Told @FoxNews that the maritime blockade, wartime losses and wider economic pressure are hurting Tehran, but Washington should not assume economic pain will lead to capitulation.

Continued pressure could instead increase Tehran's incentive to escalate if Iranian leaders conclude the status quo is worse than renewed confrontation.

Iran could attempt to target "U.S. economic assets in the Gulf," ports or U.S. vessels involved in enforcing the blockade, even as its missile-production capabilities have been degraded.

@EfratLachter
foxnews.com/world/trump-sa…
https://t.co/d2MtGtK05Y

Iran is unlikely to abandon its effort to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, even if the United States resumes military operations against it.

More importantly, Tehran has no intention of returning to the prewar status quo in the Strait. Under virtually any scenario, Iran is unlikely to accept an arrangement in which its own oil exports are constrained while other countries in the region continue to export theirs.

That should be the baseline assumption in Washington and in capitals across the region.

It also means that tactical success should not be confused with strategic deterrence. A successful U.S. or allied military operation may temporarily reduce Iran’s ability to threaten shipping, but it is unlikely, by itself, to persuade Tehran to back down. On the contrary, Iran may respond to such setbacks by escalating its efforts to impose costs on maritime traffic and on the countries it sees as benefiting from its isolation.

The central challenge, therefore, is not simply how to keep the Strait open today. It is how to manage a confrontation in which Iran increasingly sees freedom of navigation, and the ability of its neighbors to export oil while it cannot, as part of the conflict itself.

#IranWar‌
#iran

This is the simple point I keep making: economic pressure without a diplomatic off-ramp will ultimately produce escalation and at a very high cost, as we are seeing now.

Iran’s economy may be under severe strain, but that does not mean Tehran will capitulate. On the contrary, absent a viable political path, the regime is likely to respond to mounting economic pressure by increasing kinetic pressure of its own.

Economic pressure is a tool, not a strategy. Without a clear, realistic, and measurable political objective, military pressure risks becoming an escalatory cycle rather than a means to an end.

We can analyze the Islamic Republic’s economic weakness every day. But economic weakness, by itself, tells us very little about its willingness to surrender.

And the administration does not have the luxury of time. Patience is hardly this president’s defining characteristic, and oil prices are unlikely to provide meaningful relief as long as the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively constrained. There is no practical way to restore normal commercial traffic through the strait without some form of U.S.-Iranian understanding.

At most, some tankers may be able to slip through under cover of darkness. But it is far from clear whether that is operationally sustainable or sufficient to reassure global energy markets.

That leaves Washington with a narrowing window: economic pressure is intensifying, Iran has little incentive to capitulate, kinetic pressure is rising, and the economic costs of a prolonged confrontation will increasingly be felt well beyond Iran.

Time, in other words, is not necessarily on Washington’s side.

#iran

The current status quo is inherently unstable. What happened last night will happen again, perhaps at different levels of intensity, but the underlying dynamics have not changed.

The problem is that the administration appears to be operating on assumptions that simply do not match conditions on the ground.

Iran still has sufficient military capabilities to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. And despite its severe economic difficulties, Iran is not a failed state. Economic pain alone will not compel Tehran to make the concessions Washington is demanding.

More importantly, Trump is not offering Iran a credible diplomatic off-ramp. Without one, military confrontation will continue whether the administration wants it or not.

Hoping that economic pressure will eventually drive Iranians into the streets is not a strategy. What happens if they don't? And what happens if they do, only to be brutally suppressed by the same regime once again?

Washington's assumptions need to confront a basic reality: there is no purely kinetic solution to the crisis in Hormuz unless the United States is prepared to commit enormous military resources for an extended period of time. There is little indication that it is.

Trying to preserve the current status quo, maximum economic pressure, limited military action, and no meaningful diplomatic off-ramp, is therefore not a sustainable strategy. It is a formula for recurring escalation.

#iran

I was honored to participate in the Bled Strategic Forum in Slovenia for a discussion on the future of the Middle East together with @ekitbi

My main takeaway was straightforward: This war is a statehic failure. Military achievements should not be confused with strategic outcomes. For the United States, Israel, and their regional partners, several difficult questions remain.

