The Enterprise-Managed Authorization extension to the Model Context Protocol is now stable, enabling organizations to centrally provision MCP server access through their identity provider so users get connected servers on first login without per-app OAuth.
https://blog.modelcontextprotocol.io/posts/enterprise-managed-auth
#AIM
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Designed for agentic workloads, new capabilities in VPC Service Controls can help establish a network-level, destination-based perimeter.
https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/securing-agentic-ai-whats-new-in-vpc-service-controls
#gcp
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Threat actors impersonate AI brands (ChatGPT, Claude, DeepSeek, Copilot) in phishing, malvertising, and SEO-poisoning campaigns to steal credentials, credit card data, and deliver infostealers like Vidar. Storm-3075 and Fox Tempest are attributed actors using signed malware.
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/06/08/ai-brands-as-bait-how-threat-actors-are-using-the-ai-hype-in-social-engineering
#AI
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This post compares three AI agent identity models: acting as the user (simple but single-player), service account tokens (common in production but insecure), and SPIFFE-based workload identity (best but costly to implement). Covers governance plumbing like Okta XAA and cloud-provider managed options.
https://kanenarraway.com/posts/agent-identity-models
#AI
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🔶 Apps can now impersonate human access to AWS via IAM Identity Center
AWS IAM Identity Center now lets server-side apps exchange an IdP-issued OIDC token for user-scoped AWS credentials via CreateTokenWithIAM, ListAccounts, and GetRoleCredentials. Actions are attributed to the user in CloudTrail. Key gaps: no per-app scope restrictions and no application ARN in audit trails.
https://awsteele.com/blog/2026/07/01/apps-can-now-impersonate-human-access-to-aws-via-iam-identity-center.html
#aws
AWS IAM Identity Center now lets server-side apps exchange an IdP-issued OIDC token for user-scoped AWS credentials via CreateTokenWithIAM, ListAccounts, and GetRoleCredentials. Actions are attributed to the user in CloudTrail. Key gaps: no per-app scope restrictions and no application ARN in audit trails.
https://awsteele.com/blog/2026/07/01/apps-can-now-impersonate-human-access-to-aws-via-iam-identity-center.html
#aws
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Uber extended its Zero Trust architecture to assign SPIRE-backed cryptographic identities to AI agents, issuing short-lived, single-hop JWTs via a Security Token Service. Full actor chains (user to agent to tool) propagate across multi-agent MCP calls, enabling end-to-end auditability with sub-40ms P99 token exchange latency.
https://www.uber.com/us/en/blog/solving-the-agent-identity-crisis
#AI
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Anthropic eBook applying Zero Trust principles to enterprise autonomous AI agents, covering threat taxonomy (prompt injection, tool/MCP hijacking, memory poisoning, supply chain risks), tiered controls (Foundation/Enterprise/Advanced) for identity, least-privilege, observability, and AI-accelerated defensive operations.
#AI
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Noma Labs found a prompt injection flaw (GitLost) in GitHub Agentic Workflows: posting a crafted issue in a public org repo causes the AI agent to exfiltrate private repository contents as a public comment, bypassing guardrails via the keyword "Additionally.".
https://noma.security/blog/gitlost-how-we-tricked-githubs-ai-agent-into-leaking-private-repos
#AI
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GhostApproval is a symlink-following vulnerability affecting 6 AI coding assistants (Amazon Q, Claude Code, Augment, Cursor, Google Antigravity, Windsurf). Malicious repos trick agents into writing outside the workspace sandbox, enabling RCE. Critically, agents internally recognize the dangerous target but confirmation prompts hide it from users, nullifying Human-in-the-Loop protections.
https://www.wiz.io/blog/ghostapproval-a-trust-boundary-gap-in-ai-coding-assistants
#AI
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Datadog Security Research has tracked multiple coordinated campaigns enumerating GitHub organizations, repositories, and users through the public GitHub API, abusing leaked access tokens, and cloning private repositories.
