ראיון שלי @radio103fm אודות העימות הצבאי הלילה בין ארצות הברית ואיראן:

א. האמריקנים יצרו מנגנון להוצאת חלק מהנפט. הם הצליחו להוציא כמה מיליוני חביות ביום. האיראנים מנסים למנוע זאת, הם ניסו לירות מוקשים לכיוון המצר, האמריקנים תקפו את הרקטות המיוחדות של האיראנים ולכן האיראנים הגיבו בירי לירדן. בעתיד הם יחזרו לעימות כזה או אחר - המאבק לא עוצר.

ב. הלחץ הכלכלי הוא מאוד מאוד משמעותי, ואנחנו רואים אותו אפילו בתורים בתחנות הדלק באיראן. נייר הלקמוס לאירוע הזה זה הנשיא פזשכיאן, הוא רואה את עצמו כמייצג של האוכלוסיה האיראנית, ולכן אנחנו צריכים להאמין לדברים שהוא אומר על הקושי הכלכלי - הם מתכתבים עם המציאות.

ג. יש פער בין הלחץ הכלכלי לבין הנכונות האיראנית להיכנע במשא ומתן, כפי שהאמריקנים מצפים. יתרה מכך, האיראנים רואים את טראמפ, והם מבינים שאנחנו קרובים לבחירות האמצע. יש הדלפות שהפנטגון לוחץ על הגסת', מזכיר המלחמה האמריקני, לא לחדש את המלחמה מול איראן. לכן הם מבינים שדווקא האמריקנים יכולים להיות עם גבם מול הקיר, ולכן אנחנו צריכים להעריך שהעימותים הללו במצר יימשכו.

@gidonucko1
@attaliami

maariv.co.il/news/military/…

Half of this argument is correct. The other half reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of how the Iranian regime thinks, one that could lead to dangerous escalation or ultimately force the administration to allow Tehran to take control of the Strait of Hormuz itself.

Economic pressure is clearly having an effect. That is difficult to dispute. Iran is even prepared to return to the understandings previously reached, and Washington may not need additional pressure to achieve that limited objective.

But economic pressure should not be confused with strategic capitulation. There is little reason to believe that economic pain alone will persuade Tehran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, dismantle its conventional military capabilities, end its support for regional proxies, or relinquish its ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz. From the regime’s perspective, these capabilities are not bargaining chips of equal value. They are central to its deterrence strategy and, ultimately, to its survival.

That is why the expectation that Iran will eventually come to the negotiating table prepared to concede on all of these issues simply because the economic pressure becomes unbearable is a serious misreading of the regime. It repeats a familiar mistake: assuming that Tehran will respond to pressure according to our strategic logic rather than its own.

An American strategy built around objectives the Iranian regime is fundamentally unwilling, or perhaps unable, to accept risks turning economic leverage into an open-ended confrontation.

The administration therefore faces a real choice. It can build on the understandings reached between Oman and Iran, remove the immediate threat to maritime traffic, and restore a degree of stability. Or it can continue escalating its confrontation with Tehran, with the likely consequences of higher oil prices and an increasing risk of a military escalation that neither side may ultimately be able to control.

Economic pressure can change Iranian behavior at the margins and create leverage for diplomacy. What it is unlikely to do is produce Iranian surrender. A strategy that depends on such a surrender is not a strategy grounded in the nature of the Iranian regime.

#iran
#IranWar‌

Told @FoxNews that the maritime blockade, wartime losses and wider economic pressure are hurting Tehran, but Washington should not assume economic pain will lead to capitulation.

Continued pressure could instead increase Tehran's incentive to escalate if Iranian leaders conclude the status quo is worse than renewed confrontation.

Iran could attempt to target "U.S. economic assets in the Gulf," ports or U.S. vessels involved in enforcing the blockade, even as its missile-production capabilities have been degraded.

@EfratLachter
foxnews.com/world/trump-sa…
https://t.co/d2MtGtK05Y

Iran is unlikely to abandon its effort to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, even if the United States resumes military operations against it.

More importantly, Tehran has no intention of returning to the prewar status quo in the Strait. Under virtually any scenario, Iran is unlikely to accept an arrangement in which its own oil exports are constrained while other countries in the region continue to export theirs.

That should be the baseline assumption in Washington and in capitals across the region.

It also means that tactical success should not be confused with strategic deterrence. A successful U.S. or allied military operation may temporarily reduce Iran’s ability to threaten shipping, but it is unlikely, by itself, to persuade Tehran to back down. On the contrary, Iran may respond to such setbacks by escalating its efforts to impose costs on maritime traffic and on the countries it sees as benefiting from its isolation.