First, Iran has been weakened, but the fundamental strategic challenge remains. Iran’s nuclear program, conventional military buildup, and support for regional proxies remain central concerns. Most importantly, despite the damage inflicted, the Iranian regime remains in power. The relevant measure of success is therefore not only what was destroyed, but what strategic reality emerged afterward.

Second, economic pressure is having an impact — but pressure without a diplomatic offramp can produce escalation rather than capitulation. Iran’s current leadership may be pragmatic about tactics, but it is unlikely to abandon the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic. Sanctions can create leverage; they cannot substitute for a political strategy.

Third, the path toward broader Arab-Israeli normalization does not run through Tehran. It runs through Ramallah. Shared concerns about Iran can facilitate cooperation between Israel and Arab states, but they cannot indefinitely compensate for the absence of meaningful progress on the Palestinian issue. Israel’s growing legitimacy challenge in the region and internationally is becoming a strategic problem in its own right.

Fourth, Israel has achieved significant military successes against Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” particularly through the weakening of Hezbollah. But it has struggled to translate those achievements into durable political gains. Lebanon illustrates the problem well: Hezbollah’s weakening created political opportunities for its opponents, yet a continued Israeli presence can undermine the very actors Israel would like to strengthen. Similar dilemmas exist in Syria and the Palestinian arena. Military power can create opportunities; diplomacy is required to consolidate them.

Fifth, the Iranian nuclear question may now be more dangerous, not less. While much of the international focus is understandably on the Strait of Hormuz and the economic consequences of the conflict, Washington should pay close attention to the nuclear calculations of Iran’s current leadership. The removal of Ali Khamenei, who had historically been cautious about crossing the nuclear threshold, could alter Tehran’s risk calculus in unpredictable ways.

Sixth, the war has also affected Israel’s standing in Washington. Israel already faced growing political challenges in the United States. The perception among parts of the American political system that Israel helped draw the United States into an unsuccessful war will deepen those challenges — regardless of whether that perception accurately reflects how decisions were made.

Seventh, the Gulf states are drawing their own conclusions. The conflict demonstrated that, from their perspective, regional instability does not emanate exclusively from Iran. Their overriding priorities are stability, economic growth, investment, and connectivity. Israel should take seriously the possibility that its use of military power is increasingly being assessed through that lens.

Eighth, when it comes to energy security, geography is extremely difficult to overcome. This is true in both Iran and Yemen. Alternative routes can reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, but they cannot fully replace it. Without reliable navigation through the Strait, restoring lasting stability to global energy markets will be extremely difficult.

This leaves Washington with an uncomfortable but increasingly unavoidable choice.

One path is to pursue an agreement with Iran. Such an agreement could provide the regime with economic and political breathing room, but it could also reopen the Strait of Hormuz and, critically, establish meaningful constraints on Iran’s path toward a nuclear weapon.

The alternative is to maintain or intensify economic pressure in the hope that Iran eventually changes course. But pressure without a credible diplomatic endgame carries its own risks: it could accelerate Iran’s nuclear calculations and increase the likelihood of another military confrontation.And if Iranians do take to the streets, we should be realistic about what is likely to follow: the regime will almost certainly respond with force, because from its perspective it has no viable alternative. A mass uprising would be viewed not simply as domestic unrest, but as an existential threat to the survival of the Islamic Republic.

That is precisely why hoping that economic pressure will eventually bring people into the streets is not a strategy.

For Israel, there is also an important lesson. The country is heading toward consequential elections, but expectations about dramatic changes in its fundamental security doctrine should be modest regardless of who forms the next government. What should be reconsidered, however, is the assumption that military superiority alone can deliver the desired strategic outcome against Iran.

Israel can act without the United States. But doing so comes at a much higher military, economic, diplomatic, and political.

The current status quo is not a stable equilibrium. It is an interlude — and it is unlikely to last.

#BSF2026
#BSF2026

Nothing about the administration’s Iran policy is clear right now. Washington is speaking with two voices: at times signaling that it wants to return to an agreement, and at others suggesting that it is perfectly comfortable with the current situation and sees little reason to negotiate.