https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/coordinated-github-api-enumeration
#github
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Sysdig TRT observed an attacker use one leaked service principal (with RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory) to self-grant Global Administrator, then elevateAccess to root RBAC Owner, harvest storage/Event Hub/Key Vault keys, and plant backdoors on 26 app registrations.
https://www.sysdig.com/blog/no-single-pane-of-glass-anatomy-of-an-azure-permission-takeover
#azure
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🔶 Introducing OAuth Support for AWS MCP Server
AWS MCP Server now supports OAuth-based sign-in using existing AWS credentials (IAM, IAM Identity Center, federated). Includes dynamic client registration, headless token API, new IAM condition keys, token introspection/revocation, and CloudTrail logging for OAuth events.
https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/introducing-oauth-support-for-aws-mcp-server
#aws
AWS MCP Server now supports OAuth-based sign-in using existing AWS credentials (IAM, IAM Identity Center, federated). Includes dynamic client registration, headless token API, new IAM condition keys, token introspection/revocation, and CloudTrail logging for OAuth events.
https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/introducing-oauth-support-for-aws-mcp-server
#aws
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🔶 Authenticate legitimate AI agent traffic with AWS WAF Bot Control
AWS WAF Bot Control now supports Web Bot Authentication (WBA), using ed25519 cryptographic signatures (RFC 9421) to verify AI agent identities. It introduces new WAF labels (verified, invalid, expired, unknown_bot) enabling granular allow/block rules, replacing unreliable IP-based bot filtering.
https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/authenticate-legitimate-ai-agent-traffic-with-aws-waf-bot-control
#aws
AWS WAF Bot Control now supports Web Bot Authentication (WBA), using ed25519 cryptographic signatures (RFC 9421) to verify AI agent identities. It introduces new WAF labels (verified, invalid, expired, unknown_bot) enabling granular allow/block rules, replacing unreliable IP-based bot filtering.
https://aws.amazon.com/ru/blogs/security/authenticate-legitimate-ai-agent-traffic-with-aws-waf-bot-control
#aws
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🔶 OIDC tokens can now restrict which AWS roles they assume
AWS STS now supports a new OIDC claim that restricts which role ARNs a token can assume. Enforced before trust policy evaluation. The boolean condition key sts:RoleAuthorizedByIdp enables mandatory enforcement via trust policies or RCPs.
https://awsteele.com/blog/2026/07/13/oidc-tokens-can-restrict-which-aws-roles-they-assume.html
#aws
AWS STS now supports a new OIDC claim that restricts which role ARNs a token can assume. Enforced before trust policy evaluation. The boolean condition key sts:RoleAuthorizedByIdp enables mandatory enforcement via trust policies or RCPs.
https://awsteele.com/blog/2026/07/13/oidc-tokens-can-restrict-which-aws-roles-they-assume.html
#aws
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🔶🔷🔴 The Two Mitigations for the Service-Account Confused Deputy in the Cloud
Two mitigations exist for cloud service-account confused deputy attacks: for customer-managed identities, an attachment gate (GCP actAs, AWS iam:PassRole, Azure assign/action) controls bind-time authorization; for provider-managed identities, the CSP enforces internal checks, with AWS uniquely exposing this via Forward Access Sessions and condition keys.
https://kattraxler.cloud/the-two-mitigations-for-the-service-account-confused-deputy-in-the-cloud
#aws #azure #gcp
Two mitigations exist for cloud service-account confused deputy attacks: for customer-managed identities, an attachment gate (GCP actAs, AWS iam:PassRole, Azure assign/action) controls bind-time authorization; for provider-managed identities, the CSP enforces internal checks, with AWS uniquely exposing this via Forward Access Sessions and condition keys.
https://kattraxler.cloud/the-two-mitigations-for-the-service-account-confused-deputy-in-the-cloud
#aws #azure #gcp
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