The central challenge, therefore, is not simply how to keep the Strait open today. It is how to manage a confrontation in which Iran increasingly sees freedom of navigation, and the ability of its neighbors to export oil while it cannot, as part of the conflict itself.

#IranWar‌
#iran

This is the simple point I keep making: economic pressure without a diplomatic off-ramp will ultimately produce escalation and at a very high cost, as we are seeing now.

Iran’s economy may be under severe strain, but that does not mean Tehran will capitulate. On the contrary, absent a viable political path, the regime is likely to respond to mounting economic pressure by increasing kinetic pressure of its own.

Economic pressure is a tool, not a strategy. Without a clear, realistic, and measurable political objective, military pressure risks becoming an escalatory cycle rather than a means to an end.

We can analyze the Islamic Republic’s economic weakness every day. But economic weakness, by itself, tells us very little about its willingness to surrender.

And the administration does not have the luxury of time. Patience is hardly this president’s defining characteristic, and oil prices are unlikely to provide meaningful relief as long as the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively constrained. There is no practical way to restore normal commercial traffic through the strait without some form of U.S.-Iranian understanding.

At most, some tankers may be able to slip through under cover of darkness. But it is far from clear whether that is operationally sustainable or sufficient to reassure global energy markets.

That leaves Washington with a narrowing window: economic pressure is intensifying, Iran has little incentive to capitulate, kinetic pressure is rising, and the economic costs of a prolonged confrontation will increasingly be felt well beyond Iran.

Time, in other words, is not necessarily on Washington’s side.

#iran

The current status quo is inherently unstable. What happened last night will happen again, perhaps at different levels of intensity, but the underlying dynamics have not changed.

The problem is that the administration appears to be operating on assumptions that simply do not match conditions on the ground.

Iran still has sufficient military capabilities to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. And despite its severe economic difficulties, Iran is not a failed state. Economic pain alone will not compel Tehran to make the concessions Washington is demanding.

More importantly, Trump is not offering Iran a credible diplomatic off-ramp. Without one, military confrontation will continue whether the administration wants it or not.

Hoping that economic pressure will eventually drive Iranians into the streets is not a strategy. What happens if they don't? And what happens if they do, only to be brutally suppressed by the same regime once again?

Washington's assumptions need to confront a basic reality: there is no purely kinetic solution to the crisis in Hormuz unless the United States is prepared to commit enormous military resources for an extended period of time. There is little indication that it is.

Trying to preserve the current status quo, maximum economic pressure, limited military action, and no meaningful diplomatic off-ramp, is therefore not a sustainable strategy. It is a formula for recurring escalation.

#iran

I was honored to participate in the Bled Strategic Forum in Slovenia for a discussion on the future of the Middle East together with @ekitbi

My main takeaway was straightforward: This war is a statehic failure. Military achievements should not be confused with strategic outcomes. For the United States, Israel, and their regional partners, several difficult questions remain.

First, Iran has been weakened, but the fundamental strategic challenge remains. Iran’s nuclear program, conventional military buildup, and support for regional proxies remain central concerns. Most importantly, despite the damage inflicted, the Iranian regime remains in power. The relevant measure of success is therefore not only what was destroyed, but what strategic reality emerged afterward.

Second, economic pressure is having an impact — but pressure without a diplomatic offramp can produce escalation rather than capitulation. Iran’s current leadership may be pragmatic about tactics, but it is unlikely to abandon the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic. Sanctions can create leverage; they cannot substitute for a political strategy.

Third, the path toward broader Arab-Israeli normalization does not run through Tehran. It runs through Ramallah. Shared concerns about Iran can facilitate cooperation between Israel and Arab states, but they cannot indefinitely compensate for the absence of meaningful progress on the Palestinian issue. Israel’s growing legitimacy challenge in the region and internationally is becoming a strategic problem in its own right.

Fourth, Israel has achieved significant military successes against Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” particularly through the weakening of Hezbollah. But it has struggled to translate those achievements into durable political gains. Lebanon illustrates the problem well: Hezbollah’s weakening created political opportunities for its opponents, yet a continued Israeli presence can undermine the very actors Israel would like to strengthen. Similar dilemmas exist in Syria and the Palestinian arena. Military power can create opportunities; diplomacy is required to consolidate them.