The deeper problem is the absence of a coherent strategy. The White House has swung repeatedly between fundamentally different objectives — from seeking an agreement with the Islamic Republic to openly contemplating regime change. These constant shifts make it extremely difficult to identify what Washington’s actual endgame is.

What is clear, however, is what the current policy will not achieve. It will not force Iran to capitulate, nor will it bring Tehran back to the negotiating table prepared to abandon its nuclear ambitions.

At this stage, the only realistic diplomatic off-ramp is to accept the emerging Oman-Iran arrangement and lift the maritime blockade. Any renewed attempt to negotiate an agreement that crosses what Tehran now considers its fundamental red lines is likely to fail.

Washington may dislike that reality. But strategy has to begin with the world as it is, not the world policymakers wish existed.

#iran

Any strategy built on the assumption that economic pressure will force Iran to give up enrichment, or that economic pain alone will somehow produce regime change, is likely to fail.

We have seen this movie before. Economic pressure did not force Tehran to abandon its nuclear program. Even in 2013, the diplomatic breakthrough came only after Washington accepted that Iran would retain some enrichment capability as part of a negotiated agreement.

There is little reason to believe the basic equation is different today.

More importantly, if the Trump administration maintains the maritime blockade, Iran will continue to push back militarily, regardless of what is being said in Washington.

That is the fundamental contradiction in the current U.S. approach: the administration wants to avoid another major military escalation while simultaneously using overwhelming economic pressure to force fundamental changes in Iranian behavior—or perhaps even in the regime itself.

Those two objectives do not fit comfortably together. Tehran is unlikely to simply absorb that pressure indefinitely.

Economic pressure is a tool, not a strategy. It did not force Iran to capitulate in the past, and there is little reason to assume it will do so now.

#iran

And then what?

That is the question Washington still needs to answer. What is the strategic objective behind intensifying economic pressure on Iran? Regime change? The capitulation of the current leadership? Forcing Tehran to abandon its nuclear program?

None of these are realistic objectives for economic pressure alone. Sanctions can inflict enormous economic pain. They can reduce Iran’s revenues and constrain the regime’s room for maneuver. But economic pain should not be confused with political capitulation. In Iran’s case, the greater the pressure becomes, especially when Tehran sees no credible diplomatic way out, the greater the risk that the regime will respond by escalating rather than surrendering.

Economic pressure is a tool, not a strategy. And a tool is only useful if it is connected to an achievable political objective. If Washington’s demands are effectively impossible for Tehran to accept, then “maximum pressure” does not create a pathway to diplomacy. It creates an escalation ladder.

If the United States genuinely wants a negotiated outcome, it will eventually have to offer Iran a realistic off-ramp: a deal in which Iranian concessions are matched by meaningful and credible economic relief.

Otherwise, more pressure will not fundamentally change the equation. It will simply make the next round of kinetic escalation increasingly difficult to avoid.

#iran

My interview with @jimsciutto @cnni:

A. The fundamental question is: What is the administration’s endgame with Iran? Right now, that remains unclear. Is the objective to weaken Iran, bring down the regime, force Tehran to capitulate, or ultimately return to negotiations and reach an agreement? These are very different objectives that require very different strategies. Until Washington defines what success actually looks like, it is difficult to understand where this conflict is heading or how it is supposed to end.

B. Economic pressure is a tool, not an objective, and certainly not an exit strategy. Without a realistic diplomatic off-ramp, maximum economic pressure is more likely to produce escalation than capitulation. The assumption that Washington can continue squeezing Tehran while indefinitely preserving the current status quo is simply unrealistic. Iran has agency in this conflict. Tehran will look for ways to impose costs on the United States and its regional partners. So even if the administration wants to freeze the conflict at its current level, Iran has no reason to accommodate that preference. Washington does not control the escalation ladder by itself.

