude apps gateway for AWS, a self-hosted control plane that gives organizations a single point of control over access, cost, and policy for Claude Code and Claude Desktop.
https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/machine-learning/introducing-claude-apps-gateway-for-aws
#aws
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Anthropic's Deputy CISO shares a four-question framework for assessing agentic AI risk, and walks through controls that keep agent deployments bounded and auditable.
https://claude.com/blog/ciso-guide-to-agentic-ai
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A reference architecture for giving a locally-running AI agent a trustworthy, auditable identity, without long-lived credentials on disk, including a structural defense against prompt injection built into the protocol layer.
https://1password.com/blog/ai-agent-identity-delegated-local
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🔶 Introducing the Amazon GuardDuty investigation agent: on-demand AI-powered threat assessment
Amazon GuardDuty investigation agent (public preview) uses AI to auto-investigate GuardDuty security findings, reducing investigation time from hours to minutes. It returns risk levels, confidence scores, MITRE ATT&CK mappings, and remediation steps via console, CLI, API, or AWS MCP server.
https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/introducing-the-amazon-guardduty-investigation-agent-on-demand-ai-powered-threat-assessment
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Amazon GuardDuty investigation agent (public preview) uses AI to auto-investigate GuardDuty security findings, reducing investigation time from hours to minutes. It returns risk levels, confidence scores, MITRE ATT&CK mappings, and remediation steps via console, CLI, API, or AWS MCP server.
https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/introducing-the-amazon-guardduty-investigation-agent-on-demand-ai-powered-threat-assessment
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A study of ~200,000 LLM responses found 5 frontier models (Claude, GPT, Gemini, DeepSeek) hallucinate nonexistent package names at 4.62-6.10%, with 53 shared fictitious names on PyPI/npm still registrable and exploitable via slopsquatting attacks.
https://socket.dev/blog/slopsquatting-targets-across-frontier-llms
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