Fifth, the Iranian nuclear question may now be more dangerous, not less. While much of the international focus is understandably on the Strait of Hormuz and the economic consequences of the conflict, Washington should pay close attention to the nuclear calculations of Iran’s current leadership. The removal of Ali Khamenei, who had historically been cautious about crossing the nuclear threshold, could alter Tehran’s risk calculus in unpredictable ways.

Sixth, the war has also affected Israel’s standing in Washington. Israel already faced growing political challenges in the United States. The perception among parts of the American political system that Israel helped draw the United States into an unsuccessful war will deepen those challenges — regardless of whether that perception accurately reflects how decisions were made.

Seventh, the Gulf states are drawing their own conclusions. The conflict demonstrated that, from their perspective, regional instability does not emanate exclusively from Iran. Their overriding priorities are stability, economic growth, investment, and connectivity. Israel should take seriously the possibility that its use of military power is increasingly being assessed through that lens.

Eighth, when it comes to energy security, geography is extremely difficult to overcome. This is true in both Iran and Yemen. Alternative routes can reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, but they cannot fully replace it. Without reliable navigation through the Strait, restoring lasting stability to global energy markets will be extremely difficult.

This leaves Washington with an uncomfortable but increasingly unavoidable choice.

One path is to pursue an agreement with Iran. Such an agreement could provide the regime with economic and political breathing room, but it could also reopen the Strait of Hormuz and, critically, establish meaningful constraints on Iran’s path toward a nuclear weapon.

The alternative is to maintain or intensify economic pressure in the hope that Iran eventually changes course. But pressure without a credible diplomatic endgame carries its own risks: it could accelerate Iran’s nuclear calculations and increase the likelihood of another military confrontation.And if Iranians do take to the streets, we should be realistic about what is likely to follow: the regime will almost certainly respond with force, because from its perspective it has no viable alternative. A mass uprising would be viewed not simply as domestic unrest, but as an existential threat to the survival of the Islamic Republic.

That is precisely why hoping that economic pressure will eventually bring people into the streets is not a strategy.

For Israel, there is also an important lesson. The country is heading toward consequential elections, but expectations about dramatic changes in its fundamental security doctrine should be modest regardless of who forms the next government. What should be reconsidered, however, is the assumption that military superiority alone can deliver the desired strategic outcome against Iran.

Israel can act without the United States. But doing so comes at a much higher military, economic, diplomatic, and political.

The current status quo is not a stable equilibrium. It is an interlude — and it is unlikely to last.

#BSF2026
#BSF2026

Nothing about the administration’s Iran policy is clear right now. Washington is speaking with two voices: at times signaling that it wants to return to an agreement, and at others suggesting that it is perfectly comfortable with the current situation and sees little reason to negotiate.

The deeper problem is the absence of a coherent strategy. The White House has swung repeatedly between fundamentally different objectives — from seeking an agreement with the Islamic Republic to openly contemplating regime change. These constant shifts make it extremely difficult to identify what Washington’s actual endgame is.

What is clear, however, is what the current policy will not achieve. It will not force Iran to capitulate, nor will it bring Tehran back to the negotiating table prepared to abandon its nuclear ambitions.

At this stage, the only realistic diplomatic off-ramp is to accept the emerging Oman-Iran arrangement and lift the maritime blockade. Any renewed attempt to negotiate an agreement that crosses what Tehran now considers its fundamental red lines is likely to fail.

Washington may dislike that reality. But strategy has to begin with the world as it is, not the world policymakers wish existed.

#iran

Any strategy built on the assumption that economic pressure will force Iran to give up enrichment, or that economic pain alone will somehow produce regime change, is likely to fail.

We have seen this movie before. Economic pressure did not force Tehran to abandon its nuclear program. Even in 2013, the diplomatic breakthrough came only after Washington accepted that Iran would retain some enrichment capability as part of a negotiated agreement.

There is little reason to believe the basic equation is different today.

More importantly, if the Trump administration maintains the maritime blockade, Iran will continue to push back militarily, regardless of what is being said in Washington.

That is the fundamental contradiction in the current U.S. approach: the administration wants to avoid another major military escalation while simultaneously using overwhelming economic pressure to force fundamental changes in Iranian behavior—or perhaps even in the regime itself.

Those two objectives do not fit comfortably together. Tehran is unlikely to simply absorb that pressure indefinitely.

Economic pressure is a tool, not a strategy. It did not force Iran to capitulate in the past, and there is little reason to assume it will do so now.

#iran