C. Meanwhile, much of the discussion in Washington is focused on the Strait of Hormu which, we should remember, was open before the war, while the strategic problems that helped produce this conflict remain unresolved. The most important is Iran’s nuclear program. In fact, the nuclear challenge may now be more dangerous than it was before the war. Ali Khamenei was deeply hostile to the United States and Israel, but he was also extremely cautious about crossing the nuclear threshold. His removal has changed the decision-making environment in Tehran. With the IRGC now wielding greater influence, the possibility that Iran could decide to move toward a nuclear weapon has become more serious.

D.You cannot build a strategy around the assumption that the Iranian regime will collapse. That is not a strategy; it is wishful thinking. Economic pressure, even severe economic pressure, does not guarantee regime change. In fact, it could produce the opposite effect: triggering a nationalist backlash, strengthening the regime’s narrative that Iran is under external attack, and giving the leadership additional justification to crack down internally. Regime change may happen, but Washington cannot make it the central assumption on which its Iran strategy rests. U.S. policy has to be built around the Iran that exists today, not the Iran Washington hopes might emerge tomorrow.

E. For the nuclear thtrat - That creates an enormous problem for Israel. It is difficult to imagine any Israeli government simply accepting an Iranian nuclear program moving toward weaponization. So ending the current fighting without addressing the nuclear issue would not resolve the underlying conflict. It could leave Washington and Jerusalem facing an even more dangerous crisis down the road.

#IranWar‌
#iran
#thebrief

מה שהיה הוא שיהיה

הקונספציה הייתה ברורה: צריך להחליש את הרשות הפלסטינית. רשות פלסטינית חזקה פירושה כתובת מדינית וכתובת מדינית פירושה לחץ על ישראל לחזור למשא ומתן. מנגד, חמאס חזק בעזה היה התירוץ האולטימטיבי להסביר מדוע אין עם מי לדבר, ובמקביל גם הערובה לכך שהרשות הפלסטינית לא תחזור לשלוט ברצועה.

זו הייתה אחת מאבני היסוד של המדיניות הישראלית כלפי עזה במשך שנות נתניהו: לא להפיל את חמאס, לא להחזיר את הרשות, אלא לנהל את הפיצול הפלסטיני ולשמר אותו.

אבל צריך לומר ביושר: זו לא הייתה רק מדיניות נתניהו. גם "ממשלת השינוי" לא שינתה אותה באופן מהותי. היא המשיכה במדיניות שבפועל אפשרה לחמאס להתחזק, וגם בתוך המערכת המדינית והביטחונית כמעט שלא נשמע ערעור עמוק על עצם הקונספציה. לכולם היה נוח יותר לטמון את הראש בחול ולהתמקד באיראן שהיא אויב מוכר, מדינתי, רחוק, ובעיקר כזה שמולו ישראל נהנתה מתחושה עמוקה של עליונות מודיעינית ומבצעית.

אבל השאלה החשובה באמת היא אחרת: האם 7 באוקטובר גרם לישראל לשנות את הקונספציה? התשובה, למרבה הצער, היא לא.

ישראל ממשיכה להחליש את הרשות הפלסטינית מבחינה מדינית וכלכלית ומתנגדת באופן קטגורי לחזרתה לרצועת עזה. במקביל, המדיניות הישראלית בעזה — לרבות מנגנוני הכנסת הסיוע והיעדר חלופה שלטונית מוסכמת, תורמת בפועל להמשך יכולתו של חמאס לשמר את אחיזתו ברצועה.

כלומר, אותה תפיסה אסטרטגית שהתקיימה לפני 7 באוקטובר עדיין מלווה אותנו: רשות פלסטינית חלשה, התנגדות לחזרתה לעזה, היעדר אופק מדיני, ובמקביל הימנעות מבניית חלופה פלסטינית אפקטיבית לחמאס.

וזו מביאה לשאלה המטרידה מכולן: האם מי שמתיימרים להחליף את נתניהו מציעים תפיסה אחרת?

נכון לעכשיו, התשובה היא לא. אפשר לשמוע הבדלים בסגנון, בטון ובזהות המנהיג אבל קשה למצוא אצל המועמדים המרכזיים תפיסה אסטרטגית חלופית ביחס לרשות הפלסטינית, לעזה ולשאלה המדינית.

אם לא תשתנה הקונספציה, החלפת ראש הממשלה לבדה לא תשנה את המציאות.

מה שהיה הוא שיהיה.

Another indication reinforcing what should now be understood about Iran’s current strategy:

1. Iran will not accept the continuation of the status quo. Tehran is not prepared to allow Washington to maintain intense economic pressure indefinitely without imposing costs of its own on the United States.

2. Iran will not allow the Strait of Hormuz to return to normal while it remains under a maritime blockade. Tehran’s basic position is straightforward: if Iran cannot export its oil freely, it will not simply allow everyone else to do so.

3. Iran is no longer waiting to be attacked before acting. It is increasingly willing to conduct preemptive operations when it believes an American strike is imminent. What happened tonight in Jordan is another indication of this shift.

4. Tehran’s central message is economic. Iran wants Washington to understand that maintaining the current pressure campaign will impose significant costs not only on Iran, but on the global economy, and ultimately on American consumers.

5. Iranian leaders believe they can win a "contest of pain" with Washington. That calculation rests heavily on their assessment of Iran’s ability to absorb prolonged economic pressure while creating economic, military, and political costs for the United States and its partners.

6. Effective economic pressure should not be confused with successful coercion. Sanctions and the maritime blockade can hurt Iran significantly without bringing it closer to capitulation. In fact, the greater the pressure, the more likely Tehran is to intensify its own actions.

7. Jordan has become increasingly important in Iranian strategic calculations as more U.S. military assets and capabilities in the Middle East have been concentrated there. That makes Jordan a more significant potential target in a broader U.S.–Iran confrontation.

8. Iran remains willing to return to the previous memorandum of understanding, but on terms it considers acceptable. Tehran is not seeking an endless war. But neither will it refrain from using its capabilities as long as the current situation continues.

9. Iran’s decision-making process regarding the use of force has changed dramatically. The hesitation and extreme caution that previously characterized decisions involving direct friction with U.S. forces are far less evident today.

10. Iran is more proactive, more offensive, and more willing to take the initiative. Tehran still appears to operate within certain rules of the game and to calibrate escalation. But if the United States attacks Iran directly, it should be assumed that Tehran will be prepared to expand the confrontation.

11. Iran is not going to capitulate at the negotiating table. Nor should Washington expect Tehran to offer substantially greater concessions than those already discusse, including its demand for a recognized role in the future arrangements governing the Strait of Hormuz.

These are no longer simply predictions about what Iran might do. They should be the operating assumptions for anyone trying to understand Iran’s current strategy.

The crucial distinction for Washington is between hurting Iran and coercing Iran. The United States may be capable of doing the former. There is little evidence that economic and military pressure alone will produce the latter.

If U.S. strategy continues to assume that enough pressure will eventually force Tehran to surrender its core demands, Washington risks building its policy around an Iranian response that is increasingly unlikely to materialize.

#iran

This reflects a remarkable misunderstanding of how much the Gulf has changed from someone who aspires to once again become Israel’s prime minister.

Saudi Arabia and Qatar are no longer living in the era of the Qatar blockade. They have moved well beyond that confrontation and today maintain a significant strategic relationship. The UAE remains more suspicious of Doha, but Bennett might want to remember who was among the first regional leaders to travel to Qatar after the Israeli strike in Doha: Mohammed bin Zayed.

Bennett seems to be analyzing today’s Gulf through the lens of the 2017–2021 Qatar crisis. A lot has changed since then.

There is another fundamental problem with his approach: Qatar is a major strategic partner of the United States. The idea that Israel can simply mobilize Washington behind a campaign to isolate Doha ignores both current Gulf geopolitics and U.S. strategic interests.

And with all due respect to Qatar’s influence operations in Washington, they are not the primary reason Israel’s standing in the United States has deteriorated. The greatest damage is being done by Israel’s own policies—above all, its approach to the Palestinians.

If Mr. Bennett genuinely wants to reverse the erosion of support for Israel in the United States, he would be better served by investing his energy in developing a realistic political strategy for the millions of Palestinians living between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.

Israel cannot find a technological solution to what is fundamentally a strategic and political problem.